New York Law Review

Tag: takings clause

  • Terrace Hotel Co. v. State, 19 N.Y.2d 420 (1967): Upholding Highway Billboard Restrictions for Safety

    Terrace Hotel Co. v. State, 19 N.Y.2d 420 (1967)

    A state’s exercise of police power to regulate advertising signs near highways for public safety reasons, even if partly motivated by eligibility for federal funding, is constitutional and does not constitute a taking of private property without just compensation.

    Summary

    Terrace Hotel Co. challenged the constitutionality of New York’s amended Public Authorities Law § 361-a, which expanded the restricted zone for advertising signs near the Thruway from 500 feet to 660 feet from the edge of the right-of-way. The company argued that the amended law, requiring the removal of their existing signs, constituted an unconstitutional taking. The Court of Appeals upheld the law, reasoning that the expanded restriction was a valid exercise of the state’s police power to ensure public safety by minimizing driver distraction, regardless of the law’s connection to federal funding eligibility. The court emphasized the legislature’s competence in determining the necessary measures for public safety.

    Facts

    Terrace Hotel Co. leased properties near the Thruway to erect advertising signs. Initially, these signs complied with Public Authorities Law § 361-a, as they were over 500 feet from the pavement. Subsequent amendments (Laws of 1960 and 1961) expanded the restricted area to 660 feet from the Thruway’s right-of-way, encompassing the company’s signs. The Thruway Authority removed the non-conforming signs. Terrace Hotel Co. filed a late notice of intention to file a claim for compensation.

    Procedural History

    Terrace Hotel Co. sought permission to file a late notice of claim. The State and the Thruway Authority cross-moved to dismiss the claim. The Appellate Division denied Terrace Hotel’s motion and granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, citing prior precedent. Terrace Hotel Co. appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing the amended law was an unconstitutional taking.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the amended Public Authorities Law § 361-a, prohibiting advertising signs within 660 feet of the Thruway right-of-way, is an unconstitutional exercise of the police power and a taking of private property without just compensation.

    Holding

    No, because the amended law is a valid exercise of the state’s police power to protect public safety by reducing driver distraction, and therefore does not constitute an unconstitutional taking.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the expansion of the restricted zone was justified by public safety concerns related to driver distraction. While the amendment was motivated by the need to comply with federal requirements for highway funding (23 U.S.C. § 131), this did not negate the state’s independent police power to regulate highway safety. The court cited New York State Thruway Auth. v. Ashley Motor Ct., 10 N.Y.2d 151, affirming the state’s power to regulate signs near highways for safety. The court stated, “If people did not look at the signs, advertisers would not find it profitable to put them there. It was within the competence of the Legislature to determine that the safety of the traveling public is endangered by this distraction of the attention of drivers of automobiles under these circumstances.” The court further drew an analogy to the removal of structurally unsound signs, which could be required without compensation due to the imminent danger they pose. While the danger posed by distracting signs is different, the court found no reason to treat it differently. The court concluded that the legislature has the authority to regulate activities that impact public safety, even if the relationship to safety is “honestly debatable.”

  • Keystone Associates v. Moerdler, 19 N.Y.2d 78 (1966): Temporary Moratorium on Land Use as a Taking

    Keystone Associates v. Moerdler, 19 N.Y.2d 78 (1966)

    A temporary legislative moratorium on demolition of a building, designed to allow a private corporation to raise funds for condemnation, constitutes a taking of property requiring just compensation if it unreasonably interferes with the owner’s property rights.

    Summary

    Keystone Associates leased the Old Metropolitan Opera House with plans to demolish it and build an office tower. The New York legislature then passed a law creating a private corporation with the power to condemn the property and imposing a 180-day moratorium on demolition to allow the corporation time to raise funds. Keystone challenged the law. The New York Court of Appeals held that the moratorium, enacted solely to facilitate a potential future condemnation by a private entity, constituted an unreasonable interference with Keystone’s property rights and was therefore a taking requiring just compensation. The court further held that the statutory provision of $200,000 was insufficient to cover Keystone’s damages and that the legislature cannot set a maximum limit on compensation.

    Facts

    The Metropolitan Opera Association (the Association) leased its old opera house to Keystone Associates, who planned to demolish the building and erect a 40-story office building. Keystone was required to commence demolition within six months and posted $1,000,000 as security. After the Association vacated the premises and delivered possession to Keystone, the New York Legislature created The Old Met Opera House Corporation (the Corporation) and empowered it to condemn the property for use as a cultural auditorium. The legislation also allowed the city to delay demolition permits for 180 days at the Corporation’s request, provided the Corporation posted $200,000 as security for damages to the owner if no condemnation occurred.

    Procedural History

    Keystone initiated a proceeding to compel the issuance of a demolition permit, and the Association filed an action to declare the statute unconstitutional. Special Term declared the statute an unconstitutional taking. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Old Met Opera House Corporation appealed to the Court of Appeals of New York.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a temporary legislative moratorium on the demolition of a building, designed to allow a private corporation to raise funds for future condemnation, constitutes an unconstitutional taking of property requiring just compensation.

    Holding

    Yes, because the moratorium constituted an unreasonable interference with Keystone’s property rights, and the compensation provided was insufficient and improperly determined by the legislature.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that the statute’s purpose was to appropriate the Association’s and Keystone’s property for public use, as evidenced by the legislative declaration that preserving the building would serve the recreational and cultural needs of the state. The court emphasized that the 180-day delay was authorized solely to allow the Corporation to raise funds for the appropriation. Citing Forster v. Scott, 136 N.Y. 577, the court reaffirmed the principle that a law depriving an owner of the beneficial use and enjoyment of their property, or imposing restraints that materially affect its value without legal process or compensation, constitutes a taking. The court distinguished the case from valid exercises of police power, noting that the statute lacked findings that a shortage of auditoriums existed. The court rejected the argument that the $200,000 security deposit constituted just compensation, as it was demonstrably less than the damages Keystone would incur in rent, maintenance, and taxes. The court further reasoned that the determination of just compensation is a judicial function, not a legislative one. As the court stated, “All that is beneficial in property arises from its use and the fruits of that use, and whatever deprives a person of them deprives him of all that is desirable or valuable in the title and possession.”

  • Muhlker v. New York & Harlem R.R. Co., 197 U.S. 544 (1905): When a Railroad Improvement Amounts to Taking of Abutting Owner’s Property Rights

    Muhlker v. New York & Harlem R.R. Co., 197 U.S. 544 (1905)

    When a state-mandated railroad improvement substantially impairs an abutting owner’s easements of light, air, and access, it can constitute a taking of private property requiring compensation, even if the railroad itself is not directly responsible for the project.

    Summary

    Muhlker, an owner of property abutting Park Avenue in New York City, sued the railroad for damages caused by the construction of an elevated viaduct pursuant to a state-mandated improvement project. The railroad argued that the viaduct, replacing a depressed cut, was a state project and thus they were not liable for any resulting damages. The Supreme Court held that the abutting owner had property rights in easements of light, air, and access, and the construction of the viaduct substantially impaired these rights. Even though the railroad did not initiate the project, the state action impaired the owner’s property rights, which required just compensation under the Fourteenth Amendment.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, Muhlker, owned a building on Park Avenue in New York City.
    Prior to 1897, the railroad operated in a depressed cut along Park Avenue.
    In 1892, New York passed a law mandating improvements to Park Avenue, including the construction of an elevated viaduct to replace the cut.
    The viaduct was constructed under the supervision of a public board and accepted by the railroad in 1897.
    Muhlker claimed the viaduct impaired his easements of light, air, and access, diminishing his property’s value.

    Procedural History

    The trial court found the railroad liable for trespass on Muhlker’s easements after February 16, 1897.
    The Appellate Division affirmed.
    The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding the railroad not liable because the viaduct was a state project.
    The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the construction of an elevated viaduct by the state, which impaired an abutting owner’s easements of light, air, and access, constituted a taking of private property requiring just compensation under the Fourteenth Amendment, even if the railroad did not initiate the project.

    Holding

    Yes, because the abutting owner had property rights in easements of light, air, and access, and the construction of the viaduct substantially impaired these rights. The state action impaired those property rights requiring just compensation under the Fourteenth Amendment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that abutting property owners have easements of light, air, and access that are considered private property rights.
    The construction of the elevated viaduct substantially impaired these easements, diminishing the value of Muhlker’s property.
    The Court distinguished between consequential damages resulting from a public improvement (which are not compensable) and a direct appropriation of property rights (which are).
    Even though the railroad did not initiate the project, the state’s action in constructing the viaduct constituted a taking of Muhlker’s property rights.
    The Court emphasized that the state cannot take private property for public use without just compensation, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
    The Court cited previous New York cases establishing the existence and importance of these easements, including Story v. New York Elevated R.R. Co., and noted that these rights were part of the property owner’s title.
    The court notes the seeming paradox that the state mandated the project and the railroad followed suit, but yet the property owner suffered a loss. The Court states “[w]e do not, however, have to go beyond the decisions of the courts of New York to sustain the right of the plaintiff to recover. They are clear upon the existence and the extent of such rights, and we need only consider whether they are invaded by the construction and operation of the viaduct under the circumstances disclosed by the record.”
    The dissent argued that the state’s actions were a valid exercise of its police power to improve public infrastructure, and any resulting damages were consequential and non-compensable. The dissent further notes, “If the viaduct was lawfully constructed and existed in the street under the authority of law, it is impossible to conceive how the defendant could be guilty of a trespass in the operation of its trains upon it. It was constructed for that purpose and the defendant was obliged to use it in the exercise of its franchise and the discharge of the duties due to the public.”