Sutton v. Piasecki Trucking, Inc., 59 N.Y.2d 800 (1983)

A driver’s violation of a traffic law is not a basis for liability unless that violation is a proximate cause of the accident; moreover, a jury instruction on a statutory duty is appropriate where circumstantial evidence suggests a party failed to comply with that duty.

Summary

Marianne Sutton died when her car was struck by a tractor-trailer owned by Piasecki Trucking, Inc., and driven by Kerstanski. The accident occurred when Sutton, driving south on Lakes Road, allegedly failed to stop at a stop sign and turned left into the path of Kerstanski’s truck on Route 94. The jury found Sutton 99% at fault and Kerstanski 1% at fault. The trial court set aside the verdict, but the Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the verdict. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court’s jury instructions were proper. Kerstanski’s brief crossing of the center line was not a proximate cause, and there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to warrant an instruction on Sutton’s duty to stop at the stop sign.

Facts

Marianne Sutton was driving south on Lakes Road.
Lakes Road is controlled by a stop sign at its intersection with Route 94.
Kerstanski was driving a tractor-trailer west on Route 94.
Sutton’s vehicle entered Route 94 and attempted to turn left (east).
Kerstanski veered left across the center line to avoid Sutton’s vehicle.
The front of the truck struck Sutton’s vehicle near the center of Route 94.
There was no direct evidence Sutton stopped at the stop sign, but circumstantial evidence suggested she did not.

Procedural History

The jury found in favor of the plaintiff, apportioning fault 99% to Sutton and 1% to Kerstanski.
The trial court set aside the verdict and ordered a new trial.
The Appellate Division reversed the trial court, denied plaintiff’s motion, and reinstated the verdict.
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

Issue(s)

Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that the defendant driver had a duty to operate his vehicle in the right-hand lane of travel.
Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the plaintiff’s intestate was obliged to stop at the stop sign.
Whether the trial court’s failure to marshal the evidence was reversible error.

Holding

No, because the defendant driver’s failure to drive in the right-hand lane, if not excused by the emergent situation, was not a proximate cause of the accident.
No, because there was substantial circumstantial evidence from which the jury could infer that the plaintiff’s intestate had failed to stop at the stop sign.
No, because the error, if any, was not preserved for review by timely exception.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that the defendant driver’s brief movement across the center line to avoid impact, even if a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law, was not the proximate cause of the accident. The accident occurred because the Sutton vehicle entered Kerstanski’s lane of travel. The court stated, “His failure to do so in this emergent situation, if not excused, could not have been a proximate cause of the accident which occurred.”
The court found no error in charging the jury on Sutton’s obligation to stop at the stop sign. Even though there was no direct evidence Sutton failed to stop, the circumstantial evidence allowed the jury to infer that she did not. The court noted, “there was substantial circumstantial evidence from which the jury could infer that she had failed to do so and defendants were entitled to a charge upon the statutory responsibilities imposed upon her at the time.”
Regarding the failure to marshal the evidence, the court held that the plaintiff did not properly preserve this error for appeal by making a timely exception, as required by CPLR 4110-b.