New York Law Review

Tag: Suppression Order

  • People v. Fehr, 76 N.Y.2d 83 (1990): Effect of Withdrawn Appeal on CPL 450.50 Statement

    People v. Fehr, 76 N.Y.2d 83 (1990)

    A withdrawn appeal by the People from a suppression order, with the permission of the appellate court, renders the accompanying CPL 450.50(1) statement a nullity, removing the statutory bar to further prosecution.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a CPL 450.50(1) statement, filed by the People when appealing a suppression order, remains binding after the appeal is withdrawn with the court’s permission. The Court of Appeals held that a withdrawn appeal is a nullity, and the accompanying CPL 450.50(1) statement is also withdrawn, thereby removing the bar to further prosecution. The Court emphasized that appellate courts retain the discretion to deny withdrawal requests if they suspect prosecutorial bad faith or abuse of the withdrawal option.

    Facts

    Following a trial court’s decision to suppress evidence, the People filed a notice of appeal and a CPL 450.50(1) statement, asserting the suppression order rendered their case insufficient. Approximately six weeks later, the People moved to withdraw their appeal, stating that while their case was weakened, a trial was still the most appropriate avenue. The Appellate Division granted the motion and the appeal was withdrawn.

    Procedural History

    After the appeal’s withdrawal, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing the CPL 450.50(1) statement barred further prosecution. The trial court granted the motion. The Appellate Division reversed, reinstating the indictment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the act of taking an appeal with a CPL 450.50(1) statement bars further prosecution, even if the appeal is subsequently withdrawn with the court’s permission?

    Holding

    No, because an appeal that has been withdrawn with the permission of the court is a nullity. Consequently, a withdrawn appeal is not an appeal that has been “taken” within the meaning of CPL 450.50(2), and the bar to further prosecution contemplated by that statute is not applicable.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that CPL 450.20(8) and 450.50(1) are designed to limit appeals by the People to cases where the suppression order effectively ends the prosecution. While CPL 450.50(2) states that “[t]he taking of an appeal…constitutes a bar to the prosecution,” the Court held that a withdrawn appeal is a nullity. The court reasoned that because the appeal was withdrawn with the Appellate Division’s permission, the accompanying CPL 450.50(1) statement was also withdrawn and had no further legal effect. The Court emphasized the appellate courts’ power to deny withdrawal requests in cases of prosecutorial bad faith or abuse, and noted that a withdrawn appeal cannot be the basis for excluding time under CPL 30.30 (speedy trial). The Court stated, “[I]f the appellate court has authorized the withdrawal of an appeal, the accompanying CPL 450.50 (1) statement is necessarily withdrawn along with it and, in consequence, it is of no further legal significance.”

  • People v. Dorta, 465 N.E.2d 356 (N.Y. 1984): Vacatur of Suppression Order by Trial Judge

    People v. Dorta, 465 N.E.2d 356 (N.Y. 1984)

    A trial judge has the discretion to vacate a suppression order made by a judge of coordinate jurisdiction when the People belatedly disclose evidence subject to discovery, and independent evidence can satisfy accomplice corroboration requirements.

    Summary

    Dorta was convicted of selling cocaine. Prior to trial, a suppression hearing was held based on the People’s representation that no evidence was seized from Dorta’s house. The suppression motion was denied as moot. Later, the People admitted this was incorrect, and evidence had been seized. The trial judge allowed testimony about the items observed, although the items themselves were suppressed. Dorta appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in allowing the testimony and that the accomplice testimony was insufficiently corroborated. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the trial judge acted within their discretion and sufficient independent evidence corroborated the accomplice testimony.

    Facts

    Robert Anderson, an undercover officer, purchased small amounts of marijuana and cocaine from Samuel Genova. Anderson sought to purchase a larger quantity, Genova contacted Edward Strahm, who agreed to sell Anderson three ounces of cocaine. Strahm and Napolitano drove to a bar where defendant Dorta arrived. Dorta shook hands with Strahm. Strahm and Napolitano returned to Anderson with a cocaine sample. Strahm later called someone he addressed as “Ronnie” (Dorta) to arrange the transaction at “Ronnie’s” house. Strahm and Anderson went to Dorta’s house, where Strahm obtained the cocaine. Police then arrested Dorta, Strahm, and others. A triple beam scale, razor blade, metal pot, and strainer were found in the basement.

    Procedural History

    Dorta was indicted for the sale of cocaine. He moved to suppress evidence, which was initially denied based on the People’s incorrect assertion that no evidence was seized. The trial judge later allowed testimony about the observed items. Dorta was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed. Dorta appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial judge’s ruling permitting testimony about objects observed, when the objects themselves were suppressed, was an impermissible extension of People v. Young?

    2. Whether the evidence corroborating the accomplice testimony was insufficient as a matter of law?

    3. Whether it was error to deny the requested addition to the corroboration charge?

    Holding

    1. No, because the trial judge acted within their discretion to modify the suppression order based on the People’s belated disclosure.

    2. No, because the evidence sufficiently connected the defendant to the crime independent of the accomplice testimony.

    3. No, because the charge as given adequately apprised the jury of the governing law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while testimony about physical evidence observed during an illegal entry would be inadmissible, Strahm was invited into the house, and the hearing judge found Anderson’s entry lawful based on probable cause and exigent circumstances. The basis for the initial preclusion order was the People’s false representation that no evidence was seized, not a Fourth Amendment violation. The Trial Judge has broad discretion under CPL 240.70 to take “other appropriate action” when additional disclosure is made, which includes modifying a prior preclusion order. Regarding corroboration, CPL 60.22(1) requires corroborative evidence tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense. The court stated, “Although corroborative evidence must be truly independent, and may not draw its probative value from the accomplice testimony… it need not itself prove commission of the crime. Rather, it is sufficient if the corroborative evidence tends to connect the defendant to the crime so as to reasonably satisfy the jury that the accomplice is telling the truth.” Independent evidence corroborated that Strahm was dealing with a second person, cocaine was delivered, Dorta played an active role, and drug paraphernalia was present. The court concluded this evidence harmonized with the accomplice’s narrative. Finally, the court found the jury charge on corroboration was adequate, even if it didn’t use the defendant’s requested language.