New York Law Review

Tag: Suppression of Evidence

  • People v. Cunningham, 54 N.Y.2d 813 (1981): Invocation of Right to Counsel Requires Suppression of Subsequent Statements

    People v. Cunningham, 54 N.Y.2d 813 (1981)

    A statement made by a defendant in custody who has invoked their right to counsel must be suppressed unless it is demonstrably spontaneous and not the product of any inducement, provocation, encouragement, or acquiescence, however subtle.

    Summary

    Cunningham was indicted for criminal possession of a weapon and criminal trespass. After being given Miranda warnings, he stated he did not wish to answer questions without an attorney. Subsequently, while at the precinct, an officer suggested that Cunningham’s aunt, the car’s registered owner, might be arrested. Cunningham then made a statement about finding the gun. The Court of Appeals held that the statement should have been suppressed because it was obtained after Cunningham invoked his right to counsel and was not spontaneous.

    Facts

    Cunningham was arrested and charged with criminal possession of a weapon and criminal trespass. After receiving Miranda warnings, Cunningham stated that he did not want to answer questions without an attorney present. While at the police precinct, and in Cunningham’s presence, one officer suggested to another that since Cunningham denied knowledge of the gun and the car was registered to his aunt, perhaps she should be arrested for possession of the weapon. Cunningham then stated that he had found the weapon in an abandoned car.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Cunningham’s motion to suppress the weapon and the statement, finding the statement voluntary and the seizure of the pistol lawful. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision without issuing an opinion. The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a statement made by a defendant in custody, after invoking their right to counsel, is admissible if it is not spontaneous and is made following police conduct that could be construed as inducement, provocation, encouragement, or acquiescence.

    Holding

    No, because a statement made by a defendant in custody who has invoked their right to counsel must be suppressed unless it is in fact spontaneous and not the product of any inducement, provocation, encouragement, or acquiescence, no matter how subtle.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order. The Court reasoned that while the hearing judge found the statement voluntary in the sense that it was not the result of intimidation or coercion, the judge did not determine whether it was spontaneous. The court emphasized that “the spontaneity has to be genuine and not the result of inducement, provocation, encouragement or acquiescence, no matter how subtly employed.” Since the statement was made after Cunningham invoked his right to counsel and was prompted by the officer’s remark about potentially arresting Cunningham’s aunt, it could not be considered spontaneous. As such, the statement was inadmissible and should have been suppressed. The court cited People v. Maerling, stating that “the spontaneity has to be genuine and not the result of inducement, provocation, encouragement or acquiescence, no matter how subtly employed.” The Court also noted that even though the right to counsel issue was not raised in the lower courts, it is so fundamental that the court could consider it.

  • People v. Yukl, 25 N.Y.2d 585 (1979): Defining Custodial Interrogation for Miranda Rights

    49 N.Y.2d 585 (1979)

    A person is in custody for purposes of Miranda warnings when, based on an objective assessment of the circumstances, a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have believed they were not free to leave.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order suppressing the defendant’s statements, finding that the lower court erred in holding that the interrogation was custodial as a matter of law. The court held that the Appellate Division must determine the facts to assess whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have believed they were free to leave. The court also noted that the defendant’s claim regarding the misuse of taped conversations was not preserved for appellate review due to a lack of timely objection.

    Facts

    The defendant was interviewed at the offices of the Department of Investigation on June 3, 1976. Prior to the interview, the defendant was not given Miranda warnings.</r
    During the interview, the defendant made statements that the prosecution sought to use against him at trial.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the statements. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the interview was a custodial interrogation as a matter of law, thus requiring Miranda warnings. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the interview of the defendant conducted in the offices of the Department of Investigation constituted a custodial interrogation as a matter of law, requiring pre-interrogation Miranda warnings.

    Holding

    No, because it cannot be said that under no view of the evidence could the interrogation be found to be noncustodial. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division for determination of the facts to determine if a reasonable person would have believed they were free to leave.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals disagreed with the Appellate Division’s conclusion that the interrogation was custodial as a matter of law. The court emphasized that a determination of custody requires an objective assessment of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. The relevant test is not what the subjective beliefs of the interrogators were, but rather “what a reasonable man, innocent of any crime, would have thought had he been in defendant’s position.” As such, the court found that the Appellate Division erred in not determining the facts necessary to decide whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have believed they were free to leave. The court also addressed the defendant’s argument concerning the misuse of taped conversations, but found that this issue was not preserved for appellate review due to the defendant’s failure to raise a timely objection. The court cited People v. Johnson, 47 N.Y.2d 124, in support of its decision that issues not properly preserved are beyond the scope of review.

  • People v. Harris, 48 N.Y.2d 208 (1979): Admissibility of Statements Made During Custodial Interrogation Without Miranda Warnings

    People v. Harris, 48 N.Y.2d 208 (1979)

    Statements obtained during a custodial interrogation are inadmissible if Miranda warnings were not administered, and a guilty plea entered after the erroneous denial of a motion to suppress such statements must be vacated unless it can be said with certainty that the error played no part in the defendant’s decision to plead guilty.

    Summary

    Harris pleaded guilty to second-degree robbery. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by failing to suppress (1) a potential in-court identification, (2) statements he made to police without Miranda warnings, and (3) sticks seized from him. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, vacated the plea, and remanded. The Court held that Harris’s statements should have been suppressed because they were the product of a custodial interrogation conducted without Miranda warnings. Although the Court upheld the denial of the motion to suppress the sticks, the improperly admitted statements require allowing the defendant to reconsider his guilty plea.

    Facts

    On December 30, 1974, three men, each carrying a stick, forced their way into Mrs. Turner’s home and robbed her. About 30 minutes later, Mrs. Turner’s son, Police Officer Clark, and two other officers stopped three men, two of whom were carrying a television set, and one of whom (Harris) was carrying two gray sticks. The two men carrying the television dropped it and fled. Officer Clark detained Harris and questioned him about the other two men and the television set without administering Miranda warnings. Harris stated he only knew one of the men by the name of “Billy” and did not know where the television came from. Officer Clark later learned his mother had been robbed and the television set taken from the men was hers. Mrs. Turner subsequently identified Harris in a photo array and a lineup.

    Procedural History

    Harris was charged with robbery. He moved to suppress his statements, the sticks, and any identification by Mrs. Turner. After a combined Wade-Mapp-Huntley hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress. Harris then pleaded guilty. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Harris appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in failing to suppress statements made by Harris to the police when he was in custody but had not been given Miranda warnings.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in failing to suppress the sticks taken from Harris on the night of the crime.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the statements were obtained during a custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings, and their admission was prejudicial to the defendant.
    2. No, because the officers had reasonable suspicion to temporarily detain Harris and take possession of the sticks for their own protection during questioning.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Harris was subjected to custodial interrogation without being advised of his Miranda rights. The Court applied the standard of whether a reasonable person, innocent of any crime, would have felt free to leave. It determined that Harris was “in custody” when he was detained by officers, placed in the patrol car, and questioned. Because Harris’s statements were made without Miranda warnings, they should have been suppressed.

    The Court acknowledged the difficulty in determining whether an erroneous pretrial ruling contributed to a defendant’s decision to plead guilty, referencing People v. Grant, 45 N.Y.2d 366, 379. It noted that “when a conviction is based on a plea of guilty an appellate court will rarely, if ever, be able to determine whether an erroneous denial of a motion to suppress contributed to the defendant’s decision, unless at the time of the plea he states or reveals his reason for pleading guilty.” Because a jury could reasonably interpret Harris’s statement as inculpatory, it could not be said with certainty that the erroneous ruling played no part in Harris’s decision to plead guilty. Therefore, the plea must be vacated.

    Regarding the sticks, the Court held that the officers had reasonable suspicion to believe Harris was involved in a felony or misdemeanor, justifying the temporary detention and seizure of the sticks for the officers’ safety. The Court cited Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, noting that the Constitution does not require probable cause for such an action. CPL 140.50 authorizes temporary detention based on reasonable suspicion. Therefore, the denial of the motion to suppress the sticks was proper. The failure to return them after questioning was a statutory violation but not a constitutional one, and did not warrant suppression.

  • People v. Belton, 50 N.Y.2d 447 (1980): Search Incident to Arrest Must Be Contemporaneous and Proximate

    People v. Belton, 50 N.Y.2d 447 (1980)

    A search incident to a lawful arrest must be contemporaneous with the arrest and confined to the immediate vicinity of the arrestee.

    Summary

    Defendant Belton was arrested just outside his apartment. Police, without a warrant, searched his apartment, ostensibly for a stolen television. The television was not found. However, they found an imitation pistol in plain view in a partially open dresser drawer in the bedroom. The New York Court of Appeals held that the search was illegal because it was not conducted pursuant to a warrant, was not incidental to the arrest (which occurred outside the apartment), and was not conducted with Belton’s consent. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s order, vacated the guilty plea and conviction, and granted the motion to suppress the physical evidence.

    Facts

    Defendant was arrested and handcuffed either in the hallway adjoining his apartment door or immediately inside the doorway in the foyer.

    Without obtaining a warrant, police searched the defendant’s living room and bedroom, purportedly seeking a stolen television set.

    The stolen television was not found during the search.

    Police found an imitation pistol in plain view inside a partially open dresser drawer located in the bedroom.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted based on evidence found during a warrantless search of his apartment.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether physical evidence seized from an apartment during a warrantless search should be suppressed when the search was not conducted pursuant to a valid warrant, was not incidental to a lawful arrest, and was not conducted with the defendant’s consent.

    Holding

    Yes, because the search was not conducted pursuant to a valid warrant, was not incidental to the completed arrest outside the searched premises, and was not conducted with the defendant’s consent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the warrantless search violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. The court emphasized the well-established exceptions to the warrant requirement, which include searches conducted pursuant to a valid warrant, searches incident to a lawful arrest, and searches conducted with consent. The court found that none of these exceptions applied in this case.

    The court cited Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33, for the proposition that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.

    The court also cited Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, which limited the scope of a search incident to arrest to the area within the immediate control of the arrestee.

    The court distinguished the present case from People v. Loria, 10 N.Y.2d 368, 373-374, without elaborating on the distinctions, but generally Loria involved consent, which was not present here.

    Because the arrest occurred outside the apartment and the search was not contemporaneous with the arrest, the search could not be justified as incident to a lawful arrest. Moreover, since there was no warrant and no consent, the search was illegal, and the evidence seized should have been suppressed.

  • McGrath v. Gold, 36 N.Y.2d 406 (1975): Collateral Estoppel Requires Final Judgment

    McGrath v. Gold, 36 N.Y.2d 406 (1975)

    Collateral estoppel, which prevents relitigation of issues, requires a final judgment on the merits; an interlocutory ruling, such as the suppression of evidence, does not satisfy this requirement, even if it leads to dismissal of an indictment.

    Summary

    McGrath and Farrell sought to prevent prosecution under Kings County indictments after evidence was suppressed and the charges dismissed under a related Queens County indictment based on the same facts. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Queens County rulings did not bar prosecution in Kings County under the doctrines of double jeopardy, res judicata, or collateral estoppel because the suppression order and subsequent dismissal were not a final judgment on the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence.

    Facts

    McGrath and Farrell were indicted in both Queens and Kings Counties for grand larceny, criminal possession of stolen property, unauthorized use of vehicles, possession of burglar’s tools, and conspiracy. The indictments related to the same underlying facts and circumstances concerning automobiles and complainants. In Queens County, an eavesdropping warrant was controverted and evidence obtained was suppressed. Subsequently, a search warrant obtained as a result of the eavesdropping was also controverted, and the Queens County indictment was dismissed due to insufficient evidence after excising the suppressed evidence. The People did not appeal these Queens County rulings.

    Procedural History

    The petitioners sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the District Attorney of Kings County and the Supreme Court from prosecuting them under indictments pending in Kings County. The Appellate Division dismissed the proceeding, and the petitioners appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the suppression of evidence and subsequent dismissal of an indictment in Queens County, based on the same underlying facts as the Kings County indictments, preclude prosecution in Kings County under the doctrines of double jeopardy, res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.

    Holding

    No, because the suppression order and dismissal in Queens County did not constitute a final judgment on the merits and, therefore, do not trigger the application of collateral estoppel, double jeopardy, res judicata, or law of the case.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals rejected the petitioners’ arguments, explaining that double jeopardy was inapplicable because the Queens County action did not terminate in a conviction or proceed to trial. The court then addressed the argument for collateral estoppel, stating that it “means simply that, when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.” The court emphasized that, to invoke collateral estoppel, the issue of ultimate fact must have been determined by a “final judgment.” Here, the court reasoned, “there was not the requisite finality since the dismissal would not bar a trial based on a subsequent accusatory instrument charging the identical offenses…and since the dismissal was based on the suppression order which was interlocutory in nature.” The court distinguished Vavolizza v. Krieger, noting that in that case, the merits of the singular issue present had been determined, whereas, in the present case, the basic issue of the petitioners’ guilt or innocence was not resolved by the Queens proceedings. Finally, the court dismissed the “law of the case” argument because it applies to various stages of the same litigation, not to different litigations.

  • People v. Rivera, 26 N.Y.2d 304 (1970): Determining When an Arrest Occurs

    People v. Rivera, 26 N.Y.2d 304 (1970)

    The point at which a police encounter escalates into an arrest requiring probable cause is a factual determination, and observations made after an illegal arrest cannot retroactively validate it, but observations made during a lawful surveillance can provide probable cause for a subsequent arrest.

    Summary

    Rivera was convicted of unlawful possession of barbiturates. The police, without probable cause, followed a taxi in which Rivera was a passenger. After the officers approached the taxi and one knocked on the window, Rivera dropped capsules to the floor. The officer, believing them to be barbiturates, arrested Rivera and seized the capsules. The lower courts denied Rivera’s motion to suppress the evidence. The New York Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the hearing court must determine at what point the arrest occurred because if the arrest occurred when the officers initially approached the taxi without probable cause, then anything observed afterward could not validate the arrest. However, if the approach was merely a routine surveillance, Rivera dropping the capsules could establish probable cause for a subsequent arrest.

    Facts

    Detective La Briola observed Rivera enter a building known for narcotics sales, then re-enter a taxi. La Briola followed the taxi. When the taxi stopped at a light, La Briola blocked it with his car. La Briola’s partner approached the taxi, knocking on the rear window with his shield. La Briola then saw Rivera place three capsules on the floor of the taxi. Believing the capsules to be barbiturates, La Briola opened the door, seized the capsules, and arrested Rivera. La Briola admitted he could not distinguish barbiturates from other pills.

    Procedural History

    Rivera was convicted in the Criminal Court of the City of New York for unlawful possession of barbiturates after his motion to suppress the evidence (the capsules) was denied. The Appellate Term affirmed, and Rivera appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police officers’ act of blocking the taxicab constituted an illegal arrest, rendering the subsequently seized evidence inadmissible. Further, if the initial encounter was not an arrest, whether Rivera dropping the capsules to the floor provided probable cause for their seizure and Rivera’s arrest.

    Holding

    No, the judgment of conviction is reversed and the case remanded because the hearing court must determine when the arrest occurred. If the arrest occurred when the officers initially approached the taxi without probable cause, then anything observed afterward could not validate the arrest. Yes, if the initial approach was merely a routine surveillance, Rivera dropping the capsules could establish probable cause for a subsequent arrest.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the timing of the arrest is crucial. An arrest requires probable cause. If the arrest occurred when the officers initially blocked the taxi, at a time when they lacked probable cause, then the arrest was illegal, and the subsequent seizure of the capsules was unlawful. As the Court stated, “Thus if the arrest occurred then, nothing which thereafter happened could validate the arrest or justify an incidental search.” However, the court acknowledged that police officers have the right to conduct routine surveillance. If the officers merely approached the taxi for routine questioning (as in Rios v. United States), and Rivera’s act of dropping the capsules created a reasonable belief that he possessed contraband, then that act would provide probable cause for a valid arrest. The court found Rivera’s behavior of placing the capsules on the floor after noticing the police to be significant evidence of consciousness of guilt, justifying the inference that contraband was being discarded. The court distinguished the facts from cases involving harder narcotics in opaque packaging, noting that the capsules likely contained drugs covered by the relevant statute. Because the hearing court based its denial of the motion to suppress on the erroneous ground that the police could stop a taxi at any time, the Court of Appeals remanded the case for a factual determination of when the arrest occurred.

  • People v. Chapple, 38 N.Y.2d 112 (1975): Custodial Interrogation and Miranda Rights

    People v. Chapple, 38 N.Y.2d 112 (1975)

    A person is considered a prime suspect and is entitled to Miranda warnings when questioned in a custodial setting about an incident in which they are reasonably suspected of involvement, and any incriminating statements made before such warnings are inadmissible.

    Summary

    Chapple took his girlfriend, who had overdosed on narcotics, to the hospital. Police took him to the station for “identification” and questioned him about the incident. He admitted to using heroin with her. Without giving Miranda warnings, the detective asked if he had the “works” (drug paraphernalia), which Chapple admitted to and led the detective to its location. The Court of Appeals held that Chapple was a prime suspect from the beginning and should have been given Miranda warnings before being questioned. The statements and evidence obtained without those warnings were inadmissible.

    Facts

    A woman overdosed on narcotics, and Chapple brought her to the hospital.
    Police took Chapple from the hospital to the station house for “identification.”
    At the station, police questioned Chapple about the incident without providing Miranda warnings.
    Chapple admitted to using heroin with the woman.
    The detective asked Chapple if he had the “works,” and Chapple said he did.
    Chapple led the detective to his apartment, where the detective seized an eyedropper and hypodermic needle.
    Chapple was then arrested and given Miranda warnings.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized from his apartment.
    The suppression hearing was held, with the arresting detective as the sole witness.
    The lower court denied the motion to suppress.
    The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the motion to suppress should have been granted.

    Issue(s)

    Whether statements made by the defendant during custodial interrogation, without prior Miranda warnings, are admissible in evidence when the defendant was a prime suspect from the beginning of the interrogation.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant was a prime suspect from the onset of the interrogation and was questioned in a custodial atmosphere; therefore, any incriminating statements made before Miranda warnings were administered, and the physical evidence derived from those statements, are inadmissible.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the detective’s testimony established that the eyedropper and hypodermic needle were seized as a direct result of admissions obtained during custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings, which is a violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights as established in Miranda v. Arizona.

    The court rejected the People’s argument that the investigation was initially focused on the defendant’s girlfriend and that the defendant was questioned as an ordinary witness until the discovery of the contraband.

    The court stated: “It is patent from the record, however, that from the onset defendant was, and must have been, a prime suspect and was, therefore, questioned in the custodial atmosphere of the station house and that he admitted that he, as well as his girl friend, had been taking narcotics. Only after this incriminating admission was he asked if he had “ the works ”, and when he acknowledged that he had was he requested to take the officer to them.”

    The court further noted that the defendant’s arrest immediately after he produced the physical evidence confirmed that he was a target of the interrogation. The court emphasized that once the statements were deemed inadmissible, the physical evidence derived from those statements also had to be suppressed.

    The court relied on People v. Herbison, 22 N.Y.2d 946, in reaching its conclusion, reinforcing the principle that statements obtained in violation of Miranda are inadmissible.

  • People v. Perel, 34 N.Y.2d 68 (1974): Admissibility of Evidence After an Abandonment

    People v. Perel, 34 N.Y.2d 68 (1974)

    Evidence obtained after a defendant abandons property is inadmissible if the abandonment is a direct result of an unlawful arrest lacking probable cause.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s conviction for illegal possession of narcotics, holding that the evidence (pills containing methadone) should have been suppressed. The defendant dropped an envelope containing the pills while being arrested for burglary. The court reasoned that the prosecution failed to establish probable cause for the initial burglary arrest. Consequently, any abandonment of property by the defendant stemming from that unlawful arrest could not justify the subsequent search and seizure of the envelope and its contents. Therefore, the evidence was deemed inadmissible.

    Facts

    Patrolman De Angelo arrested the defendant on a burglary charge, without an arrest or search warrant. During the arrest, the defendant dropped a white envelope with his name and address on it. The officer retrieved the envelope, felt a substance inside, and opened it, discovering two pills. The defendant told the officer the pills contained either amphetamine or dolophine. Subsequent laboratory tests revealed that the pills contained methadone, a narcotic.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Kings County, for illegal possession of narcotics. His motion to suppress the evidence was denied after a hearing. The Appellate Term, Second Department, affirmed the judgment of conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted permission for further appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence (the envelope and pills) should have been suppressed because it was obtained as a result of an unlawful search and seizure incident to an arrest for which probable cause was not established.

    Holding

    Yes, because the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the initial arrest for burglary was supported by probable cause; an abandonment cannot justify admission of evidence if it stems from a primary illegality.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that a search without a warrant is reasonable only if incident to a lawful arrest or authorized by consent, or constitutes a valid abandonment of property. Here, there was no consent. Although the defendant dropped the envelope, the court found no valid abandonment because the prosecution failed to establish the lawfulness of the underlying arrest. The court cited People v. Malinsky, noting that to justify a warrantless search incident to an arrest, the prosecution must “go forward in the first instance with evidence to show that probable cause existed * * * in sustaining the legality of a search made, without a warrant, as incident to an arrest”. The mere dropping of an envelope, as in People v. Corrado, is insufficient to establish probable cause. Since the People failed to provide evidence of probable cause for the burglary arrest, the subsequent search and seizure were unlawful. The court reasoned that any abandonment stemming from the unlawful arrest could not validate the seizure of the evidence. As such, the evidence should have been suppressed. The dissent argued that the defendant should have specifically challenged the probable cause for the burglary arrest at the hearing, and the court should have presumed its validity.

  • People v. Alfinito, 16 N.Y.2d 181 (1965): Challenging the Veracity of a Search Warrant Affidavit

    People v. Alfinito, 16 N.Y.2d 181 (1965)

    A defendant may challenge the veracity of factual statements made in an affidavit supporting a search warrant, but bears the burden of proving that the statements were perjurious; any fair doubt should be resolved in favor of the warrant.

    Summary

    Alfinito was charged with policy gambling violations. He moved to suppress evidence, arguing it was obtained through an unlawful search because the supporting affidavit for the search warrant contained false statements. The Criminal Court granted the motion, finding a conflict in testimony. The Appellate Term reversed, ordering a new hearing for factual findings. The New York Court of Appeals held that a defendant can challenge the truthfulness of statements in a search warrant affidavit, but bears the burden of proof, and doubts are resolved in favor of the warrant.

    Facts

    A police officer obtained a search warrant based on an affidavit stating that a confidential informant (with a history of reliability) reported placing bets with Alfinito in a specific apartment. The officer also claimed to have personally observed several individuals engaging in transactions with Alfinito at that location, including handing over slips of paper and money. Police records indicated Alfinito had prior arrests and a conviction for policy violations.

    Procedural History

    The Criminal Court granted Alfinito’s motion to suppress evidence, citing a conflict in testimony that created a doubt in favor of the defendant. The People appealed to the Appellate Term, which reversed and ordered a new hearing, noting the lack of specific findings of fact by the Criminal Court. Both the People and Alfinito appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant can challenge the truthfulness of factual statements made in the affidavit supporting a search warrant.

    Holding

    Yes, because Section 813-c of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits an inquiry into whether the affidavit’s statements were perjurious, but the burden of proof is on the defendant, and any fair doubt should be resolved in favor of the warrant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court recognized the importance of protecting citizens’ rights against unlawful searches and seizures, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Mapp v. Ohio. However, it also acknowledged the need to avoid creating overly strict rules that would invalidate warrants based on conflicting testimony. The court balanced these concerns by holding that a defendant can challenge the truthfulness of statements in a search warrant affidavit, but the burden of proof rests on the defendant to show that the statements were perjurious. The court reasoned that because a judicial officer already examined the allegations when issuing the warrant, any fair doubt about their veracity should be resolved in favor of upholding the warrant. The court stated, “Our duty is to fashion a rule which will prevent such a violation of the citizen’s rights and at the same time avoid creating a situation where overstrict rules would invalidate numerous warrants simply because witnesses can later be found to swear to the opposite of what the officer swore when he procured the warrant.”