New York Law Review

Tag: Suppression Hearing

  • People v. Bryant, 37 N.Y.2d 208 (1975): Probable Cause and Second Chances at Suppression Hearings

    People v. Bryant, 37 N.Y.2d 208 (1975)

    The mere presence of empty glassine envelopes and a folded bill in a car, even in a narcotics-prone area, without more, does not constitute probable cause for arrest, and the prosecution is not entitled to a second chance to establish probable cause at a suppression hearing after failing to do so initially.

    Summary

    Bryant and Jones were arrested after a patrolman observed empty glassine envelopes and a folded $10 bill in their parked car. At the suppression hearing, the officer testified about the items and the location’s reputation for narcotics activity. Defense counsel waived cross-examination. The trial court granted the motion to suppress, finding no probable cause. The Appellate Term remitted for a new hearing, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding the initial finding of no probable cause should stand and the prosecution was not entitled to a second opportunity to present evidence. The Court emphasized deference to the original judicial determination and the insufficiency of the evidence to establish probable cause.

    Facts

    A patrolman observed Bryant and Jones sitting in a parked car. He approached the vehicle and requested the driver’s license and registration. The officer saw 43 empty glassine envelopes and a folded $10 bill on the dashboard. Based on these observations, the patrolman arrested both defendants and searched them. A glassine envelope containing a white residue was found on Jones; Bryant had nothing. The $10 bill contained a white substance later determined to be six grains of cocaine. The arresting officer testified he had previously made arrests for drugs being passed in folded dollar bills and that the arrest occurred in a “narcotics prone location”.

    Procedural History

    The Criminal Court of the City of New York granted the defendants’ motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search. The Appellate Term characterized the patrolman’s testimony as equivocal and remitted the case to the Criminal Court for a hearing de novo. A dissenting justice would have affirmed the lower court’s order. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Term’s order and reinstated the Criminal Court’s order granting suppression.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the observation of empty glassine envelopes and a folded bill in a car parked in a narcotics-prone area, without more, constitutes probable cause for arrest.
    2. Whether the prosecution is entitled to a second opportunity to present evidence at a suppression hearing after failing to establish probable cause initially.

    Holding

    1. No, because the mere presence of such items, without additional suspicious behavior or circumstances, is insufficient to raise the level of inference from suspicion to probable cause.
    2. No, because the People have the initial burden to establish probable cause and are not entitled to a second chance to succeed where they have already tried and failed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals deferred to the hearing court’s finding of no probable cause, noting the intermediate appellate court did not disagree with that finding. The court cited People v. Oden, stating that “the mere passing of a glassine envelope in a neighborhood in which narcotics were known to have been present, unsupplemented by any additional relevant behavior or circumstances found to exist, was insufficient to raise the level of inference from suspicion to probable cause”. The court emphasized that the arresting officer saw only containers suitable for holding narcotics, without actually observing any narcotics being exchanged or used. The court found no warrant to disturb the lower court’s finding that there was no probable cause for the defendants’ arrest. Regarding the second hearing, the Court found it improper because the original hearing was completed, and the People had a full opportunity to present evidence. The defendants chose to rest on the People’s evidence. Citing People v. Malinsky, the Court reiterated that the People bear the burden of showing probable cause to justify a warrantless search incident to arrest, and there was no justification to give them a second chance to succeed where they had already failed. The Court stated that “The People, in order to prevail, are under the necessity of going forward in the first instance with evidence to show that probable cause existed…in sustaining the legality of a search made, without a warrant, as incident to an arrest.”

  • People v. Lypka, 36 N.Y.2d 210 (1975): Probable Cause Based on Interstate Police Bulletins

    People v. Lypka, 36 N.Y.2d 210 (1975)

    An interstate police bulletin can provide probable cause for a warrantless search, but the prosecution must demonstrate that the sending agency possessed the requisite probable cause to act when the search is challenged in a suppression hearing.

    Summary

    Defendants were convicted of weapon possession and criminal trespass after a warrantless search of their vehicles. The search was based on an interstate police bulletin detailing weapons and stolen motorcycles believed to be in their possession. The New York Court of Appeals held that while a police officer can rely on a bulletin or alert from another officer or department, the prosecution must demonstrate that the sending agency had probable cause to issue the bulletin when a motion to suppress is made. Because the prosecution failed to establish the Pennsylvania authorities’ basis for the information, the case was remitted for a new suppression hearing.

    Facts

    Undersheriff Brewer of Seneca County received a call from Detective Holhman of the Lancaster, Pennsylvania Police Department, stating that the defendants were en route from Lancaster to Interlaken, NY, with specified weapons and stolen motorcycles. The detective provided detailed descriptions of the vehicles. A teletype message containing the same information was sent to the State Police Headquarters in Albany. Deputies and State Troopers converged on the Lypka residence without arrest or search warrants. The defendants purportedly consented to a search of their vehicles, which revealed contraband and weapons.

    Procedural History

    The County Court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding the defendants had consented to the search. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding probable cause and applying the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. One justice dissented, arguing for the necessity of a warrant. The New York Court of Appeals withheld determination of the appeal and remitted the case to the County Court for further proceedings on the motion to suppress.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an interstate police bulletin alone can furnish probable cause for a warrantless motor vehicle search, such that evidence found during that search is admissible.

    Holding

    No, not without further substantiation. The determination of the appeal was withheld and the case remitted to the County Court because the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the Pennsylvania authorities possessed the necessary probable cause to support a search for weapons and stolen property.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged that a police officer is entitled to act on the strength of a police bulletin or alert from another officer or department, and to assume its reliability, citing Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U. S. 560, 568. The court noted that “where the bulletin or alert, prima facie, furnishes probable cause, a reasonable search is permissible. In such circumstances the sender’s knowledge is imputed to the receiver and, when the receiver acts, he presumptively possesses the requisite probable cause to search.” However, the court emphasized that this presumption disappears when a motion to suppress is made, and the action is challenged. “At that point, bare reliance on an unsubstantiated hearsay communication from the instigating officer or department will not suffice for probable cause.”

    The court stated that the prosecution must demonstrate that the sender or sending agency itself possessed the requisite probable cause to act. Because the record lacked any proof that the Pennsylvania authorities had probable cause, the resulting search was not sustained by the proof. The court also considered the potential danger to the public safety given the nature of the reported items (weapons) and found that the immediate police response was reasonable. The court stated: “That protection of the public may have been accomplished by less intrusive means does not itself render the search unreasonable.”

    The court distinguished the case from situations where the receiver’s independent observations confirm the sender’s information and emphasized that the circumstances called for an immediate response. The court determined that the failure to seek a warrant did not make the search unreasonable. The court emphasized practical considerations, stating that it “would be unreasonable to expect or to require that the basis for the bulletin, be it the report of an eyewitness to a crime, the report of an informer, or whatever, be broadcast with the bulletin.”

  • People v. De Jesus, 42 N.Y.2d 519 (1977): Judicial Impartiality and the Right to a Fair Trial

    People v. De Jesus, 42 N.Y.2d 519 (1977)

    A defendant is deprived of the right to a fair trial when the trial judge’s actions, taken as a whole, demonstrate a lack of impartiality and prejudice the defense.

    Summary

    This case addresses the critical importance of judicial impartiality in ensuring a fair trial. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s conviction, holding that the cumulative effect of the trial judge’s actions, including denying a renewed motion for recusal, conducting a supplemental suppression hearing in the presence of the jury, excessive questioning, and unnecessary altercations with defense counsel, deprived the defendant of a fair trial. The court emphasized that while no single action constituted reversible error, the totality of the circumstances created an environment of unfairness, warranting a new trial.

    Facts

    The defendant was on trial for an unspecified crime. Prior to this trial, the same trial judge had prosecuted the defendant for a prior offense when he was a District Attorney. Before and at the start of trial, the defense moved for the judge to recuse himself based on this prior involvement. During the trial, the judge, sua sponte, conducted a supplemental suppression hearing, despite a previous judge having already ruled on the matter. This hearing was conducted in the presence of the jury over the defense’s objections. The judge also engaged in extensive questioning and arguments with the defense counsel throughout the trial.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. The defendant appealed the conviction to the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial judge’s failure to recuse himself, combined with his conduct during the trial, deprived the defendant of his constitutional right to a fair trial.

    Holding

    Yes, because the cumulative effect of the trial judge’s actions created an atmosphere of prejudice that undermined the defendant’s right to a fair trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the cumulative effect of the trial judge’s actions rather than isolating any single error. While the court acknowledged that the judge’s failure to recuse himself was not improper as a matter of law, and that no single action was, by itself, an error of law, the totality of the circumstances led to the conclusion that the defendant was denied a fair trial. The court emphasized the potential for prejudice arising from conducting a suppression hearing in front of the jury, especially when the defense was handicapped in its participation. The judge’s excessive questioning and unnecessary altercations with defense counsel further contributed to the perception of bias. As the court noted, “we are satisfied, when all are taken together, that defendant was deprived of his right to a fair trial.” This case serves as a reminder that even in the absence of explicit bias, a judge’s conduct can create an environment that compromises the defendant’s right to an impartial arbiter. The court did not provide explicit standards beyond the facts of the case to determine when actions taken together constitute a denial of a fair trial. This requires future jurists to balance deference to the trial court with a responsibility to ensure defendants receive a fair trial. This suggests motions for recusal should be carefully considered and trial judges must maintain decorum to avoid creating an appearance of bias, especially during jury proceedings.

  • People v. Esajerre, 35 N.Y.2d 463 (1974): Enforceability of Plea Bargains Requiring Waiver of Suppression Hearing

    People v. Esajerre, 35 N.Y.2d 463 (1974)

    A defendant may waive their right to a judicial determination on a suppression motion as part of a plea agreement, provided the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and the plea agreement itself is not the result of coercion or duress.

    Summary

    Esajerre, a Chilean national, was arrested for drug possession. After indictment, he moved to suppress the evidence. During the suppression hearing, plea negotiations occurred. The prosecution offered a reduced charge if Esajerre withdrew his suppression motion. Esajerre, concerned about parole due to his nationality, withdrew the motion and pled guilty. On appeal, he argued the waiver was invalid. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that a defendant can waive the right to a suppression hearing determination as part of a plea bargain if the waiver is knowing and voluntary, and the circumstances do not amount to coercion.

    Facts

    Responding to a burglary call, police found Esajerre in a hallway with a paper bag. A search of the bag revealed cocaine. Esajerre was given Miranda warnings in Spanish and admitted ownership of the drugs. He later turned over additional cocaine. He was indicted, and a motion to suppress the seized evidence was filed.

    Procedural History

    After the suppression hearing, Esajerre requested an adjournment to prepare a summation. Plea negotiations ensued, and the prosecution offered a reduced charge in exchange for withdrawing the suppression motion. Esajerre withdrew the motion and pled guilty. He appealed, arguing his waiver was invalid as a matter of law. The appellate division affirmed, and the case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s waiver of a judicial determination on a suppression motion, as a condition of a plea bargain, is invalid as a matter of law.

    Holding

    No, because a defendant can knowingly and voluntarily waive the right to a judicial determination on a suppression motion as part of a plea agreement, provided that the plea agreement is not the result of coercion or duress.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a defendant can waive certain rights, including the right to a jury trial and the right to challenge the admissibility of evidence. The court distinguished this case from People v. White, 32 N.Y.2d 393 (1973) and People v. Blakley, 34 N.Y.2d 311 (1974), where waivers of the right to a speedy trial were deemed invalid due to coercion and unreasonable delay. Here, the court found no evidence of coercion. Esajerre had sufficient time to discuss the waiver with his lawyer and understood the consequences of his guilty plea. The court emphasized the extensive discussions between Esajerre, his counsel, and the prosecution, stating that this “afforded defendant sufficient opportunity to weigh ‘the relative merits of the plea offered against the hazards of a trial’ and assured that the plea was voluntary.” The court noted that offering a reduced plea is a matter of grace, and reasonable conditions, like withdrawing the suppression motion, can be attached. Esajerre’s concern about parole was addressed by the prosecution’s assurance. Since Esajerre could waive his right to attack the search, he could also waive the right to a final determination on his claim. “Since the defendant could waive his right to attack the search as unreasonable, he could waive the right to an ultimate determination of his claim.” The court concluded the waiver was a knowing and intelligent decision.

  • People v. Darden, 34 N.Y.2d 177 (1974): Establishing Probable Cause with Confidential Informants

    People v. Darden, 34 N.Y.2d 177 (1974)

    When probable cause for an arrest hinges on information from a confidential informant, and the defendant challenges the informant’s existence or reliability, the trial court should conduct an in camera inquiry to verify the informant’s existence and the basis of their knowledge while protecting the informant’s identity.

    Summary

    In this case, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the issue of establishing probable cause for an arrest based on information provided by a confidential informant. The defendant, arrested based on an informant’s tip, challenged the refusal to disclose the informant’s identity at a suppression hearing. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s order upholding the refusal to disclose the informant’s identity but outlined a procedure for an in camera inquiry by the suppression judge to verify the informant’s existence and reliability. This inquiry aims to balance the defendant’s right to challenge probable cause with the public interest in protecting informants.

    Facts

    On December 24, 1969, Rochester police arrested the defendant at the Rochester airport after he arrived on a flight from New York City. The police seized an attaché case he was carrying, and a search revealed a substantial quantity of heroin. The arrest was based on information from a previously reliable informant who described the defendant’s appearance and indicated he would be carrying an attaché case. The informant had named individuals who provided the information, and the police knew the informant to be reliable based on prior tips leading to drug arrests and convictions. Prior to the informant’s tip, police received an anonymous tip about a large heroin shipment and learned from street inquiries that the local heroin supply was low.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was charged with criminal possession of a dangerous drug. At the suppression hearing, the trial court upheld the District Attorney’s refusal to disclose the informant’s identity and denied the motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search. The defendant then pleaded guilty. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the District Attorney’s refusal to disclose the identity of the confidential informant deprived the defendant of a fair hearing on the issue of probable cause for the arrest.

    Holding

    No, because while the informant’s identity need not be disclosed, in cases where probable cause relies solely on an informant’s communication, the suppression judge should conduct an in camera inquiry to verify the informant’s existence and reliability.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged the importance of protecting the anonymity of police informants to ensure a continued flow of information crucial to effective law enforcement, citing Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59. However, the court also recognized the defendant’s right to challenge the basis of probable cause for their arrest. Balancing these competing interests, the Court of Appeals proposed a new procedure for cases where probable cause hinges on an informant’s communication. The suppression judge should conduct an in camera inquiry, requiring the prosecution to produce the informant for interrogation. The prosecutor may be present, but not the defendant or their counsel. Defense counsel can submit written questions for the judge to ask the informant. The judge must then make a summary report, available to both the defendant and the prosecution, regarding the informant’s existence and the substance of their communication to the police. The transcript of the in camera testimony is sealed for appellate review. This procedure is designed to protect against the possibility that the informant is imaginary or the communication fabricated while preserving the informant’s anonymity. The court stated that “Assuring the desirable flow of useful information to the police will, of course, depend on predictable and reliable assurances that anonymity of informers will be preserved.” To the extent that this new procedure departs from prior decisions requiring the issue of probable cause be determined solely on the basis of a record fully available to the defendant, the court acknowledged this and indicated that they would depart from those prior decisions.

  • People v. Whitehurst, 25 N.Y.2d 389 (1969): Burden of Proof in Consent Searches

    People v. Whitehurst, 25 N.Y.2d 389 (1969)

    When a search and seizure is based on consent, the prosecution bears the burden of proving that the consent was freely and voluntarily given.

    Summary

    The defendant, Whitehurst, appealed his conviction for unlawful possession of narcotics, arguing that the contraband was obtained through an unlawful search. A detective, recognizing Whitehurst from a prior arrest, asked him, “What have you got this time?” Whitehurst then produced narcotics. The trial court incorrectly placed the burden of proof on Whitehurst to show lack of consent. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that when a search is based on consent, the prosecution has the burden to prove that consent was given freely and voluntarily. This case clarifies the allocation of the burden of proof in suppression hearings involving consent searches.

    Facts

    Detective Bryan, familiar with Whitehurst from a previous narcotics arrest, observed Whitehurst for about 15 minutes. Inside a store, Whitehurst recognized Bryan and exclaimed, “Oh no. Not you again.” Bryan responded, “Yes, it’s me. What have you got this time?” Whitehurst then took two glassine envelopes from his pocket, placed them on the counter, and said, “That’s all I’ve got.” The envelopes contained narcotics.

    Procedural History

    Whitehurst was convicted in the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Kings County, after pleading guilty to unlawful possession of narcotics. He appealed, challenging the denial of his motion to suppress the narcotics. The Appellate Term affirmed the conviction. Whitehurst then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the hearing court improperly placed the burden of proof on the defendant to demonstrate a lack of consent when the search and seizure was predicated on consent.

    Holding

    Yes, because when a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the trial court erred in placing the burden of proof on Whitehurst. The court emphasized that while the defendant generally carries the initial burden of proof when challenging a search and seizure, the People have the burden of going forward to show the legality of the police conduct. Specifically, the Court stated, “When a search and seizure is based upon consent… the burden of proof rests heavily upon the People to establish the voluntariness of that waiver of a constitutional right.” The court noted that Detective Bryan’s question, “What have you got this time?” injected the issue of consent into the case, making the voluntariness of Whitehurst’s actions a central question. Because the detective’s question prompted Whitehurst’s production of the narcotics, the People were required to prove that Whitehurst acted voluntarily, without coercion. The court referenced Bumper v. North Carolina, stating: “When a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given” (p. 548). Since the trial court did not properly apply the burden of proof, a new suppression hearing was ordered. The Court stated that the defendant ought to have the factual issue determined in accordance with constitutional standards.

  • People v. West, 29 N.Y.2d 72 (1971): Retroactive Application of Right to Suppression Hearing Transcripts

    People v. West, 29 N.Y.2d 72 (1971)

    The rule extending the right to free transcripts of pre-trial suppression hearings to indigent defendants, established in People v. Ballott, is not retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review that have already been prosecuted to final judgment.

    Summary

    West, convicted of narcotics offenses in 1963, sought habeas corpus relief, arguing that the denial of a free transcript from his pre-trial suppression hearing violated his due process and equal protection rights. He contended that a defendant with funds could have obtained the transcript, and the denial prejudiced his ability to cross-examine witnesses at trial. The New York Court of Appeals held that the right to free transcripts of suppression hearings, articulated after West’s conviction, does not apply retroactively to cases already finalized on appeal, unless the deprivation undermines the integrity of the fact-finding process in the original trial.

    Facts

    Relator, West, was convicted in 1963 for the sale and possession of narcotics. Prior to his trial, West, acting pro se, requested a transcript of his evidence suppression hearing under section 813-c of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which was denied. He did not renew the request at trial. Witnesses who testified at the suppression hearing also testified at trial. West later argued that he was prejudiced because he was indigent and couldn’t afford the transcript, while a wealthier defendant could have obtained it.

    Procedural History

    West was convicted in 1963. His conviction was affirmed on appeal (23 A.D.2d 721), and leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals was denied on May 13, 1965. He then sought habeas corpus relief, arguing the denial of the transcript violated his constitutional rights. The Court of Appeals reviewed the habeas corpus petition.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the rule established in People v. Ballott, granting indigent defendants the right to free transcripts of pretrial suppression hearings, should be applied retroactively to cases where the judgment of conviction was final before the Ballott decision.

    Holding

    No, because the rule in Ballott, while desirable, does not so profoundly and directly affect the integrity of the fact-finding process that it warrants retroactive application in collateral post-conviction proceedings, especially where appellate remedies have been exhausted.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while the principles of equal protection and due process underlie the right to a transcript, extending this right retroactively would unduly disrupt final judgments. The court distinguished the case from People v. Montgomery and Roberts v. LaVallee, which involved direct appeals and statutory rights, not collateral attacks on final judgments. The Court emphasized that not every improvement in criminal trial procedure warrants undoing past judgments. The court cited People v. De Renzzio, stating: “We have no valid basis for assuming our predecessors were so entirely wrong and we quite so entirely right about our views that we should undo what was correctly done many years ago according to the general understanding of lawyers on how the Constitution should be read.”

    The court adopted a balancing approach, weighing the fairness of the new rule against the impact on the administration of justice. It considered the retroactivity standards articulated in Stovall v. Denno, Johnson v. New Jersey, and Linkletter v. Walker. The court determined that the absence of a transcript, while undesirable, did not necessarily undermine the reliability of the fact-finding process, especially since the defendant and his lawyer were present at the suppression hearing and had the opportunity to make notes.

    The court acknowledged that there might be cases where the deprivation of a transcript results in substantial injustice, such as when it prevents the defense from exposing false testimony. However, such cases would likely involve fraud or perjury, which would be grounds for relief under existing post-conviction remedies. In this particular case, the court found the potential benefit of the transcript to be conjectural and insufficient to justify retroactive application.

  • People v. Anderson, 16 N.Y.2d 282 (1965): Defendant’s Right to be Present at Suppression Hearings

    People v. Anderson, 16 N.Y.2d 282 (1965)

    A defendant in a felony case has a statutory and due process right to be present at a pre-trial suppression hearing where evidence is taken, because such a hearing is a critical stage of the trial that affects the defendant’s ability to confront accusers and advise counsel.

    Summary

    Defendants Anderson and Thompson were convicted of robbery. Anderson appealed, arguing his due process rights were violated because he was absent from a pre-trial suppression hearing concerning evidence later used against him. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that Anderson’s absence from the suppression hearing, where testimony was taken, violated his right to be present at all material stages of the trial under New York law and the due process clause. The court reasoned that a suppression hearing is a crucial step in the prosecution and the defendant’s presence is necessary for a fair hearing. Thompson’s conviction was also reversed in the interest of justice.

    Facts

    Defendant Anderson was in custody awaiting trial for robbery. A pre-trial hearing was held to consider a motion to suppress certain evidence. Anderson was absent from the courtroom during this suppression hearing, and no explanation for his absence was provided in the record. The District Attorney presented testimony regarding the legality of the search that yielded the evidence. The motion to suppress was ultimately denied and the evidence was admitted at Anderson’s trial.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Anderson’s motion to suppress the evidence. Anderson was subsequently convicted of robbery. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction. Anderson appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing his due process rights were violated by his absence from the suppression hearing. The Court of Appeals granted permission to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a pre-trial suppression hearing, at which testimony is taken regarding evidence to be used against a defendant at trial, constitutes a part of the “trial” for purposes of Section 356 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, thus requiring the defendant’s presence.

    Holding

    Yes, because the purposes of section 356 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the rationale of the applicable decisional law and the state’s guarantee of due process require that a defendant be present at a suppression hearing where testimony is taken.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Section 356 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires a defendant’s presence at a felony trial, including post-indictment proceedings where evidence is taken. The court equated a pre-trial suppression hearing, where testimony is presented, to a stage of the trial. The court emphasized the significance of suppression hearings stating, “ [A] denial of a motion to suppress evidence is a crucial step in a criminal prosecution; it may often spell the difference between conviction or acquittal.” The court cited People ex rel. Lupo v. Fay, stating that due process mandates the defendant’s presence to the extent necessary for a fair hearing, giving the defendant the opportunity to confront accusers and advise with counsel. The court rejected the argument that the defendant had a full opportunity to defend against a charge when a suppression hearing is held during his unexplained absence. The court found that distinguishing between the actual trial and the suppression hearing ignores the reasons underlying the right to be present when testimony is taken relating to evidence used against the defendant. The court stated, “Expediency may not dictate procedural changes so as to take from a defendant the right to be present at the taking of testimony, even at a pretrial suppression hearing.” The court recognized that the suppression hearing is not within the specific meaning of “trial” as previously defined. However, the court found it could be given a meaning broad enough to include the examination of criminal cases by a court in all their stages, especially where questions of fact are to be determined. The court concluded that the defendant’s absence from the hearing on the motion to suppress required a reversal of his conviction, and the codefendant’s conviction was reversed in the interest of justice because the improperly admitted evidence may have prejudiced the jury.