New York Law Review

Tag: Suppression Hearing

  • People v. Garay, 24 N.Y.3d 64 (2014): Preservation of Right to Counsel and Courtroom Closure Procedures

    People v. Garay, 24 N.Y.3d 64 (2014)

    To preserve a claim of deprivation of the right to counsel for appellate review, a defendant must object at the time of the alleged violation, when the trial court has an opportunity to correct the error.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed three claims in this case: a Sixth Amendment right to counsel violation due to the replacement of a sick juror; a Sixth Amendment right to a public trial violation due to courtroom closure during testimony of undercover officers; and denial of a suppression hearing. The court held that the right to counsel claim was not preserved for appellate review due to a lack of timely objection. The court also upheld the courtroom closure, finding that the trial court was not required to explicitly state on the record the alternatives considered, so long as the record established the need for closure. Finally, the court upheld the denial of a suppression hearing, finding that the defendant’s assertions were insufficient to raise a factual issue warranting a hearing under CPL 710.60.

    Facts

    Benny Garay was tried with co-defendant Rivera for drug-related offenses. During the trial, a juror called in sick, prompting the judge to replace the juror with an alternate. Garay’s counsel was not present during the initial discussion of the replacement, but was present when the alternate juror was seated. During trial, the courtroom was partially closed during the testimony of two undercover officers. The court had conducted a Hinton hearing and allowed the defendant’s family members to attend. The police, investigating a drug operation, arrested Garay and found cocaine on his person. Garay moved to suppress the evidence, claiming lack of consent and probable cause. The trial court denied the motion.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Garay of criminal possession of a controlled substance. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s right to counsel was violated when a sick juror was replaced with an alternate juror.

    2. Whether the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was violated by the partial courtroom closure during the testimony of undercover officers.

    3. Whether the trial court erred in summarily denying the defendant’s request for a suppression hearing.

    Holding

    1. No, because the claim was not preserved for appellate review due to the defense counsel’s failure to object.

    2. No, because the trial court considered the alternatives to closure sufficiently.

    3. No, because the defendant’s motion papers did not contain sufficient factual allegations to warrant a hearing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court held that the defendant’s right to counsel claim was unpreserved because defense counsel was present when the alternate juror was seated, and did not object to the replacement. The court cited CPL 470.05(2), which requires a timely protest to preserve a claim of error. The court distinguished the situation from cases where counsel was absent when the alleged deprivation occurred, and thus could not object. For the courtroom closure issue, the court found the trial court’s closure was proper, as the record supported the need for closure and the court had allowed family members to attend. The court reaffirmed People v. Echevarria, which held that a trial court need not explicitly state the alternatives considered. Finally, regarding the suppression hearing, the court referenced CPL 710.60 and People v. Mendoza. Defendant’s assertion of innocent conduct at the time of arrest, without refuting the allegations of the drug conspiracy, did not establish entitlement to a hearing.

    Practical Implications

    This case underscores the importance of timely objections to preserve legal arguments for appeal. Attorneys must be vigilant in raising objections when potential errors occur in the presence of the court to ensure their clients’ rights are protected. The case confirms the standard in New York for courtroom closures, holding that a trial court does not need to explicitly enumerate alternatives considered, as long as the record supports the necessity of closure. The case also reinforces the requirements for suppression motions, emphasizing that such motions must contain sworn factual allegations sufficient to raise a legal basis for suppression. This highlights the need for attorneys to present specific factual challenges to establish grounds for a suppression hearing.

  • People v. Kevin W., 22 N.Y.3d 287 (2013): Limits on Reopening Suppression Hearings for the Prosecution

    People v. Kevin W., 22 N.Y.3d 287 (2013)

    The People are not entitled to reopen a suppression hearing to bolster their evidentiary or legal position unless they demonstrate they were deprived of a full and fair opportunity to present their case initially.

    Summary

    This case addresses the circumstances under which the prosecution can reopen a suppression hearing. The Court of Appeals held that a trial judge cannot reopen a suppression hearing to allow the prosecution to strengthen its case unless the prosecution demonstrates it was denied a full and fair opportunity to present its evidence initially. The Court reasoned that allowing the prosecution a “second bite at the apple” after failing to adequately present its case would undermine the principles of fairness and finality, and would give the prosecution an unfair advantage.

    Facts

    Two police officers, Gungor and Indiviglio, were patrolling a subway platform following a recent robbery. They observed Kevin W. and his brother acting suspiciously. The officers followed them onto a train and then off at a subsequent station. The officers stopped the brothers, identified themselves, and attempted to question them. Kevin W. resisted, and during the encounter, he discarded a bag. After a chase, the officers apprehended Kevin W.’s brother. Another officer retrieved Kevin W.’s bag, searched it, and found a loaded pistol. Kevin W. was arrested and charged with weapon possession and resisting arrest.

    Procedural History

    Kevin W. moved to suppress the evidence found in the bag. At the initial suppression hearing, Officer Gungor testified. The JHO recommended suppression, finding Gungor’s testimony insufficient to justify the stop. The Supreme Court adopted the JHO’s recommendation and granted suppression. The People moved to reargue, but the Supreme Court, instead of ruling on the reargument motion, reopened the hearing to allow the People to call Sergeant Indiviglio. Based on Indiviglio’s testimony, the JHO then recommended denying suppression, which the Supreme Court adopted. Kevin W. was convicted. The Appellate Division reversed, granted suppression, and dismissed the indictment, holding that reopening the hearing was improper under People v. Havelka. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a trial court can reopen a suppression hearing at the prosecution’s request to allow the introduction of additional evidence when the prosecution has not demonstrated that it was denied a full and fair opportunity to present its case at the initial hearing.

    Holding

    No, because the People had a full and fair opportunity to present their evidence at the initial suppression hearing. Permitting the reopening of the hearing without such a showing undermines the principles of fairness and finality.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on People v. Havelka, which held that the People are not entitled to a second chance to succeed where they previously failed, absent a showing that they were deprived of a full and fair opportunity to present evidence on dispositive issues at the initial hearing. The Court distinguished this case from People v. Crandall, where a second hearing was permitted because the initial denial of suppression was based on a legal error that prevented the People from presenting an alternative basis for the search. Here, the Court found no such error. The JHO’s initial ruling concluded that Officer Gungor’s testimony was “sketchy” and “undeveloped,” not that the People were legally precluded from presenting other evidence. The Court noted that the People were aware of Sergeant Indiviglio’s relevant information before the first hearing. The Court emphasized that allowing the reopening here would give the People an unfair advantage, allowing them to tailor their presentation based on the court’s initial assessment of the case. The Court stated, “[i]t is impossible to know if he would have testified in the same vein if he had been called at the first hearing. But the nature of his later testimony underscores the risk of presentations shaped, whether deliberately or subconsciously, by hindsight.”

  • People v. Wright, 21 N.Y.3d 932 (2013): Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Suppression Hearing

    People v. Wright, 21 N.Y.3d 932 (2013)

    A defendant is deprived of meaningful representation when his attorney fails to adequately present a suppression motion, including a failure to marshal facts, make legal arguments, or correct significant factual errors in the court’s decision, especially when counsel has expressed an inability to competently represent the defendant.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that the defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel at his suppression hearing. The defendant’s assigned counsel sought to be relieved due to being overwhelmed, but was ordered to proceed with the hearing. Counsel then failed to properly argue for suppression, misstated facts in the motion, made no legal argument, and failed to correct factual errors in the court’s decision. Given counsel’s expressed inability to competently represent the defendant and the accumulation of errors, the Court of Appeals remitted the case for a new suppression hearing, finding that the defendant was not afforded meaningful representation at a critical stage of the prosecution.

    Facts

    The defendant was arrested and charged with weapon possession offenses after a street encounter with the police. Three days before the suppression hearing, the defendant’s assigned counsel requested to be relieved, citing an overwhelming workload and inability to competently represent the defendant. The court denied the request until after the hearing. In his written motion for a hearing, counsel misstated the facts, claiming a motor vehicle stop occurred rather than a street encounter. At the hearing, counsel did not effectively present the facts or make any legal argument. After the hearing, the court issued a decision containing factual errors, but defense counsel failed to move for reargument or correction.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied the suppression motion. New counsel was appointed, and the defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. A dissenting judge at the Appellate Division granted the defendant leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel based on his attorney’s performance during the suppression hearing.

    Holding

    Yes, because the defense counsel’s representation regarding the suppression application was deficient in numerous respects, including failing to marshal the facts, present legal arguments, and correct factual errors in the court’s decision, undermining confidence in the fairness of the proceeding.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals agreed with the Appellate Division dissent, holding that the defendant was entitled to relief. The court emphasized counsel’s misstatement of facts in the motion, failure to marshal facts or make legal arguments at the hearing, and failure to correct factual errors in the court’s decision. The Court noted that these errors could not be explained as strategic decisions, especially given the attorney’s expressed inability to competently represent the defendant. The Court stated: “Thus, although the attorney secured a hearing, his representation in relation to the application as a whole was deficient in so many respects—both before, during and after the proceeding—that defendant was not afforded meaningful representation at a critical stage of this prosecution.” Even without a strict showing of prejudice, the accumulation of errors substantially undermined confidence in the fairness of the proceeding. The court found relief appropriate under the state’s meaningful representation standard (People v Stultz, 2 NY3d 277, 284 [2004]), which does not always require a strict showing of prejudice. The Court conditionally modified the judgment, remitting the matter for further proceedings on the suppression application, including legal argument and the potential reopening of the hearing.

  • In re Elvin G., 12 N.Y.3d 832 (2009): Establishing Factual Disputes for Suppression Hearings in School Searches

    In re Elvin G., 12 N.Y.3d 832 (2009)

    A suppression hearing is required in juvenile delinquency proceedings when the accused raises a factual dispute on a material point that must be resolved to determine if evidence was obtained constitutionally.

    Summary

    Elvin G. was subject to a school search. He moved to suppress a knife found during the search, alleging the dean ordered all students to empty their pockets. The presentment agency countered that Elvin voluntarily removed the knife. The New York Court of Appeals held that a suppression hearing was necessary because the conflicting factual accounts created a material dispute regarding the constitutionality of the search. The Court reasoned that the record was insufficiently developed to determine whether a search occurred and, if so, if it was reasonable under the circumstances. The dissent argued that the dean’s actions were justified due to a classroom disruption and were reasonably related in scope to finding the source of the disruption.

    Facts

    While in class, a cell phone or other electronic device disrupted the class.
    According to Elvin G., the school dean ordered all students to stand and empty their pockets to find the device.
    According to the presentment agency, the dean asked students to place their bags on their desks, and Elvin G. voluntarily removed a knife from his pocket.
    A knife was recovered from Elvin G.

    Procedural History

    Elvin G. moved to suppress the knife, arguing the search was unconstitutional.
    The Family Court denied the motion for a suppression hearing.
    The Appellate Division affirmed.
    The New York Court of Appeals reversed and remitted the matter to Family Court for a suppression hearing.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a suppression hearing is required when there is a factual dispute regarding the circumstances of a search in a school setting, specifically whether the student voluntarily revealed the weapon or whether it was discovered pursuant to an order to empty pockets.

    Holding

    Yes, because there was a factual dispute on a material point – whether the dean ordered students to empty their pockets (as alleged by Elvin G.) or whether Elvin G. voluntarily removed the knife (as claimed by the presentment agency) – that needed to be resolved to determine if the evidence was obtained constitutionally.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on CPL 710.60 and Family Court Act § 330.2 (1), stating that a suppression hearing is required if the accused raises a factual dispute on a material point that must be resolved before the court can decide the legality of obtaining the evidence.
    The court cited People v. Burton, 6 N.Y.3d 584, 587 (2006), emphasizing that a hearing is needed to resolve factual disputes relevant to constitutional permissibility.
    The Court applied the People v. Mendoza, 82 N.Y.2d 415 (1993) factors, noting the record was insufficiently developed to properly determine whether a search occurred and, if so, whether it was reasonable under the circumstances, referencing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985); Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); and Matter of Gregory M., 82 N.Y.2d 588 (1993).
    The Court emphasized that if the dean recovered the knife because it was in “plain view,” the constitutional question would be academic, highlighting the importance of resolving the factual dispute.
    The dissent argued that the dean was justified in directing students to empty their pockets due to the classroom disruption and the search was reasonably related to finding the offending article, citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). The dissent also noted that Matter of Gregory M., 82 N.Y.2d 588 (1993), supports the idea that a search may be reasonable without individualized suspicion when privacy interests are minimal and governmental interests are significant.

  • People v. Mendoza, 82 N.Y.2d 415 (1993): Sufficiency of Factual Allegations to Warrant a Suppression Hearing

    People v. Mendoza, 82 N.Y.2d 415 (1993)

    A defendant is entitled to a suppression hearing if their motion papers contain sworn allegations of fact that raise a factual dispute regarding the legality of a search or seizure, considering the context of the case and the information available to the defendant.

    Summary

    The case concerns the requirements for a defendant to obtain a Mapp/Dunaway hearing to challenge the legality of a search and seizure. The defendant, charged with murder, moved to suppress evidence, claiming an unlawful arrest. He argued that he was arrested without probable cause and lacked sufficient information to provide more specific factual allegations. The Court of Appeals held that the defendant’s allegations were sufficient to warrant a hearing, emphasizing that the defendant’s limited access to information, combined with the People’s refusal to disclose the informant’s identity, created a factual dispute requiring resolution at a hearing.

    Facts

    Johnny Speller was stabbed to death on May 30, 2003. The defendant was arrested later that day. The People’s Voluntary Disclosure Form (VDF) stated that a witness picked out the defendant’s photo at 12:45 p.m. The defendant moved to suppress all evidence, claiming he was arrested without a warrant sometime after 12:30 p.m. He denied involvement in the stabbing and claimed he had no knowledge of the police’s basis for his arrest. He argued the police only knew of the stabbing and that his photo was picked out by an unknown witness whose information source was uncertain. The People refused to disclose the informant’s name.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied the Mapp/Dunaway hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the defendant’s conclusory assertions were insufficient to create a factual issue. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the defendant’s motion for a hearing should have been granted, vacated the plea, and remitted the case.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant’s motion for a Mapp/Dunaway hearing on the ground that the defendant failed to present sufficient information to obtain a hearing, where the defendant denied acting as the principal or accomplice, raised a question of fact regarding the timing of his arrest, and challenged the reliability of the alleged witness.

    Holding

    Yes, it was error to deny the hearing because based on the defendant’s factual allegations, it was error to deny the hearing. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division order and remitted the matter to the Supreme Court for further proceedings.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that pursuant to CPL 710.60 (1), a suppression motion must contain sworn allegations of fact stating the grounds for the motion. However, hearings are not automatic. The sufficiency of the factual allegations should be evaluated by the face of the pleadings, assessed in conjunction with the context of the motion, and evaluated by the defendant’s access to information. Here, the defendant alleged he was arrested at sometime after 12:30 p.m. away from where the crime took place. The People disputed this, stating the defendant was not arrested until 7:30 p.m., after being identified by a witness and making statements. The time of arrest is in dispute, and if the defendant was arrested before his arrival at the police station, the only basis for probable cause was the witness identification.

    The Court considered that the People could not both refuse to disclose the informant’s identity, or at least some facts showing a basis for the informant’s knowledge the police relied upon to establish probable cause for the arrest, and insist that the defendant’s averments in his pleadings were insufficient to obtain a Mapp/Dunaway hearing. Without more information, the defendant could do little more than dispute the circumstances surrounding his arrest.

    Quoting from People v. Hightower, “defendant could do little but deny participation in the sale.” Similarly, the Mendoza Court stated that defendant’s lack of access to information precluded more specific factual allegations and created factual disputes, the resolution of which required a hearing.

  • People v. Williams, 7 N.Y.3d 15 (2006): Remedy for Brady Violation at Suppression Hearing

    7 N.Y.3d 15 (2006)

    When a Brady violation occurs at a pretrial suppression hearing, the trial court has discretion to fashion a remedy, including conducting a new hearing where both sides can present new evidence.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of drug charges. A key prosecution witness, Detective Gordon, testified at a suppression hearing but was later revealed to be under investigation for perjury. The prosecution had failed to disclose this impeachment evidence, a Brady violation. The trial court ordered a new suppression hearing, allowing the prosecution to call a new witness (Washington) and the defense to present evidence of Gordon’s potential perjury. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning this remedy. The Court reasoned that the trial court’s remedy was appropriate to determine the truth, not to punish the prosecution.

    Facts

    Detective Gordon testified at a suppression hearing that he observed the defendant engage in a drug transaction. Unbeknownst to the defense, Gordon was under investigation for perjury in an unrelated case for falsely claiming to witness drug activity. The prosecution failed to disclose this investigation during the suppression hearing. At trial, the prosecution did not call Gordon, but the defense sought to call him as a witness. The prosecution then revealed the perjury investigation. The trial court found that a Brady violation occurred because the information about the perjury investigation was not disclosed at the suppression hearing.

    Procedural History

    Defendant moved to suppress evidence, which was denied after a hearing. At trial, the information about the perjury investigation came to light. The trial court ordered a new suppression hearing. After the new hearing, the trial court again denied the suppression motion, finding a new witness credible. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering a new suppression hearing, allowing the prosecution to present a new witness, as a remedy for a Brady violation where the prosecution failed to disclose impeachment evidence regarding its initial witness at the original suppression hearing.

    Holding

    No, because the trial court has broad discretion in fashioning a remedy for a Brady violation, and permitting the prosecution to present a new witness at a new suppression hearing aimed to determine the truth of the matter without unfairly punishing the prosecution or providing a windfall to the defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that while the prosecution’s failure to disclose the perjury investigation was a serious error, not every misjudgment entitles the defendant to a windfall. The trial court’s remedy of a new hearing, where both sides could present evidence, aimed to determine the truth based on the best available evidence. The Court rejected the argument that the new witness’s testimony should have been excluded to punish the prosecution, stating that the Brady rule exists to prevent miscarriages of justice, not to punish society for prosecutorial misdeeds. The Court distinguished this case from precedents where a second chance to present evidence was disallowed because here, the issue was not the sufficiency of the initial proof, but a procedural error that undermined the fairness of the hearing. The Court emphasized that a new hearing is a normal remedy for a procedural error that is not harmless. The Court noted the trial court did not find the People’s misconduct to be willful, and that the record indicated there was probable cause to arrest the defendant regardless of Gordon’s reliability as a witness. “The principle…is not punishment of society for misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused” (Brady, 373 U.S. at 87).

  • People v. Wardlaw, 6 N.Y.3d 556 (2006): Harmless Error Analysis in Right to Counsel Violations at Suppression Hearings

    People v. Wardlaw, 6 N.Y.3d 556 (2006)

    A violation of the right to counsel at a suppression hearing does not automatically require reversal of a conviction if it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless because it did not affect the outcome of the trial.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of rape, sodomy, and related crimes. He sought to suppress statements made to police. At the Huntley hearing, the trial court erroneously allowed him to proceed pro se without proper inquiry. The Appellate Division found this error invalidated the hearing but affirmed the conviction, deeming the error harmless because the evidence of guilt, aside from the statements, was overwhelming. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that while the right to counsel violation tainted the suppression hearing, a new hearing would be pointless as the outcome of the trial would be the same given the strength of the other evidence, especially the DNA evidence.

    Facts

    Defendant was accused of raping his nine-year-old niece. He voluntarily went to the police station and denied the accusations in two written statements. After signing the second statement, an officer informed him that semen was found in his niece’s vagina. The defendant responded with incriminating statements regarding potential DNA evidence. At trial, the victim testified to the assault and medical evidence confirmed the presence of semen matching the defendant’s DNA in the victim’s vagina. The defendant testified and denied any wrongdoing but offered no explanation for the DNA evidence.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in the trial court. He appealed to the Appellate Division, arguing the violation of his right to counsel at the Huntley hearing required reversal. The Appellate Division agreed the hearing was invalid but affirmed the conviction, finding the error harmless due to the overwhelming evidence. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a violation of a defendant’s right to counsel at a suppression hearing requires automatic reversal of a conviction, or whether the harmless error doctrine can apply when the other evidence of guilt is overwhelming and renders the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Holding

    No, the harmless error doctrine can apply in this instance because it was clear beyond a reasonable doubt that suppression of the defendant’s statements would not have changed the outcome of the trial given the strength of the other evidence presented, most notably the DNA evidence, which overwhelmingly established the defendant’s guilt.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that while a violation of the right to counsel at a suppression hearing is a significant error, it does not automatically require reversal if the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court relied on its prior holdings in People v. Slaughter and People v. Carracedo, which established that a new suppression hearing is the ordinary remedy. However, the Court distinguished the present case by finding that a new hearing would be a “pointless exercise” because the other evidence against the defendant, specifically the DNA evidence, was so overwhelming that suppressing the defendant’s statements would not have altered the outcome. The Court emphasized that defendant offered no alternative explanation for the presence of his semen in the victim’s vagina. The Court cautioned that the harmless error rule does not always apply in right to counsel violations, noting that egregious violations may warrant other remedies. However, it found that in this case, applying the harmless error rule served the interests of justice and the victim without unfairly prejudicing the defendant. The court noted, “There is no unfairness to this defendant, for he is entitled to no better result than the best he could have obtained if he had been represented by counsel at the Huntley hearing. Since that result—suppression of his statements to the police—could not have prevented defendant’s conviction, the conviction stands.”

  • People v. Bryant, 8 N.Y.3d 530 (2007): Sufficiency of Allegations to Warrant a Suppression Hearing

    People v. Bryant, 8 N.Y.3d 530 (2007)

    A defendant is not automatically entitled to a Mapp/Dunaway hearing on a suppression motion; the defendant’s factual allegations must be sufficiently specific and detailed to warrant a hearing.

    Summary

    This case clarifies the standard for determining when a defendant is entitled to a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence. The Court of Appeals held that the defendant’s allegations were too conclusory to warrant a hearing because the defendant failed to adequately controvert a post-arrest statement that established probable cause for the arrest. The Court emphasized that the motion’s context, the face of the pleadings, and the defendant’s access to information are relevant factors in evaluating the sufficiency of the allegations.

    Facts

    The defendant, Bryant, was arrested and charged with robbery-related crimes. After his arrest, Bryant provided a written statement to the police, which was disclosed to him along with the People’s voluntary disclosure form. In the statement, Bryant admitted that he knew the police were looking for him because “one of the officers was with” one of the robbery victims, so he ran. He also stated that he threw a gun away before his arrest.

    Procedural History

    Bryant moved to suppress evidence, arguing that his arrest was unlawful. The suppression court denied the Mapp/Dunaway portion of the motion without a hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed the suppression court’s decision. Bryant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the suppression court committed reversible error by denying the defendant’s suppression motion without a hearing, where the defendant’s allegations were deemed too conclusory given the context of the motion and the information available to him.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s allegations in support of his motion were too conclusory to warrant a hearing. His post-arrest statement, disclosed to him, described events close in time and place to one of the charged crimes, and the statement on its face established probable cause for the arrest, which the defendant failed to controvert in his motion papers.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the suppression court did not commit reversible error. The Court relied on People v. Mendoza, 82 NY2d 415, 426 (1993) and People v. Jones, 95 NY2d 721, 728-729 (2001), stating that the decision should be based on “(1) the face of the pleadings, (2) assessed in conjunction with the context of the motion, and (3) defendant’s access to information.” The Court noted that the defendant’s post-arrest statement provided probable cause for his arrest. The statement indicated that Bryant knew the police were looking for him and that he discarded a gun before being apprehended. Because Bryant’s motion papers failed to adequately challenge the probable cause established by his own statement, his allegations were deemed too conclusory to warrant a hearing. The Court reasoned that a hearing is only required when the defendant presents factual allegations that raise a legitimate question about the legality of the police conduct. The court emphasized that a defendant must offer specific factual allegations; mere conclusory statements are insufficient to trigger a hearing.

  • In re George T., 99 N.Y.2d 307 (2002): Juvenile’s Right to a Speedy Trial & Suppression Hearings

    99 N.Y.2d 307 (2002)

    A juvenile’s statutory right to a speedy trial in delinquency proceedings is violated when a suppression hearing is unjustifiably protracted, especially for detained juveniles, and the court improperly insists on calling additional witnesses, delaying the fact-finding hearing.

    Summary

    George T., a juvenile, was charged with criminal possession of marijuana and detained. The Family Court adjourned his suppression hearing multiple times, including a significant delay caused by the court’s insistence on calling an additional witness after the presentment agency rested. This extended the hearing by 47 days. The New York Court of Appeals held that these delays violated George T.’s statutory right to a speedy trial, particularly because he was detained. The Court emphasized the legislative intent for swift dispositions in juvenile cases, reversing the Appellate Division and ordering the petition’s dismissal.

    Facts

    George T. was arrested and charged with an act that would constitute criminal possession of marijuana. He was detained due to being absent without leave from a prior PINS placement. A suppression hearing was scheduled and repeatedly adjourned, often due to scheduling conflicts. Critically, the Family Court directed the presentment agency to call an additional witness (Detective Alvarez) after the agency had rested its case, further delaying the proceedings when Alvarez was unavailable. George T.’s law guardian objected to these delays and requested his release.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court denied George T.’s motion to dismiss based on speedy trial violations and adjudicated him a juvenile delinquent. The Supreme Court initially granted a writ of habeas corpus, but the Appellate Division reversed. The Appellate Division affirmed the Family Court’s order of disposition. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the extensive delays in the suppression hearing, particularly those caused by the Family Court’s insistence on calling an additional witness, violated George T.’s statutory right to a speedy trial under Family Court Act § 340.1.

    Holding

    Yes, because the unjustifiably protracted suppression hearing, including the delay caused by the court’s improper insistence on calling an additional witness, had the effect of eliminating the good cause that had existed and delaying the commencement of the fact-finding hearing for an additional 47 days, thus violating respondent’s speedy trial rights.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the legislative intent behind Family Court Act § 340.1 to provide speedy trials for juveniles, especially those in detention. The Court cited Matter of Frank C., stating that § 340.1 is a “true `speedy trial’ provision” meant to address all sources of delay. While a suppression hearing can be good cause for adjourning a fact-finding hearing, George T. specifically objected to the continuation of the hearing for the additional witness. The court reasoned that Family Court, by directing the presentment agency to call Detective Alvarez and allowing his testimony to be taken piecemeal, caused considerable further delay and violated Family Court Act § 332.2(4), which requires an expedited hearing for detained respondents. The appropriate remedy for a speedy trial violation is dismissal of the petition, as established in Matter of Frank C., and thus, the motion to dismiss should have been granted.

  • People v. Carter, 86 N.Y.2d 721 (1995): Preserving Fourth Amendment Claims on Appeal

    86 N.Y.2d 721 (1995)

    A defendant’s failure to assert standing to challenge a search at the suppression hearing forfeits the right to raise that Fourth Amendment claim on appeal.

    Summary

    Defendant Carter was convicted of drug offenses. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding Carter lacked standing to contest the search of a vehicle. Carter appealed, arguing he had standing under the “automatic standing” rule of People v. Millan. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because Carter failed to raise the standing issue at the suppression hearing, the claim was unpreserved for appellate review. A defendant must assert standing to challenge a search and seizure to preserve the issue for appeal.

    Facts

    Police stopped a vehicle for a traffic violation. Carter was a passenger. A search of the vehicle, conducted with the driver’s consent, revealed a small quantity of powder cocaine in the back seat. All occupants, including Carter, were arrested. A subsequent search of another passenger, Porter, revealed a large amount of crack cocaine. Porter pleaded to a reduced charge and testified before the grand jury. Carter, along with others, was indicted on conspiracy and felony possession charges related to the crack cocaine. Carter was also charged with possession of the powder cocaine found in the car.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Carter. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding Carter lacked standing to contest the vehicle search. Carter appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant, who fails to assert standing to challenge a vehicle search at the suppression hearing, can raise that Fourth Amendment claim for the first time on appeal.

    Holding

    No, because a defendant must assert standing to challenge a search and seizure in order to preserve the issue for appellate review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the established rule that a defendant seeking to suppress evidence obtained via an illegal search must allege standing to challenge the search. If standing is disputed, the defendant bears the burden of establishing it. The Court cited Jones v. United States, People v. Ponder, and People v. Gonzalez in support of this principle. The Court noted that Carter never asserted standing in his omnibus motion or at any point during the suppression proceedings, despite the prosecution consistently contesting his standing. Because Carter failed to raise the standing issue at the trial level, the Court deemed the argument unpreserved for appellate review. The court stated, “In general, a defendant seeking to suppress evidence, on the basis that it was obtained by means of an illegal search, must allege standing to challenge the search and, if the allegation is disputed, must establish standing”. The court emphasized that appellate courts are generally limited to reviewing issues that were properly raised and preserved in the lower courts. The Court considered Carter’s remaining arguments and found them to be without merit, thus affirming the lower court’s decision.