New York Law Review

Tag: Suppressed Confession

  • People v. Tanner, 30 N.Y.2d 102 (1972): Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine and Tainted Confessions

    People v. Tanner, 30 N.Y.2d 102 (1972)

    When a confession is obtained illegally and leads to subsequent statements, those subsequent statements are inadmissible if they are tainted by the initial illegality, applying the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine.

    Summary

    This case concerns the admissibility of statements made by the defendant to Almog after the defendant’s initial police confessions were suppressed. The County Court suppressed Almog’s statements, finding them tainted by the prior inadmissible confessions. The Appellate Division modified this order. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that there was no substantial evidence to overturn the County Court’s determination that the Almog statements were tainted by the illegally obtained police confessions. The Court of Appeals emphasized that the focus should be on whether the Almog statements were derived from exploitation of the initial illegality, not on factors like custodial restraint. The original suppression order was reinstated.

    Facts

    The defendant, Tanner, made confessions to the police which were later suppressed. Subsequently, Tanner spoke with Almog, and made further statements. The prosecution sought to introduce these subsequent statements made to Almog as evidence at trial.

    Procedural History

    The County Court initially suppressed both the police confessions and the statements made to Almog. The Appellate Division modified the suppression order, allowing some of Almog’s statements to be admitted. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and reinstated the County Court’s original order, suppressing all of Almog’s statements.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the statements made by the defendant to Almog were so tainted by the prior, suppressed police confessions as to render them inadmissible under the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Appellate Division erred in modifying the suppression order based on factors not relevant to the taint issue, and there was no substantial evidence to support overturning the County Court’s determination that the Almog statements were tainted.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the principles established in Wong Sun v. United States and Clewis v. Texas to determine whether the Almog statements were admissible. These cases articulate the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine, which holds that evidence derived from an illegal search, seizure, or interrogation is inadmissible. The key question is whether the evidence was obtained by exploitation of the initial illegality or by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. The court found that the Appellate Division incorrectly focused on factors such as the absence of custodial restraint when determining whether the taint from the initial illegal confessions had been dissipated. The proper inquiry is whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. The Court stated it found “no substantial evidence supportive of the Appellate Division’s finding upon reversal of the County Court’s determination.” Therefore, the court reinstated the County Court’s order suppressing the Almog statements, emphasizing that the statements were indeed tainted by the illegally obtained police confessions.

  • Terpstra v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 26 N.Y.2d 70 (1970): Admissibility of Suppressed Confession in Civil Case

    Terpstra v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 26 N.Y.2d 70 (1970)

    A confession suppressed in a criminal trial due to a violation of the right to counsel (Escobedo rule) is not automatically inadmissible in a subsequent civil trial; its admissibility hinges on voluntariness.

    Summary

    In an action to recover on fire insurance policies, the defendant insurers prevailed based on a jury verdict of no cause of action. The key issue was whether a confession of arson, given to the police without prior warning of Escobedo rights and subsequently suppressed in a criminal trial of the insured, could be admitted in the civil trial. The court held that such a confession, if voluntarily given, is admissible. The jury was instructed to disregard the statements if they found them to be involuntary. The court reasoned that constitutional rights are intended as a shield against governmental overreach, not as a means to profit from prior inconsistent statements in civil disputes.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, Terpstra, sought to recover on fire insurance policies after a fire destroyed a building on his farm. During a police interrogation, Terpstra confessed to arson but was denied his request to consult with an attorney, violating his Escobedo rights. At his criminal trial for arson, the confession was suppressed. The insurance companies introduced the confession in the subsequent civil trial to deny the insurance claim, alleging Terpstra intentionally set the fire. Evidence was presented showing Terpstra had previously collected insurance proceeds from other fires on his property. He admitted to agreeing to take a polygraph test and voluntarily going to the police barracks.

    Procedural History

    The trial court admitted Terpstra’s confession and other evidence. The jury returned a verdict of no cause of action, denying Terpstra’s claim. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the trial court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a confession suppressed in a criminal trial due to a violation of Escobedo rights (right to counsel) is automatically inadmissible in a subsequent civil trial where the insured is attempting to recover insurance proceeds for a fire loss.

    Holding

    No, because the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights are designed to protect individuals in criminal cases, not to provide a shield against prior inconsistent statements in civil litigation. The admissibility in the civil trial depends on whether the confession was voluntarily given.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the exclusionary rule stemming from cases like Escobedo and Miranda primarily addresses procedural safeguards related to the right to counsel in criminal proceedings. These safeguards aim to protect against coerced confessions but do not automatically render a confession inadmissible in a civil context if it was otherwise voluntary. The court distinguished between rights violated at the time of the action by government, such as illegal search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment, and rights designed to protect an individual during criminal prosecution such as the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The court stated: “Thus, under the Fourth Amendment, the citizen has a right to be secure in his belongings and this security ought reasonably to extend tó whatever use is to be made of this illegally obtained evidence even if it falls into the hands of private parties for private purposes.”

    The court further reasoned that allowing the suppressed confession in the civil trial does not violate the purpose of the exclusionary rule. The court also noted the admission of evidence regarding Terpstra’s refusal to take a polygraph test and the prior fires was admissible. The court clarified, “The refusal to take the polygraph test in and of itself means nothing. You may, however, consider all of the conversations relating to the polygraph test insofar as that has a bearing upon the alleged admissions made by this plaintiff to the authorities.” The evidence of prior fires was permissible as it bore upon motive.