New York Law Review

Tag: Supporting Deposition

  • People v. Carson, 10 N.Y.3d 433 (2008): Timeliness of Request for Supporting Deposition

    People v. Carson, 10 N.Y.3d 433 (2008)

    A defendant charged with a simplified information may request a supporting deposition before the return date listed on the appearance ticket, as long as the request is made before entering a guilty plea or the commencement of trial, and within thirty days of the return date.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a defendant could request a supporting deposition before the return date on an appearance ticket for a speeding violation. The defendant was ticketed and, the next day, submitted a not guilty plea and a request for a supporting deposition to the Town Court. The Court of Appeals held that the defendant’s request was timely because the statute does not prevent a defendant from requesting a supporting deposition before the return date on the appearance ticket, provided it is done before pleading guilty or the start of trial and within 30 days of the return date.

    Facts

    Defendant was issued a speeding ticket directing him to appear in Webster Town Court on May 14, 2002. The ticket included instructions on how to plead not guilty by mail, including a notice that the defendant was entitled to a supporting deposition if requested within 30 days of the appearance date. The defendant completed the form, indicated he wanted a supporting deposition, and hand-delivered it to the Town Court clerk the day after receiving the ticket. The clerk accepted the plea and request and rescheduled the court date to May 1, 2002. At the arraignment on May 1, the defendant reiterated his not guilty plea and request. He received the supporting deposition on May 31, 2002.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to dismiss the information, arguing that the supporting deposition was untimely because it was served more than 30 days after his initial request on April 22, 2002. The Town Court denied the motion, interpreting the law to mean the defendant could not request the deposition before the return date. The County Court, Appellate Term, reversed, concluding the request was timely on April 22, making the May 31 service untimely. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant charged with a simplified information can make a “timely request” for a supporting deposition before the return date listed on the appearance ticket.

    Holding

    Yes, because nothing in CPL 100.25 or elsewhere prohibits a request prior to this return date so long as the defendant has not pleaded guilty and trial has not started.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 100.25(2) does not compel a defendant to wait until arraignment to request a supporting deposition. The statute allows a request when a defendant is “charged by a simplified information,” and the defendant was charged when ticketed. The Court noted that the defendant satisfied all conditions for a timely request because he asked for the deposition before pleading guilty or commencement of trial, and within 30 days of the date he was directed to appear in court. The court interpreted CPL 100.25(3) and (4) as defining the outside time limit for making a request, not prohibiting earlier requests. The court emphasized that the statute aims to ensure a defendant has enough information to prepare a defense, and there is no logical reason to bar a defendant from seeking this information promptly. “[W]hile a defendant cannot ask for a supporting deposition later than 30 days after the return date on the appearance ticket, nothing in CPL 100.25 or elsewhere prohibits a request prior to this return date so long as the defendant has not pleaded guilty and trial has not started.” The court also referenced the legislative history where the statute was amended to replace “arraigned upon” with “charged by”.

  • In re Desmond J., 93 N.Y.2d 950 (1999): Satisfying Petition Requirements in Juvenile Delinquency Cases Transferred from Criminal Court

    In re Desmond J., 93 N.Y.2d 950 (1999)

    When a juvenile delinquency case is transferred from criminal court to family court, a supporting deposition filed in family court on the juvenile’s first appearance, affirming the allegations in the felony complaint, satisfies the jurisdictional requirements of the Family Court Act.

    Summary

    Desmond J. was charged with rape in the first degree via a felony complaint based on a detective’s hearsay allegations. The case was transferred to Family Court, with a finding of reasonable cause. In Family Court, the presentment agency filed a supporting deposition from the complainant. Desmond argued this was an improper attempt to cure a jurisdictionally defective petition and moved to dismiss. The Court of Appeals held that the deposition, filed at the earliest possible stage in Family Court, satisfied the requirements of the Family Court Act and was not an improper amendment.

    Facts

    Respondent Desmond J., a 14-year-old, was charged with rape in the first degree and related crimes based on a felony complaint containing hearsay allegations from a detective.
    Following arraignment in criminal court, the case was transferred to Family Court “in the interests of justice” under CPL 180.75. The criminal court found reasonable cause to believe Desmond committed the crimes.
    Upon transfer, the felony complaint and supporting papers were “deemed to be” a juvenile delinquency petition in Family Court.
    The complainant signed a supporting deposition affirming the felony complaint’s allegations.
    On Desmond’s first Family Court appearance, the presentment agency filed the deposition.

    Procedural History

    In criminal court, a felony complaint was filed, followed by a transfer to Family Court.
    In Family Court, respondent moved to dismiss, arguing the petition was jurisdictionally defective.
    Family Court denied the motion.
    The Appellate Division affirmed.
    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a supporting deposition filed on the juvenile’s first appearance in Family Court after a case transfer from criminal court satisfies the requirements of Family Court Act § 311.2, or whether it constitutes an improper amendment of the petition under Family Court Act § 311.5.

    Holding

    No, because the supporting deposition was timely filed with the petition under Family Court Act § 311.2 and did not constitute an improper amendment under Family Court Act § 311.5, given that it was filed at the earliest possible stage in Family Court proceedings after the transfer.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Family Court Act § 311.1 (7) deems the felony complaint and transferred papers as satisfying the requirements of § 311.1 (3). While § 311.1 (7) doesn’t explicitly reference the non-hearsay requirement of § 311.2 (3), the Court clarified that supporting depositions can be filed to supplement the petition, as established in Matter of Jahron S., 79 NY2d 632, 638.
    The Court emphasized that “Family Court Act § 311.2 clearly contemplates that * * * supporting depositions may be filed in addition to petitions and that the sufficiency of the petition is to be measured by the factual allegations contained not only in the petition itself but also in any supporting deposition that may be attached to it.”
    The deposition here was timely filed on the date of respondent’s initial appearance in Family Court, the earliest possible stage after the transfer. The Court rejected the argument that the deposition should have been filed earlier in criminal court, deeming such an action “superfluous, if not irregular.” The Court also stated that requiring the case to be delayed in criminal court would contravene legislative intent to provide a removal avenue “as quickly as possible” (Matter of Vega v Bell, 47 NY2d 543, 550).
    Therefore, the deposition was deemed timely filed with the petition (Family Ct Act § 311.2) and not an improper amendment (Family Ct Act § 311.5).

  • In re Edward B., 655 N.E.2d 361 (N.Y. 1995): Facial Sufficiency of Juvenile Petitions and Witness Competency

    In re Edward B., 655 N.E.2d 361 (N.Y. 1995)

    A juvenile delinquency petition is not facially insufficient solely because the supporting deposition is sworn to by a child under 12 years old without a prior judicial determination of the child’s competency as a witness; such a defect is latent, not facial.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a juvenile delinquency petition is facially defective when the only supporting deposition with factual allegations is sworn to by a child under 12 without a prior judicial competency determination. The court held that the petition’s validity is not undermined because the age of the witness is a latent defect, not a facial one. The court reasoned that the notary’s signature affirmed the complainant’s sworn statement, and the petition appeared valid on its face. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision, emphasizing that age is a relevant factor but not a definitive bar to competency.

    Facts

    A juvenile delinquency petition alleged that Edward B., acting with another, committed acts that would constitute sodomy, sexual abuse, unlawful imprisonment, sexual misconduct, and menacing if committed by an adult. The petition was supported by a deposition from the complainant, sworn before a notary public, and a statement from the complainant’s mother stating the complainant’s birth date. The complainant was under 12 years old.

    Procedural History

    The respondent moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the complainant’s age rendered her incapable of submitting a sworn statement without a prior judicial competency determination. Family Court denied the motion. Prior to the fact-finding hearing, the Family Court conducted a voir dire of the complaining witness and determined she understood the difference between truth and lies and appreciated the importance of telling the truth in court. The Family Court adjudicated the respondent a juvenile delinquent. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a juvenile delinquency petition is facially insufficient if it does not explicitly state that a witness under 12 years old was judicially determined competent before swearing to a supporting deposition.

    Holding

    No, because the failure of a petition to state affirmatively that a witness under 12 years of age has been judicially determined competent to swear to a supporting deposition does not render the petition facially insufficient; any defect is latent, not facial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a petition is facially sufficient when non-hearsay allegations in the petition or supporting depositions establish every element of the crime charged and the respondent’s commission thereof, citing Family Court Act § 311.2 (3). The court emphasized that while age is a factor in determining witness capacity, the Family Court Act does not specify age limitations for witnesses swearing to supporting depositions. The court distinguished between facial and latent defects. A facial defect is apparent on the face of the document, whereas a latent defect is not. The court held that because the notary’s signature attested to the complainant’s sworn statement, the petition appeared valid on its face. Any question regarding the complainant’s capacity to swear to the deposition was a latent defect, not requiring dismissal at the outset. The court cited Matter of Edward B., 80 NY2d 458, 465, stating that the failure of a petition to state affirmatively that a witness under 12 years of age has been judicially determined competent to swear to a supporting deposition does not render the petition facially insufficient.

  • People v. Connor, 78 N.Y.2d 520 (1991): Waiver of Defect in Supporting Deposition by Guilty Plea

    People v. Connor, 78 N.Y.2d 520 (1991)

    A defendant who pleads guilty to a traffic violation waives the right to challenge the sufficiency of the factual allegations in the supporting deposition unless the defect is jurisdictional.

    Summary

    Defendant Connor was charged with driving while intoxicated and failure to keep right. He requested and received a supporting deposition, then moved to dismiss the DWI charges, arguing the deposition lacked sufficient factual evidence. The motion was denied, and Connor pleaded guilty to DWI. On appeal, Connor argued the supporting deposition was jurisdictionally defective. The County Court agreed, vacating the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Connor waived his right to challenge the deposition’s sufficiency by pleading guilty, as the alleged defect was not jurisdictional. The court relied on precedent establishing that most defects in accusatory instruments are waived by a guilty plea.

    Facts

    On October 2, 1990, Deputy Johnson issued Connor traffic tickets for failure to keep right and two counts of DWI.

    The supporting deposition stated Connor was speeding (71 mph) and driving more than 50% in the officer’s lane.

    Deputy Johnson also stated he smelled alcohol when he approached Connor’s car.

    Connor moved to dismiss the DWI charges, arguing the deposition lacked factual evidence to establish reasonable cause he was intoxicated.

    Procedural History

    The Town Justice Court denied Connor’s motion to dismiss.

    Connor pleaded guilty to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(2) (driving with .10% or more blood alcohol content).

    The Cattaraugus County Court reversed, finding the supporting deposition jurisdictionally defective and not waived by the guilty plea.

    The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant, by pleading guilty to a traffic violation, waives the right to argue that the factual allegations in the supporting deposition are insufficient to establish reasonable cause to believe the defendant committed the offense, when that alleged insufficiency is not a jurisdictional defect?

    Holding

    Yes, because a guilty plea forfeits the right to renew most arguments made before the plea, including claimed deficiencies in jurisdictionally sufficient accusatory instruments; the defect alleged here is not jurisdictional and was therefore waived.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the principle established in People v. Taylor, that a guilty plea waives many pre-plea arguments, including deficiencies in accusatory instruments that are not jurisdictionally defective.

    The court distinguished between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional defects, stating that only the former survive a guilty plea.

    The court found People v. Key controlling. In Key, the Court held that the absence of a factual allegation in a supporting deposition for a DWI charge was waivable because a simplified traffic information can proceed without a supporting deposition if one isn’t requested.

    The court quoted Key: “[e]ven if, despite the CPL provisions, there be some defects in accusatory instruments that may never be waived, the defect in this case is not of that class.”

    Therefore, Connor waived his right to challenge the sufficiency of the supporting deposition by pleading guilty.

    The court explicitly declined to determine whether the factual allegations in the supporting deposition actually provided reasonable cause, because the issue had been waived.

  • People v. Nuccio, 78 N.Y.2d 102 (1991): Reprosecution After Dismissal of Simplified Information

    People v. Nuccio, 78 N.Y.2d 102 (1991)

    The dismissal of a simplified traffic information for failure to provide a supporting deposition does not bar subsequent prosecution of the same charges via a long-form information.

    Summary

    Nuccio was initially charged with driving while intoxicated via a simplified traffic information. After the prosecution failed to provide supporting depositions as requested, the trial court dismissed the information. The prosecution then filed a long-form information for the same offenses. The New York Court of Appeals held that the dismissal of the simplified information did not bar subsequent prosecution via the long-form information because the Criminal Procedure Law does not prohibit such reprosecution, and the legislative history indicates an intent to allow it for non-felony charges dismissed for legal insufficiency.

    Facts

    Defendant Nuccio was charged with driving while intoxicated and other traffic infractions via a simplified traffic information.
    At arraignment, Nuccio requested supporting depositions from the People.
    The People failed to provide the requested depositions.
    Based on the failure to provide supporting depositions, the trial court dismissed the simplified information.
    On the same day, the People filed a long-form information, executed by the arresting officer, charging the same offenses.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Nuccio’s motion to dismiss the new long-form information.
    Nuccio pleaded guilty to driving while intoxicated and failure to keep right.
    On appeal, the County Court reversed the convictions and dismissed the information, holding that reprosecution was barred by the prior dismissal.
    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the County Court’s order and reinstated the original judgment of conviction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether charges in a local criminal court may be prosecuted by a sufficient long-form information after a prior simplified information, charging the same offenses, has been dismissed for failure to supply the supporting depositions required by CPL 100.25 (2).

    Holding

    Yes, because the Criminal Procedure Law does not prohibit it, and the legislative history suggests the legislature intentionally omitted a bar to reprosecution for non-felony charges dismissed for legal insufficiency.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that at common law, a prosecutor was not barred from resubmitting charges unless double jeopardy applied. The Legislature has regulated criminal procedure, sometimes limiting the People’s power to resubmit charges to prevent prosecutorial abuses. The court noted the distinction between the treatment of indictments and informations in the Criminal Procedure Law. Specifically, the provisions of the former Code of Criminal Procedure prohibiting reprosecution were transferred to CPL 210.20 (4), a section dealing exclusively with the dismissal of an indictment, without a similar provision prohibiting the reprosecution of charges contained in a dismissed information. The court stated, “We conclude, therefore, that the different treatment accorded indictments and informations in the statute manifests the Legislature’s intention to permit reprosecution for nonfelony charges when the information is dismissed for legal insufficiency.” Further, double jeopardy was not a bar because “reprosecution is permitted whenever a dismissal has been granted on motion by defendant, so long as the dismissal does not constitute an adjudication on the facts going to guilt or innocence.” The simplified information was dismissed for legal insufficiency, not based on an adjudication of guilt or innocence.

  • People v. Thill, 75 N.Y.2d 895 (1990): Enforcing Deadlines for Pretrial Motions

    People v. Thill, 75 N.Y.2d 895 (1990)

    A motion to dismiss based on a defect in the accusatory instrument is waived if not made within the statutory time limit for pretrial motions, unless an extension is granted.

    Summary

    Defendant Thill was convicted in Town Court of speeding and driving while intoxicated. He appealed to the County Court, which reversed both convictions. The Court of Appeals considered whether the County Court properly dismissed the speeding conviction based on an insufficient supporting deposition, given that Thill’s motion to dismiss was untimely under CPL 255.20(1). The Court of Appeals held that because the motion was filed beyond the statutory deadline without a request for an extension, the Town Court’s denial of the motion was proper. The Court of Appeals reinstated the speeding conviction.

    Facts

    The defendant was arrested and charged with speeding and driving while intoxicated. The defendant was arraigned. More than three months after his arraignment, the defendant moved to dismiss the speeding charge, arguing the supporting deposition was insufficient because it failed to specify the speed limit he allegedly violated. The defendant did not request an extension of time to file the motion.

    Procedural History

    The Town Court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss as untimely. The defendant was convicted of both speeding and driving while intoxicated in the Town Court. The Chautauqua County Court reversed both convictions. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the County Court erred in dismissing the speeding conviction when the defendant’s motion to dismiss was filed outside the statutory time limit for pre-trial motions without an extension, based on an alleged defect in the supporting deposition.

    Holding

    Yes, because CPL 255.20(1) requires pre-trial motions to be filed within forty-five days of arraignment, or within such additional time as the court may fix upon application of the defendant, and the defendant did not comply with this requirement.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the procedural requirements of CPL 255.20(1), which sets a deadline for pre-trial motions. The court emphasized that the defendant’s motion to dismiss the speeding charge was made over three months after his arraignment. The court noted that the defendant failed to request an extension of time to file the motion, and therefore, the Town Court properly denied the motion as untimely. The Court relied on People v. Key, 45 NY2d 111, 116, which reinforces the importance of adhering to statutory deadlines for pre-trial motions. The Court stated, “CPL 255.20 (1) provides that ‘all pre-trial motions shall be served or filed within forty-five days after arraignment * * * or within such additional time as the court may fix upon application of the defendant’. Defendant’s motion to dismiss was made over three months after his arraignment and he did not request an extension of time. Hence, the Town Court properly denied defendant’s motion as untimely”. By reinstating the speeding conviction, the Court reinforced the principle that procedural rules must be followed, and failure to comply with statutory deadlines can result in waiver of legal arguments.

  • People v. Филипс, 69 N.Y.2d 411 (1987): Sufficiency of a Standardized DWI Supporting Deposition

    People v. Филипс, 69 N.Y.2d 411 (1987)

    A preprinted supporting deposition form containing check marks indicating observed conditions and behaviors can satisfy the factual allegation requirements of CPL 100.20 and 100.25(2) in a DWI case.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a standardized, preprinted supporting deposition used in a DWI case, which utilized check marks to indicate observations of the defendant’s condition, was sufficient to meet the requirements of CPL 100.20 and 100.25(2). The court reasoned that the check marks adequately communicated factual allegations supporting the charge of driving while intoxicated. The court reversed the lower courts’ decisions, which had dismissed the charge based on the perceived insufficiency of the deposition form. This case clarifies that supporting depositions do not necessarily require narrative descriptions, so long as they provide reasonable cause to believe the defendant committed the charged offense.

    Facts

    On September 20, 1985, the defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated (DWI). The People served and filed a supporting deposition using a preprinted form labeled “Supporting Deposition & DWI Bill of Particulars & 710.30 Notice.” This form contained spaces for general information, chemical test results, and a checklist of police observations regarding the defendant’s behavior before and after the stop. The arresting officer marked boxes next to observations he deemed applicable to the defendant.

    Procedural History

    The Town Court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress the supporting deposition, deeming it insufficient because it was a checklist and did not contain factual allegations in the officer’s own words. Consequently, the Town Court dismissed the DWI charge under CPL 30.30, finding that the People’s statement of readiness was a nullity because it was based on the insufficient deposition. The County Court affirmed the Town Court’s decision. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals by leave of a Judge of that court.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a preprinted supporting deposition form, using check marks to indicate observations, contains sufficient factual allegations to satisfy the requirements of CPL 100.20 and 100.25(2) for a DWI charge.

    Holding

    Yes, because the check marks on the preprinted form effectively communicate factual allegations of an evidentiary character that support the DWI charge and provide reasonable cause to believe the defendant committed the offense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a supporting deposition must be a written instrument containing factual allegations of an evidentiary character that supplement the accusatory instrument and provide reasonable cause to believe the defendant committed the offense. The court stated, “Here, the factual statements in the deposition are communicated by check marks made in boxes next to the applicable conditions and observations signifying the complainant’s allegations as to the existence of those conditions and the truth of those observations. We hold such signification sufficient to meet the requirements of CPL 100.20.” The court found that the deposition, which alleged erratic driving, speeding, glassy eyes, slurred speech, impaired motor coordination, a smell of alcohol, and the defendant’s admission to drinking and driving between bars, met the statutory requirements. The court emphasized that the form contained sufficient factual allegations to provide reasonable cause to believe the defendant was intoxicated while driving. The court effectively validated a standardized approach to drafting supporting depositions in DWI cases, streamlining the process for law enforcement. There were no dissenting or concurring opinions noted.