New York Law Review

Tag: Supplemental Charge

  • People v. Womack, 73 N.Y.2d 877 (1989): Notes Taken by Juror During Supplemental Charge

    People v. Womack, 73 N.Y.2d 877 (1989)

    A juror taking notes during a supplemental charge and bringing those notes into deliberations is reversible error if defense counsel objects, because it is akin to providing the jury with unconsented written instructions.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a trial court committed reversible error by allowing a juror to bring notes taken during a supplemental charge into the jury room over defense counsel’s objection. The Court of Appeals held that permitting the juror to bring notes from the supplemental charge was not reversible error, especially since the supplemental instruction explained relevant concepts and the court provided cautionary instructions. However, the dissent argued that allowing the notes was akin to giving the jury written instructions without consent, which is per se reversible error.

    Facts

    During the trial for robbery, the jury requested a supplemental charge on the elements of first and second-degree robbery. The judge provided the supplemental charge. One of the jurors took notes during the supplemental instruction. Over defense counsel’s objection, the trial court allowed the juror to bring these notes into the jury room during deliberations. The defendants were subsequently convicted.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were convicted at trial. The defense appealed, arguing that allowing the juror to bring notes into deliberation after the supplemental charge was reversible error. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the trial court did not commit reversible error. The dissent argued for reversal and a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether it is per se reversible error for a trial court to permit jurors to bring notes taken by a juror during the court’s supplemental charge on the elements of a crime into the jury room, over the objection of defense counsel.

    Holding

    No, because the trial court’s supplemental instruction was not simply a recitation of the statutory elements, but an explanation of the relevant concepts, and the court provided cautionary instructions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The majority reasoned that the trial court’s supplemental instruction was more than just a recitation of statutory elements; it explained the relevant concepts. Additionally, the trial court gave cautionary instructions, which presumably lessened any potential prejudice. The court distinguished the situation from providing written copies of statutory elements without consent, stating that the supplemental instruction involved explanation and context. The dissent argued that allowing juror notes was functionally equivalent to providing the jury with written instructions without consent, which prior case law considers per se reversible error. Quoting People v Owens, 69 NY2d 585, 591, the dissent emphasized the danger that “the written instructions…may be given undue emphasis…by their physical presence in the jury room, as the oral instructions fade from memory.” The dissent argued the cautionary instructions were insufficient to alleviate this prejudice.

  • People v. Malloy, 55 N.Y.2d 296 (1982): Adequacy of Reasonable Doubt Jury Instructions

    People v. Malloy, 55 N.Y.2d 296 (1982)

    When a jury requests clarification on the meaning of reasonable doubt and the original instruction was adequate, it is not error for the trial judge to respond by rereading the original instruction.

    Summary

    Malloy was convicted of robbery and unlawful imprisonment. During deliberations, the jury requested clarification of “reasonable doubt.” The judge reread the original charge. Malloy appealed, arguing this was inadequate and made a subsequent Allen charge coercive. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court has discretion in responding to jury inquiries. Rereading the original charge was sufficient because the original instruction was adequate and the jury did not express further confusion after it was repeated. The court emphasized that while a per se rule against rereading instructions isn’t appropriate, further inquiry may be required if the jury indicates continued confusion.

    Facts

    Victor Licciardi, Dean Kopp, and Jay Kopp were transporting furs when they were forced to stop by a blue van. The van’s driver, later identified as Malloy, pointed a gun at them. Malloy, with accomplices, handcuffed the Kopps in the van and questioned Licciardi about the truck’s security before forcing him into the van. The victims were later released and described Malloy to the police. The victims participated in photo arrays, some deemed suggestive, but the court found independent bases for later lineup and in-court identifications.

    Procedural History

    Malloy was convicted at trial. He appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the conviction. A dissenting justice disagreed with the majority’s finding that the Kopps had an independent basis for their identifications. Malloy then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the witnesses’ in-court identifications were tainted by suggestive pre-trial identification procedures, requiring suppression.

    2. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by responding to the jury’s request for clarification of “reasonable doubt” by rereading the original charge.

    Holding

    1. No, because there was an independent basis for the in-court identifications.

    2. No, because the original charge was adequate and the jury did not express further confusion after it was repeated.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the in-court identifications, the Court of Appeals held that the determination of an independent basis is a factual one, involving an evaluation of the totality of circumstances. Since the Appellate Division upheld the trial court’s finding of an independent source, and the record supported that finding, the Court of Appeals was bound by that determination. The court cited People v Adams, 53 NY2d 241, 248, noting its limited power to review such findings.

    Concerning the jury instruction, the court acknowledged the trial court’s duty to provide meaningful supplemental instructions, citing People v Gonzalez, 293 NY 259, 262. However, the court clarified that it has never adopted a per se rule prohibiting rereading the original charge. The court emphasized that CPL 310.30 grants the trial court discretion in framing its response, as long as it responds meaningfully to the jury’s request. “the court fails to give information requested upon a vital point…an omission cannot be ignored” (People v Gonzalez, 293 NY, at p 263). The factors to be considered are the form of the question, the issue raised, the instruction given, and prejudice to the defendant.

    Here, the original charge on reasonable doubt was adequate. The court noted that “the concept of reasonable doubt itself defies precise definition” and must be described in general terms. Rereading the original charge was deemed sufficient because the jury did not express further confusion. The court distinguished this case from People v Gonzalez, where the jury specifically requested clarification on a critical element (premeditation) and the court refused to answer directly. The court cautioned that if a jury expresses further need for instruction after the original charge is repeated, it may be error simply to repeat the charge again.