New York Law Review

Tag: Superseding Cause

  • Kush v. City of New York, 76 N.Y.2d 831 (1990): Superseding Cause in Negligence

    Kush v. City of New York, 76 N.Y.2d 831 (1990)

    An intervening act will be deemed a superseding cause and relieve a defendant of liability if the act is of such an extraordinary nature or so attenuates the defendant’s negligence from the ultimate injury that responsibility for the injury may not be reasonably attributed to the defendant.

    Summary

    Plaintiff, a construction worker, was injured after jumping from a stalled elevator. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division order, granting summary judgment to the defendants. The Court held that the plaintiff’s act of jumping out of the stalled elevator was not foreseeable in the normal course of events resulting from the defendants’ alleged negligence, thereby constituting a superseding cause that relieved the defendants of liability. The court emphasized that the plaintiff, an experienced worker, was not in imminent danger and was aware that assistance had been requested.

    Facts

    Shortly after 7:30 a.m., the plaintiff, a carpenter, entered a freight elevator with 25-30 other construction workers. The elevator stalled six feet above the lobby floor. The elevator operator immediately called for assistance. The elevator remained lit, motionless, and quiet. After 10-15 minutes, two workers manually opened the elevator doors and jumped to the lobby floor. Subsequently, the plaintiff jumped, landing on his heels and claiming injury.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff brought a negligence and Labor Law action against the property’s lessee, general contractor, the contractor that hired plaintiff’s company, and the elevator manufacturer. The Supreme Court dismissed Labor Law claims but did not dismiss the negligence claims, finding the plaintiff’s conduct was not a superseding cause. The Appellate Division dismissed the Labor Law § 240(1) claim but affirmed the lower court regarding negligence claims. Two dissenting judges argued the jump was a superseding cause. The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the plaintiff’s act of jumping from a stalled elevator six feet above the lobby floor constitutes a superseding cause that relieves the defendants of liability for the plaintiff’s injuries.

    Holding

    Yes, because the plaintiff’s act of jumping was not a foreseeable consequence of the defendants’ alleged negligence under the circumstances.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the plaintiff’s jump was not foreseeable given the circumstances. The plaintiff was an experienced worker, not in immediate danger, and aware that help had been summoned. The court distinguished this case from Humbach v. Goldstein, where passengers were trapped in a stalled elevator and unable to get assistance, creating an emergency situation. The Court emphasized that the elevator was lit, quiet and had come to a smooth stop. The fact that other workers had previously jumped without injury did not make the plaintiff’s conduct more foreseeable or less risky. “As a matter of law, plaintiff’s act of jumping out of a stalled elevator six feet above the lobby floor after the elevator’s doors had been opened manually was not foreseeable in the normal course of events resulting from defendants’ alleged negligence.” Therefore, the plaintiff’s jump superseded the defendants’ conduct and terminated their liability for his injuries. The court reiterated the principle established in Jackson v Greene, 201 NY 76, 79 and Boltax v Joy Day Camp, 67 NY2d 617 regarding superseding causes.

  • People v. Cable, 652 N.E.2d 919 (N.Y. 1995): Establishing Causation in Homicide Cases

    People v. Cable, 652 N.E.2d 919 (N.Y. 1995)

    A defendant is criminally liable for the death of a victim if their conduct was a contributory cause, even if a subsequent event also contributed to the death, provided the initial conduct was a sufficiently direct cause.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction for manslaughter, holding that his assault on the victim was a contributory cause of her death, despite a physician’s subsequent removal of her breathing tube. The court emphasized that the defendant failed to properly preserve the issue of superseding cause for appeal. The evidence overwhelmingly showed that the defendant’s actions directly contributed to the victim’s death. Because the defendant did not object to the jury instructions or move for dismissal on the grounds of superseding cause before the jury deliberated, his appellate argument was not properly preserved for review.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree and criminal trespass in the second degree after severely beating the victim. As a result of the beating, the victim was comatose and placed on life support. Subsequently, at the direction of the victim’s family, a physician removed her breathing tube, leading to her death.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted by a jury. He then moved to set aside the manslaughter conviction, arguing that the physician’s removal of the breathing tube was a superseding cause that relieved him of liability. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the judgment of conviction. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the physician’s removal of the breathing tube from the comatose victim constituted a superseding cause that relieved the defendant of criminal liability for manslaughter, where the defendant’s initial assault contributed to the victim’s condition.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant failed to preserve the issue for appellate review by objecting to the jury instructions or moving for dismissal on the basis of superseding cause before the case was submitted to the jury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, but primarily on procedural grounds. The Court emphasized that the defendant never objected to the trial court’s omission of the superseding cause issue in its jury charge, nor did he move to dismiss on that basis before the case was submitted to the jury. According to the court, “Defendant did not preserve the argument by raising it, for the first time, in his motion to set aside the verdict.” The court cited CPL 470.05 [2] and People v. Robinson, 88 NY2d 1000, 1002, noting that the defendant’s objection was therefore unreviewable. While the Appellate Division addressed the merits, finding overwhelming evidence that the defendant’s conduct was an actual contributory cause of death (citing Matter of Anthony M., 63 NY2d 270, 280), the Court of Appeals avoided ruling on the merits of the superseding cause argument due to the lack of preservation. The court’s decision underscores the importance of raising objections and motions at the appropriate time during trial to preserve issues for appellate review. The court implied that, procedurally, the initial determination of causation rests on establishing that the defendant’s actions were a contributory factor in the victim’s death. Any arguments related to superseding causes must be timely raised to be considered.

  • Ziecker v. Town of Orchard Park, 75 N.Y.2d 761 (1989): Determining Proximate Cause in Negligence Claims

    Ziecker v. Town of Orchard Park, 75 N.Y.2d 761 (1989)

    In a negligence action, the determination of proximate cause is generally a question of fact for the jury, provided the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of negligence.

    Summary

    Plaintiff sued the Town of Orchard Park for negligence after sustaining injuries from diving into a lake, alleging failure to warn of shallow water and improper maintenance of the lake bottom. The jury found the plaintiff 70% liable but awarded him $4,500,000. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the plaintiff’s dive an unforeseeable superseding cause. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude the plaintiff’s actions were not reckless and thus not a superseding cause, remitting the case to the Appellate Division to consider other unresolved issues.

    Facts

    The plaintiff dove into Green Lake, a man-made lake in the Town of Orchard Park, and sustained injuries. The plaintiff alleged negligence on the part of the defendant, the Town of Orchard Park, for failing to warn against diving due to shallow water. He also claimed the Town was negligent in maintaining the lake bottom, alleging a failure to preserve its natural slope and keep it free of debris like silt, rocks, and tree limbs.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff initially won a jury verdict. The jury found the plaintiff 70% liable for his injuries but awarded him $4,500,000 of a total $15,000,000. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s decision and dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint, concluding that the plaintiff’s diving was an unforeseeable superseding cause that barred the defendant’s liability. The New York Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division’s decision and remitted the case back to the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the plaintiff made out a prima facie case of negligence against the defendant, or whether the plaintiff’s conduct was a superseding cause absolving the defendant of liability as a matter of law.

    Holding

    No, because there was sufficient evidence in the record from which the jury could have rationally concluded that the plaintiff was not aware of the depth of the water at the point he dove and, accordingly, the plaintiff’s conduct was not reckless and not a superseding cause absolving the defendant from liability.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that when an appellate division dismisses a complaint as a matter of law after a jury verdict, the standard of review requires examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. The court must determine if there is any valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences that could lead rational jurors to the conclusion reached. Quoting Cohen v. Hallmark Cards, the court stated that it could not conclude that the verdict is not supported by the evidence as a matter of law if “it would not be utterly irrational for a jury to reach the result it has determined upon.” The court cited Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., emphasizing that proximate cause is generally a question for the fact-finder, once a prima facie case is established. The court found sufficient evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that the plaintiff was unaware of the water’s depth, making his conduct not reckless. Consequently, the court held the plaintiff’s actions were not a superseding cause that would absolve the defendant of liability. The court cited Restatement (Second) of Torts § 443 and Denkensohn v. Davenport, to support the position that the plaintiff’s actions did not break the chain of causation. The court remitted the case to the Appellate Division to address unresolved issues, indicating the Appellate Division’s initial decision focused solely on the superseding cause argument, leaving other potential grounds for appeal unaddressed.

  • Kriz v. Schum, 75 N.Y.2d 25 (1989): Foreseeability and Superseding Cause in Pool Accident Liability

    75 N.Y.2d 25 (1989)

    In negligence cases involving pool accidents, the issue of legal causation is generally a question of fact for the jury, especially when foreseeability and the existence of superseding causes are disputed.

    Summary

    These consolidated cases involve plaintiffs injured in pool accidents, raising the issue of whether their reckless conduct was the sole legal cause of their injuries. The court held that summary judgment was inappropriate in both cases. In Kriz, sliding headfirst down a pool slide was not, as a matter of law, an unforeseeable use of the slide. In Denkensohn, diving from a slide into water of unknown depth, even with negligent assurances from a companion, did not automatically constitute a superseding cause. The court emphasized that foreseeability and superseding cause are generally factual issues for a jury.

    Facts

    In Kriz v. Schum, Julia Kriz was injured sliding headfirst into a shallow above-ground pool. She had previously slid down in a seated position and then headfirst without incident. The pool’s water level was about shoulder height on her. On her final slide, she went headfirst through an inner tube, hitting her head on the bottom. The slide lacked warning labels, and Kriz sued the pool owners, retailer, and manufacturer.

    In Denkensohn v. Davenport, Sheri Denkensohn dove from a pool slide into shallow water at night. The pool was poorly lit. She asked if it was safe to dive and was told that it was. She had never been to the Davenport home before and could not determine the water’s depth. The slide lacked warning decals.

    Procedural History

    In Kriz, the Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the Schums but not to Clover Pool Supply. The Appellate Division modified, granting summary judgment to Clover. The plaintiff appealed.

    In Denkensohn, the Supreme Court granted summary judgment to Pacific Pools, Archie Lawrence, and Seaboard. The Appellate Division modified, denying summary judgment to Seaboard and Archie Lawrence. Seaboard and Archie Lawrence appealed by leave of the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    1. In Kriz: Whether the plaintiff’s conduct in sliding headfirst down the pool slide was the sole legal cause of her injuries, precluding a finding of negligence on the part of the defendants.

    2. In Denkensohn: Whether the plaintiff’s conduct in diving from the top of the pool slide, combined with the actions of her companion, constituted a superseding cause of her injuries, relieving the defendants of liability.

    Holding

    1. In Kriz: No, because there was evidence that headfirst sliding was a foreseeable use of the slide, and whether the defendants’ failure to warn was a legal cause of her injuries is a question of fact.

    2. In Denkensohn: No, because a jury could find that the plaintiff’s dive was not reckless, given that she did not know the water’s depth, and her conduct cannot automatically be deemed a superseding cause.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished these cases from prior decisions like Howard v. Poseidon Pools, where the plaintiff’s reckless conduct was the sole legal cause of injury because they knew the water was shallow. The Court emphasized that summary judgment is only appropriate when the record eliminates any legal cause other than the plaintiff’s recklessness. Regarding foreseeability, the court noted, “while a plaintiff need not demonstrate ‘that the precise manner in which the accident happened, or the extent of injuries, was foreseeable’ to establish that the defendant’s negligence was a substantial cause of his or her injuries…, the undisputed facts…failed to demonstrate even the possibility that any event other than the plaintiffs own reckless conduct caused the injuries.”

    In Kriz, the Court found that headfirst sliding was a foreseeable use of the slide, citing the president of Aqua Slide’s testimony and the CPSC standards requiring warnings. In Denkensohn, the Court noted that the plaintiff did not know the water’s depth, distinguishing it from cases where the plaintiff knowingly dove into shallow water. The court stated that, “a superseding act does not break the causal nexus unless it is ‘an intervening act * * * extraordinary under the circumstances, not foreseeable in the normal course of events, or independent of or far removed from the defendant’s conduct”.

  • Kush v. City of Buffalo, 59 N.Y.2d 619 (1983): Superseding Negligence and Unforeseeable Actions

    Kush v. City of Buffalo, 59 N.Y.2d 619 (1983)

    An intervening act, particularly one involving reckless conduct by the plaintiff, may constitute a superseding cause that absolves the defendant of liability, even if the defendant’s negligence contributed to the plaintiff’s injuries.

    Summary

    The case concerns a plaintiff who sustained injuries after diving headfirst into a shallow swimming pool owned by the City of Buffalo. The plaintiff sued the city, alleging negligence in allowing trespassers into the pool area, maintaining the pool at a dangerously low water level, and placing a lifeguard chair near the shallow end. The New York Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff’s reckless act of diving headfirst into shallow water, despite being an experienced swimmer familiar with the pool’s water levels, was an unforeseeable, superseding cause that relieved the city of liability. The court emphasized that legal cause can be decided as a matter of law when only one conclusion can be drawn from the established facts.

    Facts

    The City of Buffalo owned and operated a swimming pool.

    The pool was allegedly negligently maintained: trespassers gained entry, the water level was dangerously low, and a lifeguard chair was placed near the shallow end.

    The plaintiff, an adult experienced in swimming, was aware of the general dangers of diving and familiar with the various water levels throughout the pool.

    The plaintiff chose to dive headfirst from the lifeguard chair into the shallow end of the pool and sustained injuries.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff sued the City of Buffalo, alleging negligence.

    The defendant moved for summary judgment.

    The lower court denied the motion, but the Appellate Division reversed and granted summary judgment to the defendant, finding the plaintiff’s actions to be a superseding cause.

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the plaintiff’s reckless conduct of diving headfirst into a shallow pool, despite his awareness of the dangers and water levels, constitutes an unforeseeable superseding event that absolves the defendant of liability for negligence.

    Holding

    Yes, because the plaintiff’s reckless conduct, as an adult experienced in swimming and aware of the water levels, was an unforeseeable superseding event that broke the chain of causation between the defendant’s alleged negligence and the plaintiff’s injuries.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that to establish a prima facie case of negligence, the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s negligence was a substantial cause of the injury. The court cited Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., stating that when an intervening act contributes to the injury, liability depends on whether the intervening act is a normal or foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s negligence.

    Even assuming the City’s negligence contributed to the injury, the court found that the plaintiff’s reckless dive was an unforeseeable superseding event. The court emphasized the plaintiff’s experience as a swimmer and his knowledge of the pool’s varying water levels. The court quoted Basso v. Miller, stating that “foreseeability shall be a measure of (a landowner’s) liability”.

    The court adopted the Restatement’s view on superseding cause, noting that an intervening act can break the chain of causation if it is extraordinary under the circumstances. The court concluded that only one conclusion could be drawn from the established facts; therefore, the question of legal cause could be decided as a matter of law. The court reasoned that a reasonable person would not expect an experienced swimmer, aware of the dangers and water levels, to dive headfirst into the shallow end of a pool.

    The court held that the plaintiff’s own reckless conduct absolved the defendants of liability, as it was an unforeseeable and superseding cause of his injuries. As the court noted, “[W]here only one conclusion may be drawn from the established facts * * * the question of legal cause may be decided as a matter of law”.