New York Law Review

Tag: summary judgment

  • Gaddy v. Eyler, 79 N.Y.2d 955 (1992): Establishing Serious Injury Under New York’s No-Fault Law

    Gaddy v. Eyler, 79 N.Y.2d 955 (1992)

    Under New York’s No-Fault Insurance Law, to defeat a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must present objective evidence demonstrating a ‘serious injury’ as defined by the statute, showing more than minor limitations or subjective complaints of pain.

    Summary

    Gaddy was involved in a car accident and sued for personal injuries. Eyler, the defendant, moved for summary judgment, arguing Gaddy did not sustain a ‘serious injury’ as defined by Insurance Law § 5102(d). The Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the defendant. Even accepting Gaddy’s claims and her doctors’ reports as true, the court held that she failed to demonstrate a ‘permanent consequential limitation,’ a ‘significant limitation,’ or a substantial curtailment of daily activities for 90 out of 180 days following the accident. The court emphasized the need for objective evidence to substantiate claims of serious injury under the No-Fault Law.

    Facts

    Gaddy was involved in a motor vehicle accident in June 1987, when her car was rear-ended while she was stopped at a red light.

    She claimed neck and back injuries resulting in a ‘permanent consequential limitation of use’ or ‘significant limitation of use,’ ‘permanent loss of use of a body organ, member, function or system,’ and a ‘medically determined injury or impairment of a non-permanent nature’ which lasted for 90 days or more, substantially limiting her daily activities.

    Her doctors diagnosed chronic cervical and lumbosacral sprain and strain as a result of the accident.

    Procedural History

    After Gaddy sued, Eyler moved for summary judgment, arguing the absence of a ‘serious injury’ under Insurance Law § 5102(d), supporting the motion with a physician’s affidavit indicating a normal neurological examination for Gaddy.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment to Eyler, finding that Gaddy failed to demonstrate a ‘serious injury’ as required by the No-Fault Insurance Law.

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate a ‘permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member’ or a ‘significant limitation of use of a body function or system’ within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d)?

    2. Whether the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate a ‘permanent loss of use of a body organ, member, function or system’ within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d)?

    3. Whether the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that she suffered an injury which prevented her from performing substantially all of her daily activities for 90 out of the 180 days following the accident, as required by Insurance Law § 5102(d)?

    Holding

    1. No, because the plaintiff’s doctors only concluded that she had a minor limitation of movement in her neck and back, which is considered insignificant under the no-fault statute.

    2. No, because while there was evidence of the plaintiff’s subjective pain, there was no objective evidence supporting a claim of permanency, and the neurosurgeon’s statements were speculative.

    3. No, because the plaintiff only experienced a slight impediment to her usual activities; she missed only two working days and was able to maintain most of her daily routine, and she provided no evidence to support her claim that her household and recreational activities were curtailed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that to overcome a summary judgment motion in a No-Fault case, the plaintiff must present objective evidence demonstrating a ‘serious injury’ as defined by the statute. The court emphasized that a ‘minor, mild or slight limitation of use’ is considered insignificant under the statute, citing Licari v Elliott, 57 NY2d 230, 236. Regarding the claim of ‘permanent loss of use,’ the court found the plaintiff’s evidence, particularly the neurosurgeon’s speculative statements, insufficient to establish permanency. The court noted, “the expert’s statements reflect the speculative nature of plaintiff’s condition.” Furthermore, the court dismissed the treating physician’s affidavit as consisting of conclusory assertions tailored to meet statutory requirements. Finally, regarding the 90/180-day rule, the court stated that the plaintiff must prove she was “curtailed from performing [her] usual activities to a great extent rather than some slight curtailment” (Licari v Elliott, supra, at 236). Because the plaintiff only experienced a slight impediment to her usual activities, she failed to meet this threshold. The court emphasized the need for objective evidence and a substantial curtailment of activities to meet the statutory threshold for a ‘serious injury.’

  • Diaz v. New York Downtown Hospital, 99 N.Y.2d 542 (2002): Sufficiency of Expert Testimony to Rebut Summary Judgment Motion in Negligence

    Diaz v. New York Downtown Hosp., 99 N.Y.2d 542 (2002)

    A medical expert’s conclusory assertion of negligence, based solely on conflicting test results without addressing the defendant’s evidence of non-negligence, is insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact and defeat a motion for summary judgment.

    Summary

    In this medical negligence case, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the defendant laboratory. The defendant presented evidence demonstrating the blood test was properly performed and a negative result was possible even with a later positive result. The plaintiff’s expert provided a conclusory affidavit stating the defendant’s negative result was erroneous because of the subsequent positive result. The Court of Appeals held that the expert’s conclusory statement, without more, failed to raise a triable issue of fact because it did not address the defendant’s evidence that different results could occur absent negligence.

    Facts

    The decedent had a blood test performed by the defendant laboratory. The test result was negative. Two months later, another laboratory performed a blood test on the decedent, and the result was positive. The plaintiff, presumably the decedent’s representative, brought a negligence action against the defendant laboratory, alleging the initial negative test result was erroneous and caused harm. The defendant laboratory moved for summary judgment.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially ruled on the motion. The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s decision and granted summary judgment to the defendant. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the affidavit of the plaintiff’s medical expert was sufficient to raise a material issue of fact to defeat the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, where the defendant presented a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment.

    Holding

    No, because the expert’s conclusory assertion that the defendant’s negative result was erroneous, based solely on the subsequent positive result, raised no issue of fact given the defendant’s evidence that different results were possible absent negligence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the principle that a party opposing summary judgment must present evidentiary facts sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact. The defendant laboratory demonstrated that the blood test was properly performed, it did not interpret the results, and the negative result could have been correct despite the later positive result. This established a prima facie case for summary judgment, shifting the burden to the plaintiff to produce sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue.

    The court found the plaintiff’s expert’s affidavit insufficient because it merely asserted that the defendant’s negative result was erroneous because of the later positive result. The court noted that the expert did not address or rebut the defendant’s evidence that different test results could occur without any negligence on the part of the laboratory. The court emphasized that an expert’s conclusory assertions, without supporting factual basis, are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Quoting "even if plaintiffs proof were fully credited by a fact finder, defendant has offered proof to the effect that there could be different results without any negligence, and plaintiff has offered nothing further to indicate defendant’s negligence in this case." Therefore, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding the defendant’s negligence. The court cited Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324-325 and Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Center, 64 NY2d 851, 853.

  • Matter of De Poalo v. City of Schenectady, 66 N.Y.2d 964 (1985): Summary Judgment Based on Medical Inability to Perform Light Duty

    Matter of De Poalo v. City of Schenectady, 66 N.Y.2d 964 (1985)

    A motion for summary judgment may be granted when the moving party’s papers give notice of a material fact, such as medical inability to work, affording the opposing party a fair opportunity for response.

    Summary

    A fireman, disabled in 1971 and paid his full salary until 1979, was terminated when he failed to report for light duty. He sued for damages and continuation of his salary, arguing the city never determined he was medically fit for light duty, as required by General Municipal Law § 207-a(3). The trial court granted summary judgment for the fireman. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding the fireman’s papers gave sufficient notice of his alleged medical inability to work, allowing the city a fair opportunity to respond. The court did not address whether a hearing was required before termination of salary.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, a fireman, became disabled in 1971 while performing his duties.

    The City of Schenectady paid the plaintiff his full salary until 1979.

    In 1979, the plaintiff failed to report for light duty.

    The City summarily terminated the plaintiff’s employment.

    The plaintiff then initiated legal action for damages and a declaratory judgment, seeking the continuation of his salary payments.

    Procedural History

    The trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

    The Appellate Division order was brought up for review.

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment and order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment based on the plaintiff’s moving papers adequately giving notice of his alleged medical inability to perform light duty, affording the defendant a fair opportunity to respond.

    Whether a hearing was required prior to the termination of the plaintiff’s salary eight years after he became permanently disabled.

    Holding

    Yes, because the plaintiff’s moving papers, including pleadings and affidavits, gave notice of his alleged medical inability to work, affording the defendant a fair opportunity for response, making this issue a proper basis for the award of summary judgment.

    The Court did not reach the second issue.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, focusing on the notice provided to the City regarding the fireman’s medical condition. The Court emphasized that the plaintiff’s initial papers, including pleadings and affidavits, sufficiently raised the issue of his alleged medical inability to perform light duty. This, in turn, provided the City with a fair opportunity to respond to this specific point. The key legal principle is that summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party provides adequate notice of a material fact to the opposing party, allowing them a reasonable chance to address it. The court reasoned that since the city had sufficient notice and opportunity to respond to the claim of medical inability, summary judgment was justified. The Court explicitly stated, “Although we do not subscribe to all of the trial court’s reasoning, it is clear that plaintiff’s moving papers, including pleadings and affidavits, gave notice of his alleged medical inability to work, affording defendant a fair opportunity for response, and making this issue a proper basis for the award of summary judgment.” The court found it unnecessary to determine if a hearing was required before terminating the fireman’s salary since it resolved the case based on the adequacy of notice for summary judgment. The decision highlights the importance of proper notice and opportunity to respond in summary judgment proceedings. This case serves as a reminder that summary judgment can be granted when the key facts are clearly presented and the opposing party has a chance to contest them, even if the court doesn’t agree with all of the lower court’s rationale.

  • Alvarez v. Prospect Hospital, 68 N.Y.2d 320 (1986): Establishing a Prima Facie Case for Summary Judgment in Medical Malpractice

    Alvarez v. Prospect Hospital, 68 N.Y.2d 320 (1986)

    A defendant physician in a medical malpractice case is entitled to summary judgment upon demonstrating the absence of any material issues of fact regarding their negligence, shifting the burden to the plaintiff to produce evidentiary proof demonstrating a triable issue of fact.

    Summary

    Plaintiff sued the hospital and multiple doctors, including Dr. Stark, for medical malpractice. Dr. Stark, a radiologist, had twice diagnosed the plaintiff with a cecal neoplasm based on barium enema X-rays. Plaintiff alleged that the defendants were negligent in failing to discover and/or treat the lesions. Dr. Stark moved for summary judgment, arguing his diagnosis was correct and that, as a radiologist, he wasn’t responsible for treatment. The Court of Appeals held that Dr. Stark met his burden of demonstrating the absence of material fact issues and the plaintiff failed to adequately rebut that showing with expert testimony, warranting summary judgment for Dr. Stark.

    Facts

    Maria Alvarez was admitted to Prospect Hospital multiple times for abdominal pain.
    Dr. Stark, the chief of radiology, interpreted radiological studies during these visits.
    In 1978 and 1979, Dr. Stark identified “cecal neoplasm” in barium enema X-rays and reported it to the attending physician.
    Plaintiff was discharged after the first visit with a diagnosis of gastroenteritis.
    Later, plaintiff underwent surgery to remove a malignant growth in her colon.

    Procedural History

    Plaintiff sued the hospital and nine physicians, including Dr. Stark, alleging negligence.
    Dr. Stark moved for summary judgment, which was denied by the Supreme Court.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the denial.
    The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Dr. Stark, as the moving party, made a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, thereby shifting the burden to the plaintiff to demonstrate a triable issue of fact.
    Whether the plaintiff adequately rebutted Dr. Stark’s showing with evidentiary proof establishing a material issue of fact regarding his alleged negligence.

    Holding

    Yes, because Dr. Stark’s submissions, including his deposition testimony and the hospital records, demonstrated the absence of material triable issues of fact as to the malpractice claims asserted against him.
    No, because the plaintiff’s sole submission, an affidavit from her attorney, was insufficient to rebut Dr. Stark’s showing, as it lacked expert medical opinion and attempted to introduce a new theory of liability not asserted in the original complaint or bill of particulars.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized the standards for summary judgment, stating that the moving party must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Once this is done, the burden shifts to the opposing party to produce evidentiary proof establishing material issues of fact requiring trial.

    In medical malpractice cases, the plaintiff must submit evidentiary facts rebutting the defendant physician’s showing of non-negligence. General, conclusory allegations are insufficient.

    The court found Dr. Stark’s submissions, including his deposition testimony supported by hospital records, sufficient to demonstrate that he properly and timely diagnosed the plaintiff’s condition and did not depart from accepted standards of care.

    The court distinguished this case from Winegrad v. New York University Medical Center, where the doctors’ affidavits contained only conclusory assertions of acting within the standard of care, without specific factual references. Here, Dr. Stark refuted the allegations with specific factual references.

    The court also cited Fileccia v. Massapequa Gen. Hosp., where summary judgment was granted to a radiologist who only interpreted X-rays. Similarly, Dr. Stark’s role was limited to interpreting radiological studies, and the plaintiff failed to provide expert medical opinion to support a new theory of liability (failure to consult with attending physicians) not previously asserted.

    The court stated, “Just as the burden of a party opposing a motion for summary judgment is not met merely by repeating or incorporating by reference the allegations contained in the pleadings or bills of particulars * * * neither is that burden met by the unsubstantiated assertions or speculations of plaintiff’s counsel that a defendant may have breached a possible duty of care.”

  • Salzman v. B. Kreischer & Sons, Inc., 66 N.Y.2d 902 (1985): Interpreting Ambiguous Contractual Language Regarding Employee Coverage

    Salzman v. B. Kreischer & Sons, Inc., 66 N.Y.2d 902 (1985)

    When interpreting contract language, especially regarding employee benefits, courts must consider the entire agreement to determine the intent of the parties and resolve any ambiguities.

    Summary

    Salzman v. B. Kreischer & Sons, Inc. involved a dispute over pension and health and welfare payments for employees. The plaintiffs, trustees of union benefit funds, sought summary judgment, arguing that the defendant employer was obligated to make contributions for all employees working within the union’s territorial jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of summary judgment, finding that the contract language regarding which employees were covered was ambiguous and required further factual determination. The court clarified that the contract’s arbitration clause did not apply to disputes over benefit payments.

    Facts

    The plaintiffs, as trustees, sought to enforce an agreement requiring B. Kreischer & Sons to make pension, health, and welfare payments. The dispute centered on the interpretation of the phrase “all of the employees covered by this Agreement.” The trustees argued it encompassed all employees performing work within the territorial jurisdiction of the signatory local unions. The employer contended it only applied to employees who were union members. The lower courts were divided on whether the contract language was sufficiently clear to grant summary judgment.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially ruled on the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division reviewed that decision. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s order and the original Supreme Court judgment.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the phrase “all of the employees covered by this Agreement” in the collective bargaining agreement is ambiguous regarding which employees are entitled to pension, health, and welfare benefits.
    2. Whether the agreement specifically provided that questions or disputes arising thereunder should be negotiated with the union representatives, particularly concerning pension and health and welfare payments.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the phrase could reasonably be interpreted as referring either to only union members or to all employees performing work within the union’s jurisdiction.
    2. No, because the agreement’s arbitration and grievance procedure specifically excluded violations concerning pension, health, and welfare payments, and the jurisdictional dispute clause only pertained to who could perform work, not benefit payments.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals agreed with the Appellate Division majority that the contract language was ambiguous, precluding summary judgment. The phrase “all of the employees covered by this Agreement” could reasonably refer to either union members only or all employees working within the union’s geographic jurisdiction, regardless of membership. The court emphasized the importance of considering the “context of the entire agreement” to ascertain the parties’ intent.

    Regarding the role of union representatives in resolving disputes, the court disagreed with the Appellate Division’s conclusion that the agreement mandated negotiation with the union. It found that the contract’s arbitration clause was inapplicable because Section 12.5 specifically excluded disputes over pension, health, and welfare payments from the grievance procedure. Furthermore, Article 8, concerning jurisdictional disputes, addressed “who can perform work within the Teamsters’ jurisdiction, not with payments to pension or health and welfare funds.” The court highlighted the limitation in Section 12.5 regarding payments to reinforce its conclusion. Because of the factual dispute over employee coverage, summary judgment was inappropriate. The court essentially required further factual findings to ascertain the intent of the contracting parties when using the ambiguous phrase in the agreement.

  • Gallo v. Bartelemucci, 64 N.Y.2d 898 (1985): Establishing Falsity in Defamation Claims

    Gallo v. Bartelemucci, 64 N.Y.2d 898 (1985)

    In defamation cases involving matters of public concern, a plaintiff must present sufficient evidence demonstrating the falsity of the allegedly defamatory statements to defeat a motion for summary judgment.

    Summary

    This case concerns a defamation action brought by a minor plaintiff against a newspaper and an individual defendant (Bartelemucci) for publishing letters that allegedly falsely accused him of criminal conduct. The New York Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff failed to meet their burden of establishing that the defamatory statements were false. The court emphasized that when faced with a motion for summary judgment supported by affidavits attesting to the accuracy of the statements, the plaintiff must offer evidentiary proof, typically through someone with direct knowledge, to demonstrate falsity. Reliance on a verified complaint by someone without personal knowledge (the plaintiff’s mother in this case) is insufficient to raise a question of fact.

    Facts

    Plaintiffs commenced a defamation action based on letters written by defendant Bartelemucci and printed in a newspaper published by Poughkeepsie Newspapers, Inc. The letters described the 17-year-old infant plaintiff’s conduct and criticized the police and courts’ handling of charges against him. The newspaper defendants moved for summary judgment, submitting affidavits from employees alleging the accuracy of the published statements. The plaintiffs opposed the motion with a verified complaint by the infant plaintiff’s mother but offered no affidavit from the infant or anyone else with direct knowledge of the underlying events.

    Procedural History

    The Poughkeepsie Newspapers, Inc. moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action and also for summary judgment. The Appellate Division granted defendant Bartelemucci’s motion to dismiss the negligence cause of action but denied it as to the remaining causes of action. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, granting the newspaper’s motion for summary judgment and upholding the dismissal of the negligence claim against Bartelemucci.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether, in a defamation action, a plaintiff can defeat a motion for summary judgment by relying solely on a verified complaint from someone without personal knowledge of the underlying facts, when the defendant presents affidavits asserting the truth of the statements.
    2. Whether an individual defendant who is treated as the newspaper is liable for ordinary negligence, or only for grossly irresponsible conduct.

    Holding

    1. No, because when a defendant moving for summary judgment in a defamation case submits affidavits claiming the accuracy of the statements, the plaintiff must offer evidence from someone with personal knowledge to demonstrate falsity.
    2. No, because the plaintiff conceded that under the circumstances, the individual defendant is charged with the same duty of care as the newspaper, which is to avoid grossly irresponsible conduct.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that once the newspaper presented affidavits alleging the accuracy of the published statements, the burden shifted to the plaintiffs to demonstrate falsity. The Court cited Fairley v. Peekskill Star Corp., 83 AD2d 294, 297, and Prosser and Keeton, Torts § 116, at 839 et seq., emphasizing the plaintiff’s responsibility to establish falsity. The court found the mother’s verified complaint insufficient because she lacked personal knowledge of the facts. The court emphasized that while a verified pleading can serve as an affidavit under CPLR 105(t), it’s inadequate when the affiant lacks direct knowledge of the events in question. As stated in the decision, “[T]he infant’s mother did not have personal knowledge of the incident and her verified complaint was not sufficient to raise a question of fact on the issue of falsity.” Therefore, summary judgment was properly granted to the newspaper.

    Regarding Bartelemucci, the court noted the plaintiff’s concession that she should be held to the same standard as the newspaper which is liability only for grossly irresponsible conduct, citing Gaeta v New York News, 62 NY2d 340 and Chapadeau v Utica Observer-Dispatch, 38 NY2d 196. Therefore, the negligence cause of action against her was correctly dismissed.

  • GTF Marketing, Inc. v. Colonial Aluminum Sales, Inc., 66 N.Y.2d 965 (1985): Sufficiency of Evidence in Summary Judgment Opposition

    GTF Marketing, Inc. v. Colonial Aluminum Sales, Inc., 66 N.Y.2d 965 (1985)

    When faced with a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must demonstrate a triable issue of fact with admissible evidence, and an attorney’s affidavit lacking personal knowledge is insufficient to defeat the motion.

    Summary

    GTF Marketing sued Colonial Aluminum Sales for breach of contract, alleging Colonial failed to pay for “leads” (names of potential customers). Colonial moved for summary judgment, arguing GTF hadn’t provided usable leads and further asserting collateral estoppel based on prior similar lawsuits. Colonial supported its motion with an affidavit from its president. GTF opposed with only an attorney’s affidavit. The Court of Appeals held that while collateral estoppel didn’t apply, GTF’s opposition was insufficient because it lacked admissible evidence from someone with personal knowledge of the facts, thus failing to demonstrate a triable issue.

    Facts

    GTF Marketing and Colonial Aluminum Sales entered into a contract where GTF would provide Colonial with names, addresses, and phone numbers of homeowners interested in aluminum siding for $10 per “lead.”
    GTF claimed it supplied 12,463 leads but Colonial refused to pay $124,630.
    Colonial moved for summary judgment, arguing GTF provided no usable leads and raised collateral estoppel.
    Colonial’s president, Michael Longo, submitted an affidavit claiming the purported leads were useless, consisting of people who hadn’t sent in data cards, were promised free gifts, hung up, or lacked phone numbers.
    GTF opposed with an affidavit from its attorney, asserting that a question of fact existed as to performance under the agreement.

    Procedural History

    Special Term denied Colonial’s motion for summary judgment.
    The Appellate Division reversed, holding GTF was barred by third-party issue preclusion and that GTF’s papers were insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact.
    GTF appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel (third-party issue preclusion) applies to bar GTF’s claim against Colonial.
    Whether GTF’s affidavit submitted in opposition to Colonial’s motion for summary judgment was sufficient to demonstrate a triable issue of fact.

    Holding

    No, because it wasn’t clear that the trial court in the prior actions specifically and necessarily decided the issue of whether GTF fraudulently failed to send out data processing cards.
    No, because the affidavit was from GTF’s attorney and lacked personal knowledge of the facts, which is insufficient to demonstrate a triable issue in response to a properly supported summary judgment motion.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding collateral estoppel, the court noted that while the contracts in the prior actions were similar, it wasn’t clear the prior court necessarily decided the precise issue of whether GTF fraudulently failed to send out data processing cards. The court stated, “It is not clear from the decision, however, whether the trial court specifically and necessarily decided that issue, and third-party issue preclusion therefore does not lie”. The court also noted the prior decision was delivered orally, making it difficult to ascertain the dispositive issues.
    Regarding the sufficiency of the opposing affidavit, the court emphasized that a party opposing summary judgment must demonstrate a factual issue requiring trial with admissible evidence. “[O]nce the moving party has satisfied this obligation, the burden shifts; ‘the party opposing the motion must demonstrate by admissible evidence the existence of a factual issue requiring a trial of the action or tender an acceptable excuse for his failure so to do, and the submission of a hearsay affirmation by counsel alone does not satisfy this requirement’”. Since GTF’s attorney lacked personal knowledge, the affidavit had no evidentiary value. “[A]n affidavit or affirmation of an attorney without personal knowledge of the facts cannot ‘supply the evidentiary showing necessary to successfully resist the motion’”. Because Colonial presented evidence that GTF failed to provide usable leads, and GTF failed to counter with admissible evidence, summary judgment was appropriate. The uncontroverted fact was that GTF did not perform or provide Colonial with any “leads” under the agreement.

  • Matter of the Estate of Pascal, 309 N.Y. 108 (1955): Summary Judgment Inappropriate When Material Facts Disputed

    Matter of the Estate of Pascal, 309 N.Y. 108 (1955)

    Summary judgment is inappropriate in any case, including probate proceedings, where there are material issues of fact that require a trial to resolve.

    Summary

    This case addresses the propriety of summary judgment in a probate proceeding. The appellant, a lawyer, prepared a will and codicil for the decedent, naming himself as executor and his stepdaughter as a primary beneficiary. The respondent, executor under a prior will, filed objections, challenging the decedent’s competence and alleging fraud and undue influence. The Surrogate denied the appellant’s motion for summary judgment, finding questions of fact requiring trial, a decision affirmed by the Appellate Division. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that summary judgment is inappropriate when material issues of fact exist, and such issues were present here concerning the decedent’s condition and the circumstances surrounding the will.

    Facts

    During 1977, the appellant, an attorney, drafted a will and codicil for the decedent, who was approximately 85 years old.
    The will named the appellant as the executor, his son as the substitute executor, and his stepdaughter, who had been the decedent’s companion and housekeeper for about two years, as the residual beneficiary of two-thirds of the estate.
    The respondent, who was the executor under a 1973 will that named her nephew as the principal beneficiary, filed objections to the 1977 will, alleging the decedent’s lack of competence and claims of fraud and undue influence.

    Procedural History

    The Surrogate’s Court denied the appellant’s motion for summary judgment, finding that questions of fact existed that required a trial.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the Surrogate’s Court order without providing specific reasoning.
    The Appellate Division certified the question of whether the Surrogate’s order, as affirmed, was properly made to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Surrogate’s Court erred in denying the appellant’s motion for summary judgment, given the objections raised regarding the decedent’s competence and the circumstances surrounding the creation of the will and codicil.

    Holding

    Yes, because in light of the disputed affidavits and testimony regarding decedent’s condition and the circumstances surrounding the will and codicil, the Surrogate did not err in concluding that there were triable issues relating to the matters raised by respondent’s objections.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ decisions, emphasizing that summary judgment is inappropriate when material issues of fact exist. The court cited CPLR 3212(b), which governs summary judgment procedures.
    The court found that the disputed affidavits and testimony concerning the decedent’s condition and the circumstances surrounding the will’s creation raised triable issues of fact.
    The court explicitly stated, “Here, in light of the disputed affidavits and testimony regarding decedent’s condition and the circumstances surrounding the will and codicil, we cannot say that the Surrogate erred in the conclusion that there were triable issues relating to the matters raised by respondent’s objections.”
    The court noted that its review was limited to the certified question, and other issues were not properly before the court.
    The decision underscores the importance of a full trial when there are genuine disputes over facts that could affect the outcome of the case, particularly in sensitive matters like probate challenges based on competence or undue influence. The court declined to offer its views on the “presumably significant issue” raised by the appellant because the Appellate Division failed to give the benefit of the court’s views on that issue.

  • Weissman v. Blue Cross, 486 N.E.2d 912 (N.Y. 1985): Discretion to Consider Late Affidavits in Summary Judgment

    Weissman v. Blue Cross, 486 N.E.2d 912 (N.Y. 1985)

    A trial court does not abuse its discretion when it refuses to consider a late affidavit submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, especially when the delay is due to a failure to recognize the necessity of the affidavit and the opposing party objects.

    Summary

    Weissman sued Blue Cross. Blue Cross moved for summary judgment. On the day the motion was to be submitted, but after the motion was marked submitted, Weissman’s attorney delivered Weissman’s affidavit to the judge’s law secretary, claiming it was inadvertently omitted. Blue Cross objected and requested an opportunity to reply if the affidavit was considered. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Special Term’s refusal to consider Weissman’s affidavit was not an abuse of discretion, given the circumstances of the delay and the lack of prior notice of the affidavit.

    Facts

    Weissman sued Blue Cross. Blue Cross filed a motion for summary judgment against Weissman. Weissman’s attorney submitted an affirmation opposing the motion weeks before the return date, attaching several documents but omitting an affidavit from Weissman himself. Weissman’s cross-motion for summary judgment, filed six days before the return date, also did not mention an affidavit from Weissman. After the motion was marked as submitted, Weissman’s attorney delivered Weissman’s affidavit to the judge’s law secretary. Blue Cross did not receive a copy until the next day and promptly objected, requesting an opportunity to reply if the court considered it.

    Procedural History

    Blue Cross moved for summary judgment in Special Term. Weissman attempted to submit a late affidavit. Special Term refused to consider the late affidavit and granted summary judgment for Blue Cross. The Appellate Division affirmed. Weissman appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Special Term abused its discretion as a matter of law by refusing to consider an affidavit of the plaintiff which was delivered to the Judge’s law secretary on the same day as, but several hours after, the motion was marked “submitted” on call of the calendar, because it had been inadvertently omitted from plaintiff’s papers.

    Holding

    No, because the inadvertence involved failing to realize the necessity for an affidavit from the party and because the defendant objected to its consideration and requested an opportunity to reply.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the critical error was not a mere oversight in enclosing a prepared affidavit, but a failure to recognize the need for Weissman’s personal affidavit in the first place. The court emphasized that Weissman’s attorney’s affirmation, prepared well in advance, did not refer to any intention to submit Weissman’s affidavit. Similarly, the cross-motion for summary judgment made no mention of it. Furthermore, Blue Cross’s motion included a CPLR 2214 (b) notice, requiring answering papers to be served at least five days before the return date, which was not met. Considering these factors, the court concluded that Special Term acted within its discretion in refusing to consider the late affidavit. The court cited Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 which likely stands for the proposition that an attorney’s affidavit without personal knowledge is insufficient to oppose summary judgment. The court implicitly held that the trial court is not required to allow supplemental submissions after the motion has been marked submitted, especially when the opposing party would be prejudiced. The decision underscores the importance of timely and complete submissions in motion practice and the discretion afforded to trial courts in managing the motion calendar.

  • Winegrad v. New York University Medical Center, 64 N.Y.2d 851 (1985): Establishing Prima Facie Entitlement for Summary Judgment in Medical Malpractice

    Winegrad v. New York University Medical Center, 64 N.Y.2d 851 (1985)

    A party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by presenting sufficient evidence to eliminate any material issues of fact; bare, conclusory assertions are insufficient to meet this burden, particularly when the moving party possesses superior knowledge of the facts.

    Summary

    In a medical malpractice action, the plaintiffs alleged negligence by the defendants during and after a blepharoplasty. The defendants sought summary judgment, submitting affidavits with conclusory statements denying negligence. The Court of Appeals held that the defendants failed to establish a prima facie case for summary judgment because their affidavits lacked specific factual support and merely contained conclusory denials of negligence. The court emphasized that the moving party must present sufficient evidence to eliminate material issues of fact, and the defendants’ affidavits failed to do so.

    Facts

    Mrs. Winegrad underwent a blepharoplasty performed by Dr. Jacobs. During the procedure, she experienced shock and cardiac arrhythmia. Subsequently, Drs. Ross and Pasternack treated her, administering drugs allegedly incompatible with her condition. The plaintiffs claimed Dr. Jacobs also misrepresented that the surgery was complete when it was not. The plaintiffs’ verified complaint and bill of particulars detailed these allegations.

    Procedural History

    Plaintiffs moved to strike the defendants’ answers for failure to appear for depositions. The defendants cross-moved for summary judgment, submitting affidavits stating they reviewed medical records and did not deviate from accepted medical practices. Special Term granted the plaintiffs’ motion and denied the cross-motion. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the complaint. The Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendants, as the moving parties, presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of material issues of fact and establish entitlement to summary judgment in a medical malpractice case, based solely on affidavits containing conclusory denials of negligence.

    Holding

    No, because the defendants’ affidavits contained only bare, conclusory assertions that they did not deviate from good and accepted medical practices, lacking specific factual support demonstrating the absence of material issues of fact.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that a summary judgment movant must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Citing Zuckerman v. City of New York, the court reiterated that the moving party must tender sufficient evidence to eliminate any material issues of fact. The court found the defendants’ affidavits insufficient because they merely asserted a lack of deviation from accepted medical practices without providing any factual basis to support this claim. The court noted that the plaintiffs, in their verified pleadings, described specific injuries allegedly caused by the defendants’ negligence, and Dr. Jacobs acknowledged that the surgery was not completed due to the plaintiff’s cardiac arrhythmia. Given these circumstances, the court reasoned that the defendants’ conclusory statements failed to demonstrate that the plaintiffs’ cause of action lacked merit. The court stated, “On this record, the bare conclusory assertions echoed by all three defendants that they did not deviate from good and accepted medical practices, with no factual relationship to the alleged injury, do not establish that the cause of action has no merit so as to entitle defendants to summary judgment.” The court distinguished the case from instances where more detailed factual showings were presented. The court reversed the Appellate Division order, reinstating the denial of the defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment and remitting the case for consideration of unresolved issues.