New York Law Review

Tag: Suggestiveness

  • People v. Clark, 88 N.Y.2d 552 (1996): Reopening Wade Hearings Based on New Facts

    People v. Clark, 88 N.Y.2d 552 (1996)

    A trial court has discretion to deny a motion to reopen a Wade hearing (regarding the admissibility of identification evidence) when the “additional pertinent facts” presented by the defendant are not sufficiently related to the issue of police suggestiveness.

    Summary

    Clark was convicted of attempted robbery. Prior to trial, a Wade hearing was held regarding the victim’s identification of Clark. At trial, Clark sought to reopen the Wade hearing based on a discrepancy between the arresting officer’s testimony at the Wade hearing and the victim’s grand jury testimony regarding the chase that led to Clark’s arrest. The trial court denied the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the discrepancy was not “pertinent” to the issue of police suggestiveness in the identification.

    Facts

    Ronald Cuocolo was making a delivery when he was accosted by Clark, who demanded money. After a struggle, Clark fled. Cuocolo and others chased Clark. Cuocolo then directed police officers toward Clark, who was standing on the sidewalk two blocks away. The police arrested Clark. Cuocolo identified Clark as the perpetrator in a “corporeal non-lineup.” Prior to trial, a Wade hearing was held to determine the admissibility of Cuocolo’s identification.

    Procedural History

    Prior to trial, Clark moved to suppress Cuocolo’s identification. A Wade hearing was granted. The hearing court denied suppression. At trial, after the People’s opening statement, Clark renewed the motion to suppress or, alternatively, to reopen the Wade hearing based on a discrepancy in testimony. The trial court denied the motion. Clark was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to reopen the Wade hearing based on a discrepancy between the arresting officer’s Wade hearing testimony and the victim’s grand jury testimony regarding the events leading to the defendant’s arrest.

    Holding

    No, because the discrepancy between the testimonies was not “pertinent” to the issue of police suggestiveness in the identification.

    Court’s Reasoning

    CPL 710.40(4) allows a court to permit renewal of a suppression motion if “additional pertinent facts have been discovered by the defendant which he could not have discovered with reasonable diligence before the determination of the motion.” The Court of Appeals stated that the crucial question is whether the asserted facts are “pertinent” to the issue of official suggestiveness such that they would materially affect or have affected the earlier Wade determination. The Court emphasized that the statute doesn’t mandate that the new facts be outcome-determinative, but they must be related to the issue of suggestiveness by law enforcement. The court found that the discrepancy regarding the chase was not pertinent to whether the police engaged in suggestive conduct during the identification. The court distinguished this case from *People v. Dixon*, where no Wade hearing was held initially. The court stated: “To suggest here that this standard was met as a matter of law and that the victim-initiated and uninterrupted chase, culminating in the apprehension of this perpetrator was a police-arranged procedure (dissenting opn, at 559), as a matter of law also, compelling a reopening of the *Wade* hearing, goes well beyond what this record presented to the trial court and Appellate Division.”

  • People v. Duuvon, 77 N.Y.2d 541 (1991): Admissibility of Showup Identifications Near Crime Scenes

    People v. Duuvon, 77 N.Y.2d 541 (1991)

    Prompt, at-the-crime-scene showup identifications are not presumptively invalid and admissible, but must be scrutinized carefully for suggestiveness and unreliability, considering the specific circumstances of each case.

    Summary

    Duuvon was convicted of robbery. After robbing the same dry cleaning store twice, the store manager chased and caught him. Police arrested Duuvon, and the manager identified him. Subsequently, another employee identified Duuvon while he was in the back of a patrol car near the scene. The Court of Appeals held that the showup identification was admissible because it was near the crime scene and temporally proximate to the crime. The Court emphasized that while showups are generally disfavored and suggestive, the immediate nature of the identification, coupled with the ongoing apprehension, justified its admission, subject to careful scrutiny for undue suggestiveness.

    Facts

    Defendant robbed a dry cleaning store on April 21, 1987, and again on May 1, 1987. During the second robbery, the manager recognized Duuvon from the first incident. As Duuvon fled in a taxi, the manager alerted the police, who stopped the cab. Duuvon exited the cab and ran. The police apprehended him a short distance away, clutching money. The manager identified Duuvon at the arrest scene. Police then brought Duuvon, handcuffed in a patrol car, back to the dry cleaners, where an employee also identified him.

    Procedural History

    Duuvon was charged with both robberies. He moved to suppress the employee’s showup identification. The trial court denied the motion, finding the showup not unduly suggestive due to its proximity in time and location to the crime. He was convicted of robbery in the first degree and two counts of robbery in the second degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding the showup not unduly suggestive and any error harmless due to other evidence. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a showup identification by an employee-victim-witness, made at the crime scene shortly after the defendant’s apprehension and after another witness had already identified the defendant, is impermissibly suggestive and warrants suppression.

    Holding

    No, because the showup occurred in close temporal and spatial proximity to the crime, forming an unbroken chain of events, and the lower courts found it was not so unnecessarily suggestive as to create a substantial likelihood of misidentification.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that while showup identifications are generally suspect, at-the-crime-scene showups are not presumptively infirm. The admissibility of such evidence depends on the specific circumstances and requires careful scrutiny for suggestiveness and unreliability. The Court distinguished this situation from police station showups, which are inherently suggestive and generally suppressed unless exigent circumstances exist. The Court emphasized the importance of temporal and spatial proximity to the crime, stating that the identification occurred within minutes of the robbery and near the arrest scene, forming an unbroken chain of events. The Court acknowledged the suggestive nature of the defendant being handcuffed in the patrol car but found that the exigent circumstances justified the procedure. The Court stated, “The judicial toleration of promptly conducted at-the-scene showups rests on our objective that the police have reasonable assurances that they have arrested or detained the right person.” The Court cautioned against creating per se or presumptive rules due to the variety of circumstances in street encounters. The Court deferred to the lower courts’ factual findings, emphasizing that the procedural safeguard against abuse lies in the lower courts’ rigorous review. The Court noted that the manager’s initial identification was spontaneous and not a police-arranged showup, further supporting the admissibility of the employee’s subsequent identification.

  • People v. Cicero, 572 N.E.2d 986 (N.Y. 1991): Limits on Calling Complainant at Wade Hearing

    People v. Cicero, 78 N.Y.2d 1020, 572 N.E.2d 986 (1991)

    A defendant does not have an absolute right to call a complainant at a Wade hearing to challenge an identification procedure unless there is some indication of suggestiveness in the procedure itself.

    Summary

    Cicero was convicted of a crime, and on appeal, argued that he should have been allowed to call the complainant as a witness at his Wade hearing, which was convened to determine if the pre-trial identification procedure was unduly suggestive. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that a defendant only has the right to call a complainant at a Wade hearing if there is some indication that the identification procedure was suggestive. The Court reasoned that because the showup was conducted promptly at the scene of the crime, and Cicero did not claim the complainant’s testimony would differ from the prosecution’s witnesses, calling the complainant was unnecessary.

    Facts

    The key fact is that the identification procedure used in this case was a showup that occurred promptly at the scene of the crime. Cicero did not dispute the timeliness or location of the showup. Furthermore, Cicero did not allege that the complainant’s potential testimony would contradict the accounts given by the People’s witnesses regarding the identification.

    Procedural History

    The case began in a trial court, which ruled against Cicero’s request to call the complainant to testify at the Wade hearing. Cicero was convicted. He appealed, arguing that the denial of his request was an error. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and Cicero appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the hearing court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s request to call the complainant at the Wade hearing to challenge the identification procedure.

    Holding

    No, because the showup was conducted promptly at the scene of the crime, and the defendant did not claim that the complainant’s testimony would differ from the People’s witnesses; thus, there was no indication of suggestiveness requiring the complainant’s testimony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior holdings in People v. Chipp and People v. Love. The Court stated, “A defendant does not have an absolute right to call a complainant at the Wade hearing absent some indicia of the suggestiveness of the identification procedure employed.” The court distinguished cases involving inherently suggestive procedures, such as showups, by noting that the suggestiveness is mitigated when the showup is conducted promptly at the scene of the crime. The court emphasized that Cicero had not claimed that the complainant’s testimony would differ from the prosecution’s witnesses. Thus, the Court concluded that requiring the complainant to testify would be unnecessary and would not serve the purpose of the Wade hearing, which is to determine whether the identification procedure was unduly suggestive. The court essentially found that in the absence of any evidence suggesting impropriety, the defendant’s request was a fishing expedition. As the court stated, “In these circumstances, defendant is not entitled to call the complainant at the hearing.”