New York Law Review

Tag: Suggestive Showup

  • People v. Edmonson, 84 N.Y.2d 950 (1994): Admissibility of Identification Testimony After Suggestive Showup

    People v. Edmonson, 84 N.Y.2d 950 (1994)

    When a witness has participated in a suggestive showup, their subsequent physical description of the perpetrator is inadmissible unless the prosecution proves the description is untainted by the showup, but this error can be deemed harmless if other evidence corroborates the witness’s testimony.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals considered the admissibility of a complainant’s physical description of a robber after a suggestive showup. The complainant, robbed at knifepoint, later identified the defendant at the police station. The trial court suppressed the showup and in-court identifications but allowed the complainant to describe the robber. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that while the physical description should not have been admitted without proof it was untainted by the showup, the error was harmless because other evidence corroborated the complainant’s testimony, including her identification of the knife and the cloth wrapped around the robber’s hand.

    Facts

    The complainant was robbed at knifepoint in an elevator.
    A neighbor saw a man resembling the defendant fleeing the building with cloth wrapped around his hand.
    Police stopped the defendant nearby in connection with another crime; he also had cloth wrapped around his hand.
    Complainant’s husband identified the defendant to the police as the robber, leading to a search that revealed the complainant’s jewelry and a knife on the defendant.
    The complainant identified the defendant as the robber at the police station.

    Procedural History

    The trial court suppressed both the showup identification and the in-court identification due to the suggestive nature of the showup and the lack of an independent source for the in-court identification.
    Despite the suppression, the trial court allowed the complainant to provide a physical description of the robber.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s judgment of conviction.
    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the complainant’s physical description of the robber, given after a suggestive showup, was admissible at trial when there was no finding that the description was untainted by the showup.
    Whether the admission of the physical description, if erroneous, constituted harmless error.

    Holding

    No, because there was no finding that such description, given for the first time after the showup, was untainted.
    Yes, because other evidence corroborated the complainant’s testimony, rendering the error harmless.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on People v. Moss, 80 NY2d 857, which established that a physical description given after a suggestive showup is inadmissible unless the prosecution demonstrates that the description is untainted by the showup.
    The Court acknowledged that admitting the complainant’s physical description of the robber was an error, stating, “while it was improper for complainant to give a physical description of the robber — there having been no finding that such description, given for the first time after the showup, was untainted”.
    However, the Court applied the harmless error doctrine from People v. Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 241, finding that the error did not contribute to the conviction because the complainant’s detailed description and identification of the knife, as well as the fact that cloth was wrapped around her assailant’s hand, were corroborated by other evidence. The Court noted that the complainant testified to details she could not have gleaned from the showup.
    The Court concluded that the properly admitted evidence overwhelmingly established the defendant’s guilt, rendering the error harmless. Defendant’s version of events (colliding with a lookalike while jogging who dropped the knife and jewelry) was not deemed credible in light of the other evidence.

  • People v. Adams, 53 N.Y.2d 241 (1981): Admissibility of Suggestive Pretrial Identifications Under the State Constitution

    53 N.Y.2d 241 (1981)

    Under the New York State Constitution, evidence of a suggestive pretrial identification procedure is inadmissible, even if there is an independent source for an in-court identification; however, the erroneous admission of such evidence may be deemed harmless error if there was proper identification at trial by eyewitnesses and an independent basis for the in-court identification.

    Summary

    Robert Adams appealed his robbery conviction, arguing that a suggestive station house showup tainted the victim’s identifications and that the prosecutor improperly refused to grant immunity to a defense witness. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that while the showup was unduly suggestive and evidence of it should have been excluded under the state constitution, the error was harmless because there was an independent basis for the in-court identifications and other eyewitness testimony. The Court also found no abuse of discretion in the prosecutor’s refusal to grant immunity to the witness.

    Facts

    Three men robbed a stationery store. During the robbery, one man held a gun to the owner’s wife’s head. The robbers fled with $42, pursued by the owner, his nephew, and others. A security guard and a police officer on patrol witnessed the escape. One robber, Sanabria, was apprehended with the stolen money. Adams and Gaston were arrested later in an apartment, based on information from Sanabria. The store owners and nephew identified Adams and the other men at a station house showup where the police told the victims that they had the robbers.

    Procedural History

    Adams moved to suppress the station house identification and prevent in-court identifications. The trial court suppressed Mrs. Mangoubi’s pretrial identification but denied the motion otherwise, finding an independent source for the in-court identifications. At trial, the three victims and two eyewitnesses identified Adams. Adams presented an alibi defense and called Sanabria, who recanted his prior statement implicating Adams. Gaston refused to testify without immunity, which the prosecutor denied. The jury convicted Adams of robbery, and the Appellate Division affirmed.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the prosecutor’s refusal to grant immunity to a defense witness deprived the defendant of his right to call witnesses on his behalf.
    2. Whether the station house showup was so suggestive as to violate the defendant’s due process rights under the Federal and State Constitutions, requiring suppression of the pretrial and in-court identifications.

    Holding

    1. No, because the prosecutor’s discretion to grant immunity was not abused, as there was no evidence of bad faith or that the prosecutor built the case using immunized witnesses while denying the defendant a similar opportunity.
    2. Yes, the station house showup was unduly suggestive, and evidence of it should have been excluded under the state constitution; however the error was harmless because there was an independent basis for the in-court identifications and other eyewitness testimony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the prosecutor has discretion to grant immunity, reviewable only for abuse. No abuse occurred because there was no indication of bad faith or that the prosecutor built the case on immunized witnesses while denying the defendant a similar opportunity. The Court stated that “to permit a defendant to override the prosecutor’s discretion under those circumstances could itself lead to abuses of the immunity statute.”

    Regarding the showup, the Court found it undeniably suggestive, noting the victims were told they had the robbers, the suspects were held by officers, and the victims viewed the suspects as a group. The Court distinguished the New York State Constitution from the federal standard articulated in Manson v. Brathwaite, stating that the state constitution provides additional protections. The court emphasized that the rule excluding suggestive showups aims to ensure a reliable determination of guilt or innocence, and that “Permitting the prosecutor to introduce evidence of a suggestive pretrial identification can only increase the risks of convicting the innocent.”

    Despite finding the showup evidence inadmissible, the Court deemed the error harmless because five eyewitnesses, including two who did not attend the showup, identified Adams at trial. Furthermore, there was an affirmed finding of an independent basis for the victims’ in-court identifications. Chief Judge Cooke concurred in the result but disagreed with the majority’s creation of a state constitutional standard, arguing that applying harmless error analysis largely negates the standard.

  • People v. Allweiss, 48 N.Y.2d 40 (1979): Independent Basis for In-Court Identification Despite Suggestive Showup

    People v. Allweiss, 48 N.Y.2d 40 (1979)

    An in-court identification is admissible if it has an independent basis, even if a prior showup identification was impermissibly suggestive.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that in-court identifications of the defendant by two assault victims were admissible, despite a suppressed hospital showup, because the victims’ detailed observations of the defendant during the attacks provided an independent basis for the identifications. The court also upheld the trial court’s decision to deny the defendant’s motion to sever the counts related to each victim, citing striking similarities in the execution of the crimes and the defendant’s likely presence in the area.

    Facts

    Two separate assaults occurred. The victims were able to observe the defendant closely and in detail during the course of the attacks. Prior to trial, a hospital showup was conducted where the victims identified the defendant. The trial court suppressed the hospital showup identification as impermissibly suggestive.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was tried on multiple counts relating to the assaults of two separate victims. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to sever the counts relating to each victim. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the in-court identifications of the defendant were admissible, given the suppressed hospital showup.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to sever the counts relating to the two separate assaults.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the close and detailed observations of the defendant separately made during the course of the attacks by each of the two victims were sufficient to provide independent bases for the subsequent in-court identifications.
    2. No, because the circumstances surrounding the commission of the two crimes indicate striking similarities in their methods of execution as well as in the nature of the weapons employed, and each took place within a time span consistent with the defendant’s presence in the area where both were committed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that even though the hospital showup was impermissibly suggestive, the victims’ independent recollections and detailed observations during the assaults provided a sufficient basis for their in-court identifications. The court relied on People v. Ballott, stating that a prior suggestive identification does not automatically taint a subsequent in-court identification if the latter has an independent source. The Court cited Neil v. Biggers for guidance on assessing the reliability of identification testimony. Regarding the severance motion, the court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, citing the similarities in the crimes’ execution, weapons used, and the defendant’s likely presence in the area. The court referenced People v. Hetherington to support the principle that the trial court has discretion in deciding severance motions, and that such discretion should not be disturbed unless there is a clear abuse. The court emphasized judicial efficiency, finding “there is no reason why the exercise of discretion by the trial court, affirmed as it has been by the Appellate Division, should be disturbed.”

  • People v. Whitmore, 28 N.Y.2d 826 (1971): Admissibility of Identification Testimony After Suggestive Showup

    People v. Whitmore, 28 N.Y.2d 826 (1971)

    Where a pretrial identification procedure is suggestive, the prosecution must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identification is based on independent recollection and not influenced by the prior suggestive procedure.

    Summary

    This case addresses the admissibility of an in-court identification following a potentially suggestive showup. Whitmore was convicted of attempted rape and robbery. The key issue was the reliability of the victim’s identification, especially considering a prior showup where Whitmore was presented to the victim without a lineup after being implicated in other high-profile crimes to which he confessed (confessions later proven false). The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding that the prosecution had demonstrated that the victim’s in-court identification was based on her independent recollection of the event, untainted by the suggestive showup. The dissent argued that the suggestive showup and the subsequent retraction of his other confessions undermined the reliability of the identification.

    Facts

    On April 23, 1964, a woman was attacked and nearly raped on a street in Kings County. A police officer witnessed part of the assault but the assailant fled. The officer initially described the suspect as a Black male, 5’8″-5’9″, 165 lbs, wearing a tan coat. The victim described her assailant as a light-skinned Black male, 5’7″, 135 lbs, pockmarked, and wearing a tan coat. The next day, the officer saw Whitmore, who fit parts of the description, in a laundromat. Whitmore gave a false name and employment. He was later arrested and shown to the victim, who identified him. Whitmore then confessed to this crime, and also to two other infamous rape-murders. He was later exonerated of the other crimes after his confessions were proven false.

    Procedural History

    Whitmore was convicted in the trial court. An earlier appeal led to a post-trial identification hearing to determine if the victim’s in-court identification was tainted by the showup. The Appellate Division held the appeal in abeyance pending the outcome of the hearing. The trial court determined the identification was untainted. The Appellate Division then affirmed the conviction, and the case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the victim’s in-court identification of Whitmore was admissible, given the potentially suggestive nature of the pre-trial showup, and the later retraction of Whitmore’s confessions to other crimes?

    Holding

    Yes, because the prosecution demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the victim’s in-court identification was based on her independent recollection of the crime, untainted by the suggestive showup.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the potential for suggestiveness in the showup procedure. However, the Court emphasized that the hearing court found the victim’s trial testimony on identification was untainted by the showup or any other improper suggestion. The court applied the rule that when a pretrial identification is potentially tainted, the prosecution must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identification has an independent source. The court deferred to the trial court’s finding that the prosecution met this burden. The dissent strongly disagreed, arguing that the conflicting descriptions, the false confessions, and the suggestive showup made the identification unreliable, stating “The positiveness of the Borrero identification is no better than the positiveness of the untrustworthy confessions. The positiveness in each instance is undermined or belied by ineradicable and contradictory facts of record and history.” The dissent highlighted the danger of relying on a witness’s positive identification when that identification might have been influenced by external factors, especially in light of the fact that Whitmore had falsely confessed to other crimes. The dissent further stated that the proof on the hearing must be “clear and convincing ”, that is, the proof must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the pretrial impropriety did not influence the in-court identification.