New York Law Review

Tag: suggestive lineup

  • People v. Wilson, 4 N.Y.3d 777 (2005): Independent Basis Required for In-Court Identification After Suggestive Lineup

    4 N.Y.3d 777 (2005)

    When a pretrial lineup identification is deemed unduly suggestive, an in-court identification by the same witness is inadmissible unless the prosecution establishes an independent basis for the in-court identification, untainted by the suggestive lineup.

    Summary

    Wilson was convicted based on an eyewitness identification. The eyewitness identified Wilson in a lineup shortly after viewing Wilson’s photograph shown to him by a police officer. Wilson moved to suppress the lineup and any in-court identification. The trial court denied the motion, finding the lineup was not tainted. The appellate court reversed, finding the lineup unduly suggestive. However, the appellate court upheld the conviction, concluding there was an independent basis for the in-court identification. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court had not actually made a finding of an independent basis, and remanded for a hearing on whether such a basis existed.

    Facts

    An eyewitness identified Wilson in a pretrial lineup.
    Prior to the lineup, a police officer showed the eyewitness a photograph of Wilson.
    Wilson moved to suppress the lineup identification and any potential in-court identification.
    The trial court denied the motion, finding the lineup untainted by the photo viewing.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Wilson.
    The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s finding that the lineup was not unduly suggestive but affirmed the conviction, stating that the trial court correctly found an independent basis for the in-court identification.
    Wilson appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an in-court identification is admissible when the pretrial lineup identification is deemed unduly suggestive and the trial court has not made an explicit finding regarding an independent source for the in-court identification.

    Holding

    No, because the trial court did not take the additional step of determining whether an independent source existed for the eyewitness’s in-court identification, the Appellate Division erred in concluding the trial court had “correctly found” that the eyewitness had an independent source for his in-court identification testimony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that because the trial court never explicitly determined whether an independent source existed for the in-court identification, the Appellate Division erred in concluding that the trial court had “correctly found” such a basis.
    The Court emphasized that the Appellate Division could make a de novo independent source determination based on evidence from the suppression hearing but that the inquiry in this case was too truncated to allow for such a determination. The Court noted, “Because Supreme Court never took the additional step of determining whether an independent source existed for the eyewitness’s in-court identification, Supreme Court cannot be said to have ruled “correctly” when it never ruled at all.”
    The Court reiterated the importance of the prosecution presenting independent source evidence at a Wade hearing to avoid the risk of completely renewed proceedings, quoting People v. Burts, 78 N.Y.2d 20, 25 (1991) that, in light of the “risk for completely renewed proceedings” whenever a pretrial identification is challenged, the People are generally well-advised to come forward with any independent source evidence at a
    Wade hearing so that the suppression court may, where appropriate, rule in the alternative.
    This demonstrates a practical consideration for prosecutors to present all available evidence during the initial suppression hearing.
    The remedy was to reverse the conviction and remand the case to the Supreme Court for an independent source hearing prior to retrial.

  • People v. Adams, 68 N.Y.2d 677 (1986): Admissibility of In-Court Identification Despite Suggestive Lineup

    People v. Adams, 68 N.Y.2d 677 (1986)

    An unduly suggestive pretrial lineup identification does not automatically preclude an in-court identification if the in-court identification is based on an independent source and the error in admitting the tainted lineup identification is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to overwhelming evidence of guilt.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of robbery. At trial, one complaining witness testified to a pretrial corporeal lineup identification. The Supreme Court found the lineup permissible, but the Court of Appeals disagreed, finding it unduly suggestive because the defendant was the only person wearing clothing matching the description of the perpetrator’s clothing. Despite this, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the in-court identifications by both complainants were based on an independent source and that the error in admitting the tainted lineup identification was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt.

    Facts

    Two complainants observed the defendant’s face during a gunpoint robbery that lasted 2 to 2 1/2 minutes.

    At a pretrial lineup, the defendant was the only person wearing a tan vest and a blue snorkel jacket, which matched the description of the clothing worn by the perpetrator.

    One of the complaining witnesses testified to this pretrial lineup identification at trial.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court found the in-court identifications were based on an independent source and that the lineup procedure was permissible.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision without disturbing these findings.

    The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the pretrial lineup was unduly suggestive, thus making the witness’s pretrial lineup identification inadmissible.

    2. Whether, despite the suggestiveness of the lineup, the in-court identifications were admissible because they were based on an independent source.

    3. Whether the error in receiving the tainted lineup identification was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the defendant was conspicuously displayed in the lineup as the only person wearing clothing that matched the description of the perpetrator’s clothing.

    2. Yes, because the complainants had ample opportunity to observe the defendant during the robbery, providing an independent source for their in-court identifications.

    3. Yes, because there was overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt, including the properly admitted in-court identifications by the two eyewitnesses.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found the lineup unduly suggestive, stating that the defendant was “conspicuously displayed in that lineup” because he was the only person wearing the distinctive clothing that fit the description of the clothing allegedly worn by the perpetrator. This violated the principle that lineups should not be arranged in a way that singles out the suspect. The Court cited People v. Adams, 53 NY2d 241, 248, for the standard of undue suggestiveness.

    However, the Court emphasized that the in-court identifications were admissible because they had an independent source. This means the witnesses’ ability to identify the defendant in court stemmed from their observations during the robbery itself, not from the suggestive lineup. The Court noted the undisturbed finding that both complainants observed the defendant’s face during a gun-point robbery which lasted 2 to 2 Vi minutes.

    Finally, the Court applied the harmless error doctrine, finding that the error in admitting the tainted lineup identification was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Citing People v. Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 237, the Court reasoned that the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt, specifically the properly admitted in-court identifications, made the error insignificant. The Court focused on the strength of the untainted evidence to conclude that the suggestive lineup did not contribute to the conviction. This demonstrates a practical application of balancing fairness in identification procedures with the need for efficient criminal justice administration.

  • People v. Wright, 29 N.Y.2d 408 (1972): Admissibility of Identification Testimony after Suggestive Lineup

    People v. Wright, 29 N.Y.2d 408 (1972)

    When a pretrial identification procedure is unduly suggestive, the prosecution must prove by clear and convincing evidence that a subsequent in-court identification is based on an independent source, untainted by the suggestive procedure.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of robbery. The victim identified him in court, but this identification was preceded by a potentially suggestive photo array and a highly suggestive showup. The prosecutor improperly cross-examined the defendant about statements made at the police station without Miranda warnings, using those statements to impeach his credibility. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the showup violated due process and that the prosecutor’s cross-examination exceeded the scope of the defendant’s direct testimony, thus improperly introducing evidence obtained in violation of Miranda.

    Facts

    Mrs. Wright was robbed in her apartment by an intruder who was present for 30-45 minutes. She later identified the defendant from a photo array of parolees and known criminals. The police then conducted a showup where she identified the defendant. During his arrest, black socks were found in the defendant’s pocket, relevant because the victim said the robber wore black socks on his hands.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of robbery. Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress the identification evidence, arguing it was tainted by the suggestive showup. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the in-court identification would be sufficient even without the pretrial identifications. The defendant appealed, arguing the improper admission of identification testimony and improper cross-examination.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the showup identification procedure was so suggestive as to violate due process, thereby requiring the prosecution to demonstrate that the in-court identification was independently sourced.
    2. Whether the prosecutor’s cross-examination of the defendant regarding statements made at the police station, without proper Miranda warnings, was permissible impeachment.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the showup, conducted after the witness had already selected a photograph and been told the police might pick someone up, was unduly suggestive, requiring the prosecution to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identification had an independent source.
    2. No, because the prosecutor’s cross-examination exceeded the scope of the defendant’s direct testimony and improperly introduced evidence obtained in violation of Miranda for impeachment purposes.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court found that the showup, where the victim was told she would see the man whose photo she picked out, was “so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to an erroneous identification that it violated due process of law.” The court emphasized that the burden was on the People to establish by “clear and convincing evidence” that the in-court identification was not tainted by the suggestive showup, citing People v. Ballott. Since the hearing court did not properly utilize the preliminary hearing, because of the misplacement of the burden of proof and the omission from the People’s case of Mrs. Wright’s testimony, it made it impossible for the hearing court to determine whether an in-court identification would have independent value. The court stated, “It was error for the court on the identification suppression hearing to hold that the in-court identification would be ‘sufficient’ without first requiring the prosecution to establish by ‘clear and convincing evidence’ that it was neither the product of, nor affected by, the improper pretrial showup.”

    Regarding the cross-examination, the court held that while statements inadmissible on direct examination can be used for impeachment, this is only permissible when the defendant “opens the door” by testifying to the matter on direct examination, citing People v. Harris. The court found that the defendant’s direct testimony was limited to a denial of guilt and alibi and did not address events at the police station. Therefore, the prosecutor’s cross-examination “in order to lay a foundation for the tainted evidence on rebuttal” was improper, citing People v. Miles. The court found that this error was not harmless because the improperly admitted statement related to a crucial element of the case – the method of the crime and the defendant’s identification.

    The court explicitly stated that the black socks found on the defendant were admissible since they were discovered during a search incident to a lawful arrest.

  • People v. Burwell, 26 N.Y.2d 331 (1970): Admissibility of In-Court Identification After Suggestive Pre-Arraignment Lineup

    People v. Burwell, 26 N.Y.2d 331 (1970)

    Where a pre-arraignment lineup is unduly suggestive, an in-court identification is admissible only if the prosecution can establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the in-court identification was based on observations independent of the suggestive lineup.

    Summary

    Defendants Burwell, McMoore, and Washington were convicted of assault. The Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of their confessions and in-court identifications following a suggestive pre-arraignment lineup. The court held that while the confessions were admissible due to the defendants’ ability to cross-examine confessing co-defendants and the substantial similarity of the confessions, the suggestive nature of the pre-arraignment lineup necessitated a hearing. This hearing was to determine whether the in-court identifications had an independent basis from the suggestive lineup. The court modified Burwell’s conviction to include this hearing and reinstated the convictions of McMoore and Washington, also directing a hearing on the in-court identifications for them.

    Facts

    The defendants were arrested in the early morning hours of December 27, 1962, and questioned throughout the day concerning an assault that occurred approximately one week prior. A lineup was held that afternoon, viewed by the surviving victims of the attack. The lineup consisted of the three defendants placed alongside four police officers and one civilian. The defendants, aged 17-19, were notably younger than the police officers, who ranged from 27 to 48 years old. Furthermore, one of the defendants, Washington, who was initially described as bald, appeared in the lineup with a shiny rag on his head. A second lineup, held shortly after the first, added two more police officers to the group.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were convicted after trial. The Appellate Division reversed the convictions of McMoore and Washington. Burwell’s conviction was appealed separately. The Court of Appeals consolidated the issues, modifying Burwell’s judgment to include a hearing on the in-court identification and reversing the Appellate Division’s reversal of McMoore and Washington’s convictions, reinstating them but also ordering a hearing on the in-court identifications.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the in-court identifications of the defendants were impermissibly tainted by the suggestive pre-arraignment lineup, thus requiring a hearing to determine if an independent basis for the in-court identifications existed.

    Holding

    Yes, because the pre-arraignment lineup was improperly suggestive, a hearing is required to determine whether the in-court identifications were influenced by the lineup and, if so, whether those identifications had an independent basis stemming from observations other than the lineup.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court found the pre-arraignment lineup to be “highly likely” to cause identification by suggestion, given the age discrepancies between the defendants and the police officers and the distinctive appearance of Washington. Recognizing that the lineup occurred before the Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v. Wade, Gilbert v. California, and Stovall v. Denno, which established stricter rules regarding the right to counsel at post-arraignment lineups, the court nevertheless applied the principles underlying those cases. The court emphasized that because the victims’ opportunity to observe their assailants was limited to “seconds or at most a minute,” the potential for the suggestive lineup to influence the in-court identifications was significant. Quoting People v. Ballott, 20 N.Y.2d 600, 606-607, the court stated that in-court identifications are only admissible “if the prosecution can establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the in-court identifications were based on observations other than the lineups.” The court also noted the importance of this issue given that two of the defendants had repudiated their confessions, meaning that the in-court identifications played a crucial role in their convictions. The court distinguished the admissibility of the confessions of co-defendants by citing People v. Anthony (24 Y 2d 696, 702-703) because confessing co-defendants testified and were available for cross-examination. It also applied the rule in People v. McNeil (24 Y 2d 550, 552-553) regarding the similar nature of the confessions.