New York Law Review

Tag: Suggestive Identification Procedures

  • People v. Brisco, 99 N.Y.2d 596 (2003): Legality of Showup Identifications

    99 N.Y.2d 596 (2003)

    A showup identification is permissible if conducted in close geographic and temporal proximity to the crime and if the procedure is not unduly suggestive.

    Summary

    Frank Brisco was convicted of attempted burglary. The key evidence was a showup identification made by the victim at the crime scene approximately one hour after the burglary. Brisco, who matched the victim’s initial description, was asked to hold maroon shorts (matching the victim’s description of the perpetrator’s clothing) during the showup. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the showup was reasonable under the circumstances because it was conducted promptly at the crime scene as part of a continuous investigation and the procedure was not unduly suggestive. The court emphasized that the victim independently identified Brisco based on his height, hair color, and build.

    Facts

    On July 6, 1999, at 11:30 AM, police responded to a reported burglary at 51 Mills Pond Road. The victim described the suspect as a shirtless white male, 18-20 years old with brown hair, muscular build, and wearing maroon shorts. Officers found Brisco, who matched the description, at a nearby house at 11:55 AM. Brisco was shirtless, wearing a towel. Later, he wore tan shorts. Inside the house, officers found wet maroon shorts that Brisco claimed were his. At 12:25 PM, police transported Brisco to the victim’s house, where, while holding the maroon shorts, the victim identified him as the person she saw leaving her house, based on height, hair color, and build.

    Procedural History

    Brisco was charged with burglary in the second degree and petit larceny. He pleaded guilty to attempted burglary in the second degree, conditional upon his right to appeal the suppression ruling related to the showup identification. The trial court upheld the showup identification. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the crime scene showup identification of the defendant was unduly suggestive because the defendant, wearing tan shorts and no shirt, was asked to hold a pair of maroon shorts that matched the victim’s description of the perpetrator’s clothing.

    Holding

    No, because the showup was reasonable under the circumstances, taking place at the crime scene within an hour of the crime as part of a continuous investigation, and the procedure was not unduly suggestive, as the victim initially and independently identified the defendant based on his height, hair color, and build.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on precedent allowing showup identifications when conducted in close geographic and temporal proximity to the crime and when the procedure used was not unduly suggestive (citing People v Ortiz, 90 NY2d 533, 537 [1997] and People v Johnson, 81 NY2d 828, 831 [1993]). The court found that the showup took place at the scene of the crime within an hour of the crime’s commission as part of a continuous investigation. Crucially, the court emphasized that the victim had independently identified the defendant based on his height, hair color, and build *before* identifying the maroon shorts. The court stated, “the presence of defendant’s maroon shorts, admittedly his own, did not, as a matter of law, negate the reasonableness of the police action.” The dissenting judge argued that the showup was unduly suggestive because Brisco was required to hold the shorts, effectively singling him out as the perpetrator. The dissent also noted that a lineup would have been a more appropriate identification procedure given the circumstances. The majority distinguished this case from others where showups were deemed improper because those cases often involved a greater lapse of time between the crime and the identification. The court emphasizes that determining the timeliness of a showup should not be a “bright-line rule” and should be assessed case-by-case.

  • People v. Johnson, 81 N.Y.2d 831 (1993): Limits on Admissibility of Showup Identifications

    People v. Johnson, 81 N.Y.2d 831 (1993)

    A showup identification is impermissible if conducted hours after the crime, with both the complainant and the defendant transported to the crime scene; in such circumstances, a properly conducted lineup is required.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s conviction, holding that a showup identification conducted hours after the robbery, with both the complainant and the defendant being transported to the crime scene, was improper. The Court emphasized that while prompt showup identifications are permissible when suspects are captured at or near the crime scene, the identification in this case lacked the necessary immediacy. The Court determined that under these circumstances, a properly conducted lineup was required to ensure a fair identification process.

    Facts

    A postman was robbed of a gold chain and pendant in the lobby of an apartment building. The postman chased the perpetrator, who was carrying a knife, but eventually abandoned the pursuit. He reported the incident to a security guard and police. Later that day, police apprehended the defendant near his home, which was close to the crime scene. The police then transported the postman back to the apartment building, informing him that they had a suspect in custody and were taking him back for a positive identification. The postman, seated in a police vehicle, identified the defendant, who was in handcuffs and civilian clothing, as the robber.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to suppress the showup identification, arguing it was unduly suggestive. The hearing court denied the motion. The identification was introduced at trial, and the complainant also made an in-court identification. The defendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree and resisting arrest. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a showup identification, conducted hours after the crime and involving the transportation of both the complainant and the defendant to the crime scene, is an impermissible identification procedure.

    Holding

    Yes, because showup identifications are strongly disfavored and are only permissible under exigent circumstances or when suspects are captured at or near the crime scene and viewed immediately. A showup hours after the crime, with both parties transported to the scene, does not meet this standard.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that showup identifications are inherently suggestive and should only be employed when justified by exigent circumstances or the immediacy of the capture. Citing People v. Riley, 70 N.Y.2d 523, 529, the court reiterated that showups are permissible “if the suspects are captured at or near the crime scene and can be viewed by the witness immediately.” Here, the showup lacked the requisite immediacy, as it occurred hours after the crime and involved the transportation of both the complainant and the defendant. The Court emphasized that the focus should be on the promptness of the identification after the crime, not after the arrest. Given these circumstances, the Court concluded that an appropriately conducted lineup was necessary to ensure a fair identification process. The Court noted that while the limits of an appropriate time period between the alleged crime and a showup identification may vary from case to case, “the emphasis must be upon the prompt and immediate nature of an identification after the crime has been committed, not, as the People argue, after the defendant has been arrested.” The admission of the showup identification at trial was therefore deemed prejudicial, warranting a new trial.

  • People v. Edmonson, 75 N.Y.2d 672 (1990): Admissibility of Videotape Identification Evidence

    People v. Edmonson, 75 N.Y.2d 672 (1990)

    Evidence of a prior extrajudicial identification made by a witness from a police videotape canvassing a neighborhood is admissible if the tape and its presentation are not suggestive.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a witness’s identification of the defendant from a police-created videotape showing random passersby in a neighborhood was admissible evidence. The court reasoned that because the videotape and its presentation to the witness were not suggestive, there was no risk of misidentification. This case clarifies the circumstances under which videotape identification evidence is permissible, balancing the need for reliable identification with the potential for suggestive procedures to taint the process.

    Facts

    The victim was violently attacked. She had seen her attacker a few times prior to the attack. After the attack, while hospitalized, she described her attacker to the police and suggested possible locations where he could be found. Based on this information, the police videotaped pedestrian traffic in the specified area. The videotape captured numerous people, including the defendant, in closeup shots. The victim viewed the tape at home and immediately identified the defendant as her attacker.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of attempted murder and assault. He moved to suppress the victim’s identification of him from the videotape. The trial court denied the motion, finding the identification procedure not suggestive. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction without opinion. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to consider the admissibility of the videotape identification.

    Issue(s)

    Whether evidence of a prior extrajudicial identification made by the complaining witness from a videotape taken by the police, canvassing a particular neighborhood and focusing on numerous passersby, is inadmissible as a matter of law under CPL 60.30.

    Holding

    No, because the videotape procedure employed by the police officers and the subsequent viewing by the victim were neither suggestive nor prejudicial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that suggestive pretrial identifications are generally inadmissible to reduce the risk of misidentification. The Court found that the videotaping procedure in this case was not inherently suggestive. The defendant was not singled out or portrayed unfavorably. At the time of videotaping, the police did not suspect the defendant or have reason to believe the attacker would be captured on camera. The police simply canvassed the area mentioned by the victim, videotaping all pedestrian traffic. While the police took a closeup of the defendant, they did the same for approximately 50 other individuals. The Court distinguished this case from prior decisions where identification procedures were deemed suggestive, such as precinct showups where the defendant was forced to wear similar clothing as the suspect (People v. Ballott, 20 NY2d 600) and showups where suspects were presented in handcuffs (People v. Riley, 70 NY2d 523; People v. Adams, 53 NY2d 241). The Court also noted that a videotape of random pedestrians does not carry the same prejudicial inference as a “rogues’ gallery” of mug shots. The Court quoted People v. Tunstall, 97 AD2d 523, 524, stating that “videotaped lineups avoid the possibility that the credibility of third parties will be used to strengthen a questionable identification”. The Court reasoned that the videotaping procedure was akin to permitting a victim to canvass an area for her attacker. In conclusion, the Court found no abuse of the videotaping procedure and affirmed the order of the Appellate Division.

  • People v. Blake, 64 N.Y.2d 730 (1984): Admissibility of Pretrial Identifications

    People v. Blake, 64 N.Y.2d 730 (1984)

    Pretrial identification procedures do not require per se suppression if there is sufficient evidence to support a finding that the procedures were not unduly suggestive, even if some improprieties occurred.

    Summary

    Blake was convicted of grand larceny. He appealed, arguing that pretrial identification procedures were unduly suggestive, warranting suppression. The victim identified Blake in a photo array and a subsequent lineup, despite changes in his appearance. The police made some suggestive remarks during the identification process. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the identification procedures, while not perfect, were not so suggestive as to require automatic suppression. The court emphasized that there was sufficient evidence to support the lower court’s finding that the identifications were based on the victim’s independent recollection.

    Facts

    Joann Blaha was robbed of a gold chain. She chased the thief and directly faced him before he escaped in a taxi. Blaha described the thief to Officer Murphy, who indicated he had a suspect fitting the description. Murphy showed Blaha a photo array containing Blake’s picture, which she identified within 20 seconds. She was then shown the original color photo of Blake, which she also identified. Two months later, she identified Blake in a lineup despite his changed appearance (hair, beard, weight).

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Blake’s motion to suppress the pretrial and in-court identifications, finding that the victim’s identification was based on her independent recollection. The jury convicted Blake of grand larceny. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and Blake appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the pretrial identification procedures used by the police were so unduly suggestive as to require per se suppression of the identifications and taint the in-court identification.

    Holding

    No, because there was sufficient evidence to support the finding that the identification procedures were not unduly suggestive, and the identifications were based on the victim’s independent recollection despite some improprieties by the officer.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from People v. Adams, where the identification was undeniably suggestive. Here, the court found sufficient evidence to support the lower court’s finding that the procedures were not unduly suggestive. While Officer Murphy made suggestive remarks (mentioning a suspect was in custody, showing a color photo after the initial identification, and indicating the chosen person would be in the lineup), these improprieties did not automatically contaminate the identifications. The court cited People v. Logan, noting that informing a victim that a suspect is in custody does not automatically taint an identification. The court emphasized that the victim had ample opportunity to observe the defendant during the crime and the subsequent chase. The court noted the significant changes in Blake’s appearance between the photo and the lineup, suggesting the victim’s identification was based on her memory, not just the suggestive procedures. Unlike People v. Rahming, where the police presented the defendant alone after the photo identification, Blake was identified in a lineup. Regarding the denial to display defendant’s tattooed hands, the court stated that the defendant offered no proof regarding the presence of the tattoos on the date in issue. The court also stated there was no abuse of discretion in refusing to allow defendant to testify on the tattoo point, without being subject to cross-examination concerning his past convictions.

  • People v. Gonzalez and Castellano, 27 N.Y.2d 53 (1970): Admissibility of Identification Testimony Following Suggestive Pretrial Procedures

    People v. Gonzalez and Castellano, 27 N.Y.2d 53 (1970)

    Pretrial identification procedures that are unnecessarily suggestive and create a substantial likelihood of misidentification can taint subsequent in-court identifications, rendering them inadmissible unless the prosecution proves by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identification has an independent source.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether in-court identifications of the defendants were tainted by suggestive pretrial identification procedures. The dissent argued that a showup where police told witnesses “we caught this man, the robber of your store” and showing witnesses photographs of the defendants shortly before trial (16 months after the robbery) were impermissibly suggestive. The dissent concluded that the case should be remanded to determine whether the in-court identifications were influenced by these tainted procedures, especially since the witnesses’ initial observations were brief and made during a stressful robbery.

    Facts

    A robbery occurred, and sixteen months later, witnesses were shown photographs of the defendants just before they were to identify them in court. One witness initially gave the police a wrong description of one of the defendants. Another defendant, Castellano, had a full beard at the time of the robbery but was clean-shaven in the photograph shown to the witness before trial. Two witnesses viewed Castellano in a showup where police stated, “[w]e caught this man, the robber of your store.” One witness admitted he would not have been able to identify Castellano in court without the pretrial procedures.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were convicted of robbery based, in part, on eyewitness identifications. The dissenting judge in the New York Court of Appeals argued that the pretrial identification procedures were so suggestive that the in-court identifications were potentially tainted, requiring a hearing to determine the admissibility of the identification testimony.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the pretrial identification procedures (a showup and the showing of photographs shortly before trial) were so suggestive as to taint the subsequent in-court identifications, requiring a hearing to determine the independent source of the in-court identifications.

    Holding

    No, because the majority found that, on the present record, the in-court identifications were based on observations made at the scene of the crime, and the dissent failed to demonstrate that the identifications were tainted by the unnecessarily suggestive pretrial procedures.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Chief Judge Fuld, in dissent, argued that the pretrial identification procedures were highly suggestive and prejudicial. The dissent emphasized that the witness, Mrs. D’Amora, had only a brief and frightening encounter with Gonzalez, and she initially gave a wrong description to the police. Regarding Castellano, the dissent highlighted the suggestive showup where the police declared, “this was the robber of your store,” and the fact that the witnesses were shown photographs of Castellano just before entering the courtroom. The dissent quoted United States ex rel. Phipps v. Follette, 428 F.2d 912, stating:

    “Lapse of time between the crime and the confrontation is also important; the longer the interval, the greater the dangers that the initial image will have dimmed and that the second image will play a significant role. Also, a long interval between the initial observation and the trial coupled with an improper confrontation a comparatively short time before the witness appears in court enhances the danger that he may be relying on his most recent encounter.”

    The dissent believed that the prosecution failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the in-court identifications had independent sources. Referencing Foster v. California, 394 U. S. 440, 442, supra; Simmons v. United States, 390 U. S. 377, 384; Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293, 302; the dissent contended that there was a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification, warranting a hearing to determine the impact of the pretrial procedures on the in-court identifications. The dissent emphasized that the witnesses’ observations occurred “but for a few minutes during a frightening and upsetting episode.”