New York Law Review

Tag: Suggestive identification

  • People v. Marte, 13 N.Y.3d 583 (2009): Limits of Exclusionary Rule for Suggestive Identifications

    13 N.Y.3d 583 (2009)

    The state constitutional rule excluding unnecessarily suggestive police-arranged identifications does not extend to identifications where the suggestion originates from private citizens.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that the rule excluding suggestive police-arranged identifications does not apply when the suggestiveness originates from a private citizen. The victim, Peter L., was robbed and shot. Months later, his sister, Margaret, who knew the defendant, told Peter she thought the defendant was the shooter and showed him the defendant’s picture. Peter then identified the defendant in a police lineup. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the exclusionary rule is primarily aimed at deterring police misconduct and does not extend to private communications.

    Facts

    Peter L. was robbed and shot. He was shown hundreds of photographs by police but made no identification. Six months later, Peter’s sister, Margaret, met the defendant, who told her, “I actually shot someone on this block.” Margaret later told Peter she thought she knew who shot him and showed him the defendant’s picture. Peter initially rejected the idea but then identified the defendant from the picture. Margaret reinforced this with a letter describing the defendant as “[t]he kid that everyone thinks shot you.”

    Procedural History

    The victim and his sister then went to the police, who arranged a lineup where Peter identified the defendant. The defendant’s motion to suppress the identification was denied, and he was convicted of robbery and assault. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the state constitutional rule excluding unnecessarily suggestive police-arranged identifications extends to identifications where the suggestiveness originates from a private citizen.

    Holding

    No, because the primary goal of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct, and this goal cannot be advanced by extending the rule to cases where the suggestion comes from private citizens.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the exclusionary rule for suggestive identifications, as established in People v. Adams, is designed to enhance the truth-finding process and prevent wrongful convictions by influencing police procedures. The court stated: “The exclusionary rules were fashioned to deter improper conduct on the part of law enforcement officials which might lead to mistaken identifications”. Extending this rule to private communications would not deter such communications, as family and friends are unlikely to regulate their conduct based on court rules of evidence suppression.

    The court distinguished this case from federal cases and cases in other states, noting that those cases either involved police or prosecutor actions or dealt with non-constitutional evidentiary issues. The court emphasized that its decision was based on a constitutional issue and declined to extend a per se constitutional rule of exclusion to cases where a private citizen’s communication results in an identification.

    The court acknowledged the risk of misidentification due to suggestiveness, regardless of its source. However, it emphasized that suggestiveness is just one potential source of error. The court noted that the proper remedy when law enforcement is not the source of the suggestive identification is to rely on cross-examination, counsel’s arguments, and other evidence to allow juries to assess the reliability of eyewitnesses.

    Ultimately, the Court refused to extend the Adams rule because its primary purpose is to influence police conduct, and such influence is impossible when private citizens are the source of the suggestion. The Court suggested expert testimony on eyewitness fallibility may be admissible in certain cases and did not foreclose the possibility that a court could exclude testimony that is more prejudicial than probative under common-law rules of evidence.

  • People v. Duuvon, 77 N.Y.2d 541 (1991): Admissibility of Prompt Showup Identifications

    People v. Duuvon, 77 N.Y.2d 541 (1991)

    Prompt showup identifications of a suspect by witnesses following an arrest at or near the crime scene are generally permissible and are not categorically condemned under the Due Process Clause.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a hospital showup identification was impermissibly suggestive, violating the defendant’s due process rights. The victim identified the defendant in a hospital showup after being shot. The Court held that prompt showup identifications are not inherently improper, especially when conducted shortly after the crime. Given the victim’s injury and the need for a prompt identification, the showup was deemed permissible. The court emphasized that such identifications are generally allowed and not presumptively condemned.

    Facts

    On July 25, 1994, the defendant and others passed by James and Mary Webber’s home in Buffalo, New York. The defendant and his companions returned, and the defendant shot James Webber. Mary Webber identified the defendant at the crime scene, although she did not witness the shooting itself. The police transported the defendant to the hospital where James Webber was being treated for a gunshot wound to the abdomen. James Webber identified the defendant at the hospital while the defendant was in handcuffs and bleeding from a head wound.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of assault in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree after a jury trial. The defendant appealed, arguing that the hospital showup was impermissibly suggestive and violated his due process rights. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the hospital showup identification of the defendant by the victim was impermissibly suggestive, violating the Due Process Clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions.

    Holding

    No, because prompt showup identifications by witnesses following a defendant’s arrest at or near the crime scene are generally allowed and have never been categorically or presumptively condemned. Further, given the injury to James Webber and the necessity of a prompt identification, the showup was not unduly suggestive.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals rejected the defendant’s argument that a hospital showup is inherently improper, citing People v. Duuvon, 77 NY2d 541, 544, which stated that “prompt showup identifications by witnesses following a defendant’s arrest at or near the crime scene have been generally allowed and have never been categorically or presumptively condemned.” The Court emphasized the importance of prompt identifications, especially when the victim is seriously injured and a quick determination is necessary. The court found that the showup was not unduly suggestive, considering the circumstances. The court also addressed the defendant’s argument that the identifying witness was told before the identification that the defendant was under arrest, but found that this argument was not supported by the hearing record. The Court’s reasoning centers on balancing the potential for suggestiveness against the practical necessities of immediate identification in the context of an ongoing investigation and the victim’s condition.

  • People v. Dixon, 85 N.Y.2d 218 (1995): Right to Wade Hearing After Canvassing Identification

    People v. Dixon, 85 N.Y.2d 218 (1995)

    A defendant is entitled to a Wade hearing when an identification occurs as a result of a police-arranged canvassing procedure, even if the witness spontaneously identifies the defendant.

    Summary

    Dixon was convicted of robbery based on an out-of-court identification by the victim during a police canvass of the crime scene. The trial court summarily denied Dixon’s motion for a Wade hearing, arguing the identification was spontaneous and not police-arranged. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because the canvassing was a police-directed procedure, Dixon was entitled to a Wade hearing to determine if the identification was tainted by police suggestion, regardless of whether the victim’s identification was unprompted.

    Facts

    Harold Knowings was robbed by a group of men. Transit police drove Knowings through the area near the crime scene in a marked police van to search for the perpetrators. During this “canvass,” Knowings pointed to Dixon on the street and identified him as one of the robbers. Dixon was arrested based on this identification and charged with robbery, grand larceny, and assault.

    Procedural History

    The People notified Dixon about the out-of-court identification. Dixon moved for a Wade hearing, arguing the identification procedure was unfair and created a substantial likelihood of misidentification. The People opposed, stating the identification was spontaneous during a canvass, not a police-arranged procedure. The suppression court denied the motion without a hearing. Dixon was convicted of second-degree robbery. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding the identification was spontaneous and not police-arranged. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant is entitled to a Wade hearing when an identification results from a police-directed canvassing procedure, even if the witness’s identification is spontaneous.

    Holding

    Yes, because the canvassing was an identification procedure undertaken at the deliberate direction of the State, and the possibility of police prompting was not foreclosed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals noted that CPL 710.60 requires a hearing unless summary denial is authorized. A suppression motion can be summarily denied if there’s no legal basis for suppression or the factual predicate is insufficient. The Court emphasized that defendants are no longer required to plead specific facts about the identification procedure to be entitled to a Wade hearing. The purpose of a Wade hearing is to test for taint arising from official suggestion during police-arranged confrontations. The Court rejected the argument that a spontaneous identification removes the canvassing from the category of police-sponsored viewings warranting a Wade hearing, distinguishing between witness-initiated procedures and witness-initiated identifications.

    “[T]he due process concerns underlying the notice provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law…are implicated whenever ‘identification procedures…come about at the deliberate direction of the State.’” The Court emphasized the canvassing was arranged for the distinct purpose of identifying perpetrators, making it a police-sponsored procedure. The Court reiterated that exceptions to Wade hearings are narrowly confined to confirmatory identifications or when the protagonists are known to one another. It noted that “'[t]he influence of improper suggestion upon identifying witnesses probably accounts for more miscarriages of justice than any other factor.’” Without a hearing, the courts could not conclude the identification was free from police suggestion. The case was remitted for a Wade hearing.

  • People v. Johnson, 80 N.Y.2d 798 (1992): Harmless Error Analysis and In-Court Identification

    People v. Johnson, 80 N.Y.2d 798 (1992)

    When an improperly admitted lineup identification occurs, a conviction can still be upheld if the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, considering the strength of the independent source for an in-court identification and other surrounding evidentiary inferences and circumstances.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of robbery. The victim’s lineup identification testimony was improperly admitted due to the suggestive nature of the lineup. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, deeming the error harmless due to a strong independent source for the victim’s in-court identification. The Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing the Appellate Division’s order affirming the judgment of conviction should be affirmed, finding the in-court identification, supported by other evidence, rendered the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, requiring a traditional and thorough harmless error analysis.

    Facts

    The defendant participated in a knife-point robbery of an elderly woman as she approached her home in Brooklyn. At trial, the victim testified about identifying the defendant in a lineup. The lineup was later determined to be suggestive, making the victim’s testimony regarding the lineup inadmissible.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of first-degree robbery after a jury trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, even with the improperly admitted lineup identification, citing the harmless error doctrine. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order affirming the judgment of conviction, finding the improperly admitted evidence harmless.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the admission of the suggestive lineup identification testimony was harmless error, considering the victim’s in-court identification and other evidence presented at trial.

    Holding

    Yes, because the victim’s strong, independently-evolved, non-suggestive in-court identification was supported by her sister’s testimony and other evidentiary inferences, establishing that there was no reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to the defendant’s conviction; thus, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals agreed with the Appellate Division’s ultimate decision affirming the conviction. While acknowledging the error in admitting the lineup identification, the court emphasized that the strength of the independent source for the in-court identification is crucial in determining harmless error. The court found that the victim’s in-court identification was strong and reliable because it was independently evolved and non-suggestive. This in-court identification was further supported by her sister’s testimony and other surrounding evidentiary inferences and circumstances presented at trial. The Court applied the harmless error standard articulated in People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 237, concluding that there was no reasonable possibility that the erroneously admitted evidence contributed to the conviction. The court distinguished this case from others, such as People v. Coates, 74 N.Y.2d 244 and People v. Dodt, 61 N.Y.2d 408, where the errors were deemed not harmless. The court cited People v Owens, 74 NY2d 677 in support of their decision. The Court held that the error in admitting the lineup identification was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the totality of the evidence, specifically the victim’s independent in-court identification and corroborating testimony.

  • People v. Wharton, 74 N.Y.2d 921 (1989): Warranting a Wade Hearing for Undercover Officer Identifications

    People v. Wharton, 74 N.Y.2d 921 (1989)

    A pretrial Wade hearing is not automatically required when a trained undercover officer identifies a defendant shortly after a drug transaction, but the specific facts of the encounter must be examined to determine if the identification procedure was unduly suggestive.

    Summary

    Wharton was convicted of drug sale and possession based on an undercover officer’s identification. The officer bought drugs from Wharton, radioed a description to a backup team who arrested him, and then identified Wharton at the precinct three hours later. Wharton’s motion for a Wade hearing to suppress the identification was denied. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that while a Wade hearing isn’t automatically precluded for police identifications, the circumstances here didn’t suggest undue suggestiveness because the officer was trained, the viewing was close in time to the arrest, and it served to confirm the correct person was arrested. The dissent argued for a hearing to explore potential suggestiveness, emphasizing the fleeting nature of the initial encounter.

    Facts

    An undercover police officer purchased cocaine from Wharton in a “buy and bust” operation. The officer radioed Wharton’s description to a backup team, who arrested Wharton at the scene. Within five minutes, the undercover officer drove past and saw Wharton being detained. Approximately three hours later, the same undercover officer identified Wharton through a one-way mirror at the police precinct.

    Procedural History

    Wharton moved to suppress the identification testimony, seeking a Wade hearing. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing. Wharton was convicted by a jury. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a pretrial station house identification of the defendant by an undercover police officer, who purchased drugs from the defendant in a “buy and bust” operation, requires a Wade hearing to determine if the identification was tainted by unnecessarily suggestive factors.

    Holding

    No, because the identification was made by a trained undercover officer shortly after the drug transaction as a completion of an integral police procedure and to ensure that the correct person was detained, and the circumstances did not suggest undue suggestiveness.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the identification was made by a trained undercover officer who observed Wharton during a face-to-face drug transaction, knowing Wharton would be arrested soon after. The station house viewing occurred at a place and time sufficiently connected and contemporaneous to the arrest, constituting the ordinary and proper completion of an integral police procedure. This ensured an innocent person was not mistakenly detained. The officer’s participation in the operation was planned, and he was experienced and expected to observe Wharton carefully for later identification. The court distinguished this situation from show-up identifications by civilian witnesses, which are more prone to misidentification. The court emphasized they were not creating a categorical rule exempting police officer identifications from Wade hearings but held that based on the record, the trial court did not err in denying the hearing. Titone, J., dissented, arguing that the fleeting nature of the initial contact warranted a hearing to explore potential suggestiveness, citing CPL 60.25 and 60.30 regarding constitutional rights during identification procedures. The dissent highlighted examples from other cases where suggestive circumstances, revealed during Wade hearings, tainted police officer identifications. The dissent argued that the majority’s approach created an “insuperable threshold” by requiring knowledge of the specific events before granting a hearing.

  • People v. Rodriguez, 69 N.Y.2d 159 (1987): Admissibility of Identification Evidence After Loss of Filler Photos

    People v. Rodriguez, 69 N.Y.2d 159 (1987)

    The accidental loss of filler photos used in a photo array does not automatically render a subsequent identification inadmissible if the pretrial identification procedures were not suggestive and an independent source for the identification exists.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of attempted robbery. Prior to trial, a witness identified Defendant’s photo, but the five “filler” photos used in the array were misplaced. Another witness was told by police “We got the guy who hold [sic] you up” before viewing a photo array and identifying the defendant. The trial court ruled that the pre-trial identifications were not tainted and that an independent basis existed for in-court identification. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that because the pretrial identification procedures were not suggestive and an independent source existed for the identification, the loss of the filler photos was irrelevant.

    Facts

    Three witnesses to a grocery store robbery were unable to identify the perpetrator from drawers of photographs at the station house shortly after the incident; Defendant’s photo was not among those viewed. Three months later, one witness, Rodriguez, identified Defendant’s photo from a second set of photos at the station house, claiming to have seen him at a restaurant. On the same day, police showed another witness, Bolanos, Defendant’s photo among five others, stating, “I got photos. I want you to look at the photos. We got the guy who hold [sic] you up.” Bolanos identified Defendant. The five “filler” photos used in the Bolanos array were later misplaced.

    Procedural History

    Following the two positive photo identifications, a “Wanted” card was prepared. Defendant was arrested and placed in a lineup, where Bolanos again identified him. At a Wade hearing, the trial court found that none of the pretrial photo identifications were tainted or suggestive, and that the loss of the filler photos was inadvertent. The court also found each complainant had an independent basis for an in-court identification. Defendant pleaded guilty, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals then affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the identification procedures were unconstitutionally suggestive as a matter of law, rendering the identification evidence inadmissible.
    2. Whether Defendant was improperly denied his right to counsel when police, knowing he had an unrelated pending case, arrested him and placed him in a lineup without his attorney present.

    Holding

    1. No, because the police officer’s statements did not suggest that defendant’s photo was in the array and the trial court made undisturbed findings of nonsuggestive pretrial identification procedures and of independent source. Therefore, any theoretical prejudice from the lost filler photos is irrelevant.
    2. No, because there is no Federal or State constitutional right to counsel for an accused at a preindictment lineup.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the police officer’s statement to Bolanos did not suggest that the defendant’s photo was in the array, citing People v. Rodriguez, 64 N.Y.2d 738, 740. This supported the finding that the pretrial identification procedures were not suggestive. The court emphasized that there were undisturbed findings of nonsuggestive pretrial identification procedures and an independent source for the identifications. Given these findings, the court concluded that any potential prejudice from the loss of the “filler” photos was irrelevant. The court noted the absence of a constitutional right to counsel at a pre-indictment lineup, citing Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 and People v. Hawkins, 55 N.Y.2d 474. The court concluded that the defendant’s other claims were without merit.

  • People v. Rodriguez, 40 N.Y.2d 834 (1976): Admissibility of In-Court Identification After Suggestive Pre-Trial Confrontation

    People v. Rodriguez, 40 N.Y.2d 834 (1976)

    An in-court identification is admissible if it is based on an independent source and not tainted by a suggestive pre-trial identification procedure.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the admission of in-court identifications of the defendant, Rodriguez, by two witnesses. The Court held that one witness’s identification had an independent source, untainted by any suggestive station house identification. The court also determined the other witness’s in-court identification was based on her own independent recollection, despite a suggestive confrontation during the suppression hearing. The Court emphasized the trial judge’s opportunity to observe the witness and the lack of contemporaneous objection to the in-court identification procedure.

    Facts

    The defendant, Rodriguez, was accused of burglary. Witness Carmen Jiminez had ample opportunity to observe the defendant during the burglary. Both Carmen and Norma Jiminez identified the defendant in court as the perpetrator.

    Procedural History

    The trial court admitted the in-court identifications of the defendant. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision. The defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the in-court identifications were tainted by suggestive pre-trial identification procedures.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the in-court identification by witness Carmen Jiminez was tainted by a suggestive identification at the station house, thereby rendering it inadmissible.

    2. Whether the in-court identification by witness Norma Jiminez was tainted by a suggestive confrontation during the identification suppression hearing, thereby rendering it inadmissible.

    Holding

    1. No, because the witness had ample opportunity to observe the defendant at the time of the burglary, providing an independent source for her in-court identification.

    2. No, because the hearing judge found that her identification was the product of her own independent recollection and was not tainted by any improper confrontation; this finding was affirmed by the Appellate Division.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the finding that Carmen Jiminez had “ample opportunity to observe the defendant at the time of the burglary,” thus establishing an independent source for her in-court identification. This independent source negated any potential taint from the suggestive station house identification.

    Regarding Norma Jiminez’s identification, the Court deferred to the hearing judge’s finding that her identification stemmed from her independent recollection, not from the suggestive confrontation during the suppression hearing. The Court also noted the lack of contemporaneous objection to the in-court identification procedure when it occurred, suggesting defense counsel did not perceive it as unduly suggestive at the time. The court implicitly highlighted the importance of the trial judge’s ability to assess the witness’s credibility firsthand.

    The Court distinguished this case from *People v Bell, 38 NY2d 116* regarding the defendant’s claim about the trial judge improperly marshaling the evidence and rejected that claim.

  • People v. Joyiens, 39 N.Y.2d 176 (1976): Admissibility of Eyewitness Identification After Photographic Display

    People v. Joyiens, 39 N.Y.2d 176 (1976)

    A prior photographic identification is admissible if the photographic display was not suggestive and the witness had an adequate independent basis for identification.

    Summary

    Kim Joyiens was convicted of attempted murder and assault for shooting two police officers. The key evidence was the eyewitness identification of Joyiens by one of the officers, Scarabino, who had previously identified Joyiens in a photographic display. Joyiens argued the photographic identification was suggestive and tainted Scarabino’s in-court identification. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the photographic display was not unduly suggestive, and Scarabino had an independent basis for his identification stemming from his clear view of Joyiens during the shooting. The court emphasized the jury’s role in assessing credibility and the sufficiency of the evidence.

    Facts

    Two police officers, Scarabino and Rollins, were shot by three men. Scarabino identified Kim Joyiens as one of the shooters. Scarabino testified that the lighting was good, he was close to the shooters, and he looked directly at Joyiens’ face during the shooting. Ten months later, Scarabino identified Joyiens from a photographic array. Joyiens presented an alibi defense and claimed scars on his body were from shrapnel in Vietnam, not from bullet wounds sustained during the shooting. Rebuttal witnesses contradicted the testimony of Joyiens’ alibi witness regarding the timing of Joyiens’ arrival at her home on the night of the shooting and his physical condition.

    Procedural History

    Kim Joyiens was indicted on multiple charges, including attempted murder and assault. Following a trial, the jury found Joyiens guilty on all counts. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Joyiens appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the photographic identification was suggestive and violated his due process rights.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the photographic identification procedure was so suggestive as to taint the in-court identification and violate the defendant’s due process rights.

    Holding

    No, because the photographic display was not suggestive, and the witness had an independent basis for his identification based on his observations during the crime.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the photographic display was not suggestive. The court noted that all the photographs were similar in size and type, depicted individuals of the same race and build, and Scarabino did not view the back of the photographs. The court deferred to the lower court’s assessment of credibility regarding the circumstances of the photographic identification. More importantly, the court emphasized Scarabino’s clear and prolonged opportunity to view Joyiens during the shooting. Scarabino testified to excellent lighting conditions, close range, direct eye contact, and a two-to-three-minute encounter. This provided an independent basis for his identification, untainted by any potential suggestiveness in the photographic display. The court stated that “Scarabino made positive identification of appellant at the time of the shooting and that the photographic identification was not suggestive.” The court also noted that issues of credibility were primarily for the jury to decide, and there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict. The court dismissed other alleged errors, finding no basis for reversal.

  • People v. McCullers, 38 N.Y.2d 783 (1975): Independent Source Rule for In-Court Identifications

    People v. McCullers, 38 N.Y.2d 783 (1975)

    When a pre-trial identification procedure is unduly suggestive, an in-court identification is permissible only if the prosecution proves by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identification is based on a source independent of the suggestive procedure.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of an in-court identification following a suggestive pre-trial identification. The court held that the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the witness’s in-court identification had a source independent of a suggestive encounter orchestrated by the police. A taxi driver, unable to initially identify the defendant, was later prompted by police before a court appearance. The dissent argued the witness’s initial inability to identify the defendant, combined with the suggestive circumstances, undermined the reliability of the in-court identification, requiring reversal of the conviction.

    Facts

    Ernest Bush, a taxi driver, was robbed by two men. Initially, Bush could not identify McCullers, one of the alleged robbers, at the police station. Three weeks later, a police officer informed Bush that they had apprehended the second perpetrator, McCullers, who was the same individual brought to the station house previously. Shortly before Bush was to sign a complaint, the officer reiterated that McCullers was the suspect. Bush then identified McCullers in court after observing him being escorted by the police officer.

    Procedural History

    Following McCullers’ conviction, the case reached the New York Court of Appeals. The court considered whether the in-court identification was tainted by the prior suggestive identification procedure.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecution met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the witness’s in-court identification was based on a source completely independent of the suggestive Criminal Court identification.

    Holding

    No, because the suggestive pre-trial procedure tainted the in-court identification and the prosecution failed to prove an independent source for the in-court identification.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court focused on whether the prosecution had demonstrated an independent source for the in-court identification, citing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218. The factors to be considered include the prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal act, any discrepancies between pre-lineup descriptions and the defendant’s actual description, prior identification of another person, identification by picture prior to lineup, failure to identify the defendant on a prior occasion, and the lapse of time between the act and the lineup identification.

    The dissent argued that, despite Bush’s opportunity to observe the robbers, his initial failure to identify McCullers was critical. The dissent highlighted the witness’s admission that his identification rested partially on his observation of McCullers during the suggestive station house showup. As the dissent stated, “Fairly considered the People’s proof strongly suggests that if Bush formed any impression of the other man it was at best a faint image which slowly emerged and only fully developed in the light of police suggestion.” The dissent concluded that the witness’s opportunity to observe should not have been given weight and that the prosecutor failed to show, by clear and convincing proof, an independent source for the identification.

  • People v. Rahming, 26 N.Y.2d 786 (1970): Right to a Pretrial Hearing on Identification Procedures

    People v. Rahming, 26 N.Y.2d 786 (1970)

    A defendant is entitled to a pretrial hearing to determine whether improper pretrial identification procedures tainted a witness’s in-court identification, especially when the defendant is unaware of the prior identification.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case to the County Court for a post-trial hearing. The hearing was ordered to determine whether improper pretrial identification procedures tainted the victim’s in-court identification of the defendant. The Court emphasized that a trial judge must affirmatively find that taking proof on the main trial attacking the identification will not prejudice the defendant. Where the defendant was unaware of a prior photographic identification, prejudice was likely, warranting a separate hearing to ensure fairness.

    Facts

    The victim identified the defendant in court as the perpetrator of the crime.

    The prosecution had previously shown the victim a photographic lineup where the victim identified the defendant.

    The defendant was unaware of the photographic identification before trial.

    Procedural History

    The case proceeded to trial, where the victim identified the defendant.

    The defendant was convicted.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in not holding a pretrial hearing to determine if the victim’s in-court identification was tainted by an impermissibly suggestive prior photographic identification, especially when the defendant was unaware of the prior identification.

    Holding

    Yes, because the trial court made no finding that it would not prejudice the defendant to take proof on the main trial attacking the identification, and prejudice arising out of presenting proof on the main trial in this case was almost inevitable due to the defendant’s lack of knowledge about the prior photographic identification.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that while People v. Ganci (27 N.Y.2d 418) allows a trial judge to direct that proof regarding identification be taken at trial if it won’t be prejudicial, in this case, prejudice was “almost inevitable.” The defendant’s lack of knowledge of the photographic identification created a situation where cross-examination on that point would risk improperly bolstering the identification with otherwise inadmissible evidence. The Court highlighted that the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL 710.30, subd. 1, par. [b]), though not effective at the time of trial, requires pretrial notice to the defendant of testimony identifying the defendant by a witness who previously identified him. This underscores the importance of ensuring fairness in identification procedures. Since identification goes to guilt or innocence, the court found it unfair to deny the defendant a hearing on the possibility that the in-court identification was based on suggestive procedures. The court implied the importance of a pretrial hearing outweighed judicial efficiency in this case. As the court stated, “Since identification of the accused goes to the determination pf guilt or innocence, it would be unfair not to extend to this defendant the right to a hearing where there is the unexplored possibility that the in-court identification was based on suggestive procedures.”