New York Law Review

Tag: Suffolk County Charter

  • Henry v. Suffolk County, 42 N.Y.2d 818 (1981): Limits on Legislative Power Over District Attorney Hiring

    Henry v. Suffolk County, 42 N.Y.2d 818 (1981)

    A county legislature cannot, through resolutions, unilaterally frustrate the hiring power granted to the District Attorney by the county charter; such power may only be limited by legislative action of equal or greater dignity.

    Summary

    The Suffolk County District Attorney and two senior assistants challenged resolutions passed by the Suffolk County Legislature. Resolution 1070 gave the county executive and presiding officer the power to approve or disapprove requests to fill positions earmarked by the budget director, impacting the District Attorney’s hiring ability. Resolution 919 established a salary plan where new county appointees would start at the lowest step in the grade unless a higher salary was approved. The Court of Appeals found Resolution 1070 invalid as applied to the District Attorney, as it encroached upon the hiring power granted by the Suffolk County Charter. The challenge to Resolution 919 was deemed moot because the resolution was amended, rendering it inapplicable to Assistant District Attorneys.

    Facts

    The Suffolk County Legislature passed two resolutions that impacted the District Attorney’s office: Resolution 1070 and Resolution 919.
    Resolution 1070 required the county executive and presiding officer to approve any request to fill a position earmarked by the budget director.
    Resolution 919 stipulated that new appointees to county positions would be paid at the lowest step in grade unless the county executive and presiding officer approved a higher salary.
    The District Attorney argued that these resolutions infringed upon his power to hire assistants as granted by the Suffolk County Charter.

    Procedural History

    The District Attorney and his assistants brought an action challenging the validity of Resolutions 1070 and 919.
    The lower courts ruled on the matter, and the case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Resolution 1070 improperly encroached upon the power of the District Attorney as granted by the Suffolk County Charter, thereby rendering it invalid as applied to that office.
    2. Whether the challenge to Resolution 919 was moot due to the passage of Resolution No. 1980-1979, which amended the salary plan and rendered the salary approval procedure inapplicable to the hiring of Assistant District Attorneys.

    Holding

    1. Yes, Resolution 1070 improperly encroached upon the power of the District Attorney because the Suffolk County Charter granted the District Attorney the power to hire assistants as the county legislature allowed in the budget, and Resolution 1070 gave the county executive and presiding officer power to unilaterally frustrate that action.
    2. Yes, the challenge to Resolution 919 was moot because Resolution No. 1980-1979 amended the classification and salary plan, rendering the salary approval procedure inapplicable to the hiring of Assistant District Attorneys.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding Resolution 1070, the court reasoned that the Suffolk County Charter granted the District Attorney the power to hire assistants, subject to budgetary constraints approved by the legislature. Resolution 1070, however, gave the county executive and presiding officer the unilateral power to frustrate the legislature’s action in authorizing assistants for the District Attorney. The court emphasized that while the District Attorney’s hiring power could be limited by legislative action of equal or greater dignity, it could not be done indirectly through a resolution like 1070.

    The court stated, “It is the budget which defines the extent of the District Attorney’s hiring power. While that power properly may be limited by legislative action of equal or greater dignity than that sought to be altered, it may not be done indirectly by a resolution such as this.”

    Regarding Resolution 919, the court found the challenge to be moot because the Suffolk County Legislature passed Resolution No. 1980-1979, which amended the classification and salary plan, rendering the salary approval procedure inapplicable to the hiring of Assistant District Attorneys. The court noted that the plaintiffs’ request for retroactive in-step salary payments did not alter the conclusion of mootness because the Appellate Division did not grant this relief, and the plaintiffs did not cross-appeal. The court stated, “Inasmuch as Resolution 919 is attacked only as applied to the hiring of assistants, the county’s action has rendered that portion of the complaint moot.”

  • Matter of Weissman v. Suffolk County Legislature, 36 N.Y.2d 931 (1975): Validity of Emergency Legislation Notice

    Matter of Weissman v. Suffolk County Legislature, 36 N.Y.2d 931 (1975)

    Courts are generally reluctant to question the internal procedures used by legislative bodies in enacting laws, especially concerning certifications of necessity or emergency procedures, as long as minimal notice requirements are met and the public has an opportunity to be heard.

    Summary

    This case addresses the validity of a local law enacted under emergency procedures that provided only one hour’s notice before a public hearing. The petitioner argued that this notice was insufficient under the Suffolk County Charter. The Court of Appeals held that while the notice was minimal, it complied with the charter’s requirements for emergency measures and that courts should be reluctant to interfere with internal legislative procedures, particularly when the electorate has the opportunity to vote on the matter. The court emphasized the importance of allowing local governments to function efficiently in emergencies.

    Facts

    Suffolk County Legislature passed a local law under a certificate of necessity issued by the County Executive. This law amended the county charter to permit further amendments by initiative, subject to public hearings and referendums. The local law was passed after a public hearing for which notice was provided only one hour in advance, as per Local Law No. 1 of 1970. The petitioner challenged the validity of this local law, arguing the one-hour notice was insufficient.

    Procedural History

    The case originated in a lower court, which ruled against the validity of the local law. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a one-hour notice for a public hearing on a local law, enacted under a certificate of necessity, is sufficient to comply with the requirements of the Suffolk County Charter.

    Holding

    No, because the Suffolk County Charter allows for expedited procedures, including limited notice, for emergency measures certified by the County Executive. Also, the Court should be reluctant to question internal procedures of the legislative process.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the Suffolk County Charter, while generally requiring public notice and hearings for local laws, anticipates potential emergencies by allowing for immediate passage of measures accompanied by a certificate of necessity. The charter delegates the specifics of notice for such emergencies to be “prescribed by local law.” The court acknowledged the minimal nature of the one-hour notice but deferred to the legislature’s judgment, stating, “Were more extensive notice to be required, the charter provision permitting immediate passage of measures accompanied by a certificate of necessity… would be of no effect.” The court also noted that the Municipal Home Rule Law requires a public hearing before approval of a local law by the County Executive, a requirement that was met in this case, with the petitioner present and speaking. The court emphasized the importance of not hindering local government’s ability to respond to emergencies and the right of the electorate to determine the issues at hand. It cited Finger Lakes Racing Assn. v New York State Off-Track Pari-Mutuel Betting Comm., 30 NY2d 207, 219-220 in support of its reluctance to question internal procedures in the lawmaking process. The court stated, “Courts should be most reluctant to question certifications of necessity in the general legislative process. Similarly, courts are reluctant to question the internal procedures in the general lawmaking process, State or local”. Furthermore, the court considered the opportunity for the public to voice their opinion through referendum and future amendments as a mitigating factor for the limited notice. The court emphasized, “the right of the electorate to determine the questions at issue after an airing in the campaign is a weighty factor”.