New York Law Review

Tag: Successive Tortfeasors

  • Glaser v. M. Fortunoff of Westbury Corp., 71 N.Y.2d 643 (1988): Contribution vs. Indemnification for Successive Tortfeasors

    71 N.Y.2d 643 (1988)

    A tortfeasor who settles with the injured party is barred from seeking contribution from successive tortfeasors whose negligence aggravated the original injury, but may still seek indemnification if they were not negligent.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a settling tortfeasor can seek reimbursement from successive tortfeasors whose negligence aggravated the plaintiff’s initial injuries. Carol Glaser was injured in Fortunoff’s store and later suffered complications due to negligent medical treatment. Glaser sued Fortunoff, who then brought a third-party claim against the doctors. Fortunoff settled with Glaser, and the doctors sought dismissal based on General Obligations Law § 15-108(c), which bars contribution claims by settling tortfeasors. The New York Court of Appeals held that Fortunoff’s claim was one for contribution, not indemnification, and was therefore barred by the statute because Fortunoff’s liability was based, at least in part, on its own negligence.

    Facts

    On November 18, 1982, Carol Glaser fell and fractured her knee in a Long Island store operated by M. Fortunoff of Westbury Corp.
    Glaser was taken to a local medical center and subsequently transferred to New Rochelle Hospital Medical Center, where she underwent surgery.
    Following the surgery, Glaser developed congestive heart failure and suffered brain damage.
    Glaser and her husband sued Fortunoff for all injuries, including those sustained at the hospital.
    Fortunoff filed a third-party complaint against Salvatore Orsini and Drs. George Froehlich and Jaime Javier, who treated Glaser at New Rochelle, seeking indemnification.

    Procedural History

    Fortunoff settled with Glaser in the main action.
    Orsini, Froehlich, and Javier moved to dismiss Fortunoff’s third-party complaint, arguing it was barred by General Obligations Law § 15-108(c).
    Special Term agreed and dismissed Fortunoff’s complaint.
    The Appellate Division affirmed.
    The New York Court of Appeals granted Fortunoff permission to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Fortunoff’s claim against the third-party defendants is one for common-law indemnification or contribution.
    Whether General Obligations Law § 15-108(c) bars a tortfeasor who has settled with the injured party from seeking contribution from successive, independent tortfeasors whose negligence aggravated the injured plaintiff’s damages.

    Holding

    1. Fortunoff’s claim is one for contribution, not indemnification because Fortunoff’s liability is predicated, at least in part, on its own negligence.
    2. Yes, because General Obligations Law § 15-108(c) bars a tortfeasor who has obtained a release from seeking contribution from any other person.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court distinguished between contribution and indemnification. Indemnification applies when a party is held liable without having committed a wrong, due to a relationship with the tortfeasor or an obligation imposed by law. Contribution applies when a party is held liable at least partially due to its own negligence.
    The court stated, “where one is held liable solely on account of the negligence of another, indemnification, not contribution, principles apply to shift the entire liability to the one who was negligent”.
    The court reasoned that Fortunoff, as the initial tortfeasor, was liable for Glaser’s knee injury and any aggravation resulting from subsequent negligent treatment. This liability is based, in part, on Fortunoff’s own negligence and the foreseeable consequences thereof.
    Conversely, the third-party defendants were only liable for the aggravation of Glaser’s condition, not the original injury.
    Because Fortunoff’s liability was partly based on its own negligence, its claim against the doctors was for contribution and therefore barred by General Obligations Law § 15-108(c).
    The court emphasized that the designation of the claim by the parties is not controlling; rather, the theory of recovery against each tortfeasor must be analyzed.

  • Hill v. St. Clare’s Hospital, 67 N.Y.2d 72 (1986): Vicarious Liability for Clinic Physicians & Release Effect on Successive Tortfeasors

    Hill v. St. Clare’s Hospital, 67 N.Y.2d 72 (1986)

    A physician who owns a medical clinic held out to the public as offering medical services may be vicariously liable for the malpractice of a treating doctor, and a plaintiff who releases the original tortfeasor bears the burden of proving the extent to which the release reduces the claim against subsequent tortfeasors who aggravated the initial injuries.

    Summary

    Birdell Hill sustained injuries and was treated at St. Clare’s Hospital, where a fracture was missed. He then sought treatment at the Benjamin A. Gilbert Medical Clinic, owned by Dr. Bono but staffed by other physicians. Dr. Carranza misdiagnosed and improperly treated Hill’s foot injuries, resulting in further complications. Hill sued the original tortfeasors (responsible for the initial injury) and later St. Clare’s Hospital and Dr. Bono. Hill settled with the original tortfeasors and executed a general release. The Court of Appeals addressed whether Dr. Bono could be vicariously liable for Dr. Carranza’s malpractice and the impact of the release on the claims against St. Clare’s and Dr. Bono. The court held that Bono could be vicariously liable and that Hill had the burden of proving how the release should affect the damages award against the subsequent tortfeasors.

    Facts

    Birdell Hill was injured in an elevator accident on June 30, 1972. He was taken to St. Clare’s Hospital, where doctors misdiagnosed his injuries as soft tissue damage. Hill then sought treatment at the Benjamin A. Gilbert Medical Clinic, which was owned by Dr. Bono, who had taken over the practice while Dr. Gilbert was incapacitated. Dr. Carranza, practicing at the clinic, misdiagnosed Hill’s foot fractures and dislocation, applying a cast improperly. This improper treatment aggravated Hill’s injuries, leading to permanent deformity and complications.

    Procedural History

    Hill and his wife sued the original tortfeasors and settled for $57,000, executing a general release. They then sued St. Clare’s Hospital and Drs. Bono and Carranza. The defendants amended their answers to include the release as an affirmative defense. The trial court denied any offset for the prior settlement, placing the burden of proof on the defendants. The jury found in favor of Hill against both defendants. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the denial of offset was proper and sufficient evidence supported Dr. Bono’s liability. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a physician who owns a medical clinic can be held vicariously liable for the malpractice of another physician practicing at the clinic, even if the owner-physician did not directly participate in or control the treatment?

    2. Whether the plaintiff, having released the original tortfeasors, bears the burden of proving the extent to which that release reduces their claim against the subsequent tortfeasors (hospital and physician) who aggravated the original injuries?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because a physician who owns a medical clinic which is held out to the public as offering medical services may be held vicariously liable for the malpractice of a treating doctor even though the owner-physician neither participates in nor controls the diagnosis made or treatment prescribed.

    2. Yes, because General Obligations Law § 15-108 (a) imposes upon the plaintiff who releases the original tort-feasor the burden of proving the extent to which his release reduces his claim against a hospital or physician who through malpractice aggravates the original injuries.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding vicarious liability, the court distinguished between the liability of hospitals for their employees and the non-liability for independent physicians. However, it invoked the doctrine of apparent or ostensible agency, as established in Hannon v. Siegel-Cooper Co. (167 NY 244). The court emphasized that if a clinic holds itself out to the public as providing medical services, it can be held liable for the malpractice of the physicians practicing there, even if those physicians are technically independent contractors. The court found sufficient evidence for the jury to determine whether Dr. Bono owned the clinic and represented it as offering medical services.

    Regarding the release, the court noted the common-law rule that releasing the original tortfeasor barred actions against subsequent tortfeasors, but that General Obligations Law § 15-108 abrogated that rule. The statute states a release does not discharge other tortfeasors but reduces the claim against them. The court reasoned that while the statute provides for a reduction, it doesn’t specify who bears the burden of proving the reduction amount. Drawing from Derby v. Prewitt (12 NY2d 100, 105), the court stated that “considerations of reason and basic fairness” dictate that the plaintiff, who controlled the settlement with the original tortfeasors, bears the burden of proving what portion of the settlement was intended to cover the aggravation of injuries caused by the subsequent tortfeasors. The court emphasized that failing to place the burden on the plaintiff would create the risk of double recovery.

    The court clarified that the reduction is the *greatest* of (1) the amount stipulated by the release, (2) the consideration paid, or (3) the released tortfeasor’s equitable share of the damages. The equitable share should be based on the *damage inflicted* by each tortfeasor, not the culpability of their acts.

  • Schauer v. Joyce, 54 N.Y.2d 1 (1981): Contribution Among Successive Attorneys in Malpractice Actions

    54 N.Y.2d 1 (1981)

    A defendant in a legal malpractice action may seek contribution from a subsequent attorney whose negligence allegedly contributed to the plaintiff’s damages, even in the absence of contractual privity between the attorneys.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether an attorney, sued for malpractice by a former client, can bring a third-party claim for contribution against a subsequent attorney who also represented the client in the same matter. The New York Court of Appeals held that such a third-party claim is valid if both attorneys owed a duty to the client and their negligence contributed to the same injury, even if their negligence was successive and independent. The key is whether each attorney’s actions contributed to the plaintiff’s ultimate damages. The court reversed the lower court’s dismissal of the third-party complaint.

    Facts

    Vivian Schauer hired attorney Patrick Joyce in 1975 for a divorce. Joyce obtained a default judgment for Schauer that included alimony. The husband successfully moved to vacate parts of the judgment due to a false affidavit of regularity submitted by Joyce. Schauer discharged Joyce and hired Thomas Gent in April 1977. Schauer later sued Joyce for malpractice, alleging that his negligence caused her to lose alimony. Joyce then filed a third-party action against Gent, claiming that Gent negligently failed to reinstate the vacated alimony award or promptly seek alimony payments.

    Procedural History

    The Special Term dismissed Joyce’s third-party complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed this dismissal. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the third-party complaint stated a valid cause of action for contribution.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an attorney being sued for malpractice can bring a third-party claim for contribution against a subsequent attorney who represented the same client in the same matter, alleging that the subsequent attorney’s negligence contributed to the client’s damages.

    Holding

    Yes, because CPLR 1401 allows contribution among those who are subject to liability for damages for the same personal injury or injury to property, and the key question is whether both attorneys owed a duty to the plaintiff and contributed to the same injury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that under CPLR 1401 and Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., the relevant question is not whether Gent owed a duty to Joyce, but whether both Gent and Joyce owed a duty to Mrs. Schauer and whether their breaches contributed to her ultimate injuries. The court emphasized that CPLR 1401 applies not only to joint tortfeasors but also to successive and independent tortfeasors. The court found that Joyce’s third-party complaint adequately alleged that Gent’s negligence could have contributed to Mrs. Schauer’s loss of alimony. The court stated that “[t]he primary injury of which Mrs. Schauer complains is the loss of alimony.” It noted that a substantial portion of the damages occurred after Gent took over the case. The court concluded that Gent could be found at least partially responsible for the loss if he negligently failed to obtain a new hearing on alimony and support or to seek reinstatement of the vacated alimony judgment. In effect, Joyce was claiming that Gent, as an independent, successive tortfeasor, contributed to or aggravated Mrs. Schauer’s injuries. This, the court held, is “clearly the type of claim encompassed by CPLR 1401.” The court clarified that Joyce’s ability to raise the defense of failure to mitigate damages did not preclude him from asserting a third-party claim for contribution. The court directly addressed the lower court’s reasoning that there was nothing to make Gent even partially liable for Schauer’s loss of alimony as “erroneous” since, according to the pleadings, the negligence of both attorneys was responsible for the same injury.