New York Law Review

Tag: Subway Crime

  • People v. Mack, 17 N.Y.3d 928 (2011): Establishing Forcible Compulsion in Sexual Abuse Cases

    People v. Mack, 17 N.Y.3d 928 (2011)

    Forcible compulsion in the context of first-degree sexual abuse requires more than just the physical contact inherent in the sexual act itself; it necessitates a showing of additional physical force used to compel the victim.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the evidence presented to the grand jury was insufficient to establish forcible compulsion as required for a charge of first-degree sexual abuse. The case involved a defendant accused of sexually abusing a teenage girl on a crowded subway. While the evidence showed unwanted sexual contact, the court found that the crowded conditions merely facilitated the crime and the sexual contact itself was the only physical force exerted. This was deemed insufficient to prove that the sexual contact was compelled by the use of physical force.

    Facts

    During rush hour, a teenage girl boarded a crowded subway train in Manhattan. A large man (the defendant) pushed his way onto the train behind her. The girl felt unusual movements on her lower back, which she initially attributed to the train’s motion and the close proximity of other passengers. When she turned around, the touching stopped, but resumed when she turned back. She was unable to move away due to the crowd. After the man exited the train, the girl discovered semen on her clothing and reported the incident.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was indicted on one count of first-degree sexual abuse and one count of third-degree sexual abuse. The Supreme Court initially reduced the first-degree charge to third-degree, finding insufficient evidence of forcible compulsion. After the case was re-presented, the defendant was again indicted for first-degree sexual abuse. The Supreme Court again dismissed the first-degree charge. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented to the grand jury was sufficient to establish that the defendant subjected the victim to sexual contact by forcible compulsion, as required for a charge of first-degree sexual abuse under New York Penal Law § 130.65(1) and § 130.00(8)(a).

    Holding

    No, because the crowded conditions in the subway car merely masked and facilitated the unwanted sexual contact, and the sexual contact itself was the only physical force that the defendant deployed against his victim. This is not enough to establish that the sexual contact was “compelled] by . . . use of physical force.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that forcible compulsion requires more than just the physical contact inherent in the sexual act itself. It requires a showing of additional physical force used to compel the victim. The court distinguished the case from robbery cases where a “human wall” is created to intimidate victims, noting that there was no coordinated action by the defendant and other passengers to trap the victim. The court stated, “Here, there was no coordinated action by defendant and other passengers to hedge in the victim. Rather, the crowded conditions in the subway car merely masked and facilitated the unwanted sexual contact alleged. The sexual contact itself is the only physical force that defendant may be said to have deployed against his victim. This is not enough to establish that the sexual contact was ‘compelled] by . . . use of physical force.’” The court emphasized that while the defendant’s conduct was reprehensible, the evidence only showed the use of stealth to commit the crime, not the use of physical force beyond the act of sexual contact itself.

  • Weiner v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 84 N.Y.2d 324 (1994): Governmental vs. Proprietary Functions and Proximate Cause in Negligence

    Weiner v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 84 N.Y.2d 324 (1994)

    A governmental entity is immune from liability for negligence claims when its actions are overwhelmingly governmental in nature, and a plaintiff must establish proximate cause between the alleged negligence and the injury.

    Summary

    The plaintiff was attacked in a subway tunnel undergoing renovations. She sued the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), alleging negligence in storing construction materials (a metal plate) that allowed her assailant to hide and in failing to close the tunnel despite a history of crime. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, granting summary judgment to the MTA. The court held that the MTA’s actions were overwhelmingly governmental, thus shielding it from liability. Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to establish that the metal plate, rather than the general lack of security, was the proximate cause of her injuries. This case highlights the distinction between governmental and proprietary functions and the importance of establishing proximate cause in negligence claims against governmental entities.

    Facts

    On March 20, 1991, the plaintiff was attacked while walking through a subway tunnel undergoing renovations. The assailant dragged her behind a large metal plate that was temporarily placed against the tunnel wall. The tunnel had a history of violent felonies, including two prior rapes. Eight months before the attack, the local community board had recommended closing the tunnel to the MTA.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff sued the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), alleging negligence. The lower courts allowed the case to proceed. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, granted the MTA’s motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the complaint.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the MTA’s actions in maintaining the subway tunnel constituted a governmental function, thereby shielding it from liability for negligence.
    2. Whether the plaintiff established that the placement of the metal plate was the proximate cause of her injuries.

    Holding

    1. No, because the MTA’s actions were overwhelmingly governmental in nature, placing the source of asserted liability well toward the “governmental function” end of the Miller continuum.
    2. No, because the plaintiff’s claim was speculative, and she failed to establish that the location of the metal plate, rather than the general lack of security, was the proximate cause of her injuries.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court determined that the MTA’s actions fell under a governmental function, providing immunity from liability. The court applied the governmental/proprietary function test established in Weiner v Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 55 NY2d 175. Citing Miller v. State of New York, 62 NY2d 506, 511-512, the court noted the “continuum of responsibility” from proprietary acts to governmental functions, like “the maintenance of general police and fire protection.” The court found the MTA’s actions to be overwhelmingly governmental because the failure to close the tunnel or properly police it were governmental decisions. Furthermore, the court stated that the plaintiff failed to establish proximate cause. The court highlighted prior instances of violent felonies in the tunnel even without the presence of negligently placed construction materials. Therefore, the court concluded that the plaintiff’s claim was speculative on the issue of causation, requiring dismissal as a matter of law. The court referenced Matter of Crichlow v New York City Tr. Auth., 184 AD2d 395 and Khodai v New York City Tr. Auth., 176 AD2d 524 to support this conclusion. The court emphasized that “plaintiffs claim is so speculative on the issue of causation as to mandate dismissal as a matter of law”. There were no dissenting or concurring opinions noted.