New York Law Review

Tag: Substantial Pain

  • People v. Henderson, 92 N.Y.2d 677 (1999): Defining “Substantial Pain” for Physical Injury

    People v. Henderson, 92 N.Y.2d 677 (1999)

    “Substantial pain,” as an element of “physical injury” under New York Penal Law, requires more than slight or trivial pain but need not be severe or intense, assessed by considering the objective injury, the victim’s subjective account, whether medical treatment was sought, and the offender’s motive.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed a defendant’s conviction for burglary and assault, holding that sufficient evidence existed for the jury to find the victim experienced “substantial pain,” a necessary element of “physical injury” for both crimes. The victim, Adrian Gentles, was bitten on the finger by the defendant during a burglary. The court considered the cracked fingernail and bleeding caused by the bite, Gentles’s testimony of moderate pain, his seeking medical treatment, and the defendant’s motive to inflict pain to escape. The court clarified that “substantial pain” is more than trivial but less than severe, considering all relevant factual aspects.

    Facts

    Adrian Gentles confronted the defendant, who was committing burglary in a building where Gentles worked. During a struggle, the defendant bit Gentles on the left ring finger in an attempt to escape. The bite caused Gentles’s fingernail to crack and his finger to bleed. After the defendant was apprehended, Gentles sought medical treatment at a hospital, receiving a tetanus shot and a bandage.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of second-degree burglary and second-degree assault. He appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to prove “physical injury,” an element of both crimes. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and the defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to establish that the victim, Adrian Gentles, suffered “substantial pain” as a result of the defendant’s actions, thereby satisfying the “physical injury” element of second-degree burglary and second-degree assault under New York Penal Law.

    Holding

    Yes, because the evidence, viewed objectively and subjectively, supported the jury’s finding that the defendant caused “substantial pain” to his victim.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals considered the definition of “physical injury” under Penal Law § 10.00 (9), which includes “impairment of physical condition or substantial pain.” The court focused on whether substantial pain was proven. While “substantial pain” cannot be defined precisely, it is “more than slight or trivial pain” but need not be “severe or intense.” The court outlined several factual aspects to consider:

    1. The objective nature of the injury: Here, the cracked fingernail and bleeding would normally cause more than a little pain.
    2. The victim’s subjective description: Gentles testified to “moderate pain,” confirming it was not trivial.
    3. Whether the victim sought medical treatment: Gentles’s hospital visit indicated the pain’s significance.
    4. The offender’s motive: The court noted the revisors’ comments that “petty slaps, shoves, kicks and the like delivered out of hostility, meanness and similar motives” are harassment, not assault. Here, the defendant’s motive was to inflict pain to make Gentles release him. The court reasoned, “Indeed, it seems unlikely that anything less than substantial pain would have caused Gentles, evidently a tenacious man, to release his hold.”

    The Court found that these factors, viewed together, supported the jury’s finding of substantial pain. The Court distinguished the case from cases where the pain was considered trivial. The court stated, “Pain need not, however, be severe or intense to be substantial.”

  • People v. Henderson, 92 N.Y.2d 677 (1999): Sufficiency of Factual Allegations for Physical Injury in Assault Cases

    People v. Henderson, 92 N.Y.2d 677 (1999)

    An information charging assault in the third degree is facially sufficient if it alleges facts from which a jury could infer that the victim suffered substantial pain, even if the long-term effects of the injury are not yet known at the time the information is filed.

    Summary

    Henderson was charged with assault in the third degree after allegedly kicking a victim during an attempted robbery, causing contusions, swelling, and substantial pain. He pleaded guilty, but later appealed, arguing that the information was facially insufficient to establish “physical injury.” The Appellate Term reversed, but the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Term, holding that the factual allegations in the information were sufficient to establish a prima facie case of assault in the third degree because a jury could infer substantial pain from the described injuries.

    Facts

    The defendant, acting with another individual, attempted to steal the victim’s motor scooter. During the attempt, the defendant and his accomplice kicked the victim about the legs. The victim suffered contusions and swelling about the legs and experienced substantial pain, alarm, and annoyance.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was charged in New York City Criminal Court with assault in the third degree, attempted petit larceny, resisting arrest, and harassment. The defendant pleaded guilty to assault in the third degree. The Appellate Term reversed the judgment of conviction and dismissed the information, finding it insufficient regarding physical injury. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the factual allegations in the information were sufficient to establish a prima facie case of assault in the third degree, specifically whether the allegations were sufficient to establish the “physical injury” element of the offense.

    Holding

    Yes, because accepting the allegations as true, a jury could certainly infer that the victim felt substantial pain. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Term’s order and reinstated the judgment of Criminal Court.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that, to be facially sufficient, an information must contain non-hearsay allegations that, if true, establish every element of the offense charged. The Court noted that “physical injury” is defined as “impairment of physical condition or substantial pain” (Penal Law § 10.00 [9]). The Court clarified that substantial pain is more than a mere technical battery. Quoting prior precedent, the Court stated that “ ‘petty slaps, shoves, kicks and the like delivered out of hostility, meanness and similar motives’, are not within the definition” of the statute. Here, the kicks were part of a concerted physical attack to steal the victim’s property. The Court reasoned that because the supporting deposition is often secured shortly after the event, the victim would not necessarily know the lasting effects of the injury. Thus, allegations of substantial pain, swelling, and contusions following kicks are sufficient to constitute physical injury. The Court also emphasized that the prima facie case requirement is not the same as the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt required at trial. Therefore, the factual allegations in the information were sufficient to make out a prima facie case of assault in the third degree and support the judgment of conviction based upon the defendant’s guilty plea.

  • People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490 (1987): Establishing “Substantial Pain” in Assault Cases

    People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490 (1987)

    In assault cases, whether the victim experienced “substantial pain,” as required by New York Penal Law, is generally a question for the trier of fact, and can be inferred from the nature of the injury, medical treatment received, and other objective evidence, even without direct testimony from the victim regarding their subjective pain level.

    Summary

    Defendant Bleakley appealed his assault conviction, arguing the prosecution failed to prove the victim suffered “substantial pain.” The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the jury could reasonably infer substantial pain from the evidence presented, including the laceration size, the victim’s return to the hospital for wound care, and the doctor’s testimony that the injury could have caused pain. The court emphasized that the victim’s subjective experience is only one factor, and objective evidence can suffice to prove substantial pain.

    Facts

    The victim was shot, resulting in a laceration of 1.5 inches on his back. The victim returned to the hospital the day following the assault because the wound was oozing and required redressing. At the time of the trial, the laceration was still visible.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of assault in the second degree. The defendant appealed, arguing that the prosecution did not prove that the victim suffered “substantial pain,” as required by New York Penal Law. The lower courts upheld the conviction, and the defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence for a jury to reasonably conclude that the victim suffered “substantial pain” as defined by New York Penal Law § 10.00(9) and § 120.05(2), even in the absence of direct testimony from the victim regarding their subjective experience of pain.

    Holding

    Yes, because the jury could infer substantial pain from the objective evidence presented, including the size and nature of the laceration, the medical treatment required, and the doctor’s testimony, irrespective of the victim’s explicit testimony regarding the degree of pain felt.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while the Penal Law requires proof of “physical injury” or “serious physical injury” for assault, the degree of the crime and the punishment depend on factors such as the instrument used. The court emphasized that determining whether “substantial pain” exists is generally a question for the jury. The court stated that the victim’s subjective reaction to the pain is only one factor, and that a jury can infer substantial pain from other evidence, such as the nature of the injury, the medical treatment received, and expert testimony. The court distinguished the case from People v. Jimenez, where the cut was much smaller, left no mark, and required no medical treatment. In this case, the laceration size, the fact that it was still visible at trial, the need for follow-up medical care, and the doctor’s testimony provided sufficient evidence for the jury to infer substantial pain, even without the victim’s direct testimony. The court noted, “Whether the ‘substantial pain’ necessary to establish an assault charge has been proved is generally a question for the trier of fact.” The court further clarified that “The subjective reaction of the victim is but one factor for the jury to consider.”

  • Matter of Philip A., 49 N.Y.2d 198 (1980): Defining ‘Substantial Pain’ in Assault Cases

    Matter of Philip A., 49 N.Y.2d 198 (1980)

    For a physical injury to meet the threshold of ‘substantial pain’ necessary to support an assault charge under New York Penal Law, the pain must be more than petty slaps and must reach an objective level that is more than the subjective feeling of the complainant.

    Summary

    This case concerns the definition of “substantial pain” within the context of a juvenile delinquency proceeding involving an assault charge. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the evidence presented—testimony that the complainant was hit in the face, cried, felt bumps, and had red marks—was sufficient to establish “substantial pain” beyond a reasonable doubt. The court held that the evidence was insufficient because it amounted to no more than evidence of petty slaps, which is not enough to demonstrate “substantial pain” as intended by the statute.

    Facts

    The respondent, Philip A., was accused of hitting the complainant twice in the face. As a result, the complainant cried, reported feeling like bumps were forming (although none did), and exhibited red marks on his face. The Family Court Judge concluded that the complainant experienced substantial pain based on his own feelings at the time of the incident.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court found that the respondent committed acts constituting an assault. The Appellate Division affirmed the Family Court’s decision, with two justices dissenting. The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the pain experienced by the complainant constituted “substantial pain” within the meaning of subdivision 9 of section 10.00 of the Penal Law, sufficient to sustain an assault charge.

    Holding

    No, because the evidence presented was consistent with “petty slaps” and did not establish “substantial pain” beyond a reasonable doubt as contemplated by the statute.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that while pain is subjective, the Legislature’s inclusion of “substantial” indicated an intention to avoid a purely subjective standard. The court noted the Revisors’ notes explicitly stated that “petty slaps, shoves, kicks and the like delivered out of hostility, meanness and similar motives” are not within the definition of physical injury requiring substantial pain. The court referenced People v. McDowell, noting that an incidental reference to a blackened eye without elaboration on its appearance, seriousness, or pain was insufficient to establish substantial pain. Here, the court found that the complainant’s experience of being hit, feeling pain (undefined in degree), crying, and having red marks, was consistent with minor physical contact and thus insufficient to prove “substantial pain.” The court reasoned that while the trier of fact could consider the subjective reaction of the alleged victim, there remained an objective threshold implied in the Revisors’ notes. The Court stated: “Here we have nothing more than evidence that complainant was hit, that it caused him pain, the degree of which was not spelled out, caused him to cry and caused a red mark. All of that is consistent with ‘petty slaps’ and, therefore, was insufficient to establish ‘substantial pain’ beyond a reasonable doubt.”