New York Law Review

Tag: Subsequent Indictment

  • People v. Lomax, 16 N.Y.3d 182 (2011): Applying Speedy Trial Exclusions to Later Indictments

    People v. Lomax, 16 N.Y.3d 182 (2011)

    When a subsequent indictment is related back to the commencement of the initial proceeding for speedy trial purposes, the excludable time from the initial proceeding also applies to the subsequent indictment.

    Summary

    Defendant was initially charged with assault via a desk appearance ticket. Over a year later, the People filed an indictment including theft-related charges stemming from the same incident. Defendant argued the theft charges should be dismissed on speedy trial grounds. The Court of Appeals held that because the subsequent indictment related back to the initial appearance for speedy trial commencement, the excludable time from the initial charges also applied to the theft charges. This prevents selective application of CPL 30.30 and ensures the speedy trial statute is applied as an integrated whole. The court affirmed the Appellate Division’s reinstatement of the theft-related counts.

    Facts

    The complainant was photographing a construction site when the defendant approached him, punched him, and stole his camera on August 18, 2005.

    The police issued the defendant a desk appearance ticket for assault in the third degree.

    The defendant appeared in Criminal Court on September 26, 2005, in response to the ticket.

    About a month later, the People filed a misdemeanor complaint charging the defendant with assault, menacing, and harassment.

    On November 8, 2006, the People filed an indictment charging the defendant with robbery, petit larceny, assault, grand larceny, criminal possession of stolen property, and menacing.

    The People filed a statement of readiness on the same day as the indictment.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to dismiss the theft-related counts based on CPL 30.30 speedy trial grounds.

    The Supreme Court denied the motion concerning the assault counts but granted it for the theft counts.

    The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s order and reinstated the theft-related counts, finding the excludable time and the People’s statement of readiness applied to all charges since they arose from the same incident.

    The Court of Appeals granted the defendant leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the theft-related charges in the indictment, filed over a year after the initial accusatory instrument, are barred by the speedy trial provisions of CPL 30.30, specifically, whether the time excludable from the initial charges applies to the later theft-related charges.

    Holding

    No, because when a subsequent indictment is related back to the initial proceeding for purposes of applying the speedy trial statute, the excludable time is also related back.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior holding in People v. Sinistaj, 67 N.Y.2d 236 (1986), stating, “[w]e perceive no logical reason why, when a subsequent indictment is related back to the commencement of the proceeding for purposes of applying the six-month limitation prescribed by CPL 30.30 (1) (a), it should not also be related back for the purpose of computing the time to be excluded from that limitation.”

    The Court reasoned that the provisions of CPL 30.30 should be interpreted as an integrated whole. The court emphasized that because both parties agreed the charges were sufficiently related to require the same commencement date, they are sufficiently related to apply the same excludable time.

    The Court considered the meaning of “directly derived” under CPL 1.20(16)(b), stating that term should be accorded its plain meaning—specifically, whether the indictment can be traced to or originates from the prior accusatory instrument. In this case, the indictment appears to satisfy that test because the charges, including the theft-based charges, originate from the prior accusatory instrument, incorporating the same physical injury component.

    The court stated that even if the indictment was not directly derived from the initial accusatory instrument, it would not benefit the defendant, because then the indictment would not relate back for the purpose of any speedy trial calculation, including determination of a commencement date. The speedy trial statute should be applied as a rational, integral whole.

  • People v. Wilson, 11 N.Y.2d 421 (1962): Effect of Dismissal for Failure to Indict on Subsequent Indictment

    People v. Wilson, 11 N.Y.2d 421 (1962)

    A dismissal under Section 667 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law, for failure to indict a defendant at the next term of court, does not bar a subsequent indictment for the same offense.

    Summary

    The defendant was initially charged with theft in Magistrate’s Court and released on bail pending grand jury action. After a significant delay, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint under Section 667 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law because he hadn’t been indicted. Before the motion was heard, the defendant was indicted on charges including the original theft charge. His motion to dismiss was denied, he pleaded guilty, and then appealed, arguing the indictment should have been dismissed under Section 667. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that a dismissal under Section 667 does not prevent a subsequent indictment for the same felony offense.

    Facts

    1. May 1959: Defendant arraigned in Magistrate’s Court on theft charge; examination waived; bail granted pending grand jury action.
    2. April 1961: Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint under Section 667 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for failure to indict.
    3. May 1961: Before the dismissal motion was heard, the defendant was indicted on multiple counts, including the original theft charge.
    4. Defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint was denied.
    5. Defendant arraigned on the indictment, renewed motion to dismiss, which was denied.
    6. Defendant pleaded guilty to one charge and appealed.

    Procedural History

    The County Court of Queens County convicted the defendant. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, setting aside the guilty plea and granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a dismissal under Section 667 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for failure to indict a defendant at the next term of court bars a subsequent indictment for the same offense, particularly when the indictment is handed up before the dismissal motion is heard.

    Holding

    No, because the statutory language of Section 667 does not mandate such a construction, and the fact of indictment before the dismissal motion is heard constitutes “good cause” for refusing to dismiss the charge.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Section 667 allows the court to dismiss the “prosecution,” but this does not prevent a subsequent prosecution for the same crime. The court relied on People v. Dillon, 197 N.Y. 254, 256-257, interpreting similar language to mean that “that particular prosecution is terminated” without barring subsequent prosecution. The court stated that such a dismissal has no greater effect than a discharge by a magistrate on preliminary hearing, which does not affect the grand jury’s power to indict later. The fact that an indictment had been handed up before the dismissal motion was heard constituted “good cause” for refusing to dismiss the charge, citing People v. Pearsall, 6 Misc.2d 40. The court also compared Section 667 to Section 668 (dismissal for failure to try at the next term), where dismissal does not prevent reindictment, citing People v. Wilson, 8 N.Y.2d 391, 396. The court highlighted Section 673, which states that a dismissal under Chapter VII “is not a bar” to another prosecution for the same offense if the offense charged is a felony. The court concluded that a dismissal for failure to indict should not have more drastic consequences than a failure to bring to trial after indictment.