Mayer v. Cronkite, 40 N.Y.2d 857 (1976)

A general release, without reservation of rights, given to some joint tortfeasors discharges all other joint tortfeasors from liability, and a subsequent change in the law does not revive liability extinguished by the release, especially where the initial settlement was judicially approved and operated as a final judgment.

Summary

In this case, the New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a general release given to some joint tortfeasors barred a subsequent action against other joint tortfeasors after a change in law that arguably created new liability. The infant respondent received a general release without reservation of rights in 1968. Later, the court’s decision in Gelbman v. Gelbman removed the bar on intrafamilial tort actions. The Court of Appeals held that the general release discharged all tortfeasors, including the parents, and that Gelbman did not create new liability that would override the effect of the release, which operated as a final judgment under CPLR 1207 because it was judicially approved.

Facts

In 1968, an infant respondent, Mayer, received a general release without any reservation of rights related to a tort claim. The release was given to other joint tortfeasors. The order of compromise authorizing the general release was judicially approved.

Procedural History

The defendant parents moved to amend their answer to assert a defense of general release. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and certified a question.

Issue(s)

Whether a general release, given to some joint tortfeasors without reservation of rights, discharges other joint tortfeasors from liability, even after a subsequent change in law that removes a bar to the specific type of tort action.

Holding

Yes, because the general release, without a reservation of rights, discharged all other joint tortfeasors from liability and the subsequent change in law did not create new liability that would override the effect of the release, especially given that the initial settlement was judicially approved and operated as a final judgment.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals relied on established precedent that a general release without a reservation of rights discharges all joint tortfeasors. The court cited Oliver v. Washburn, Berlow v. New York State Thruway Auth., and Milks v. Mclver. The Court distinguished the case from situations where rescission of the release might be warranted due to mutual mistake or other grounds. The court stated, “There was no reservation of rights in the unlimited general release given on May 16, 1968 to the other joint tort-feasors, and, hence, the infant respondent’s parents, against whom this new action has been brought, were discharged from any alleged tort liability on their part.”

The court addressed the argument that Gelbman v. Gelbman, which removed the bar on intrafamilial tort actions, created new liability. The court held that Gelbman did not create new liability encompassed by the general release but only removed a judicially created impediment. It also noted that Gelbman was only retrospectively applicable to matters which had not gone to final judgment, and the order of compromise authorizing the execution of the general release operated as a final judgment pursuant to CPLR 1207.

The court emphasized that the release was given in 1968, before the enactment of section 15-108 of the General Obligations Law (effective Sept. 1, 1972), and thus the statute did not apply. The court addressed a procedural issue related to the denial of the defendant’s motion to amend their answer, acknowledging that such decisions are typically discretionary and not reviewable. However, it reasoned that the lower courts likely would have permitted the amendment had they believed the defense was available as a matter of law. The court concluded that the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, and the appellants granted leave to serve an amended answer asserting the defense of general release.