New York Law Review

Tag: Subdivision Approval

  • Aloya v. Planning Board of Town of Stony Point, 89 N.Y.2d 339 (1996): Effect of Final Subdivision Plat Disapproval on Preliminary Approval

    Aloya v. Planning Board of Town of Stony Point, 89 N.Y.2d 339 (1996)

    Disapproval of a final subdivision plat application by a Town Planning Board, due to failure to obtain the supermajority vote required to override a negative recommendation from the County Planning Department, constitutes an “action” under Town Law § 276 and automatically extinguishes any prior preliminary plat approval.

    Summary

    Aloya sought to develop a 45-acre property in Stony Point, NY. After obtaining preliminary plat approval in 1991, their final subdivision application was disapproved in 1994 because they failed to secure the supermajority vote needed to override the Rockland County Planning Department’s negative recommendation. Aloya then submitted another application in 1996, arguing the preliminary approval was still valid and thus exempt from a new building moratorium. The Court of Appeals held that the 1994 disapproval was a valid “action” and terminated the preliminary approval, subjecting the 1996 application to the moratorium. The court reasoned that preliminary approval is contingent on final approval, and its denial renders the preliminary approval invalid.

    Facts

    Petitioners sought to subdivide a 45-acre property into 27 single-family home lots in Stony Point, NY.

    They received unanimous, unconditional preliminary plat approval on December 4, 1991.

    On March 1, 1992, they submitted an application for final subdivision plat approval.

    The Town Planning Board referred the plan to the Rockland County Planning Department, which recommended disapproval due to insufficient information regarding drainage impacts.

    On July 28, 1994, the Board voted on the application; four members voted to approve, one against. Because a “majority plus one” vote was required to override the County’s recommendation, the motion failed, and the application was “turned down.”

    In 1996, Aloya submitted a new application. The Board rejected it due to a moratorium on major subdivisions implemented after the initial preliminary approval.

    Procedural History

    Aloya initially filed a CPLR article 78 proceeding, arguing the 1994 vote was not a valid “action” under Town Law § 276, seeking default approval. Supreme Court dismissed the petition, and the Appellate Division affirmed.

    Aloya then filed a second article 78 proceeding challenging the rejection of their 1996 application, arguing the original preliminary approval remained valid. Supreme Court ordered consideration of the application. The Appellate Division reversed, holding the 1994 disapproval terminated the preliminary approval.

    The New York Court of Appeals then heard the case.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Town Planning Board’s rejection of Aloya’s final subdivision application in 1994, due to failure to obtain a supermajority vote, constituted an “action” within the meaning of Town Law § 276.

    2. Whether the disapproval of the final subdivision application automatically extinguished the prior preliminary plat approval.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the turning down of the final plat application for failure to gain supermajority approval constituted dispositive Board action under the law.

    2. Yes, because denial of the final application extinguished prior preliminary approval, subjecting Aloya’s subsequent plans to the moratorium.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the first issue, the court analyzed Town Law § 276(6) and General Municipal Law § 239-n(5). While Town Law § 276(6) requires a planning board to “act” on an application, General Municipal Law § 239-n(5) mandates a supermajority vote to override a County Planning Department’s negative recommendation. The court reasoned that permitting default approval under Town Law § 276(8) despite the failure to obtain a supermajority would negate General Municipal Law § 239-n(5) and its legislative purpose.

    Regarding the second issue, the court emphasized that preliminary plat approval is “subject to the approval of the plat in final form” as per Town Law § 276(4)(c). The court stated, “Once a final application is denied… the subdivision plan can no longer be approved, rendering preliminary plat approval invalid as the essential contingency — final approval — cannot arise. Thus, by operation of law denial of petitioners’ final plat application itself rescinded the preliminary approval.” The court distinguished Town Law § 276(5)(h), which authorizes revocation of preliminary approval for failure to submit a final application within six months, stating that this provision is applicable *before* a determination on the final application, not after.

    The court effectively established that a failed attempt to override a county planning disapproval is a dispositive act, and that preliminary approvals are inherently temporary and extinguished upon final disapproval.

  • Bayswater Realty & Capital Corp. v. Planning Board, 76 N.Y.2d 460 (1990): Ripeness Doctrine in Land Use Challenges

    76 N.Y.2d 460 (1990)

    A challenge to administrative action is not ripe for review unless the action is final and the anticipated harm is direct and immediate.

    Summary

    Bayswater Realty and other developers brought a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of a statute and regulation that allowed the Planning Board to require a $5,000 per lot recreation fee as a condition of subdivision approval. The developers argued the fee lacked a close nexus to the legitimate governmental interest of providing recreational facilities. The New York Court of Appeals held that the challenges were not ripe for review because no fee had been definitively imposed on any of the plaintiffs. This case underscores the importance of finality and direct harm in establishing ripeness for judicial review of administrative actions.

    Facts

    Several real estate developers, including Bayswater Realty, sought subdivision approval from the Planning Board. The developers challenged the Board’s policy of requiring a $5,000 per lot recreation fee as a condition of approval. Bayswater Realty had received a final approval resolution that imposed the fee, but then sought judicial review, resulting in a remand for further determinations. Other developers’ applications were still pending before the Board.

    Procedural History

    The developers filed a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of the fee requirement. The lower courts addressed the merits of the constitutional claim. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, finding the matter not ripe for review and dismissing the complaint. The Court of Appeals cited a prior decision, remitting Bayswater Realty’s case back to the Supreme Court to remand to the planning board.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a challenge to a Planning Board’s recreation fee requirement is ripe for judicial review when the fee has not been definitively imposed on the plaintiffs.

    Holding

    No, because the administrative action was not final and the anticipated harm was not direct and immediate.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on the ripeness doctrine, which requires that administrative action be final and the harm be direct and immediate before judicial review is appropriate. The court stated, “For a challenge to administrative action to be ripe, the administrative action sought to be reviewed must be final, and the anticipated harm caused by the action must be direct and immediate.” The court noted that Bayswater Realty’s case was pending further review before the Planning Board, and the other developers had not yet had their applications acted upon. The court emphasized the importance of preventing premature judicial intervention, stating that the rule “not only prevents dissipation of judicial resources, but more importantly, it prevents devaluation of the force of judicial decrees which decide concrete disputes.” The court found neither requirement of ripeness was met here, as Bayswater’s case had been remanded, and the other plaintiffs’ applications were still pending and not final.

  • Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78 (1966): Upholding “Money in Lieu of Land” Exactions for Subdivision Approvals

    Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78 (1966)

    A village may validly authorize its planning board to require a subdivider to allot land for park purposes within the subdivision or, at the village’s option, pay a fee in lieu of such allotment as a condition for plat approval.

    Summary

    The Village of Scarsdale required Jenad, Inc., a real estate developer, to either dedicate land for park purposes within its new subdivision or pay a fee of $250 per lot into a fund for park and recreational purposes. Jenad paid the fees without protest and then sued to recover them, arguing that the requirement was an unconstitutional tax. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Village’s requirement was a valid exercise of its power to plan for the general welfare of the community and not an unconstitutional tax. The court reasoned that the exaction was a reasonable condition for subdivision approval, similar to zoning regulations and requirements for essential infrastructure.

    Facts

    Jenad, Inc. sought approval from the Village of Scarsdale Planning Commission for a subdivision plat. The Village’s regulations, specifically Section 2, Article 12, required subdividers to allot land within the subdivision for park purposes or, at the Planning Commission’s option, pay a fee of $250 per lot to be used for park, playground, and recreational purposes. Jenad paid the required fees without protest. Subsequently, Jenad sued the Village to recover the fees paid, claiming the requirement was an unconstitutional tax and an unauthorized taking of property.

    Procedural History

    Jenad, Inc. sued the Village of Scarsdale in New York state court to recover the fees paid under protest. The lower court ruled in favor of Jenad. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Village of Scarsdale appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a village can validly require, as a condition for subdivision plat approval, that a subdivider allot land within the subdivision for park purposes or, at the village’s option, pay a fee in lieu of such allotment.

    Holding

    Yes, because section 179-l of the Village Law grants villages the power to make such exactions as a reasonable form of village planning for the general community good, analogous to zoning regulations and infrastructure requirements.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that section 179-l of the Village Law empowers villages to require subdivision maps to show “a park or parks suitably located for playground or other recreation purposes.” While the statute doesn’t specifically authorize a “money in lieu of land” system, it allows the planning board to “waive” the parkland provision “subject to appropriate conditions and guarantees.” The court interpreted “appropriate conditions and guarantees” to reasonably include a fee per lot paid into a separate village fund used for park and recreational purposes. The court distinguished this case from Gulest Assoc. v. Town of Newburgh, where the town law amendment was deemed vague. In this case, the Scarsdale regulations specifically directed that the funds be used for the “acquisition and improvement of recreation and park lands.”

    The court rejected the argument that the fee was an unconstitutional tax, stating that it was a “reasonable form of village planning for the general community good,” akin to zoning regulations and requirements for essential infrastructure. The court noted that subdivisions increase the demand for recreational space and that requiring developers to contribute to parklands, either through land dedication or fees, is a reasonable way to address this increased demand. The court cited with approval decisions from Wisconsin (Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls) and Montana (Billings Props. v. Yellowstone County) that upheld similar requirements. The court in Jordan stated “a required dedication of land for school, park, or recreational sites as a condition for the approval of the subdivision plat should be upheld as a valid exercise of police power if the evidence reasonably establishes that the municipality will be required to provide more land for schools, parks, and playgrounds as a result of approval of the subdivision.” The court concluded that the fee was not a tax on the land, but a fee for obtaining plat approval.