10 N.Y.3d 523 (2008)

A defendant can be retried for intentional manslaughter after the reversal of a conviction for depraved indifference murder, even if the jury in the first trial was instructed on intentional manslaughter but did not reach a verdict on that charge due to an “acquit-first” instruction and a guilty verdict on the depraved indifference murder charge.

Summary

Santos Suarez was convicted of depraved indifference murder, but acquitted of intentional murder. The Court of Appeals reversed the depraved indifference murder conviction for legal insufficiency. The key issue was whether Suarez could be retried for first-degree (intentional) manslaughter, a charge presented to, but not decided by, the jury in the first trial. The Court of Appeals held that retrial was permissible. Because the jury did not have a full opportunity to consider the intentional manslaughter charge due to an erroneous “acquit first” instruction, double jeopardy did not bar retrial on that charge.

Facts

Suarez stabbed his girlfriend, Jovanna Gonzalez, resulting in her death. He was charged with second-degree murder (intentional and depraved indifference), first-degree manslaughter (intentional), and weapon possession. At trial, he claimed self-defense and extreme emotional disturbance, denying intent. The judge instructed the jury to consider intentional murder first, then depraved indifference murder. He told them not to consider intentional manslaughter unless they acquitted Suarez of depraved indifference murder.

Procedural History

The jury acquitted Suarez of intentional murder but convicted him of depraved indifference murder. The trial court did not record a verdict on the manslaughter charge. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Suarez’s actions did not constitute depraved indifference murder as a matter of law, and remitted the case to the Appellate Division to address the appropriate remedy. On remittitur, the Appellate Division held that double jeopardy did not bar retrial for intentional manslaughter. Suarez appealed to the Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions bar Suarez from being retried for intentional manslaughter after his acquittal of intentional murder and the reversal of his conviction for depraved indifference murder on legal insufficiency grounds.

Holding

1. No, because the jury did not have a full opportunity to consider the intentional manslaughter charge in the first trial due to the trial court’s instructions and the jury’s verdict on the depraved indifference murder charge.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court reasoned that the Double Jeopardy Clauses prevent a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal or conviction. However, retrial is permissible after a successful appeal, except when the reversal is based on legal insufficiency of the evidence for that specific charge. The Court distinguished this case from People v. Biggs, where retrial was barred because the jury was never given an opportunity to consider the charge in question. Here, the jury was instructed on intentional manslaughter, but because of the trial court’s “acquit-first” instruction regarding the depraved indifference murder charge, the jury never reached it. The Court analogized the situation to a mistrial, where retrial is typically permissible. The Court also emphasized that its reversal was based on legal insufficiency of the evidence for depraved indifference murder, but not for intentional manslaughter. Therefore, retrial for intentional manslaughter did not violate double jeopardy principles. The Court also determined that depraved indifference murder and intentional manslaughter are not inconsistent counts, as a defendant can recklessly cause a grave risk of death while intentionally inflicting serious physical injury, citing People v. Trappier. The court stated, “While different theories have been advanced to support the permissibility of retrial, of greater importance than the conceptual abstractions employed to explain the Ball principle are the implications of that principle for the sound administration of justice.”