New York Law Review

Tag: strike

  • Matter of Sanford v. Rockefeller, 35 N.Y.2d 788 (1974): Assessing Employee Fear of Violence During Strikes

    Matter of Sanford v. Rockefeller, 35 N.Y.2d 788 (1974)

    A hearing officer’s determination regarding an employee’s subjective state of mind, specifically their fear of personal injury during a strike, is entitled to deference if supported by substantial evidence, especially when credibility is a key factor.

    Summary

    This case concerns correction officers who refused assignments during a strike, claiming fear of violence. The hearing officer determined they didn’t prove their refusal stemmed from a genuine fear of injury. The Appellate Division reversed, but the Court of Appeals reinstated the hearing officer’s determination. The Court emphasized the hearing officer’s superior position to assess witness credibility and the substantial evidence supporting the finding that the officers failed to demonstrate a bona fide fear. The statutory presumption that an employee abstaining from duties during a strike is participating in it, further bolsters this conclusion.

    Facts

    Correction officers refused to cross picket lines during a strike, citing fear of violence from striking colleagues.
    Some civilian employees reported threats if they crossed the picket lines.
    However, some employees crossed without incident, and no actual violence or injuries were reported on the picket lines.
    Offers of safe passage through the gates via trucks were made.

    Procedural History

    A hearing officer determined the correction officers violated Section 210 of the Civil Service Law by participating in a strike.
    The Appellate Division reversed the hearing officer’s determination.
    The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and reinstated the hearing officer’s original determination.

    Issue(s)

    Whether there was substantial evidence to support the hearing officer’s determination that the correction officers’ refusal to accept assignments was not due to a bona fide fear of personal injury during the strike, thus violating Section 210 of the Civil Service Law.

    Holding

    Yes, because the hearing officer, having observed the witnesses firsthand, was in the best position to judge their credibility, and there was substantial evidence, including the lack of reported violence and the statutory presumption against striking employees, to support the finding that the correction officers did not genuinely fear personal injury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the importance of deferring to the hearing officer’s assessment of witness credibility, stating, “He was best able to judge by observation of their demeanor and otherwise the credibility and probative worth properly to be accorded their testimony. Particularly is this so when the ultimate issue was the subjective state of mind of the witnesses.”

    The court considered the statutory rebuttable presumption in Civil Service Law § 210(2)(b) that an employee abstaining from duties during a strike is presumed to be participating in the strike. This presumption, combined with the testimony presented, provided substantial evidence supporting the hearing officer’s determination.

    The absence of reported violence or injuries on the picket lines, coupled with offers of safe passage, further weakened the officers’ claim of genuine fear.

    The court concluded that, based on the totality of the evidence and reasonable inferences, the hearing officer’s determination was supported by substantial evidence, thus warranting reinstatement.

  • Park West Management Corp. v. Mitchell, 47 N.Y.2d 316 (1979): Establishes the Scope and Enforcement of the Implied Warranty of Habitability

    Park West Management Corp. v. Mitchell, 47 N.Y.2d 316 (1979)

    A landlord impliedly warrants that residential premises are fit for human habitation and that tenants will not be subjected to conditions endangering their life, health, or safety; breach of this warranty allows for rent abatement.

    Summary

    This case defines the scope and remedies for breach of the implied warranty of habitability in residential leases under New York Real Property Law § 235-b. Tenants in Park West Village withheld rent due to a strike by the building’s maintenance staff, leading to uncollected garbage, rodent infestation, and other unsanitary conditions. The court held that the landlord’s failure to provide essential services due to the strike constituted a breach of the implied warranty of habitability, entitling the tenants to a rent reduction. The decision clarifies that landlords have a non-delegable duty to maintain habitable premises and establishes a methodology for calculating damages based on the diminished value of the premises during the breach.

    Facts

    Park West Village, a large apartment complex, experienced a 17-day strike by its maintenance and janitorial staff. As a result, essential services were severely disrupted: incinerators were shut down, trash accumulated due to sanitation workers refusing to cross picket lines, extermination services ceased leading to rodent and insect infestations, and routine maintenance was not performed. The New York City Department of Health declared a health emergency due to the conditions.

    Procedural History

    Park West Management Corp. initiated a summary nonpayment proceeding against tenants who withheld rent due to the strike. The Civil Court of the City of New York ruled in favor of the tenants, finding a breach of the implied warranty of habitability and granting a 10% rent reduction. The Appellate Term and Appellate Division affirmed this decision. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a landlord’s failure to provide essential services due to a strike constitutes a breach of the implied warranty of habitability under Real Property Law § 235-b?
    2. What is the proper measure of damages for breach of the implied warranty of habitability?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the landlord has a non-delegable duty to maintain the premises in habitable condition, and the failure to provide essential services directly impacted the tenants’ health and safety.
    2. The proper measure of damages is the difference between the fair market value of the premises if they had been warranted (as measured by the rent reserved under the lease) and the value of the premises during the period of the breach.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reviewed the historical development of landlord-tenant law, noting the shift from viewing a lease as a conveyance of land to recognizing it as a contract for shelter and essential services. It emphasized that Real Property Law § 235-b codified existing case law and placed the tenant in parity with the landlord. The court stated, “a residential lease is now effectively deemed a sale of shelter and services by the landlord who impliedly warrants: first, that the premises are fit for human habitation; second, that the condition of the premises is in accord with the uses reasonably intended by the parties; and, third, that the tenants are not subjected to any conditions endangering or detrimental to their life, health or safety.”

    The Court clarified that the warranty covers conditions caused by deterioration, work stoppages, third-party acts, or natural disasters, as the landlord retains ultimate control and responsibility for the building. While housing code violations are prima facie evidence of a breach, the Court noted that a violation is not the exclusive determinant. Instead, the focus is on conditions materially affecting the health and safety of tenants. “Threats to the health and safety of the tenant—not merely violations of the codes—determines the reach of the warranty of habitability.”

    Regarding damages, the Court held that the tenant’s duty to pay rent is coextensive with the landlord’s duty to maintain habitable premises. It explained that the damages are measured by the difference between the fair market value of the premises as warranted and its value during the breach. The court also said, “In ascertaining damages, the finder of fact must weigh the severity of the violation and duration of the conditions giving rise to the breach as well as the effectiveness of steps taken by the landlord to abate those conditions.” The Court found that the 10% rent reduction ordered by the Civil Court was supported by the record, given the severity of the conditions and the landlord’s inadequate response.

  • Matter of Weis v. General Motors Corp., 20 N.Y.2d 262 (1967): Unemployment Benefits During Labor Disputes

    Matter of Weis v. General Motors Corp., 20 N.Y.2d 262 (1967)

    Employees laid off due to a lack of work caused by a strike at a separate, but related, establishment are eligible for unemployment benefits because the layoff is not a direct result of a labor dispute at their own establishment.

    Summary

    This case concerns General Motors (GM) employees at five New York plants who sought unemployment benefits during a nationwide strike. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether these employees were barred from receiving benefits under New York Labor Law § 592(1), which suspends benefits for unemployment arising from a strike or industrial controversy “in the establishment in which he was employed.” The court held that employees at the Tonawanda plant were entitled to benefits for the period after local issues were settled, and employees at parts plants were eligible because their unemployment resulted from a lack of work, not a labor dispute at their own facilities. The court dismissed GM’s appeal, finding no substantial constitutional question directly involved.

    Facts

    General Motors and the United Automobile Workers (UAW) were negotiating a new contract. When the contract expired without a new agreement, a nationwide strike began on September 25, 1964. The strike affected multiple GM plants, including the Chevrolet assembly plant in Tonawanda, NY, and four other parts plants in New York. The Tonawanda plant also had local issues that were not resolved until October 26, after which the plant gradually resumed operations. The four parts plants continued to operate initially, but eventually had to curtail production and lay off workers because the strike at the assembly plants meant there was no place to ship the parts they manufactured.

    Procedural History

    The Industrial Commissioner granted unemployment benefits to the claimants. The Unemployment Insurance Referee and the Appeal Board upheld this decision. The Appellate Division affirmed the board’s determination. GM appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing a constitutional violation based on federal preemption of labor-management relations.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the payment of unemployment benefits to GM employees whose unemployment was caused either by the time required to restart a plant after a local strike settlement, or by lack of work at parts plants due to a strike at assembly plants, interferes with GM’s ability to exert economic pressure on the union, thereby improperly intruding into a federally protected sphere.

    Holding

    No, because the unemployment at the Tonawanda plant after the local issues were settled was due to manufacturing conditions, not the labor dispute itself. Additionally, the unemployment at the parts plants was the result of a lack of work, not a labor dispute or lockout at those establishments.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the Tonawanda employees were entitled to benefits for the period after the local issues were settled because their unemployment was due to the time required to resume full production, not the strike itself. Referencing Matter of George (Catherwood), 14 N.Y.2d 234, the court stated, “A strike ends when the workers stop striking and not at some later date when, because of the employer’s method of doing business, it is again ready for full production.”

    Regarding the parts plants, the court determined that the layoffs were due to a lack of work, not a lockout or industrial controversy. The court cited American Ship Bldg. v. Labor Bd., 380 U.S. 300, 321, noting that “a lockout is the refusal by an employer to furnish available work to his regular employees.” The court emphasized that GM did not refuse available work; instead, the lack of demand for parts forced the layoffs. The court concluded that GM’s decision was “based solely on the exigencies of doing business” and “in no sense a labor relations tactic.” Because the unemployment was not directly related to a labor dispute in the employees’ own establishments, the court found that the payment of unemployment benefits did not interfere with GM’s bargaining position and thus did not intrude into a federally protected area. The court dismissed the appeal, finding no substantial constitutional question was directly involved in the case.

  • Matter of General Mills, Inc., 24 N.Y.2d 676 (1969): Defining ‘Establishment’ for Unemployment Benefits During Strikes

    Matter of General Mills, Inc., 24 N.Y.2d 676 (1969)

    For purposes of unemployment benefits during a strike, the term “establishment” refers to a distinct physical place of business, not the entire enterprise or corporate entity.

    Summary

    This case concerns whether non-striking employees of General Mills were eligible for unemployment benefits after being laid off due to a strike by longshoremen at the company’s grain elevators. The New York Court of Appeals held that the grain elevators constituted a separate “establishment” from the mills and processing plants where the claimants worked, due to their geographic separation and operational distinctions. Therefore, the laid-off employees were entitled to unemployment benefits because the strike did not occur in their “establishment.”. The court emphasized a narrow, geographically-based interpretation of “establishment” to protect non-involved employees.

    Facts

    General Mills operated a complex of grain elevators, mills, and processing plants in Buffalo, New York. Wheat was received and stored in grain elevators and then transported to the mills. Longshoremen went on strike in the grain elevators, protesting layoffs. As a result, General Mills couldn’t transfer grain and laid off approximately 315 non-striking employees working in other parts of the plant. The longshoremen and mill workers belonged to different unions with different agreements and separate superintendents and benefit plans.

    Procedural History

    The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board ruled in favor of the claimants, holding that the grain elevators were a separate establishment. The Appellate Division reversed this decision, dismissing the claims. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the grain elevators and the mills/processing plants of General Mills constitute a single “establishment” under New York Labor Law § 592(1), such that the non-striking employees are ineligible for unemployment benefits due to the strike at the grain elevators?

    Holding

    No, because the grain elevators and the mills/processing plants are geographically distinct and operate with sufficient independence to be considered separate establishments.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the term “establishment” should be equated with “place or situs” rather than the entire “enterprise.” Citing Matter of Ferrara (Catherwood), the court emphasized a geographic interpretation of “establishment.” The grain elevators were physically separated from the other buildings by distances of up to 400 feet, railroad tracks, and public streets. The court also noted the historical separateness of the grain elevators, which were originally owned by different companies. There was minimal contact between the striking longshoremen and the non-striking mill workers. The court stated that the suspension provision should be “narrowly construed to effectuate the broad humanitarian objectives sought to be achieved” and that defining “establishment” in “geographic terms” best serves this purpose. The court distinguished Matter of George (Catherwood), noting that in that case, the Appeal Board had found a single establishment, which was supported by substantial evidence. Here, the Appeal Board found separate establishments, which was also supported by substantial evidence. The court concluded that unemployment insurance is intended to protect workers who lose their employment through no fault of their own, and a narrow construction of “establishment” prevents the harmful effects of lost benefits on innocent employees.