New York Law Review

Tag: strict liability

  • Doundoulakis v. Town of Hempstead, 42 N.Y.2d 440 (1977): Abnormally Dangerous Activities and Strict Liability

    Doundoulakis v. Town of Hempstead, 42 N.Y.2d 440 (1977)

    Whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, giving rise to strict liability, depends on factors such as the degree of risk, likelihood of harm, possibility of eliminating risk with reasonable care, common usage, appropriateness to the location, and community value versus dangerous attributes.

    Summary

    Homeowners sued the Town of Hempstead, its contractor, and its engineer for property damage allegedly caused by a hydraulic landfill project. The trial court submitted the case to the jury on a theory of strict liability, which the Appellate Division upheld. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, finding the record insufficient to determine whether the landfill operation was abnormally dangerous. The court held that the plaintiffs were also entitled to have their negligence claims considered by the jury. The court clarified the factors for determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, emphasizing the need for a thorough factual record.

    Facts

    Three homeowners owned property adjacent to a 146-acre marshland owned by the Town of Hempstead. The town decided to create a public park on the marshland, which required depositing 1.5 million cubic yards of sandfill. The town hired an engineer, De Bruin, to prepare plans and supervise the project, and Gahagan Dredging Corporation was awarded the contract. Beginning in September 1966, a mixture of 85% water and 15% sand was pumped onto the site, creating a large “lake.” Shortly after, the homeowners’ bulkheads began to fail, allegedly due to subterranean water percolation from the landfill, raising the water table and increasing pressure.

    Procedural History

    The homeowners sued, alleging negligence. The trial court precluded submission of the negligence issue to the jury and instead submitted the case on a theory of strict liability. The jury returned verdicts for the homeowners against all three defendants, but the trial court set aside the verdicts against the contractor and engineer and also the verdict for one homeowner (Silver) due to a notice of claim issue. The Appellate Division modified the judgment, reinstating the verdicts against all defendants. The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether hydraulic dredging and landfilling is an abnormally dangerous activity giving rise to strict liability under the circumstances.

    2. Whether strict liability should be imposed on the contractor and design engineer engaged by the offending landowner.

    3. Whether apportionment of relative liability can be had among defendants if strict liability applies.

    4. Whether the plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence of negligence to warrant submission of that issue to the jury.

    Holding

    1. No, not based on the current record because the record is insufficient to establish whether the activity was abnormally dangerous. A new trial is needed to resolve the issue of negligence and to allow the plaintiffs to establish, if they can, that there is a sufficient basis for recovery on a theory of strict liability.

    2. Yes, because those who intentionally undertake or join in an abnormally dangerous activity must bear the consequences resulting from harm to others.

    3. Yes, because CPLR 1401 allows equitable apportionment of damages among “persons who are subject to liability for damages for the same… injury to property”.

    4. Yes, because the plaintiffs presented some credible evidence of negligence, such as insufficient exit weirs and failure to ensure the integrity of the existing dike.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court outlined the factors to consider when determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, drawing from the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520, including:

    (a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm;

    (b) likelihood that the harm will be great;

    (c) inability to eliminate the risk by reasonable care;

    (d) the activity is not a matter of common usage;

    (e) inappropriateness of the activity to the location;

    (f) the activity’s value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes.

    The court found the record lacked sufficient information on these factors, such as the degree of risk posed by hydraulic landfilling, the availability of alternative methods, and the specific circumstances of the landfill project. The court noted that strict liability is often imposed on landowners who undertake abnormally dangerous activities, reasoning that those who engage in high-risk activities should bear the cost of harm to the innocent. Regarding the liability of the contractor and engineer, the court stated that they could be held responsible if the landfill operation was found to be abnormally dangerous because they were the actors through whose conduct harm was allegedly suffered by plaintiffs. The court also addressed the issue of apportionment of liability among joint actors strictly liable, concluding that equitable apportionment is permissible under CPLR Article 14. Finally, the court addressed negligence, the original theory of liability, and found that the plaintiffs presented enough credible evidence to have the issue decided by the jury.

  • People v. D. H. Productions, Inc., 41 N.Y.2d 906 (1977): Strict Liability for Corporate Officers Failing to Secure Worker’s Compensation

    People v. D. H. Productions, Inc., 41 N.Y.2d 906 (1977)

    Corporate officers, specifically the president, secretary, and treasurer, are strictly liable for a corporation’s failure to secure worker’s compensation insurance, reflecting a legislative intent to ensure payment to injured employees.

    Summary

    This case addresses the criminal liability of corporate officers for failing to secure worker’s compensation insurance for their employees. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the statute imposes strict liability on the president, secretary, and treasurer of a corporation for such failures. This decision is based on the legislative intent to ensure that injured employees receive compensation and the historical context of the statute’s amendment, which specifically targeted responsible corporate officers while excluding directors from such strict liability.

    Facts

    D.H. Productions, Inc. failed to secure worker’s compensation insurance as required by New York law. As a result, the corporation and its president were charged with a misdemeanor under Section 52 of the Worker’s Compensation Law.

    Procedural History

    The lower court convicted the corporation’s president. The Appellate Term affirmed the conviction. The case then came before the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Section 52 of the Workers’ Compensation Law imposes strict liability on corporate officers (president, secretary, and treasurer) for the corporation’s failure to secure worker’s compensation insurance.

    Holding

    Yes, because the legislative intent and the purpose of the law indicate a desire to ensure that injured employees receive compensation, and the legislative history shows a deliberate choice to hold specific officers responsible for the corporation’s compliance.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Section 52 of the Workers’ Compensation Law clearly penalizes the “failure to secure the payment of compensation,” indicating a legislative intent to impose strict liability. This interpretation is supported by the statute’s purpose of assuring payment to injured employees. The Court examined the legislative history of the 1926 amendment to Section 52, which added the provision imposing liability on corporate officers. An initial draft included “executive officers and directors,” but the Committee on Criminal Courts Law and Procedure of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York objected, arguing that directors often lack direct involvement in the corporation’s day-to-day business and may be unaware of the failure to secure compensation. The legislature heeded these concerns and excluded directors from the final draft. The Court inferred that the legislature intended to apply strict liability to the named corporate officers, who are “likely to have responsibility for the day-to-day operation and management of the corporate enterprise,” but not to directors. The court referenced Matter of Aioss v. Sardo, 223 App. Div. 201, 203, aff’d 249 N.Y. 270 to support the purpose of the law in assisting and assuring payment to an injured employee.

  • Guzman v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 69 Misc.2d 336 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972): Establishes Shipowner’s Strict Liability for Transitory Unseaworthy Conditions

    Guzman v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 69 Misc.2d 336 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972)

    A shipowner is strictly liable for injuries to longshoremen caused by a vessel’s unseaworthy condition, even if the condition is temporary and the shipowner had no prior notice of the hazard.

    Summary

    A longshoreman, Guzman, sued Farrell Lines, Inc. for injuries sustained when he slipped on grease while unloading cargo. The trial court dismissed the case, finding no evidence of negligence. The appellate court reversed, holding that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of unseaworthiness. The court emphasized that under federal maritime law, a shipowner’s duty to maintain a seaworthy vessel is absolute and independent of negligence concepts. Even a temporary condition like grease on cargo can render a vessel unseaworthy, creating liability regardless of the shipowner’s knowledge.

    Facts

    Guzman, a longshoreman, was injured while unloading cargo from the S.S. Pioneer Contender. A fellow worker, Sumberaz, testified that Guzman slipped and fell on a greasy area of the cargo in hold No. 1. Sumberaz observed grease on the carton Guzman slipped on and on the sole of Guzman’s shoe immediately after the accident. Guzman himself did not testify due to a dispute regarding the interpreter’s qualifications.

    Procedural History

    Guzman filed suit against Farrell Lines, Inc., alleging both negligence and unseaworthiness. The trial court dismissed the complaint at the close of the plaintiff’s case. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of the unseaworthiness claim and ordered a new trial on that cause of action.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a shipowner can be held liable for injuries to a longshoreman caused by a transitory unseaworthy condition, such as grease on cargo, without proof of negligence or notice of the condition.

    Holding

    Yes, because a shipowner has an absolute duty to provide a seaworthy vessel, and this duty extends to temporary conditions. Liability for unseaworthiness is distinct from liability for negligence and does not require proof that the shipowner had notice of the dangerous condition.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that federal maritime law imposes a strict duty on shipowners to maintain a seaworthy vessel. This duty extends to longshoremen and is independent of negligence principles. The court cited Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., emphasizing that the presence of even a temporary condition, such as grease, can render a vessel unseaworthy. The court found that the testimony of Guzman’s fellow worker, Sumberaz, provided sufficient evidence for a jury to infer that Guzman fell because of the greasy condition of the cargo. The court noted that while the plaintiff’s proof was “thin,” it was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of unseaworthiness. The court distinguished the case from situations involving isolated acts of negligence by fellow longshoremen, which do not constitute unseaworthiness. It emphasized that the unseaworthy condition must be related to the ship or its cargo. The court quoted Justice Stewart from Mitchell, stating the core issue: “In its present posture this case thus presents the single issue whether with respect to so-called ‘transitory’ unseaworthiness the shipowner’s liability is limited by concepts of common-law negligence”. The court concluded that the duty to provide a seaworthy vessel is no less onerous “with respect to an unseaworthy condition which may be only temporary” and that liability evolved is without fault, not governed by concepts of negligence.

  • Spano v. Perini Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 11 (1969): Strict Liability for Blasting Damage

    25 N.Y.2d 11 (1969)

    One who engages in blasting is strictly liable for any injury caused to neighboring property, regardless of negligence.

    Summary

    Spano sued Perini Corp. for property damage to his garage and a customer’s car caused by blasting during the construction of a tunnel. Spano argued for strict liability, while Perini contended that negligence must be proven, citing the precedent set in Booth v. Rome, W. & O. T. R. R. Co. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s ruling, holding that blasting is an inherently dangerous activity warranting strict liability for resulting damages to neighboring properties, regardless of whether there was a physical trespass or proof of negligence. The court explicitly overruled the prior holding in Booth.

    Facts

    Spano owned a garage in Brooklyn. Davis was a customer whose car was in the garage for repairs. Perini Corp. was engaged in blasting as part of a tunnel construction project approximately 125 feet from Spano’s garage. On November 27, 1962, Perini detonated 194 sticks of dynamite. The blast caused significant damage to Spano’s garage, including cracks in the walls, broken windows, and damage to the cement floor. Davis’s car, inside the garage, also sustained damage.

    Procedural History

    Spano and Davis sued Perini in the Civil Court of the City of New York, New York County, and the trial court ruled in favor of Spano and Davis. The Appellate Term reversed the judgment. The Appellate Division affirmed the Appellate Term’s order. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a person who sustains property damage caused by blasting on nearby property can maintain an action for damages without showing that the blaster was negligent.

    Holding

    Yes, because one who engages in blasting must assume responsibility and be liable without fault for any injury he causes to neighboring property.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the traditional rule requiring proof of negligence in blasting cases (established in Booth v. Rome, W. & O. T. R. R. Co.) was outdated and inconsistent with both the majority of American jurisdictions and earlier New York cases. The court emphasized that blasting is an inherently dangerous activity, stating that “blasting involves a substantial risk of harm no matter the degree of care exercised.” The court noted that earlier cases like Hay v. Cohoes Co. and Heeg v. Licht had established absolute liability for damages caused by explosions, even absent physical trespass. The court found the distinction made in Booth between direct physical invasion and damage caused by concussion to be artificial and irrelevant. The court also refuted the policy rationale in Booth that strict liability would hinder development, arguing that the question was not whether blasting was lawful but who should bear the cost of resulting damages: “The question, in other words, was not whether it was lawful or proper to engage in blasting but who should bear the cost of any resulting damage—the person who engaged in the dangerous activity or the innocent neighbor injured thereby.” The court concluded that it was fairer and more logical to impose the risk of loss on the blaster rather than the innocent neighbor. The court explicitly overruled Booth, holding that strict liability applies to blasting damage regardless of negligence or physical trespass.

  • Joyce v. Rumsey Realty Corp., 17 N.Y.2d 118 (1966): Strict Liability for Labor Law Violations Resulting in Injury

    Joyce v. Rumsey Realty Corp., 17 N.Y.2d 118 (1966)

    A contractor’s violation of the New York Labor Law, specifically the requirement to complete flooring as a building progresses, constitutes conclusive evidence of negligence and imposes absolute liability when a worker is injured as a result of that violation.

    Summary

    The plaintiff, a construction worker, was injured when a plank he was standing on broke, causing him to fall through an uncovered opening to the basement. The defendant, the contractor, had failed to comply with New York Labor Law requiring flooring to be completed as the building progressed. The Court of Appeals held that the contractor’s violation of the Labor Law constituted conclusive evidence of negligence, and the plaintiff was entitled to a directed verdict on the issue of liability. The court reasoned that the statute imposes an absolute and unconditional duty on the contractor, and the worker’s injury directly resulted from the contractor’s failure to fulfill that duty. The fact that the plank broke was considered a concurrent cause, not negating the contractor’s primary liability.

    Facts

    The plaintiff was working on the fourth floor of a building under construction. The first, second, and third floors had not been fully floored as required by the New York Labor Law. The plaintiff was moving planks when the plank he was standing on broke. As a result, the plaintiff fell through the open floors into the basement, sustaining injuries.

    Procedural History

    The trial court directed a verdict for the plaintiff against the defendant Bumsey, the contractor, on the issue of liability, leaving the determination of damages to the jury. The contractor appealed this decision, arguing that the breaking of the plank was an intervening cause that should negate their liability. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the contractor’s violation of the Labor Law constituted conclusive evidence of negligence.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a contractor’s failure to comply with the New York Labor Law requiring flooring to be completed as a building progresses constitutes conclusive evidence of negligence when a worker is injured as a result of falling through an uncovered opening, warranting a directed verdict on the issue of liability.

    Holding

    Yes, because the statute imposes an absolute and unconditional duty on the contractor to complete flooring, and the worker’s injury directly resulted from the contractor’s failure to fulfill that duty. The violation of the statute is conclusive evidence of negligence, regardless of other contributing factors.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the New York Labor Law imposes a “flat and unvarying” duty on contractors to complete flooring as a building progresses. Citing prior cases like Koenig v. Patrick Constr. Corp., the court reiterated that “For breach of that duty, thus absolutely imposed, the wrongdoer is rendered liable without regard to his care or lack of it.” The court further stated that a violation of such a statute is “conclusive evidence of negligence,” warranting a directed verdict. The court rejected the argument that the breaking of the plank was an intervening cause, stating that “Something must project him into the hole but that something cannot be more than a concurrent cause of the injury.” The court feared that allowing a jury to find no cause of action would nullify the statute’s protective intent for workers in situations such as the plaintiff’s. The court concluded that the statute places absolute and unconditional liability on the contractor in favor of the workman who falls through the floor opening that the statute insists must be covered.