New York Law Review

Tag: strict liability

  • Yenem Corp. v. 281 Broadway Holdings, 18 N.Y.3d 481 (2012): Establishes Strict Liability for Excavation Damage Under NYC Administrative Code

    18 N.Y.3d 481 (2012)

    In New York City, Administrative Code § 27-1031(b)(1) (now § 3309.4 of the NYC Construction Code) imposes strict liability on parties undertaking excavation work exceeding ten feet below curb level who fail to protect adjoining structures, regardless of negligence.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether New York City Administrative Code § 27-1031(b)(1) imposes strict liability on excavators for damage to neighboring properties. The Court of Appeals held that it does, reversing the Appellate Division. Plaintiff Yenem, a tenant, and Plaintiff Randall, the building owner, sued the defendant developers after excavation work caused structural damage to their building. The Court reasoned that the code provision, originating from an 1855 state law, was intended to shift the burden of protecting adjoining properties to the excavator, imposing absolute liability for resulting damages. The court reinstated summary judgment for the plaintiffs on the issue of liability.

    Facts

    Defendant JBC, through its subsidiary 281 Broadway Holdings, began developing a commercial and condominium complex adjacent to Plaintiff Randall’s building at 287 Broadway. Defendant Hunter-Atlantic performed the excavation, reaching a depth of 18 feet. During the excavation, 287 Broadway shifted out of plumb. The Department of Buildings found the building leaning approximately nine inches and issued a vacate order, forcing Plaintiff Yenem to close its pizzeria and rendering Randall’s building vacant.

    Procedural History

    Yenem and Randall separately sued the defendants, claiming negligence and strict liability under Administrative Code § 27-1031(b)(1). The Supreme Court initially denied Yenem’s motion for summary judgment but granted Randall’s motion. The Appellate Division consolidated the appeals, reversing the order granting Randall summary judgment. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed the Appellate Division, reinstating the Supreme Court’s order in Randall and granting summary judgment to Yenem.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Administrative Code of the City of New York § 27-1031(b)(1) imposes strict liability on a party who causes excavation to be made, for damage to adjoining structures.

    Holding

    Yes, because the provision originated from an 1855 state law that imposed absolute liability on excavators for damage to adjoining properties when excavations exceed ten feet below curb level, and this liability remains despite recodification as a municipal ordinance.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on the principle that violation of a state statute imposing a specific duty constitutes negligence per se or absolute liability, while violation of a municipal ordinance is merely evidence of negligence. However, the Court acknowledged an exception for Administrative Code sections originating from state law. Analyzing the origin of § 27-1031(b)(1), the Court found its language and purpose “virtually identical” to its state law predecessors, which imposed absolute liability as stated in Dorrity v. Rapp, 72 N.Y. 307, 311 (1878): “When the facts bring the case within the statute, the duty and liability which the statute imposes is absolute and unqualified.”

    The Court emphasized that the provision’s purpose—shifting the risk of injury from landowners to excavators—remained constant despite recodification. The Court quoted the dissent below stating “neither the wording nor the import of the statute was materially or substantively altered” upon recodification. Treating the provision as merely evidence of negligence would defeat the legislative intent. The Court also found the building’s allegedly poor condition irrelevant to the proximate cause analysis, affecting only the measure of damages.

  • Petrone v. Fernandez, 12 N.Y.3d 546 (2009): Strict Liability for Dog Bites and the Vicious Propensity Rule

    Petrone v. Fernandez, 12 N.Y.3d 546 (2009)

    In New York, liability for harm caused by a domestic animal, including a dog, is determined solely by the rule of strict liability based on the animal’s known or should-have-been-known vicious propensities, precluding negligence claims based on violations of leash laws alone.

    Summary

    A mail carrier, Melanie Petrone, was injured when she jumped back into her car to avoid an unleashed Rottweiler. She sued the dog owner, alleging negligence based on a violation of the local leash law and the dog’s supposed vicious propensities. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that liability for harm caused by a domestic animal is determined solely by the rule of strict liability for known vicious propensities, as established in Collier v. Zambito and Bard v. Jahnke. A violation of a leash law is irrelevant in the absence of such knowledge.

    Facts

    Melanie Petrone, a mail carrier, encountered an unleashed Rottweiler on a customer’s lawn. The dog was on the unfenced lawn of the defendant’s property. Fearing the dog, Petrone retreated to her vehicle. While attempting to get back into her car, she injured her finger. The dog did not bite, threaten, or make any contact with Petrone. She sued, alleging the dog owner was negligent for violating the local leash law.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the defendant, dismissing the complaint. The Appellate Division reversed, finding that a dog owner could be liable for violating a leash ordinance, even without prior vicious propensities. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and reinstated the Supreme Court’s order, dismissing the negligence claim.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a dog owner may be held liable for injuries sustained as a result of an unleashed dog’s behavior based solely on a violation of a local leash ordinance, absent evidence of the dog’s known vicious propensities.

    Holding

    No, because in New York, liability for harm caused by a domestic animal is determined solely by the rule of strict liability for harm caused by an animal whose owner knows or should have known of the animal’s vicious propensities, precluding negligence claims based solely on violations of leash laws.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior holdings in Collier v. Zambito and Bard v. Jahnke, which established that strict liability, based on the owner’s knowledge of an animal’s vicious propensities, is the sole basis for liability in domestic animal injury cases. The court stated, “[W]hen harm is caused by a domestic animal, its owner’s liability is determined solely by application of the rule articulated in Collier…i.e., the rule of strict liability for harm caused by a domestic animal whose owner knows or should have known of the animal’s vicious propensities.” The Court reasoned that a leash law violation is, at best, evidence of negligence, but negligence is no longer a basis for liability after Collier and Bard. Judge Pigott concurred, but expressed reservations about the elimination of negligence as a basis for liability, stating, “[N]egligence by an owner, even without knowledge concerning a domestic animal’s [vicious] propensity, may create liability”. However, he felt constrained by the precedent of Bard v. Jahnke. The ruling reinforces the focus on an animal’s known history rather than an owner’s general negligence.

  • State of New York v. Speonk Fuel, Inc., 3 N.Y.3d 720 (2004): Defining ‘Person Who Has Discharged Petroleum’ Under Navigation Law

    State of New York v. Speonk Fuel, Inc., 3 N.Y.3d 720 (2004)

    Under Navigation Law § 181 (1), a party cannot be considered a ‘person who has discharged petroleum’ liable for cleanup costs, if they had no connection to the property or control over the petroleum discharge at the time it occurred.

    Summary

    The State of New York sought to hold Speonk Fuel, Inc. liable for the cleanup costs of petroleum contamination on property Speonk later acquired. The Court of Appeals held that Speonk, which had no ownership or control of the property or the petroleum storage system when the discharge happened, was not a ‘person who has discharged petroleum’ within the meaning of Navigation Law § 181 (1). The court distinguished between failing to prevent a discharge (which might equate to discharging) and failing to clean up a discharge caused entirely by others. The dissent argued that the majority’s interpretation narrowed the scope of liability envisioned by the statute.

    Facts

    A petroleum discharge occurred on property in Suffolk County. Speonk Fuel, Inc. later acquired the property. The State of New York sought to recover cleanup costs from Speonk, arguing that Speonk was a ‘person who has discharged petroleum’ under Navigation Law § 181 (1). Crucially, Speonk had no connection to the property, the underground storage tanks, or the discharge itself at the time the discharge occurred. The State argued that Speonk’s subsequent ownership triggered liability.

    Procedural History

    The lower courts ruled in favor of the State, finding Speonk liable for cleanup costs. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Speonk was not a ‘person who has discharged petroleum’ under the statute.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a party who had no connection to a property or control over a petroleum storage system at the time a petroleum discharge occurred can be considered a ‘person who has discharged petroleum’ under Navigation Law § 181 (1) solely by virtue of their subsequent ownership of the property.

    Holding

    No, because the plain meaning of ‘person who has discharged petroleum’ does not encompass a party who had no involvement in causing the discharge and acquired the property after the discharge occurred. The Court reasoned that the statute targets those responsible for the initial discharge, not subsequent owners merely inheriting a contaminated site.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court focused on the statutory language, emphasizing the phrase ‘person who has discharged petroleum.’ It reasoned that this language implies active participation in the discharge event, not merely passive ownership of contaminated land. The Court distinguished its prior holding in State of New York v Green, where a landowner who could have prevented a discharge but failed to do so was held liable. The Court stated that, “While failing to prevent a petroleum discharge may in a sense be the equivalent of discharging petroleum, failure to clean up the discharge afterwards is not. If the Legislature had intended to impose liability for failure to clean up, it would have said so.” The Court declined to extend liability to a party with no connection to the discharge itself. The dissent argued that the majority was interpreting the statute too narrowly, contrary to its remedial purpose and the legislature’s intent to ensure the cleanup of petroleum spills. The dissent asserted that the majority’s decision allowed subsequent owners to avoid responsibility for remediating pollution they inherited, potentially shifting the burden of cleanup to the State.

  • Abbatiello v. Lancaster Studio Associates, 3 N.Y.3d 46 (2004): Labor Law § 240(1) and Owner Liability to Unauthorized Workers

    3 N.Y.3d 46 (2004)

    A building owner is not strictly liable under Labor Law § 240(1) for injuries sustained by a cable technician performing work on its property without the owner’s knowledge or consent, especially when the work constitutes routine maintenance.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a building owner can be held strictly liable under Labor Law § 240(1) for injuries to a cable technician who was working on the property without the owner’s awareness or permission. Anthony Abbatiello, a cable technician, was injured when a ladder he was using to access a cable junction box on Lancaster Studio Associates’ building bent, causing him to fall. Lancaster had no prior notice that Abbatiello would be on the premises. The Court of Appeals held that Lancaster was not liable under Labor Law § 240(1). The Court reasoned that Abbatiello was not an “employee” for purposes of the statute because there was no nexus between the owner and the worker, and the work being performed constituted routine maintenance.

    Facts

    Anthony Abbatiello, a cable technician for Paragon Cable Manhattan, was dispatched to Lancaster Studio Associates’ building in response to a tenant’s complaint about cable service. Lancaster had no prior notice that Abbatiello would be on the property. Abbatiello, unable to reach the tenant, located the junction box (15-20 feet above ground). While Abbatiello was inspecting the box from a ladder, the ladder bent, causing him to fall and sustain injuries.

    Procedural History

    Abbatiello sued Lancaster, alleging negligence and violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240, and 241. Lancaster brought a third-party action against Paragon, who counterclaimed. Supreme Court granted Lancaster’s and Paragon’s motions for summary judgment, dismissing the complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding no Labor Law § 240(1) liability because the owner did not authorize the work and the work was routine maintenance. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s ruling.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a building owner can be held strictly liable under Labor Law § 240(1) for injuries sustained by a cable technician performing work on its property without the owner’s knowledge or consent.
    2. Whether the work performed by the cable technician constitutes “repairing, altering” or other activities covered by Labor Law § 240(1), or whether it constitutes routine maintenance.

    Holding

    1. No, because the injured plaintiff was on the owner’s premises not by reason of any action of the owner but by reason of provisions of the Public Service Law, and thus, the plaintiff was not an employee for the purposes of Labor Law § 240(1).
    2. No, because the work involved the routine maintenance of a malfunctioning cable box.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that to be covered under Labor Law § 240(1), a plaintiff must demonstrate that they were “permitted or suffered to work on a building or structure and that he was hired by someone, be it [the] owner, contractor or their agent” (Whelen v Warwick Val. Civic & Social Club, 47 NY2d 970, 971 [1979]). The court distinguished this case from precedents like Celestine v City of New York, 86 AD2d 592 [2d Dept 1982], where liability was imposed on owners, because those cases involved some nexus between the owner and the worker (e.g., a lease agreement). Here, the technician’s presence was mandated by Public Service Law § 228, which requires landlords to allow cable installation. The court stated:

    “Lancaster cannot be charged with the duty of providing the safe working conditions contemplated by Labor Law § 240 (1) for cable television repair people of whom it is wholly unaware…Any permission to work on the premises was granted upon compulsion and no relationship existed between Lancaster and Paragon or the plaintiff.”

    Furthermore, the court agreed with the Appellate Division that the work being performed was routine maintenance, similar to Esposito v New York City Indus. Dev. Agency, 1 NY3d 526 (2003). The court stated that the technician was addressing “a common problem caused by rainwater accumulating in junction boxes affixed to building exteriors.” Therefore, the work did not constitute “repairing” as contemplated by Labor Law § 240(1). The court emphasized that imposing liability on the owner in this situation would create a new liability not envisioned by the Legislature.

  • Collier v. Zambito, 1 N.Y.3d 444 (2004): Establishing Knowledge of a Dog’s Vicious Propensities

    Collier v. Zambito, 1 N.Y.3d 444 (2004)

    To establish liability for harm caused by a domestic animal, the plaintiff must prove that the owner knew or should have known of the animal’s vicious propensities, which is not demonstrated merely by showing the animal was confined or barked at people.

    Summary

    Matthew Collier, a 12-year-old boy, was bitten in the face by Cecil, a mixed-breed dog owned by Charles and Mary Zambito. The dog was usually confined to the kitchen when guests were present because he barked. On the night of the incident, Mrs. Zambito invited Matthew to approach the leashed dog after he came out of the bathroom, and the dog lunged and bit him. Collier sued, alleging the Zambitos knew or should have known of Cecil’s vicious propensities. The New York Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendants knew or should have known of their dog’s alleged vicious propensities, reversing the Appellate Division dissent and dismissing the claim. The court emphasized the need to show more than confinement or barking to prove vicious propensities.

    Facts

    The Zambitos owned Cecil, a beagle-collie-rottweiler mix, and typically confined him to the kitchen with a gate when they were away or had visitors because he barked. On December 31, 1998, Matthew Collier, a guest of the Zambitos’ son, went downstairs to use the bathroom. Cecil began barking, so Mrs. Zambito leashed the dog. After Matthew came out of the bathroom, Mrs. Zambito invited him to approach Cecil, who she said knew him from prior visits. As Matthew approached, Cecil lunged and bit Matthew’s face. Cecil had never threatened or bitten anyone before, to the parties’ knowledge. He was considered a family pet.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied both the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissal and the plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment on liability, finding a factual issue regarding the defendants’ knowledge of Cecil’s vicious propensities. The Appellate Division reversed, finding no issue of fact as to the defendants’ awareness of Cecil’s propensities. Two justices dissented. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s reversal, dismissing the complaint.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendants knew or should have known of their dog’s vicious propensities, such that they could be held liable for the dog’s actions.

    Holding

    No, because the evidence submitted by the plaintiff was insufficient to raise an issue of fact as to whether Cecil had vicious propensities that were known, or should have been known, to the defendants.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the established principle that an owner of a domestic animal is liable for harm caused by the animal if the owner knew or should have known of the animal’s vicious propensities. Vicious propensities include any propensity to act in a way that might endanger others. Knowledge of vicious propensities can be proven by prior similar acts that the owner knew about, or evidence of growling, snapping, or baring teeth. The court distinguished this case, stating, “But nothing in our case law suggests that the mere fact that a dog was kept enclosed or chained or that a dog previously barked at people is sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether it had vicious propensities.” Here, Cecil was a family pet, not a guard dog. He was confined to the kitchen only because he barked at guests, not because the owners feared he would harm them. The court noted the plaintiff himself was not afraid of the dog and testified that the dog was friendly. The fact that the owner invited Matthew to approach the dog showed that she did not expect the dog to attack. The court stated, “Once such knowledge is established, an owner faces strict liability for the harm the animal causes as a result of those propensities.” However, the behavior exhibited by Cecil did not rise to the level of apparent viciousness required to impute knowledge to the owners.

  • Blake v. Neighborhood Housing Services, 1 N.Y.3d 280 (2003): Establishing Liability Under New York’s Scaffold Law

    1 N.Y.3d 280 (2003)

    A defendant is not liable under Labor Law § 240(1) when the plaintiff’s own negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident, even if the statute imposes strict liability.

    Summary

    Plaintiff, a contractor, sued after injuring himself while using his own ladder. The jury found the ladder provided proper protection, and the accident was solely due to plaintiff’s negligence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of plaintiff’s motion to vacate the verdict, holding that Labor Law § 240(1) does not impose liability when a worker’s actions are the sole proximate cause of their injuries, even under a strict liability standard, and that a statutory violation must contribute to the injury.

    Facts

    Plaintiff, a self-employed contractor, was renovating a two-family house. Defendant Neighborhood Housing Services (NHS) provided financing to the homeowner and referred the plaintiff as a potential contractor. Plaintiff used his own extension ladder, which he acknowledged was in good condition. While scraping rust from a window, the ladder retracted, causing plaintiff to fall and injure himself. He conceded the ladder was stable and not defective, and there was no need for someone to steady it.

    Procedural History

    Plaintiff sued the homeowner and NHS, alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1). The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the homeowner but denied it to NHS and the plaintiff. The Appellate Division affirmed. At trial, the jury found that NHS had the authority to direct the work, but the ladder provided proper protection. The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion to vacate the jury verdict, and the Appellate Division affirmed.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a plaintiff can recover under Labor Law § 240(1) when the jury finds that the ladder provided proper protection, and the plaintiff’s own negligence was the sole cause of the injury.
    2. Whether NHS can be held liable as an agent under Labor Law § 240(1).

    Holding

    1. No, because Labor Law § 240(1) does not impose liability when the plaintiff’s own negligence is the sole proximate cause of the accident; a statutory violation must contribute to the injury.
    2. No, because NHS did not have the requisite supervision and control over the work to be considered an agent under the statute.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reviewed the history and purpose of Labor Law § 240(1), noting its intent to protect workers from unsafe conditions at heights. The Court clarified that strict liability under § 240(1) requires a statutory violation and proximate cause. “Violation of the statute alone is not enough; plaintiff [is] obligated to show that the violation was a contributing cause of his fall.” The Court distinguished the case from situations involving comparative fault, where a culpable defendant can reduce its responsibility. Here, the jury implicitly found the fault was entirely the plaintiff’s. The Court emphasized that “even when a worker is not ‘recalcitrant,’ we have held that there can be no liability under section 240 (1) when there is no violation and the worker’s actions (here, his negligence) are the ‘sole proximate cause’ of the accident.”

    The Court distinguished Bland v. Manocherian, where there were findings that the defendants failed to provide proper protection. Here, the ladder was in proper working order, and no further devices were necessary. “To impose liability for a ladder injury even though all the proper safety precautions were met would not further the Legislature’s purpose.” The Court also found NHS lacked the requisite indicia of agency as it did not supervise the contractor. “An agency relationship for purposes of section 240 (1) arises only when work is delegated to a third party who obtains the authority to supervise and control the job.” NHS acted as a lender, and the homeowner retained primary control over the renovation project.

  • Brown v. Christopher Street Owners Corp., 78 N.Y.2d 782 (1991): Scope of Labor Law § 240(1) in Routine Window Cleaning

    Brown v. Christopher Street Owners Corp., 78 N.Y.2d 782 (1991)

    Labor Law § 240(1), which imposes absolute liability for failing to provide safety devices during building cleaning, does not extend to routine household window washing by an individual hired by an apartment owner.

    Summary

    Arthur Brown, a window washer, was injured when he fell from the second-floor ledge of a cooperative apartment building while washing windows for Anne Hack. He sued the building owner under Labor Law § 240(1), which provides absolute liability for failing to furnish appropriate safety devices during building cleaning. The New York Court of Appeals held that § 240(1) does not apply to routine household window washing. The court distinguished this from large-scale commercial cleaning or other enumerated activities like painting, concluding that the legislature did not intend to impose such broad liability for ordinary household tasks.

    Facts

    Arthur Brown was hired by Anne Hack to wash the windows of her one-bedroom cooperative apartment in Manhattan.
    While attempting to wash the exterior of a window from a second-floor ledge, Brown fell and sustained injuries.
    Brown subsequently brought a claim against the building owners, Christopher Street Owners Corp., alleging violations of Labor Law § 240(1).

    Procedural History

    The lower courts’ decisions were not explicitly stated in the Court of Appeals decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Appellate Division, implying the lower courts found against the plaintiff, Brown. The Court of Appeals’ decision represents the final determination in this case.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Labor Law § 240(1) applies to routine window washing of a single apartment in a cooperative building.
    2. Whether Labor Law § 202 provides the exclusive Labor Law remedy in cases involving window cleaning.

    Holding

    1. No, because the “cleaning” encompassed under Labor Law § 240 (1) does not include routine, household window washing.
    2. The court did not reach this issue.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Labor Law § 240(1) was not intended to cover routine household tasks. The court distinguished this situation from other scenarios where § 240(1) would apply, such as the painting of a house (Rivers v. Sauter) or the cleaning of all the windows of a large, nonresidential structure (Koenig v. Patrick Constr. Corp.). The court stated that “the routine cleaning of the five windows of a single cooperative apartment by an individual engaged by the apartment owner is not the kind of undertaking for which the Legislature sought to impose liability under Labor Law § 240.” The court emphasized the distinction between large-scale commercial endeavors and small-scale residential tasks. The court explicitly declined to address whether Labor Law § 202 provides the exclusive remedy because the parties did not raise the issue in their briefs, citing Terry v Young Men’s Hebrew Assn., 78 NY2d 978, 979. This highlights the importance of proper legal briefing and issue presentation to the court. The ruling reinforces the principle that statutes should be interpreted in light of their intended purpose and scope, avoiding interpretations that would lead to absurd or unintended results. This case serves as a limiting principle on the broad application of Labor Law § 240(1), ensuring it is applied to construction-related activities rather than ordinary household maintenance.

  • White v. Long, 85 N.Y.2d 564 (1995): Navigation Law Allows Current Landowner to Sue Prior Owner for Pollution Cleanup Costs

    White v. Long, 85 N.Y.2d 564 (1995)

    Under New York Navigation Law § 181, a current property owner deemed a ‘discharger’ due to contamination can sue a prior owner who actually caused the discharge for cleanup and removal costs, even if the current owner is also strictly liable.

    Summary

    White purchased property from Long, a prior gas station operator, and discovered a leaking underground storage tank requiring costly remediation. White, considered a ‘discharger’ under the Navigation Law, was denied reimbursement from the New York State Environmental Protection and Spill Compensation Fund. White then sued Long to recover cleanup costs under Navigation Law § 181. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Navigation Law allows a current landowner, even if deemed a ‘discharger’, to sue a prior owner-discharger for cleanup costs. The court reasoned that precluding such suits would undermine the law’s purpose of prompt environmental cleanup by removing the incentive for current owners to remediate promptly.

    Facts

    Long operated a gas station on the property from approximately 1984 to 1987. White contracted to buy the property from Midstate Enterprises in 1987, with the intention of opening a Kentucky Fried Chicken franchise. The sale contract was contingent on a clean environmental report. Groundwater Technology tested soil samples at locations identified by Long, who disclosed six underground storage tanks. A low level of aromatic hydrocarbons was detected, but the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) did not require remediation at that time. White waived the contract conditions and purchased the property. During excavation for the restaurant, White discovered a seventh, leaking, underground petroleum storage tank. The DEC ordered remediation, and White removed the tank and cleaned up the land at a cost exceeding $100,000.

    Procedural History

    White’s application for reimbursement from the New York State Environmental Protection and Spill Compensation Fund was denied because White, as the property owner, was considered a ‘discharger’ and thus precluded from recovering from the Fund. White’s CPLR article 78 petition challenging this denial was dismissed by the trial court and affirmed by the Appellate Division. The Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. White then sued Long in Supreme Court alleging strict liability under the Navigation Law, as well as common-law claims. The Supreme Court dismissed the common law claims but denied summary judgment on the Navigation Law claim. The Appellate Division dismissed all of White’s claims. The Court of Appeals reinstated White’s Navigation Law claim.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Navigation Law § 181 allows a property owner, deemed a ‘discharger’ due to contamination on their property, to bring a private cause of action against a prior owner who actually discharged the petroleum, to recover cleanup and removal costs.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Navigation Law provides a private cause of action without denying standing to a property owner deemed a discharger to sue another discharger in strict liability for clean-up costs, particularly when the current owner did not cause or contribute to the discharge.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court focused on the plain language of Navigation Law § 181(1), which imposes liability on any discharger for cleanup costs “no matter by whom sustained,” and subdivision (5), which permits “any injured person” to bring a claim against a discharger. The court noted that subdivision (5) was added in 1991 to establish a private right of action. The court reasoned that while owners of contaminated land may be deemed “dischargers” for their own liability under section 181(1), this does not preclude them from suing those who actually caused or contributed to the discharge, provided they themselves are not responsible for it. To preclude reimbursement in that situation would significantly diminish the reach of section 181(5). The court emphasized the Navigation Law’s purpose of prompt and effective cleanup of environmental pollutants. Allowing a cause of action against other potentially liable parties incentivizes the current owner to promptly effect cleanup. As the court stated, “With the assurance that a cause of action is available against other potentially liable parties, the current owner of contaminated property will have the best incentive to effect cleanup as soon as possible, in order to use the property.” The Court distinguished this case from State of New York v King Serv., noting that the latter involved a claim by the State to recover from the fund. The court clarified that permitting a discharger who has paid for remediation to sue other responsible dischargers does not negate its own liability. The court dismissed the argument that a party who cannot bring a claim against the Fund should not be able to bring private claims against other responsible parties, pointing out that the Legislature amended the definition of “claim” in 1991 to clarify that a party bringing suit against a private party need not first seek recovery from the Fund.

  • Matter of Belanger v. New York State Racing & Wagering Board, 70 N.Y.2d 687 (1987): Trainer Responsibility Rule in Horse Racing

    70 N.Y.2d 687 (1987)

    The trainer responsibility rule in horse racing places strict liability on trainers for prohibited substances found in their horses unless they present substantial evidence proving they were not responsible for the administration.

    Summary

    This case addresses the trainer responsibility rule in horse racing. Belanger, a horse trainer, faced a suspension after his horse tested positive for a prohibited substance. The New York State Racing & Wagering Board argued that Belanger, as the trainer, was strictly liable. Belanger argued the substance was administered outside the prohibited window. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the trainer did not provide sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of responsibility. This case underscores the high burden placed on trainers to ensure compliance with anti-doping regulations.

    Facts

    Belanger was the trainer of Ryan’s Choice, a horse that raced at Monticello Raceway. A post-race urinalysis revealed the presence of prednisolone, a prohibited drug. The New York State Racing & Wagering Board suspended Belanger’s license, citing the trainer responsibility rule. Belanger contended the drug was administered outside the 48-hour window prior to the race. The Board’s expert testified the drug was likely administered within 48 hours. Belanger and his witnesses testified it was administered 55 hours before the race.

    Procedural History

    The Racing & Wagering Board upheld the 60-day suspension. Belanger initiated an Article 78 proceeding. The Supreme Court transferred the case to the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division reversed the Board’s decision, finding Belanger presented substantial evidence. The Racing & Wagering Board appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trainer presented substantial evidence to rebut the presumption of responsibility under the trainer responsibility rule, given the positive drug test and conflicting testimony regarding the timing of drug administration.

    Holding

    No, because the trainer failed to rebut the presumption that he was responsible for the presence of the prohibited substance, as he didn’t prove the horse was out of his care during the critical period, despite presenting evidence suggesting administration occurred outside the prohibited window.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized the strict liability nature of the trainer responsibility rule: “The rule places strict responsibility on a trainer to ensure that a horse in his or her care and custody does not receive any drug or other restricted substance within specified periods before a race.” Once a positive drug test is established, a presumption of the trainer’s responsibility arises. This presumption can only be rebutted by substantial evidence showing the trainer (or their agents) were not responsible. Here, the Board presented expert testimony supporting administration within the prohibited window, triggering the presumption. While Belanger offered evidence the drug was administered 55 hours prior, he failed to prove the horse was not under his care during the critical 48-hour period. This failure to account for the horse’s whereabouts during the critical period was fatal to his defense. The court distinguished this case from situations where trainers demonstrate lack of control or custody during the relevant time frame. The court thus reinforced the strict liability standard and the high burden on trainers to disprove responsibility. The court explicitly stated that the trainer needed to prove the horse was not in his care, control, or custody during the critical period. “Petitioner offered no proof that the horse was not in his care, control or custody during the critical period”.

  • Rosado v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 66 N.Y.2d 21 (1985): Barring Indemnification for Manufacturers of Defective Products

    Rosado v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 66 N.Y.2d 21 (1985)

    A manufacturer of a defective product cannot obtain indemnification from the purchaser when the purchaser’s employee is injured due to the manufacturer’s failure to provide adequate safety devices, even if the sales contract requires the purchaser to install such devices.

    Summary

    Hector Rosado, an employee of Comet Fibers, was injured while operating a garnett machine purchased by Comet from Proctor & Schwartz. The sales contract required Comet to install necessary safety guards, but the machine lacked adequate safeguards, leading to Rosado’s injuries. Rosado sued Proctor, who then sought indemnification from Comet. The New York Court of Appeals held that Proctor, as the manufacturer of a defective product, could not obtain indemnification from Comet, as Proctor had a non-delegable duty to ensure the machine was reasonably safe when it left their control. Allowing indemnification in this situation would undermine the policy goals of strict products liability.

    Facts

    Comet Fibers purchased a garnett machine from Proctor & Schwartz in 1970. The sales contract stipulated that Comet was responsible for installing safety guards and disconnect switches.
    The machine was delivered without safety devices. Comet installed a mesh fence with a gap and doors that exposed moving parts when opened.
    Hector Rosado, a Comet employee, was injured when his hand came into contact with unprotected chains and gears while cleaning the machine, which was often operated with the safety gate open.

    Procedural History

    Rosado sued Proctor & Schwartz.
    Proctor initiated a third-party action against Comet, seeking contribution and indemnity.
    The trial court dismissed Proctor’s indemnification claim. Comet settled with Rosado, precluding Proctor’s contribution claim.
    Proctor settled with Rosado before a verdict and appealed the dismissal of its indemnification claim.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal, and Proctor appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a manufacturer of a defective product can obtain indemnification from the purchaser when the sales contract requires the purchaser to install safety devices and the purchaser’s employee is injured due to the absence of such devices.

    Holding

    No, because the manufacturer has a non-delegable duty to provide a reasonably safe product, and allowing indemnification in this circumstance would undermine the public policy goals of strict products liability.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court distinguished between contribution and indemnity, noting that contribution involves distributing the loss among tortfeasors, while indemnity shifts the entire loss to another party.
    Indemnity arises from contract, either express or implied. Proctor conceded there was no express agreement for indemnification.
    The court rejected Proctor’s argument for implied indemnity, stating that strict products liability is not akin to vicarious liability; manufacturers are held accountable as wrongdoers and must ensure their products are reasonably safe when they leave their control. The court stated that “a prima facie case is not established unless it is shown, among other things, that in relation to those who will use it, the product was defective when it left the hands of the manufacturer because it was not reasonably safe”.
    The court disagreed with the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Proctor & Schwartz v. United States Equip. Co., which allowed a similar indemnity claim, stating that the manufacturer is in the best position to determine appropriate safety devices, particularly when the dangers do not vary by job site.
    The court emphasized that “Preventing injuries in the first place is the primary public policy underlying the doctrine of strict products liability.”
    Allowing manufacturers to shift their duty of care through boilerplate contract language would erode the incentive to maintain safety and sanction the marketing of dangerous machines.
    The court distinguished McDermott v. City of New York, where indemnification was allowed because the manufacturer breached a duty to the injured plaintiff, whereas in this case, Proctor sought to recover from Comet based on a contract between them, despite Proctor’s breach of duty to Comet’s employee.