New York Law Review

Tag: Stop and Frisk

  • People v. Mack, 26 N.Y.2d 311 (1970): Justification for Frisk Incident to Lawful Stop for Violent Crime

    People v. Mack, 26 N.Y.2d 311 (1970)

    When a police officer lawfully stops a suspect based on reasonable suspicion of a violent crime, a frisk for weapons is permissible without requiring a separate, independent basis for believing the suspect is dangerous.

    Summary

    James Mack was convicted of unlawful possession of a weapon. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that a police officer who reasonably suspects an individual of committing a violent crime like burglary is justified in performing a frisk for weapons incident to a lawful stop, without needing an independent basis to believe the suspect is dangerous. The court reasoned that the inherent danger in confronting a suspect potentially involved in a violent crime necessitates allowing officers to take immediate steps to ensure their safety and the safety of others. This decision balances individual rights against the practical realities of law enforcement.

    Facts

    On October 20, 1968, police officers were investigating narcotics activity in Brooklyn. Uniformed officers informed them that three burglaries had been committed that day by two males in the vicinity, providing descriptions of the suspects: one six feet tall wearing a camel hair overcoat and brown hat, the other five feet nine inches wearing a black hat. Fifteen minutes later, the officers observed Mack and another man matching the descriptions entering and exiting multiple buildings suspiciously. The officers approached the suspects, identified themselves, and ordered them to stop. Mack was wearing a camel hair overcoat and brown hat. An officer frisked Mack and discovered a revolver in his coat pocket, leading to his arrest.

    Procedural History

    Mack moved to suppress the weapon, arguing the search was unlawful. The trial court denied the motion, finding the stop and frisk justified under Section 180-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Mack pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a weapon. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Mack then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a police officer, having lawfully stopped an individual based on reasonable suspicion of committing a violent crime, must have an independent basis for believing the individual is dangerous before conducting a frisk for weapons.

    Holding

    No, because when an officer reasonably suspects an individual has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a serious and violent crime, that suspicion alone justifies both the detention and the frisk, eliminating the need for a separate, independent basis for believing the individual is dangerous.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged prior cases like People v. Rivera, which emphasized the inherent dangers faced by police officers during street encounters. The court recognized that Section 180-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Supreme Court’s decision in Terry v. Ohio established a standard for justifying a frisk separate from the justification for the detention itself. However, the court distinguished between different types of crimes. When an officer reasonably suspects an individual of a non-violent crime, an independent basis for believing the suspect is dangerous is required before a frisk. But when the suspected crime is serious and violent, like burglary, the very nature of the crime creates a sufficient basis for the officer to believe the suspect may be armed and dangerous. Quoting Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Terry v. Ohio, the court stated, “Where such a stop is reasonable, however, the right to frisk must be immediate and automatic if the reason for the stop is, as here, an articulable suspicion of a crime of violence… There is no reason why an officer rightfully but forcibly confronting a person suspected of a serious crime, should have to ask one question and take the risk that the answer might be a bullet.” The court concluded that requiring officers to develop an independent belief of danger in such circumstances would unnecessarily endanger them. The court emphasized the importance of allowing police officers to take necessary measures to ensure their safety while investigating serious criminal activity.

  • People v. Taggart, 20 N.Y.2d 335 (1967): Anonymous Tips and ‘Stop and Frisk’ Exception

    People v. Taggart, 20 N.Y.2d 335 (1967)

    An anonymous tip, if sufficiently detailed and corroborated by observation, can provide reasonable suspicion to justify a “stop and frisk” for weapons, especially when public safety is at risk.

    Summary

    The case addresses the legality of a search and seizure based on an anonymous tip. Police received an anonymous call stating a youth at a specific location possessed a loaded gun. Upon arrival, the police found someone matching the description and immediately searched him, finding the gun. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the search under the “stop and frisk” doctrine, finding that while the anonymous tip alone might not establish probable cause for arrest, the corroborated details provided reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant and, given the potential danger, to immediately search him for the weapon, even among a group of children.

    Facts

    Detective Delaney received an anonymous phone call at the police station. The caller stated that a white male youth was at the corner of 135th and Jamaica Avenue with a loaded .32 caliber revolver in his left jacket pocket. The caller described the youth as eighteen years old, with blue eyes, blond hair, wearing white chino-type pants. Delaney went to the location and observed someone who matched the description perfectly. The youth (Taggart) was standing in a group of children who had just finished bowling. Delaney crossed the street, took Taggart by the arm, placed him against the wall, and retrieved the revolver from his left-hand jacket pocket. Delaney did not observe any bulge in Taggart’s pocket prior to the search.

    Procedural History

    Taggart was arrested and charged with possession of a pistol. He moved to suppress the evidence (the pistol). The Criminal Court, Queens County (Schreckinger, J.) denied the motion. Taggart pleaded guilty and was committed to Elmira Reception Center, and adjudged a youthful offender. The Appellate Term, Second Department, affirmed the conviction, with one Justice dissenting.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an anonymous tip, without more, provides reasonable grounds for a search and subsequent arrest.
    2. Whether, even if the anonymous tip did not provide reasonable grounds for an arrest, the search was valid under New York’s “Stop and Frisk” law (Code Crim. Pro., § 180-a).

    Holding

    1. No, because the information received from the anonymous caller was not substantiated by sufficient indicia of reliability beyond the defendant’s mere presence at the specified location.
    2. Yes, because the detective had a reasonably based suspicion that Taggart was committing a crime and that he possessed a dangerous weapon, justifying the stop and immediate search under the exigent circumstances.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that while the anonymous tip alone might not constitute “reasonable grounds” for a search incident to an arrest under traditional standards (citing People v. Malinsky and People v. Coffey), the search was justified under the “Stop and Frisk” law. The Court relied on the fact that the detective corroborated the details of the tip: Taggart’s appearance matched the description. The court reasoned the detective had a reasonable suspicion that Taggart was committing a crime which justified the initial stop. Moreover, the court emphasized the potential danger: Taggart was suspected of possessing a loaded weapon among a group of children, creating exigent circumstances that justified an immediate search rather than a preliminary frisk. The court acknowledged the potential dangers of relying on anonymous tips but emphasized that the police action was related to a matter gravely affecting personal and public safety. The court distinguished this case from those involving sumptuary laws or offenses of limited public consequence. The court noted that the Constitution forbids “unreasonable” searches, and what is reasonable is determined by the circumstances. The majority stated, “To tolerate unconstitutional action as a matter of necessity… but then to reject use of the evidence obtained, is hardly a proper way to justify illegal conduct as necessary”.

  • People v. Rivera, 20 N.Y.2d 244 (1967): Justifying Stop and Frisk Based on Reasonable Suspicion

    People v. Rivera, 20 N.Y.2d 244 (1967)

    A police officer may stop and frisk an individual based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and a reasonable belief that the officer’s safety is at risk, and evidence discovered during such a frisk is admissible.

    Summary

    The case concerns the legality of a stop and frisk conducted by an off-duty police officer, Lasky, who observed suspicious activity in his apartment building. Lasky confronted the defendant, frisked him, and discovered burglar’s tools. The New York Court of Appeals held that the stop and frisk were justified based on reasonable suspicion, making the evidence admissible. The court emphasized the importance of allowing police officers to prevent crime and protect themselves when faced with potentially dangerous situations. The decision upholds the constitutionality of stop and frisk laws and affirms the conviction.

    Facts

    Officer Lasky, an off-duty New York City patrolman residing in a Mount Vernon apartment building, heard a noise at his door after showering. He observed two men tiptoeing in the hallway through his peephole. Lasky called the police, armed himself, and pursued the men, who were hurrying down the stairway. He apprehended the defendant between the fifth and fourth floors. The defendant claimed to be looking for a girlfriend but refused to identify her. Lasky frisked the defendant, felt a hard object, and retrieved an envelope containing burglar’s tools from the defendant’s pocket.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was indicted for unlawful possession of burglar’s tools. The defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence was denied. He was convicted upon a guilty plea. The case reached the New York Court of Appeals after an appeal regarding the admissibility of the evidence obtained during the search.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence of the burglar’s tools was the result of an unlawful search and seizure and thus inadmissible.

    Holding

    No, because the officer’s actions were justified under the ‘stop and frisk’ doctrine given the suspicious circumstances and the officer’s reasonable concern for his safety.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied the rationale of People v. Rivera (14 N.Y.2d 441), which established that police officers have the right to stop and frisk individuals based on reasonable suspicion. The court reasoned that preventing crime is a crucial police function, and prompt inquiry into suspicious activity is essential. The standard for inquiry is lower than that for arrest. Officer Lasky had a reasonable basis to suspect criminal activity: he twice observed unfamiliar men tiptoeing around the top floor of his apartment building, and they hastily exited via the stairway. “The stopping of the individual to inquire is not an arrest and the ground upon which the police may make the inquiry may be less incriminating than the ground for an arrest for a crime known to have been committed.” The court held that the frisk was justified by the need to ensure the officer’s safety. The court emphasized that the critical question is whether there was a right to find anything, not what was ultimately found. The court stated, “The question is not what was ultimately found, but whether there was a right to find anything.” The court noted the location of the confrontation (narrow stairwell) made the frisk a necessity. The court also upheld the constitutionality of Section 180-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which codified the stop and frisk doctrine, emphasizing that it strikes a fair balance between individual rights and the need for effective law enforcement.

  • People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441 (1964): Legality of Stop and Frisk Based on Reasonable Suspicion

    People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441 (1964)

    Police may stop and question a person based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and, as an incident to that inquiry, conduct a limited “frisk” of the outer clothing for weapons if they reasonably believe they are in danger.

    Summary

    This case addresses the legality of a police stop and frisk conducted before New York’s “stop and frisk” law was enacted. Detectives observed two men, including Rivera, acting suspiciously in an area known for crime. The men looked into a bar window, walked away, returned, and then rapidly walked away when they noticed the detectives. The detectives stopped Rivera, frisked him, and discovered a loaded gun. The court considered whether the police action of stopping and frisking Rivera was justified under the Fourth Amendment, ultimately holding that, under the circumstances, the stop and frisk was reasonable given the need to protect the officers and maintain public order.

    Facts

    On May 25, 1962, at 1:30 a.m., three plainclothes detectives were patrolling in an unmarked car near 7th Street and Avenue C in Manhattan. Detective Bennett observed Rivera and another man behaving suspiciously for about five minutes. The men repeatedly looked into the window of a bar and grill. Rivera looked towards the detectives’ car, said something to his companion, and both men began walking rapidly away. Detective Bennett described the area as having “quite a bit of crime…Muggings, stick-ups, assaults, larcenies, burglaries.” The detective stopped Rivera and, for his own protection, patted down the outside of Rivera’s clothing, feeling what he believed to be a weapon. He then removed a loaded .22 caliber gun from Rivera’s person.

    Procedural History

    Rivera was arrested and indicted for criminally carrying a loaded pistol and for criminally possessing a pistol. He moved to suppress the evidence (the gun and bullets). The Supreme Court granted the motion to suppress. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision without opinion.

    Issue(s)

    Whether police officers, based on reasonable suspicion, may stop and question an individual in public.

    Whether police officers, incident to a lawful stop, may conduct a limited search (frisk) of an individual’s outer clothing for weapons when they have a reasonable fear for their safety or the safety of others.

    Holding

    Yes, because prompt inquiry into suspicious street action is an indispensable police power in the orderly government of large urban communities.

    Yes, because the right to frisk may be justified as an incident to inquiry upon grounds of elemental safety and precaution which might not initially sustain a search.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that police have a duty to prevent crime and must be able to make prompt inquiries into suspicious behavior. The level of evidence needed for inquiry is less than that required for an arrest. Stopping someone for questioning is not an arrest. The court emphasized, “The business of the police is to prevent crime if they can.” The court recognized the inherent dangers faced by police officers when questioning individuals in public. The court stated, “The answer to the question propounded by the policeman may be a bullet; in any case the exposure to danger could be very great.” Therefore, a limited frisk for weapons is a reasonable precaution to ensure the officer’s safety. The court acknowledged that a frisk is a limited invasion of privacy, but it is less intrusive than a full search. The court balanced the individual’s right to privacy against the need for public safety and the safety of police officers. The Court noted that the constitutional restriction is against unreasonable searches, not all searches, and that reasonableness requires a balancing of interests. The court concluded that the precautionary procedures followed by the police in questioning Rivera met the practical demands of effective criminal investigation without being unreasonable.