New York Law Review

Tag: Stop and Frisk

  • People v. Brown, 26 N.Y.3d 976 (2015): Reasonable Suspicion for Stop and Frisk Based on Flight and Prior Knowledge

    People v. Brown, 26 N.Y.3d 976 (2015)

    The New York Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division erred by ruling that law enforcement did not have reasonable suspicion to stop and detain individuals, Brown and Thomas, where the officers observed them running in a high-crime area, knew of their prior criminal activity in the area, and knew that Brown had been previously instructed by police to leave that location.

    Summary

    The case concerns the standard for reasonable suspicion necessary for a police stop. Officers in Times Square observed Brown and Thomas running and looking over their shoulders. The officers knew Brown had a history of fraudulent accosting in the area and knew Thomas associated with people involved in similar scams. Within a short time, the officers had a robbery victim identify the two as the perpetrators. The trial court found reasonable suspicion. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, finding the reversal was not “on the law alone” but held that the officers had reasonable suspicion based on their observations and prior knowledge of the individuals. The dissent disagreed with the majority and would have reversed the order of the Appellate Division and remitted the cases to that Court for a review of the facts.

    Facts

    In the early morning hours in Times Square, officers of the “cabaret unit” saw Brown, whom they had previously arrested for fraudulent accosting, and instructed him to leave the area. Three hours later, the officers, in an unmarked van, observed Brown and Thomas running down Broadway, looking over their shoulders. The officers stopped them, and a robbery victim identified them as the perpetrators. The victim’s Rolex and cash were recovered from Thomas.

    Procedural History

    The defendants moved to suppress the identification. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion. The New York Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial court’s finding of reasonable suspicion.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police officers had reasonable suspicion to stop and detain Brown and Thomas based on their observations and prior knowledge.

    Holding

    No, because the Appellate Division erred, as a matter of law, in holding that the undisputed facts and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom failed to satisfy the minimum showing necessary to establish reasonable suspicion. Therefore the case was dismissed, and the Appellate Division’s decision was reversed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals analyzed the stop under the standard of reasonable suspicion, stating that this standard is met when an officer has “the quantum of knowledge sufficient to induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious [person] under the circumstances to believe criminal activity is at hand” (People v. Cantor). The court found that the officers’ observations of the defendants running and looking back, combined with their knowledge of Brown’s history of fraudulent accosting and Thomas’s associations, provided reasonable suspicion. The Court found that the police officers possessed reasonable suspicion to stop Brown and Thomas and that the officers would have been derelict in their duty had they not done so.

    Practical Implications

    This case emphasizes the importance of officers’ prior knowledge in establishing reasonable suspicion, especially in high-crime areas. It suggests that flight, when combined with other specific circumstances such as prior knowledge of criminal activity or associations, can give rise to reasonable suspicion. This ruling guides law enforcement in determining when a stop and frisk is justified, balancing the need for effective law enforcement with the protection of individual rights. This case also illustrates how a court may assess actions in their totality, rather than dissecting each individual act by the police. The case also shows how a court must not be too quick to second-guess police on the street.

  • People v. Ocasio, 85 N.Y.2d 508 (1995): Legality of a ‘Stop’ Command as a Seizure Under the New York Constitution

    People v. Ocasio, 85 N.Y.2d 508 (1995)

    Under the New York Constitution, a direction to “stop” by a uniformed police officer, considered in light of all surrounding circumstances, may constitute a seizure if it results in a significant interruption of an individual’s liberty of movement.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a police officer’s direction to a suspect to “stop” constitutes an unlawful seizure under the New York State Constitution. Police officers, responding to a radio report of a black male selling narcotics while wearing red and blue clothing, encountered the defendant, who matched the description. As the officer approached, the defendant began to walk away. The officer told him to “stop,” and the defendant then fled, discarding a bag containing cocaine. The New York Court of Appeals held that the officer’s direction to “stop” did not, as a matter of law, constitute a seizure under the specific facts presented.

    Facts

    Police received a radio report about a black male selling narcotics at a specific location, wearing red and blue clothing. Upon arriving at the location within a minute, they observed approximately ten people, including the defendant, who was the only one matching the description. As an officer approached, the defendant, after looking at the officer, began to walk away. The officer then directed the defendant to “stop.” The defendant then ran and discarded a bag containing vials of crack cocaine before being apprehended.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to suppress the drugs, arguing the “stop” command was an unlawful seizure. The Supreme Court denied the motion. The defendant pleaded guilty. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding a sufficient basis for a common-law inquiry and reasonable suspicion to pursue the defendant after he fled.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a direction by a uniformed police officer to “stop,” made to a defendant as he began to walk away, constitutes a seizure as a matter of law under the New York State Constitution.

    Holding

    No, because under the totality of the circumstances, the officer’s single direction to stop was not a sufficient show of authority to constitute a seizure.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished between the Fourth Amendment standard under California v. Hodari D., which requires physical force or submission to authority for a seizure, and the New York Constitution, which focuses on whether there was a “significant interruption [of the] individual’s liberty of movement.” The court emphasized that while a verbal command alone might not be a seizure, it can be when coupled with other factors, such as drawn weapons or preventing movement. The Court distinguished this case from prior cases where a seizure was found, noting that here, there was only a single command to stop. The Court stated, “There are no bright lines separating various types of police activity. Determining whether a seizure occurs during the course of a street encounter between the police and a private citizen involves an analysis of the ‘most subtle aspects of our constitutional guarantees’.” The Court found that the facts did not indicate the officer’s conduct rose to the level of a seizure and deferred to the factual findings of the lower courts. The test is “whether a reasonable person would have believed, under the circumstances, that the officer’s conduct was a significant limitation on his or her freedom.”

  • People v. Martinez, 82 N.Y.2d 436 (1993): Reasonable Suspicion Justifying a Stop and Frisk

    People v. Martinez, 82 N.Y.2d 436 (1993)

    When reviewing a suppression motion denial, the Court of Appeals determines only whether there was record support for the finding that police possessed a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justifying a forcible stop and detention.

    Summary

    Defendant Martinez appealed the denial of his motion to suppress vials of crack cocaine found on his person. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the police officers possessed reasonable suspicion to stop and detain Martinez. The Court emphasized that its review was limited to whether the record supported the determination that the police had reasonable suspicion to believe Martinez was committing or had committed a crime. Because such support existed, the Court affirmed the denial of the suppression motion.

    Facts

    Police officers forcibly stopped and detained Martinez. A search incident to that stop revealed vials of crack cocaine in his hand and coat pockets. Martinez moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the stop and search.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Martinez’s motion to suppress the evidence. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. An Associate Justice of the Appellate Division dissented, granting Martinez permission to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police officers had a reasonable suspicion that the defendant had committed or was committing a crime, thus justifying the forcible stop and detention.

    Holding

    Yes, because the determination that the police officers had reasonable suspicion was supported by the record.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that its review was limited to whether the determination of the mixed question of law and fact – whether the police officers had reasonable suspicion to support the forcible stop and detention – was supported by the record. Citing People v. Harrison, 57 NY2d 470, 477, the court stated that since the lower court’s determination was supported, the Court of Appeals’ review was concluded, and the order of the Appellate Division had to be affirmed. The court reiterated that only the application of the legal standard to the specific facts was at issue. The court did not detail the specific facts giving rise to the reasonable suspicion; however, the affirmance indicates the facts were sufficient to meet the reasonable suspicion standard. The decision highlights the limited scope of review for the Court of Appeals in cases involving mixed questions of law and fact, where the lower courts’ findings are supported by the record.

  • People v. Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d 181 (1992): Distinguishing a Request for Information from a Common-Law Inquiry

    People v. Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d 181 (1992)

    A request for information during a police encounter involves basic, non-threatening questions supported by an objective, credible reason, while a common-law inquiry involves more pointed questions based on a founded suspicion that criminality is afoot.

    Summary

    This case clarifies the distinction between a request for information and a common-law inquiry in police-citizen encounters under New York’s De Bour framework. Hollman was observed acting suspiciously in a bus terminal. An officer approached and asked him and his companion questions about their travel plans and luggage. After they denied owning bags that the officer saw them with, the officer searched the bags, finding drugs. The court held that the initial questions were a permissible request for information, but that subsequent questions and the search were justified only after the officer developed a founded suspicion of criminal activity based on the inconsistent answers. The court also reaffirmed the continued validity of the De Bour test under state common law, even in light of more permissive federal Fourth Amendment standards.

    Facts

    Officer Canale, an undercover narcotics officer, observed Hollman at a bus terminal. Hollman appeared nervous, looking around the terminal. He ascended and descended an escalator multiple times, then met a companion. They stood apart with a bag between them for 20 minutes. Hollman placed a bag in an overhead rack away from his seat. Canale approached them and asked questions.

    Procedural History

    Hollman was charged with drug possession. His motion to suppress the drugs was denied after a hearing. He pleaded guilty to third-degree possession. The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of the suppression motion. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Officer Canale’s initial questioning of Hollman constituted a permissible request for information or an unlawful common-law inquiry requiring founded suspicion.
    2. Whether the search of the bag was justified.
    3. Whether the De Bour framework remains valid under New York law, independent of federal Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the initial questions were basic and supported by an objective, credible reason based on Hollman’s suspicious behavior.
    2. Yes, because the officer had a founded suspicion of criminal activity based on Hollman’s and his companion’s denial of owning the bags they were seen handling.
    3. Yes, because De Bour is grounded in state common law, reflecting concerns for privacy and security, and its continued application serves predictability and protects individual rights.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court distinguished between a request for information and a common-law inquiry. A request for information involves basic, non-threatening questions about identity, destination, or reason for being in the area, supported by an objective, credible reason not necessarily indicative of criminality. A common-law inquiry involves more pointed questions that would lead a reasonable person to believe they are suspected of wrongdoing, requiring a founded suspicion that criminality is afoot. The Court stated, “Once the officer asks more pointed questions that would lead the person approached reasonably to believe that he or she is suspected of some wrongdoing and is the focus of the officer’s investigation, the officer is no longer merely seeking information. This has become a common-law inquiry that must be supported by a founded suspicion that criminality is afoot.”

    The Court emphasized that the intensity and content of the questions are critical in distinguishing the two types of encounters. “[A] request for information is a general, nonthreatening encounter in which an individual is approached for an articulable reason and asked briefly about his or her identity, destination, or reason for being in the area.” Here, the initial questions about travel plans were permissible. However, the question about luggage was more directed towards possible criminality. The men’s denial of owning the bags, after Canale observed them handling the bags, created a founded suspicion justifying further inquiry. The court found the abandonment to be valid.

    The Court also addressed the People’s request to overrule De Bour in light of more permissive federal Fourth Amendment standards. The Court declined, reaffirming that De Bour is grounded in state common law and reflects concerns for privacy and security that are independent of federal constitutional interpretations. The court stated, “The continued vitality of De Bour, therefore, is not contingent upon the interpretation that the Supreme Court gives the Fourth Amendment, because De Bour is largely based upon considerations of reasonableness and sound State policy.”

  • People v. Salaman, 71 N.Y.2d 869 (1988): Anonymous Tip Justifying a Stop and Frisk

    People v. Salaman, 71 N.Y.2d 869 (1988)

    An anonymous tip, corroborated by independent observations, providing a specific description of a suspect and their location, coupled with the presence of the suspect in a high-crime area at night, can establish a sufficient predicate for a police officer to conduct a pat-down frisk for weapons.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction for criminal possession of a weapon, holding that the arresting officer’s frisk, which revealed a .22 caliber revolver, was justified. The officer acted on an anonymous tip describing a black male with a gun at a specific location, wearing a long beige overcoat and a maroon hooded sweatshirt. Upon arriving at the scene, the officer found the defendant, who matched the description, among a group of people. The court reasoned that the corroborated tip, combined with the circumstances (nighttime in a high-crime area), provided reasonable suspicion to justify the frisk for the officer’s safety and the safety of others.

    Facts

    An anonymous tip was received describing a black male with a gun at the intersection of South Fifth Avenue and West Third Street in Mount Vernon. The tipster stated that the man was wearing a long beige overcoat and a maroon sweatshirt with a hood. The arresting officer arrived at the location and observed approximately 25 people. The defendant was the only person who matched the description provided in the anonymous tip. The officer approached the defendant and directed him to place his hands on the hood of a nearby car. The officer then conducted a pat-down frisk of the defendant’s outer clothing, which resulted in the discovery of a .22 caliber revolver.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree after pleading guilty. The defendant appealed, arguing that the arresting officer’s frisk was not justified. A suppression hearing was held where the circumstances of the arrest and frisk were examined. The trial court upheld the search and seizure. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and the defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an anonymous tip, corroborated by independent police observation, providing a specific description of a suspect and their location, is sufficient to justify a police officer’s pat-down frisk of the suspect for weapons, particularly when the suspect is found in a high-crime area at night.

    Holding

    Yes, because the officer’s independent observations corroborated the anonymous tip, and the encounter occurred at night in a high-crime area, creating a reasonable basis to believe the suspect was armed and posed a threat to the officer and others in the vicinity.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals weighed the degree of intrusion against the circumstances. The court cited People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 223, emphasizing that any inquiry into police conduct must balance the intrusion against the precipitating and attending circumstances. The court also cited Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, which holds that a frisk for weapons is permissible when an officer reasonably believes the suspect is armed. The court emphasized the officer’s duty to investigate the report, citing People v. Landy, 59 N.Y.2d 369, 374, and People v. Benjamin, 51 N.Y.2d 267, 270. The court highlighted the corroboration of the anonymous tip through the officer’s independent observations, referencing People v. Kinlock, 43 N.Y.2d 832. The court noted the late hour and the location being a high-crime area, citing People v. Bronston, 68 N.Y.2d 880, 881, and People v. McLaurin, 43 N.Y.2d 902. The court stated that because there was evidence to support the hearing court’s finding that there was a sufficient predicate for the officer’s interference with the defendant to secure the safety of the officer and others, the court’s review process was at an end, citing People v. Jones, 69 N.Y.2d 853, 855. The court determined that, given the totality of the circumstances, the officer’s actions were reasonable and justified to ensure safety, therefore affirming the lower court’s decision to allow the evidence.

  • People v. Allen, 62 N.Y.2d 626 (1984): Establishing Reasonable Suspicion for Stop and Frisk

    People v. Allen, 62 N.Y.2d 626 (1984)

    A police officer may conduct a stop and frisk when they have a reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity and poses a threat to the officer’s safety or the safety of others.

    Summary

    The defendant, Allen, was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon. The key issue was whether the weapons, seized from a locker, were admissible as evidence. The Court of Appeals upheld the conviction, finding that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk Allen based on his observed behavior (attempting to force open a locker, presence in a deserted area, and prior record), and that the subsequent search warrant was valid despite Allen’s initial arrest. The court emphasized the mixed question of law and fact involved in determining reasonable suspicion, limiting its review to whether evidence supported the lower court’s findings.

    Facts

    Amtrak Police Officer Rogers observed Allen in Penn Station at 1:00 a.m., leaning on locker Y861 and attempting to force it open. Allen had an open canvas bag next to him. A woman was nearby, looking away from Rogers. When Allen saw Rogers, he started to walk away, placing his hand in his waistband. Rogers grabbed Allen, frisked him, and found a key to the locker. Rogers also observed a crowbar, screwdrivers, and a flashlight in Allen’s open bag. Rogers knew Allen had a prior arrest for attempting to break into a locker in the same station and that Allen had been directed to stay out of Penn Station. Rogers also believed Allen was carrying a sawed-off shotgun based on an informer’s statement. Rogers testified he feared for his safety when he grabbed and frisked Allen.

    Procedural History

    Allen was convicted after a jury trial of criminal possession of a dangerous weapon. He appealed, challenging the denial of his motion to suppress the weapons found in the locker. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Allen then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the weapons were seized in violation of his rights because the search warrant was based on statements he made after an illegal arrest.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police officer had reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk the defendant based on the totality of the circumstances observed at the time of the encounter.

    Holding

    Yes, because there was evidence in the record to support the findings of the lower courts that the officer possessed reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk the defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the officer possessed reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk Allen. The court emphasized that reasonable suspicion is a mixed question of law and fact, meaning that the Court of Appeals’ review was limited to whether there was evidence in the record to support the lower court’s findings. The court found that the officer’s observations of Allen attempting to force open the locker, his presence in a deserted area at 1:00 a.m., his prior record of similar offenses, and the officer’s belief that Allen was armed, all contributed to a reasonable suspicion that Allen was involved in criminal activity and posed a threat. The court noted undisturbed findings of attenuation, supported by evidence, were also not available for review. The court relied on precedent such as People v. Harrison, 57 NY2d 470, 477; People v. McCray, 51 NY2d 594, 601; People v. Wharton, 46 NY2d 924.

  • People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976): Lawful Basis for Police Encounters with Citizens

    People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976)

    A police officer’s encounter with a citizen must be justified by the circumstances, ranging from a simple request for information based on an objective credible reason to an arrest based on probable cause.

    Summary

    This case outlines a four-tiered framework for evaluating the legality of police encounters with citizens. The court held that police encounters must be justified by the circumstances. These range from a simple request for information based on an objective credible reason, not necessarily indicative of criminality, to a stop and frisk based on reasonable suspicion, to an arrest based on probable cause. The court found the initial encounter in this case justified, but suppressed the evidence because the escalated search was not.

    Facts

    Two police officers patrolling in New York City observed De Bour walking towards them at 12:30 a.m. in an area with a high incidence of drug activity. De Bour crossed the street when he was approximately 30 feet from the officers. The officers followed De Bour and asked him a question. During the encounter, one of the officers noticed a bulge in De Bour’s jacket. The officer asked De Bour to open his jacket, and upon doing so, the officer discovered a gun.

    Procedural History

    De Bour was charged with possession of a weapon. He moved to suppress the weapon as evidence, arguing that the police stop and search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court denied the motion, and De Bour was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the police officers’ initial approach and questioning of De Bour was justified.
    2. Whether the officer’s request for De Bour to open his jacket constituted an unlawful search.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the police officer had an objective, credible reason, not necessarily indicative of criminality, to approach De Bour to request information.
    2. Yes, because the officer’s request to open his jacket was an unreasonable intrusion absent reasonable suspicion that De Bour was armed or dangerous.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals established a four-tiered analysis for evaluating police encounters: “The minimal intrusion of approaching to request information is permissible when there is some objective credible reason for that interference not necessarily indicative of criminality.” The court reasoned that the officers’ initial approach and questioning were justified because De Bour’s act of crossing the street late at night in a high-crime area provided an objective, credible reason for the officers to seek information. However, the court found that the officer’s request for De Bour to open his jacket was an unreasonable search. The court stated that a more intrusive encounter, such as a search, requires a greater degree of suspicion. “Before the police officer places a hand on the person of a citizen in search of anything, he must have reasonable suspicion that that person is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime.” Because the officer’s observation of a bulge in De Bour’s jacket, without more, did not provide reasonable suspicion that De Bour was armed or dangerous, the request to open the jacket was unlawful.

  • People v. Harrison, 57 N.Y.2d 470 (1982): Standard of Review for Reasonable Suspicion in Stop and Frisk Cases

    People v. Harrison, 57 N.Y.2d 470 (1982)

    The determination of whether reasonable suspicion exists for a stop and frisk is a mixed question of law and fact, limiting the Court of Appeals’ review to whether the record supports the lower courts’ finding.

    Summary

    The defendant was charged with criminal possession of a weapon and moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the police lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop and frisk. The suppression court denied the motion, and the defendant pleaded guilty. The Appellate Term affirmed the denial. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the existence of reasonable suspicion is a mixed question of law and fact. The Court of Appeals’ review is limited to ascertaining whether the record supports the determination made by the lower courts. Because the record contained adequate support, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Term’s order.

    Facts

    Police officers stopped and frisked the defendant, subsequently discovering a weapon. The defendant was then charged with criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, in violation of Penal Law § 265.01. The defendant moved to suppress the gun, arguing the police lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop and frisk.

    Procedural History

    The suppression court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress, finding the officers had reasonable suspicion. Following the denial, the defendant pleaded guilty to the charge and received an unconditional discharge. The Appellate Term affirmed the suppression court’s decision, adopting the reasoning of the suppression judge. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the record supports the determination that the police possessed reasonable suspicion at the time of the stop and frisk, thus justifying the denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress.

    Holding

    Yes, because the determination of reasonable suspicion is a mixed question of law and fact, and the record contained adequate support for the suppression court’s determination, as affirmed by the Appellate Term. Therefore, the Court of Appeals’ review is limited to ensuring the record supports the lower courts’ findings.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that the question of reasonable suspicion is a mixed question of law and fact. As such, its review power is limited. The court can only ascertain whether there is support in the record for the determination made by the lower courts. The court cited People v. McRay, 51 N.Y.2d 594 (1980), to emphasize the limited scope of review. Because there was adequate support in the record for the suppression court’s determination, as affirmed by the Appellate Term, the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court emphasized, “Whether reasonable suspicion exists at the time of a stop and frisk has been held to be a mixed question of law and fact which is beyond the review powers of this court, other than to ascertain whether the record supports that determination.” This highlights the practical importance of creating a strong record in the suppression hearing, as the Court of Appeals will generally defer to the factual findings of the lower courts if supported by evidence. The ruling emphasizes that the Court of Appeals will not re-weigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the suppression court and the Appellate Term on the issue of reasonable suspicion if there is support for the initial determination.

  • People v. Benjamin, 51 N.Y.2d 267 (1980): Reasonable Suspicion Based on Radio Transmission and Suspect’s Actions

    People v. Benjamin, 51 N.Y.2d 267 (1980)

    A police officer may have reasonable suspicion to stop and investigate a suspect based on a radio transmission coupled with the officer’s observations of the suspect’s behavior and appearance, even if there are some inconsistencies between the radioed description and the suspect’s actual appearance.

    Summary

    This case addresses the legality of a police stop and search based on a radio transmission describing a suspect. Two officers received a radio transmission describing a Hispanic male carrying a gun wrapped in a white shirt. Upon arriving at the specified location, they observed the defendant, who partially matched the description, leaving the area carrying a white shirt. The officers followed him, and one officer grabbed the shirt, discovering a gun. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding the police action justified based on the radio transmission, the defendant’s proximity to the location, his carrying of a white shirt, and his actions. The court emphasized the minimal intrusion involved in the stop.

    Facts

    Two police officers received a radio transmission about a 5’10” Hispanic male with an afro, wearing a white T-shirt and light blue pants, carrying a gun wrapped in a white shirt at 96th Street and Amsterdam Avenue in Manhattan.

    Upon arriving at the location, they saw the defendant, who was Hispanic, approximately 5’6″ tall with wavy hair, wearing a light shirt, and carrying a white shirt.

    The defendant left the group of people and walked south. The officers followed him.

    As the defendant was entering a building and placing the white shirt on the ground, an officer grabbed the shirt, felt a hard object, and discovered a .22 caliber revolver.

    The other officer drew his gun and ordered the defendant not to move.

    The officers arrested the defendant.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court, New York County (Special Term) denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence (banlon shirt, white shirt, and gun).

    The Appellate Division affirmed the Special Term’s decision.

    The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police officers had reasonable suspicion to stop and search the defendant based on the radio transmission and their observations, despite inconsistencies between the description and the defendant’s appearance.

    Holding

    Yes, because the unusual identifying element of carrying a white shirt in the hand, coupled with geographical proximity, provided ground for reasonable suspicion in the circumstances. The intrusion was minimal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court determined that the police action was justified by the totality of the circumstances.

    The court found the radio transmission to be authentic and noted that inconsistencies in the description (height, hairstyle, shirt color) did not invalidate the police action.

    The court emphasized the defendant’s geographical proximity to the reported location and the fact that he was carrying a white shirt, which was a key element of the description.

    The court characterized the police intrusion as minimal, noting that there was no pat-down or frisk and that the officer only touched the defendant to grab the white shirt.

    The court distinguished this case from others where the police intrusion was more significant. The Court stated, “The unusual identifying element of carrying a white shirt in the hand, coupled with geographical proximity, provided ground for reasonable suspicion in the circumstances.”

    The court implicitly applied the standard of reasonable suspicion, which requires a showing of articulable facts that would lead a reasonable person to believe that criminal activity is afoot. This case is a practical example of the application of this standard, emphasizing that even imperfect information can justify a brief investigatory stop.

  • People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976): Articulable Suspicion Required for Stop and Frisk Based on Citizen Tip

    People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976)

    A police officer may not frisk a suspect based solely on a citizen’s report of “suspicious” behavior without the officer independently assessing the facts and forming a reasonable suspicion that the individual is armed and dangerous.

    Summary

    This case addresses the limits of stop-and-frisk procedures based on information provided by a civilian. The New York Court of Appeals held that a frisk is unlawful when based solely on a citizen’s conclusory report of “suspicious” behavior without the officer independently observing facts to justify a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous. The court emphasized the importance of the officer’s personal observation and experience in forming a reasonable suspicion, distinguishing the case from situations where the tip has indicia of reliability or is immediately verifiable.

    Facts

    Shortly before midnight, a liquor store was robbed by two armed black men. Officer Morris responded to the scene. A man identifying himself as a patron of “Fat Man’s Bar,” located near the liquor store, flagged down Officer Morris. The patron reported hearing about the shooting and stated that two “suspicious” black men had just entered Fat Man’s Bar. Without further inquiry or observation, Officer Morris entered the bar and, based solely on the citizen’s identification, frisked the defendant and his companion, finding a loaded revolver on the defendant. The liquor store owner later stated that the men were not the robbers.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was charged with attempted felonious possession of a weapon. He moved to suppress the evidence (the revolver), arguing that the frisk was unlawful. The trial court denied the motion, and the defendant pleaded guilty. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a police officer may conduct a lawful frisk based solely on a citizen’s report that an individual looks “suspicious,” without the officer having any independent basis to suspect that the individual is armed and dangerous.

    Holding

    No, because the officer had no independent knowledge of facts to suggest the defendant possessed a firearm or posed a threat, and the citizen’s report of suspicion, without more, did not provide adequate grounds for a frisk.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reversed, relying on Terry v. Ohio, which requires specific and articulable facts, combined with rational inferences, to justify a stop and frisk. The court emphasized that the officer’s personal knowledge and experience are critical in evaluating the circumstances. A mere anonymous tip of “men with guns” is insufficient to justify a pat down (citing People v. Benjamin). The court distinguished this case from Adams v. Williams and People v. Moore, where the information received by the police had indicia of reliability (e.g., a known informant with a history of providing tips, or a man claiming to be the suspect’s husband). Here, the tip lacked any indicia of reliability and was subjective, non-particularized, and conclusory. The court stated, “whether a person is ‘suspicious’ is the ultimate determination that is to be reached by the officer on the basis of his or her own observations and experience.” The court further reasoned that the circumstances required further investigation before a forcible stop and frisk would be authorized. The court noted that a frisk based solely on an officer’s conclusory statement that someone looks suspicious would be unjustifiable; relying solely on a layperson’s conclusory and unsubstantiated suspicion is even weaker.