New York Law Review

Tag: stolen property

  • People v. Moro, 23 N.Y.2d 496 (1969): Inference of Guilt from Possession of Stolen Property

    People v. Moro, 23 N.Y.2d 496 (1969)

    The recent and exclusive possession of stolen property, if unexplained or falsely explained, allows a jury to infer that the possessor is a criminal, but the jury must determine whether the possessor is the thief or merely a receiver of stolen goods; the defendant cannot be convicted of both crimes.

    Summary

    Charles Moro was convicted of criminally concealing and withholding stolen property and possessing burglar’s tools, but acquitted of grand larceny. The key evidence involved a stolen car found near Moro, a known “street mechanic,” with alterations suggesting he was dismantling it. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the jury could infer guilt from Moro’s unexplained possession of the stolen car, even though he was acquitted of stealing it. The court clarified that the inference of guilt arises from unexplained possession and does not violate the defendant’s right to remain silent.

    Facts

    Rene Cartayas reported his 1960 Oldsmobile stolen. Three days later, police officers familiar with Charles Moro, a local “street mechanic,” spotted him driving a similar car. The next day, the officers found the car, with the same license plate, near Moro. It had been partially dismantled and altered. Moro could not produce a driver’s license or registration for the car. The police confirmed the car was stolen from Cartayas. Moro possessed a key that fit the car. The car was inoperable when recovered.

    Procedural History

    Moro was indicted on five counts, but only three were submitted to the jury: grand larceny, criminally concealing and withholding stolen property, and unlawfully possessing burglar’s tools. The jury acquitted Moro of grand larceny but convicted him of the other two charges. Moro appealed, arguing it was improper to convict him of receiving stolen property and that the judge prejudiced him by remarking on his unexplained possession of the stolen car. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a jury can convict a defendant of criminally receiving stolen property when there is evidence that someone else may have stolen the property, and the defendant was in recent and exclusive possession of it.
    2. Whether a judge’s remark about the defendant’s unexplained possession of a stolen car violates the defendant’s right to remain silent.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the recent and exclusive possession of the fruits of a crime, if unexplained, justifies the inference that the possessor is a criminal, and the jury determines whether the possessor is the thief or merely a receiver of stolen goods.
    2. No, because the inference of guilt arises from the unexplained possession of the stolen property, and the judge properly instructed the jury not to draw any inferences from the defendant’s failure to testify.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the established principle that “recent and exclusive possession of the fruits of crime, if unexplained or falsely explained, will justify the inference that the possessor is the criminal.” The court distinguished between the act of stealing and the act of receiving stolen property, noting that a defendant cannot be convicted of both crimes, but can be indicted for both, allowing the jury to determine the appropriate charge based on the evidence. In Moro’s case, the evidence suggested he may not have been the original thief but was instead dismantling the car, justifying the conviction for receiving stolen property. The court noted that the alterations to the car were not such that an experienced mechanic could not have performed them quickly.

    Regarding the defendant’s right to remain silent, the court clarified that the inference of guilt arises from the unexplained possession of the stolen property, not from the defendant’s failure to testify. The court emphasized that the inference can be overcome by evidence presented to explain the possession, even without the defendant’s testimony. The court also highlighted that the trial judge instructed the jury that no adverse inferences should be drawn from the defendant’s decision not to testify, mitigating any potential prejudice. The court cited Wangrow v. United States, 399 F. 2d 106, 118, supporting this view.

  • People v. Crego, 297 N.Y.S.2d 443 (1969): Determining Market Value of Stolen Goods

    People v. Crego, 297 N.Y.S.2d 443 (N.Y. 1969)

    The market value of stolen property, for purposes of determining the degree of larceny, is the price a willing buyer would pay at the time and place of the theft, considering factors such as condition, use, and any damage incurred.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of grand larceny for stealing a water pump. The key issue on appeal was whether the prosecution adequately proved the pump’s value exceeded $100, the threshold for grand larceny. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the trial court failed to properly determine the market value of the pump at the time of the theft. The court emphasized that the pump’s value should reflect its condition after attempted installation and any resulting damage, not simply its original purchase price.

    Facts

    Lloyd Crego purchased a water pump for $124 from J & R Plumbing. His son-in-law, Terpening, an employee of the plumbing company, along with Crego’s son, began installing the pump. During the installation, they bent the copper tubing, damaged the gauge, and nicked the pump. The installation was abandoned, and the pump was left uninstalled. The following day, the pump was discovered missing. The defendant was later apprehended and convicted of grand larceny.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of grand larceny in the second degree. He appealed, arguing that the prosecution failed to adequately prove the value of the stolen pump exceeded $100. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to establish that the market value of the stolen water pump exceeded $100 at the time of the theft, considering its condition and any damage incurred during a failed installation attempt.

    Holding

    No, because the prosecution failed to adequately account for the pump’s condition and any damage incurred during the attempted installation when determining its value at the time of the theft. The original purchase price was insufficient to establish market value under these circumstances.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that, per People v. Irrizari, the relevant measure of value in a larceny case is the market value of the stolen item at the time of the theft – what the thief would have to pay to replace the item in the marketplace. The court reasoned that the original purchase price is merely some evidence of value, but not conclusive, especially when the item’s condition has changed after the sale. The court noted that the pump had been subjected to a botched installation attempt, resulting in damage. Justice Burke stated, “Since we stated in Irrizari that the price for which an item is sold in a particular store is some evidence but not conclusive proof of its value when stolen from that store, it necessarily follows that the original cost of an item is not proof of its value some five days after the goods have left the store.” Furthermore, the court referenced Parmenter v. Fitzpatrick and People v. Liquori in asserting that an allowance must be made for the fact that the pump, when taken, was no longer new. The court criticized the prosecution’s expert witness for failing to assess the pump’s value after the attempted installation and damage, noting the witness admitted he didn’t know the condition of the pump at the time it was stolen. The court concluded that because the pump’s value was crucial in determining the degree of the offense, the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered to properly assess the pump’s market value at the time of the theft.

  • People v. Brady, 16 N.Y.2d 186 (1965): Establishing Probable Cause for Arrest Based on Observed Conduct and Prior Knowledge

    People v. Brady, 16 N.Y.2d 186 (1965)

    Probable cause for an arrest exists when the totality of the circumstances, including observed conduct and prior knowledge, would lead a reasonable and prudent peace officer to believe that a crime has been committed and the defendant committed it.

    Summary

    Brady was convicted of criminally concealing stolen property. The police, aware of recent burglaries in a hotel and Brady’s prior suspicious activity there, observed him acting suspiciously outside the hotel. He repeatedly examined “little white boxes” and denied his identity when stopped. The court held the arrest lawful, finding probable cause based on the officers’ observations and prior knowledge. Brady’s admission during trial that the stolen jewelry exceeded $100 in value removed the misdemeanor charge from consideration, negating the need for the jury to consider it.

    Facts

    Police officers were aware of a series of burglaries at a specific hotel.
    Months prior to the arrest, Brady had been stopped on an upper floor of the hotel with keys to five different rooms.
    On the night of the arrest, officers observed Brady leaving the hotel.
    They saw him repeatedly take “little white boxes” out of his pockets and examine their contents as he walked along the street.
    When stopped by the officers, Brady denied that his name was Brady and denied being at the hotel that evening.
    During the trial, Brady admitted the value of the stolen jewelry exceeded $100.

    Procedural History

    Brady was convicted in the trial court of criminally concealing and withholding stolen property as a felony.
    The Appellate Division reversed the conviction and granted a new trial.
    The People and Brady cross-appealed by permission to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police had probable cause to arrest Brady, making the subsequent search incident to that arrest lawful.
    Whether the trial court erred by not instructing the jury that if they found the value of the stolen property to be less than $100, they should find the defendant guilty of a misdemeanor.

    Holding

    Yes, because the officers’ observations of Brady’s suspicious behavior, combined with their prior knowledge of his activities at the hotel, were sufficient to establish probable cause for a reasonable officer to believe that a crime had been committed and that Brady had committed it.
    No, because Brady’s admission during trial that the value of the stolen jewelry exceeded $100 removed the issue of value from the case, making a charge on the misdemeanor offense unnecessary.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that the police officers had probable cause to arrest Brady based on the totality of the circumstances. The officers knew of recent burglaries at the hotel, and that Brady had previously been found on an upper floor with keys to multiple rooms. They observed him leaving the hotel and suspiciously examining small boxes. His subsequent denial of his identity further supported the probable cause. The court quoted Bell v. United States, stating that the officers observed the standard of what would be probable cause to “a reasonable, cautious and prudent peace officer.” Because the arrest was lawful, the search at the precinct station was a valid search incident to arrest.

    Regarding the failure to instruct on the misdemeanor offense, the court cited People v. Walker, noting that when a defendant admits a fact in open court, that fact is established, and no further evidence is needed. Brady’s admission that the jewelry’s value exceeded $100 removed the question of value from the jury’s consideration. The court also cited People v. Mussenden, stating that “the submission of a lesser degree or an included crime is justified only where there is some basis in the evidence for finding the accused innocent of the higher crime, and yet guilty of the lower one.” Since Brady admitted the value exceeded $100, there was no basis for finding him guilty of the misdemeanor but not the felony.