New York Law Review

Tag: Stipulation

  • White House Manor, Ltd. v. Benjamin, 11 N.Y.3d 392 (2008): Scope of Stipulations and Enforcement in Pending Actions

    White House Manor, Ltd. v. Benjamin, 11 N.Y.3d 392 (2008)

    A court’s power to enforce a stipulation in a pending action extends only to the terms of that stipulation; it cannot be used to resolve separate contract claims between the parties without a plenary action.

    Summary

    White House Manor sued the Levys for unjust enrichment related to property taxes. The Korean Presbyterian Church, a contract vendee of the Levys’ property, entered into a stipulation to settle the tax dispute. When a dispute arose between the Levys and the Church regarding the underlying purchase contract, the Levys sought to enforce the purchase contract within the existing unjust enrichment action. The Court of Appeals held that the lower court improperly used the stipulation to resolve the contract dispute, as the stipulation only pertained to the property tax issue, and the Levys needed to bring a separate action to litigate the contract claim. The court emphasized that stipulations cannot be used to circumvent standard procedural rules.

    Facts

    White House Manor owned land and sold a portion to Travis Levy, who mortgaged it. The mortgage was assigned to the Levys (Benjamin, Levy, and Levy). White House later defaulted, deeding the land back to the Levys. White House then sued the Levys for unjust enrichment, seeking a pro rata share of property taxes. The Levys contracted to sell their land to the Korean Presbyterian Church. The Church’s purchase contract contained contingencies regarding obtaining necessary government approvals for subdivision and site plans. The Church, the Levys, and White House entered into a stipulation to settle the unjust enrichment action, with the Church agreeing to pay the Levys’ share of the property taxes. Disputes arose between the Levys and the Church regarding the purchase contract.

    Procedural History

    White House moved to enforce the stipulation against the Levys and the Church. The Levys cross-moved for a declaration that the Church was in default of the purchase contract, the amendment, and the stipulation. Supreme Court granted the motion and cross-motion, declaring the Church in default and ordering various forms of relief. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a court can use a stipulation in a pending action to resolve a separate contract dispute between the parties, or whether a plenary action is required to litigate the contract claim.

    Holding

    No, because the court’s power to enforce a stipulation is limited to the terms of that stipulation. A separate plenary action, including service of process and an opportunity to answer, is required to resolve the underlying contract dispute.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on Teitelbaum Holdings v. Gold, which states that a trial court has supervisory control over pending actions, including the power to relieve parties from stipulations made during litigation. However, this power extends only to the enforcement of the stipulation itself. The Church expressly agreed to be a party to the stipulation regarding the property tax dispute. Therefore, the court could enforce the stipulation against the Church. However, the Supreme Court exceeded its authority by ordering remedies against the Church for breach of the purchase contract and its amendment, as those issues were not within the scope of the stipulation.

    The Court emphasized that the Levys needed to commence a plenary action to pursue their contract claims against the Church, following the standard procedural rules: “If the Levys desire to pursue a claim against the Church for breach of contract, they will have to commence a plenary action by filing a summons and complaint… after which the Church would have at least 20 days to answer… Then, after issue is joined, the Levys may move for summary judgment if they believe there are no material disputed issues of fact to be resolved.” The stipulation in the unjust enrichment action could not be used to bypass these procedural steps.

    The Court found that the Supreme Court’s judgment improperly declared the Church in default of the purchase contract without specifying when or how any default may have occurred. To the extent that the judgment directed the Church to pay the Levys’ pro rata share of property taxes after termination of the contract, it was erroneous. The Court remitted the case to Supreme Court to resolve any remaining differences between the Levys and the Church over the Church’s obligation to pay real estate taxes under the stipulation.

  • Haberman v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 8 N.Y.3d 269 (2007): Authority of Counsel to Extend Variance Time Limits

    Haberman v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 8 N.Y.3d 269 (2007)

    When a zoning board of appeals has voted to grant a variance, the board’s attorney, acting with actual or apparent authority, may agree to extend the time to build the improvements permitted by the variance without requiring a second board meeting and vote.

    Summary

    Sinclair Haberman obtained a variance from the Long Beach Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) to construct a residential complex. A subsequent dispute was resolved by a stipulation that required Haberman to obtain new variances with time limits for applying for building permits. Haberman paid the city $200,000 for public improvements, which the city failed to complete on time. Haberman agreed to extend the city’s deadline in exchange for tolling the time limits on his building permits. Years later, the ZBA revoked Haberman’s building permit, arguing the extension required a new ZBA vote. The Court of Appeals held that the ZBA’s attorney’s agreement to extend the time was binding, as the attorney had at least apparent authority and a new ZBA vote was not required.

    Facts

    Sinclair Haberman sought a variance to build a four-tower residential condominium complex. The ZBA granted the variance, but a dispute arose after one tower was built. A 1989 stipulation settled Haberman’s lawsuit against the City and ZBA, requiring him to apply for new variances subject to time limits for building permit applications. Haberman also agreed to pay $200,000 to the City for public improvements, including underground utility lines, to be completed by the City within two years. The City failed to meet the deadline, and Haberman agreed to extend the deadline, contingent upon tolling the time limits on his building permits.

    Procedural History

    Haberman applied for and received new variances in 1989. The City failed to meet the deadline for the utility lines. In 1992, Haberman agreed to extend the City’s deadline in exchange for tolling his time to apply for building permits, memorialized in a letter agreement signed by the City’s Corporation Counsel, representing the ZBA. In 2002, Haberman applied for a building permit, which the Building Department issued in 2003. The ZBA then revoked the permit, arguing Haberman missed the 1989 stipulation deadline and the extension was invalid. Haberman sued to annul the revocation. The Supreme Court annulled the ZBA’s action, but the Appellate Division reversed, finding the extension unenforceable. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the ZBA is bound by its attorney’s agreement to extend the time to apply for building permits, or whether such an extension requires a new vote by the ZBA.

    Holding

    No, the ZBA is bound by its attorney’s agreement, because the attorney had at least apparent authority to act on the ZBA’s behalf and a new ZBA vote was not required for the extension.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that the Corporation Counsel’s agreement to extend Haberman’s time to apply for building permits was binding on the ZBA. The Court reasoned that parties are generally bound by their attorneys’ agreements. While granting a variance requires ZBA action, extending the duration of a variance does not require the same formality. Citing Matter of New York Life Ins. Co. v Galvin, 35 NY2d 52, 59 (1974), the Court noted that an extension does not require a new application, public notice, or a hearing. The court found no basis to require a ZBA vote for an extension. The agreement was in writing, negotiated by counsel, and approved by the court. The City received a benefit (extension of time for utility work) in exchange for the extension granted to Haberman. The Corporation Counsel, as the ZBA’s attorney, had at least apparent authority. The Court emphasized the unfairness of invalidating the agreement years later due to a procedural requirement not mandated by statute or precedent. The court stated, “It would be unfair to hold, many years after the event, that the lawyer’s agreement was a nullity because the parties did not follow a procedure that no statute and no precedent required.”

  • People v. Hill, 89 N.Y.2d 986 (1997): Admissibility of Prior Convictions When Defendant’s Stipulation is Unclear

    People v. Hill, 89 N.Y.2d 986 (1997)

    When a defendant’s offer to stipulate to an element of a crime is unclear or not definitively offered, the trial court does not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence related to that element.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of drug-related crimes, including criminal possession of a controlled substance. The prosecution introduced evidence of the defendant’s prior drug convictions to prove his knowledge of the weight of the cocaine, an element of the crime at the time. The defendant argued that he had offered to concede his knowledge of the weight, making the prior convictions inadmissible. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that because the defendant’s offer to stipulate to the element of knowledge was not clear or definite, the trial court did not err in admitting the prior convictions as evidence. The court declined to address broader questions about the impact of stipulations on the presentation of evidence.

    Facts

    Defendant was arrested in May 1995 and subsequently convicted of three drug-related crimes, including one count of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree. The charge was based on the defendant possessing slightly more than one-eighth ounce of cocaine, a threshold amount under Penal Law § 220.09 [1]. At trial, the prosecution introduced certificates of the defendant’s three prior cocaine-related convictions. The prosecution’s stated purpose for introducing these certificates was to establish the defendant’s knowledge of the weight of the cocaine he possessed.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted after a jury trial. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of his prior convictions. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, citing People v. Hills, 140 A.D.2d 71, 79, for the proposition that every element of a crime must be submitted to the jury, even if the defendant stipulates to it. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, but on different grounds, sidestepping the broader issue of stipulations.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of the defendant’s prior drug convictions when the defendant claimed to have offered to concede his knowledge of the weight of the cocaine, an element of the charged crime.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s trial counsel never effectively conceded the issue of the defendant’s knowledge of the weight of the cocaine or definitively offered to stipulate to that element of the crime charged. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the People to offer the defendant’s prior drug sale convictions as evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals avoided addressing the broader legal question of whether a defendant’s stipulation to an element of a crime necessarily precludes the prosecution from introducing evidence to prove that element. Instead, the court focused on the specific facts of the case, finding that the defendant’s offer to stipulate was not clear or definite. Because the defendant’s concession was ambiguous, the trial court was within its discretion to allow the prosecution to present evidence of the defendant’s prior convictions to prove his knowledge of the cocaine’s weight. The court explicitly stated, “We cannot and do not pass on the correctness of that conclusion in this case, however, because defendant’s trial counsel, in fact, never effectively conceded the issue of defendant’s knowledge of the weight of the cocaine or definitively offered to stipulate as to that element of the crime charged.” The court emphasized the lack of a clear stipulation as the basis for its decision, rather than endorsing a blanket rule permitting the introduction of evidence even when an element is conceded. The court’s decision highlights the importance of clear and unambiguous stipulations in criminal trials. The Court declined to take a position on the correctness of People v. Hills. There were no dissenting or concurring opinions. Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Bellacosa, Smith, Ciparick, Wesley and Rosenblatt concurred.

  • Whitfield v. City of New York, 90 N.Y.2d 777 (1997): Finality of Conditional Orders for Appeal

    Whitfield v. City of New York, 90 N.Y.2d 777 (1997)

    An Appellate Division order reversing a judgment and directing a new trial unless a party stipulates to a different damages award is not final and appealable until the stipulation and any required amended judgment are entered, adhering strictly to the language of the order.

    Summary

    This case clarifies when a conditional order from the Appellate Division is considered a final, appealable order. The New York Court of Appeals held that the finality of such an order depends on its specific language. If the order requires only a stipulation to amended damages, the stipulation is the final paper. If it mandates a stipulation followed by an amended judgment, the judgment is the final paper. If the order states that the amended judgment entered on the stipulation is affirmed, the Appellate Division order is final upon entry of the amended judgment. Because, in this case, the amended judgment had not yet been entered, the motion for leave to appeal was dismissed for non-finality.

    Facts

    Gary Whitfield sued the City of New York for negligence due to injuries sustained in a fire in a city-owned building. The jury awarded Whitfield $10,351,000, which the trial court reduced to $7,402,000. The City appealed this judgment.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s judgment and ordered a new trial on damages unless Whitfield stipulated to reduce the awards for past and future pain and suffering. The order stated that if Whitfield stipulated and an amended judgment was entered, the amended judgment would be affirmed. Whitfield stipulated to the reduced damages. The City then sought leave to appeal from the Appellate Division order before an amended judgment was entered.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an Appellate Division order reversing a judgment and directing a new trial unless the plaintiff stipulates to reduced damages and the entry of an amended judgment is a final, appealable order before the amended judgment is entered.

    Holding

    No, because the Appellate Division order explicitly contemplated further action (the entry of an amended judgment) before the outcome of the appeal was known and before the order could have any effect. The court held that because the amended judgment had not been entered, no final paper existed, and the motion for leave to appeal was premature.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the importance of adhering to the specific language of the Appellate Division order to determine finality. The court distinguished between orders that require only a stipulation, those that require a stipulation and an amended judgment, and those that explicitly affirm the amended judgment upon entry. In this case, the Appellate Division order specifically stated that the amended judgment would be affirmed if the plaintiff stipulated, indicating that the appeal was being held in abeyance until the amended judgment was entered. The court stated, “[I]f the order provides only for the execution of a stipulation, the stipulation is the final paper. If the Appellate Division order dictates a stipulation followed by an amended judgment, the judgment is the final paper. Where the Appellate Division order directs the entry of an amended judgment and specifies that, in that event, the amended judgment is affirmed, the Appellate Division order will be viewed as the final paper once the amended judgment is entered.” Because the amended judgment was not yet entered, the Appellate Division order was not yet a final determination. The Court also noted that only the non-stipulating party may appeal. The party who stipulates to the reduction or enhancement of the damages award cannot appeal or seek leave to appeal inasmuch as that party is not aggrieved.

  • Shapiro v. McNeill, 92 A.D.2d 1092 (1983): Requirements for a Binding Stipulation

    Shapiro v. McNeill, 92 A.D.2d 1092 (1983)

    A stipulation in an action is not binding unless it is made in open court, contained in a writing subscribed by the party or his attorney, or reduced to the form of an order and entered.

    Summary

    This case addresses the requirements for a valid and binding stipulation between parties in a legal action. Plaintiff’s attorney sent defendant’s attorney a stipulation to extend the time to answer or move to dismiss. Plaintiff’s attorney modified the stipulation by striking the motion to dismiss clause and adding a clause admitting service and jurisdiction, and then returned the stipulation. Defendant then filed an answer including a defense that the court lacked personal jurisdiction. The New York Court of Appeals held that because the defendant did not sign the modified stipulation, it was not binding under CPLR 2104. Therefore, the defendant was not barred from including the jurisdictional defense in the answer.

    Facts

    Defendant’s attorney sent a proposed stipulation to Plaintiff’s attorney, seeking an extension of time for Defendant to file an answer or move to dismiss the complaint.

    Plaintiff’s attorney modified the stipulation by:

    (1) Striking out the provision allowing Defendant to make a motion to dismiss, and

    (2) Adding a provision stating Defendant admitted the propriety of service and jurisdiction.

    Plaintiff’s attorney then signed and returned the modified stipulation.

    Defendant’s attorney filed an answer asserting lack of personal jurisdiction as an affirmative defense.

    Procedural History

    The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint based on lack of personal jurisdiction. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant, by relying on the beneficial terms of the proposed stipulation (extending time to answer), waived the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction, or should be estopped from asserting that defense, even though the stipulation was modified by the plaintiff and not signed by the defendant.

    Holding

    No, because the purported agreement did not amount to a valid stipulation since the defendant did not sign it as modified. Therefore, the defendant was not barred from including the jurisdictional defense in the answer.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on CPLR 2104, which dictates the requirements for a binding stipulation. CPLR 2104 states that a stipulation is only binding if it is: (1) made in open court between counsel, (2) contained in a writing subscribed by the party or his attorney, or (3) reduced to the form of an order and entered. Because the defendant did not sign the stipulation as modified by the plaintiff, the court found the stipulation not binding. The Court stated, “We conclude that the purported agreement did not amount to a valid stipulation upon which plaintiff could rely to preclude defendant’s assertion of the lack of jurisdiction or extend his time to answer. A stipulation concerning any matter in an action is not binding unless it is made in open court between counsel, contained in a writing subscribed by the party or his attorney, or reduced to the form of an order and entered (CPLR 2104). The claimed stipulation is not binding upon defendant, because he did not sign it as modified. Accordingly, there was no bar to inclusion of the jurisdictional defense in the answer.” The court also noted that although the defendant’s answer was untimely, the plaintiff never moved for a default judgment on that basis, meaning the plaintiff waived the untimeliness argument.

  • Mitchell v. New York Hospital, 61 N.Y.2d 212 (1984): Enforceability of Stipulations Waiving Statutory Rights

    Mitchell v. New York Hospital, 61 N.Y.2d 212 (1984)

    Parties to a civil dispute can stipulate away statutory rights, including the protection against contribution claims provided by General Obligations Law § 15-108(c), if the stipulation is made knowingly, openly, and does not offend public policy.

    Summary

    In a personal injury lawsuit, New York Hospital settled with the plaintiff and sought contribution from third-party defendants, despite General Obligations Law § 15-108(c) generally prohibiting such claims by settling tortfeasors. All parties had stipulated to allow the hospital to pursue these claims. The New York Court of Appeals held that the stipulation was enforceable, allowing the hospital to seek contribution. The court reasoned that parties can waive statutory rights through stipulations, and that enforcing this particular agreement fostered the public policy goals of encouraging settlement and ensuring equitable sharing of liability among tortfeasors. The court modified the Appellate Division’s order, reinstating the contribution claims against some of the third-party defendants.

    Facts

    Michael Mitchell, a steamfitter employed by Wolf & Munier, Inc. (W & M), was injured while working at New York Hospital. He was scalded by steam or hot water from a ruptured pipe during renovation work. Mitchell sued the Hospital, alleging failure to provide a safe workplace. The Hospital then initiated a third-party action against W & M, Syska & Hennessy, Inc. (S & H), Utilex Demolition, Inc. (Utilex), and Regal Insulation Corp. for contribution and indemnification.

    Procedural History

    The parties informed the trial court that they had reached a settlement, stipulating that the Hospital would settle with the plaintiff and then pursue its third-party claims for contribution or indemnification. The third-party defendants later moved to dismiss the Hospital’s third-party complaint, arguing that General Obligations Law § 15-108(c) barred the contribution claim. The trial court denied the motion, holding that the third-party defendants had waived the statute’s protection. The Appellate Division reversed regarding contribution, holding the statutory right could not be waived. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal after dismissing an earlier appeal as nonfinal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether subdivision (c) of section 15-108 of the General Obligations Law, which prohibits a settling tort-feasor from obtaining contribution from another person, can be waived by agreement of all parties to the litigation.

    Holding

    Yes, because parties to a civil dispute can stipulate away statutory rights unless public policy is affronted, and enforcing this stipulation furthers the policy goals of encouraging settlements and ensuring equitable sharing of liability among tortfeasors. The statute was not intended to be nonwaivable.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the long-standing judicial preference for stipulations as a means of resolving disputes efficiently. The court stated that parties are generally free to chart their own litigation course and can even stipulate away statutory and constitutional rights, as long as public policy is not violated. Here, the court found that the stipulation did not offend public policy; rather, it promoted the fair compensation of the injured party and facilitated the equitable sharing of liability among the tortfeasors.

    The court analyzed the legislative history of General Obligations Law § 15-108, noting that it was enacted to balance the competing policies of encouraging settlement and ensuring equitable apportionment of liability. While subdivision (c) generally prohibits settling tortfeasors from seeking contribution, the court found no indication that the Legislature intended this protection to be nonwaivable. The court reasoned that enforcing the stipulation would remove a barrier to settlement and allow for a more equitable distribution of liability.

    The court distinguished prior cases, such as Lettiere v. Martin Elevator Co., where the nonsettling tortfeasor was not a party to the stipulation. The court also clarified that Rock v. Reed-Prentice and McDermott v. City of New York were not applicable because they involved different factual scenarios. Finally, the court upheld the principle that a plaintiff can advance inconsistent theories of recovery, such as contribution and contractual indemnity.

    The court emphasized the importance of enforcing stipulations that are “freely, knowingly and openly agreed to by all of the named parties.” By allowing the Hospital to pursue contribution claims, the stipulation removed a barrier to settlement and promoted the equitable sharing of liability.

  • Matter of Grutman v. New York City Conciliation and Appeals Board, 60 N.Y.2d 836 (1983): Enforceability of Stipulations in Landlord-Tenant Disputes

    Matter of Grutman v. New York City Conciliation and Appeals Board, 60 N.Y.2d 836 (1983)

    A stipulation entered into by parties represented by counsel, even in the context of rent control, is binding and enforceable absent a showing of fraud, collusion, mistake, accident, or other similar grounds, and the proper forum for challenging such a stipulation is the court that issued the order.

    Summary

    This case addresses the enforceability of stipulations in landlord-tenant disputes, particularly concerning rent-controlled apartments. The tenant, Grutman, challenged a 1979 order decontrolling his apartment, alleging fraud. While this challenge was pending, Grutman, represented by counsel, entered into a stipulation with the landlord to withdraw his answer in a dispossess action and surrender possession. The court “So Ordered” the stipulation. Subsequently, Grutman sought to annul the decontrol order. The Court of Appeals held that the stipulation was binding because Grutman was aware of the alleged fraud when he signed it and failed to demonstrate sufficient grounds (fraud, collusion, mistake, etc.) to set it aside. The proper venue to challenge the stipulation was the Civil Court that issued the order.

    Facts

    1. In 1979, the Office of Rent Control ordered Grutman’s apartment decontrolled, and no appeal was taken.
    2. In 1982, Grutman challenged the 1979 decontrol order, alleging it was procured by fraud.
    3. The district rent director dismissed Grutman’s challenge.
    4. While Grutman’s administrative appeal was pending, the landlord initiated a dispossess action in Civil Court.
    5. Grutman, represented by counsel, stipulated to withdraw his answer with prejudice and surrender possession; the court “So Ordered” the stipulation.
    6. The deputy commissioner affirmed the district rent director’s order.
    7. Grutman then brought an Article 78 proceeding to annul the decontrol of his apartment.

    Procedural History

    1. The district rent director dismissed Grutman’s challenge to the 1979 decontrol order.
    2. The deputy commissioner affirmed the district rent director’s order.
    3. Grutman initiated an Article 78 proceeding seeking annulment of the decontrol of his apartment.
    4. The Appellate Division’s order was appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a stipulation entered into by a tenant, represented by counsel, to surrender possession of a rent-controlled apartment is binding when the tenant was aware of alleged fraud related to the apartment’s decontrol before signing the stipulation.
    2. Whether an Article 78 proceeding is the proper vehicle to challenge a stipulation “So Ordered” by a Civil Court.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because no showing was made of fraud, collusion, mistake, accident, or other such ground to set aside the stipulation, and the tenant was aware of the alleged fraud before signing the stipulation.
    2. No, because the appropriate vehicle to challenge the stipulation is an application to the Civil Court seeking relief from its order.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that stipulations are binding agreements and can only be set aside for specific reasons like fraud, collusion, or mistake. Since Grutman was aware of the alleged fraud when he entered into the stipulation, and no other valid grounds for setting aside the stipulation were demonstrated, the stipulation was enforceable. The court emphasized that the proper forum for challenging a court-ordered stipulation is the court that issued the order (here, the Civil Court), not an Article 78 proceeding. The court cited Matter of Frutiger, 29 NY2d 143, 150, for the principle that a stipulation may be set aside because of fraud, collusion, mistake, accident or other such ground. The court also cited Siegel, NY Practice, p 242, regarding the appropriate vehicle for seeking relief from a court order. The court distinguished the case from situations where tenants waive the benefit of the rent law, noting that the stipulation was an agreement to surrender possession and resolve incidental differences, which is permissible. As the court noted, “Petitioner was aware of the alleged fraud before he signed the stipulation, that being the basis for his challenge to the 1979 order of decontrol.” Given the binding nature of the stipulation surrendering possession, the court found it unnecessary to address the request for a remand to determine issues of fraud. This highlights the strong policy favoring the enforcement of stipulations, especially when parties are represented by counsel.

  • In re Estate of Frutiger, 29 N.Y.2d 143 (1971): Setting Aside Waiver of Citation and Consent to Probate

    29 N.Y.2d 143 (1971)

    A consent to probate, made following or simultaneously with an appearance in the proceeding, is essentially a stipulation and should be treated accordingly, allowing withdrawal for good cause such as fraud, collusion, mistake, accident, or some other ground of the same nature, provided the parties can be placed in statu quo.

    Summary

    The Frutiger case addresses the circumstances under which a waiver of citation and consent to probate can be set aside, allowing objections to a will. Two brothers, the decedent’s only distributees, signed waivers and consents at the request of the executor’s representatives shortly after the funeral. The brothers later sought to object to the will. The Surrogate initially allowed them to withdraw their consent, but the Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals determined that the consent was essentially a stipulation that could be withdrawn for good cause, provided the parties could be returned to their original positions. The case was remanded to the Surrogate’s Court to consider whether the brothers had demonstrated sufficient cause to withdraw their consent.

    Facts

    Following Walter Frutiger’s funeral, his brothers, Ernest and Willard, met with representatives of the Endicott Trust Company (the executor) and its attorneys. The will and codicils were read, and the brothers were asked to sign waivers of citation and consents to probate. The purpose was allegedly to expedite payment of the decedent’s bills. The brothers were given copies of the will and codicils but not of the waivers. Shortly after, the brothers sought legal advice regarding the validity of the will. The will reduced the brothers’ share of the residuary estate compared to an earlier version.

    Procedural History

    The probate petition was filed approximately 32 months after the waivers were signed. A citation was served on the brothers, which was inconsistent with having valid waivers. The brothers filed objections. The waivers were only filed after objections were made, some 45 months after signing. The Surrogate’s Court initially allowed the brothers to withdraw their consent, finding that the proponent’s conduct implied the waivers were withdrawn. The Appellate Division reversed, finding no such agreement to withdraw the waivers. The case was appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Surrogate’s Court properly set aside the appellants’ waivers of citation and consents to the probate of the will and codicils, thus permitting them to pursue objections to probate.

    Holding

    No, not definitively; because the consent to probate is essentially a stipulation, the Surrogate’s Court has the power to relieve a party from its terms for good cause, provided the parties can be placed in statu quo. The case was remitted to the Surrogate’s Court to determine if sufficient cause existed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the consent to probate, made in conjunction with an appearance in the proceeding, is akin to a stipulation. As such, it is subject to the court’s control and can be withdrawn under certain circumstances. The Court stated, “The court has control over stipulations and power to relieve from the terms thereof when the parties can be placed in statu quo. But the stipulation will not be destroyed without a showing of good cause therefor, such as fraud, collusion, mistake, accident, or some other ground of the same nature.” The court emphasized that the proponent had not changed its position based on the waivers, preserving the status quo. Furthermore, the proponent’s delay in disclosing the waivers contributed to any potential prejudice. The Court cited Foote v. Adams, 232 App. Div. 60, 63 stating, “It is sufficient if it appears that either party has inadvertently, unadvisably or improvidently entered into an agreement which will take the case out of the due and ordinary course of proceeding in the action, and in so doing may work to his prejudice.”. However, the Court noted the brothers needed to demonstrate a reasonable probability of success in their objections. The dissenting opinion argued that the brothers had not met their burden of proving fraud or misrepresentation in procuring the waivers and that the waivers should be enforced. The dissent emphasized the importance of waivers in the efficient administration of estates.

  • Matter of Weekes v. O’Connell, 11 N.Y.2d 220 (1962): Stipulations and the Extent of Liquor Authority Jurisdiction

    Matter of Weekes v. O’Connell, 11 N.Y.2d 220 (1962)

    A licensee can waive the statutory limitations on the State Liquor Authority’s power to revoke or suspend a license for violations occurring outside the immediately preceding license period by entering into a stipulation permitting the Authority to consider such violations.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the State Liquor Authority’s (SLA) jurisdiction, specifically its ability to revoke or suspend a liquor license for past violations, can be extended by stipulation. The petitioners, tavern operators, agreed to stipulations allowing the SLA to investigate violations from a prior license period when renewing their licenses. The Court of Appeals held that licensees can waive the statutory limitations on the SLA’s power through such stipulations, especially when the stipulations benefit the licensee by allowing them to continue operating while the investigation is pending. The court reversed the lower court’s decision, confirming the SLA’s determinations.

    Facts

    Two tavern operators, Weekes and an unnamed operator in Johnson City, New York, held liquor licenses. The SLA suspected violations during the summer of 1959. Upon renewal of their licenses for 1960-61, the SLA proposed stipulations allowing them to institute revocation or suspension proceedings for violations from the 1958-59 license year. Both operators agreed to these stipulations. At a hearing in December 1960, both admitted to selling liquor to minors in the summer of 1959 but argued Section 118 of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law (ABC Law) barred license revocation or suspension for those violations. The SLA suspended their licenses, leading to these proceedings.

    Procedural History

    The Special Term initially ruled the stipulations were improperly pleaded and that Section 118 of the ABC Law prohibited the SLA from suspending licenses for actions predating the immediately preceding license period. It then annulled the suspension orders. The Appellate Division affirmed the Special Term’s order but disagreed regarding the stipulations. The Appellate Division held that while the stipulations were not formally introduced as evidence, they were part of the licenses and thus before the Authority. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Section 118 of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law constitutes a limitation on the jurisdiction of the Authority which can be waived by stipulation.

    Holding

    Yes, because the statutory limitation on the State Liquor Authority’s power to revoke or suspend a license can be waived by the licensee through a stipulation, especially when the stipulation allows the licensee to continue operating under a renewed license while the investigation of alleged violations is ongoing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while Section 118 of the ABC Law limits the SLA’s power to revoke or suspend licenses for violations occurring only in the “license period immediately preceding,” this limitation can be waived. The court distinguished Matter of Colonial Liq. Distrs. v. O’Connell, 295 N.Y. 129, noting that the 1945 amendment to Section 118 added the “immediately preceding” clause. The court interpreted this amendment as a statute of limitations on the Authority’s power. However, the court emphasized that the stipulations benefited the petitioners by allowing them to continue operating their businesses pending investigation. Citing Matter of Maksik v. O’Connell, 301 N.Y. 541, the Court confirmed that the Authority’s power to use such stipulations had been previously approved. The court concluded that the petitioners, having agreed to the stipulations, could not then challenge the SLA’s jurisdiction based on the statute. The Court reasoned that “the power of the Authority to procure and act upon stipulations of the character in question is not an open issue”.