New York Law Review

Tag: Statutory Presumption

  • People v. Galindo, 22 N.Y.3d 716 (2014): Applying the Statutory Presumption of Unlawful Intent in Firearm Possession

    People v. Galindo, 22 N.Y.3d 716 (2014)

    Possession of a weapon creates a permissive statutory presumption of intent to use it unlawfully, which the jury may accept or reject based on the totality of the evidence.

    Summary

    Oliverio Galindo was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon after shooting his cousin. The prosecution relied on Penal Law § 265.15(4), which states that possession of a weapon is presumptive evidence of intent to use it unlawfully. Galindo argued that the evidence was insufficient because he claimed the shooting was accidental. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the statutory presumption allowed the jury to infer unlawful intent from the possession of the loaded firearm, and the jury was entitled to weigh all the competing inferences in deciding whether to accept or reject the presumption, even if the defendant presented evidence suggesting the shooting was accidental.

    Facts

    Oliverio Galindo shot his cousin, Augustine Castaneda, in the leg. Both worked at Broome Street Bar. Galindo accompanied Castaneda to the hospital. Galindo initially told his manager, Luis Flores, that they were mugged, but later admitted he accidentally shot Castaneda while “showing the gun.” Galindo disposed of the gun near the hospital. While in prison, Galindo urged an unidentified woman to tell Castaneda not to testify in court.

    Procedural History

    Galindo was indicted on two counts of second-degree criminal possession of a weapon. The trial court denied Galindo’s motions to dismiss. The jury convicted Galindo on both counts. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding sufficient evidence of intent based on the statutory presumption. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the statutory presumption of unlawful intent arising from possession of a weapon, under Penal Law § 265.15(4), is sufficient to support a conviction for criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, even when the defendant claims the weapon was discharged accidentally?

    Holding

    Yes, because the statutory presumption allows the jury to infer unlawful intent from the possession of the weapon, and the jury is entitled to weigh all the competing inferences in deciding whether to accept or reject the presumption.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that a statutory presumption is a permissible evidentiary device that allows the jury to infer a particular fact from established facts. Penal Law § 265.15(4) creates a permissive presumption, meaning the jury is not required to accept the presumed fact (unlawful intent) but may do so. The prosecution must first prove the predicate fact (possession of the weapon) beyond a reasonable doubt. Once this is done, the presumption becomes part of the prosecution’s prima facie case. The defendant can rebut the presumption with contrary proof, but the jury ultimately decides whether to accept or reject the presumption.

    The court emphasized that the People weren’t required to prove intent to use the gun unlawfully against Castaneda specifically, but rather against “another” person. The court found that Galindo’s actions after the shooting, such as disposing of the gun and lying about the incident, supported the inference of unlawful intent. The Court stated: “[T]hat is exactly what the legislature intended Penal Law § 265.15 (4) to permit a jury to do: find that a defendant intended to use a weapon unlawfully merely because he or she possessed that weapon.”

    The dissent argued that Galindo’s admission of an accidental shooting negated any inference of unlawful intent, and there wasn’t sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding. The majority rejected this argument, noting that the jury was entitled to weigh the competing inferences and that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the People, supported the conviction.

  • People v. Andrews, 78 N.Y.2d 88 (1991): Limits of Automatic Standing in Possessory Crimes

    People v. Andrews, 78 N.Y.2d 88 (1991)

    Automatic standing to challenge a search and seizure is limited to cases where the criminal possessory charge is rooted solely in a statutory presumption attributing possession to the defendant; it does not extend to charges based on ordinary constructive possession.

    Summary

    Defendant Andrews was convicted of drug and weapons charges. He sought to suppress evidence, arguing he had standing. The Court of Appeals held that automatic standing only applies when the possessory charge is *solely* based on a statutory presumption. Since the weapon and paraphernalia charges were based on constructive possession, not solely on a statutory presumption, Andrews had to demonstrate a personal expectation of privacy in the searched premises, which he failed to do. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, limiting the application of automatic standing.

    Facts

    Police searched an apartment and found controlled substances, a weapon, and drug paraphernalia. Andrews was charged with criminal possession of a controlled substance, criminal possession of a weapon, and criminally using drug paraphernalia. The drug charge was based on Penal Law §220.25 (2), a statutory presumption. The other charges were based on constructive possession. Andrews did not reside at the apartment.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially denied Andrews’ motion to suppress for lack of standing. The Appellate Division held the appeal in abeyance and remitted for a hearing on the suppression motion. On remittal, the Supreme Court held Andrews had automatic standing to challenge the drug charge but needed to demonstrate a personal expectation of privacy for the other charges. The Appellate Division modified the judgment, reversing the drug conviction but affirming the others. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to consider the standing issue for the weapon and drug paraphernalia charges.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant should be accorded automatic standing to challenge the search and seizure of the weapon and drug paraphernalia, where one charge (drug possession) was rooted in a statutory presumption, but the other charges were based on ordinary constructive possession.

    Holding

    No, because automatic standing is a narrow exception limited to cases where the criminal possessory charge is rooted *solely* in a statutory presumption attributing possession to the defendant. Since the charges related to the weapon and paraphernalia were based on ordinary constructive possession, the defendant was required to demonstrate a personal expectation of privacy in the searched premises.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the distinction between statutory presumption-based possession and ordinary constructive possession. Citing People v. Wesley, the Court stated that when a charge is based on ordinary constructive possession, standing is available only if the defendant demonstrates a “personal legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched premises.” The Court refused to extend the automatic standing exception established in People v. Millan, which applies when possession is attributed solely through a statutory presumption, to cases involving constructive possession based on other evidence. The Court reasoned that expanding automatic standing would undermine the general rule requiring a personal expectation of privacy. The Court quoted People v. Ponder, stating that a defendant must ” ‘establish, that he himself was the victim of an invasion of privacy’ ” to challenge a search. The court emphasized that the “unfairness… perceived in Millan is not present in cases where a defendant is charged with constructive possession on the basis of evidence other than the statutory presumption”.

  • People v. Millan, 69 N.Y.2d 514 (1987): Standing to Challenge Search Based on Statutory Presumption

    People v. Millan, 69 N.Y.2d 514 (1987)

    When the prosecution’s case for criminal possession of a weapon relies solely on the statutory presumption of possession arising from the defendant’s presence in a vehicle where the weapon was found, the defendant has standing to challenge the legality of both the stop of the vehicle and the search that uncovered the weapon.

    Summary

    Millan was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon based solely on the statutory presumption arising from his presence in a taxi where a gun was found. He moved to suppress the weapon, arguing the stop and search were illegal. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing, finding Millan lacked standing. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that when the prosecution’s case hinges on the statutory presumption, the defendant has standing to challenge the legality of the stop and search. Denying the defendant this right would violate fundamental fairness.

    Facts

    Millan and two companions were passengers in a taxi. Plainclothes officers in an unmarked taxi directed Millan’s taxi to pull over. The officers ordered the occupants out and searched them and the taxi’s passenger compartment without consent. A gun was found in a black leather bag on the back seat. The prosecutor stated the police stopped the cab because the occupants made “suspicious moves”. Millan was charged with criminal possession of a weapon based on Penal Law § 265.15(3), which presumes possession by all occupants of a vehicle where a firearm is found.

    Procedural History

    Millan moved to suppress the weapon, arguing the stop and search were illegal. The suppression court denied the motion without a hearing. Millan was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a defendant, charged with criminal possession of a weapon based solely on the statutory presumption arising from their presence in a vehicle where the weapon was found, has standing to challenge the legality of the search of the vehicle.

    2. Whether a passenger in a vehicle has standing to challenge the legality of the stop of that vehicle.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the People cannot rely on the statutory presumption to establish constructive possession and simultaneously deny the defendant the right to challenge the search that yielded the evidence supporting that presumption.

    2. Yes, because a passenger has a right to be free from unreasonable seizures, and an unlawful stop constitutes such a seizure.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the People’s reliance solely on the statutory presumption to establish Millan’s guilt of constructive possession gave him standing to challenge the search. Citing People v. Mosley, the court stated that when the prosecution relies on the discovery of evidence to establish constructive possession, the defendant has standing to contest the legality of the search that produced that evidence. The court distinguished People v. Ponder, which eliminated “automatic standing,” because Millan’s claim was not based on a right to possess the gun or on the mere accusation of a possessory crime, but on the circumstances giving rise to the presumption.

    The court emphasized the unfairness of allowing the government to use the legal fiction of constructive possession to prosecute passengers while denying them the right to challenge the search. It stated that such a rule offends fundamental tenets of fairness inherent in New York criminal jurisprudence.

    The court further held that Millan had standing to challenge the stop of the taxi, regardless of the legality of the search. An illegal stop constitutes an unlawful seizure, and a passenger has a right to be free from such seizures. The court found that the stop, search, and discovery of the gun were part of a continuous chain of events, and there was no evidence that the taint of the allegedly improper stop had been attenuated. Quoting Wong Sun v. United States, the court stated that the gun was “‘come at by exploitation of that illegality’” and should be suppressed if the stop was unlawful.

    The court concluded that the moving papers were sufficient to warrant a hearing, and any objection to their sufficiency was waived by the suppression court. The court modified the order of the Appellate Division and remitted the case for a suppression hearing.

  • People v. Rosano, 50 N.Y.2d 1004 (1980): Statutory Presumptions and Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases

    People v. Rosano, 50 N.Y.2d 1004 (1980)

    A statutory presumption in a criminal case does not relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, provided there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact presumed, and the presumption does not relate to criminal intent.

    Summary

    Defendants were convicted of violating Lien Law § 79-a, which addresses the misuse of trust funds in construction projects, and Penal Law § 210.35 for making false statements. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order upholding the convictions. The court held that the statutory presumption in Lien Law § 79-a(3), which states that failure to keep required books is presumptive evidence of misapplication of trust funds, does not violate constitutional principles. The court clarified that the presumption is a permissible inference and does not shift the burden of proof to the defendants or relieve the prosecution of its duty to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Facts

    The defendants were involved in a construction project and were accused of misusing trust funds. They were also charged with making false statements in affidavits submitted to a lending institution. A key piece of evidence was their failure to maintain the books and records required by Lien Law § 75. The prosecution argued that this failure triggered the presumption in Lien Law § 79-a(3), indicating that the trust funds were used for unauthorized purposes.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were convicted at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the statutory presumption in Lien Law § 79-a(3) unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proof to the defendant in a criminal case.

    2. Whether the People demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that the affidavits submitted to the lending institution constituted a falsity.

    Holding

    1. No, because the statutory presumption is a permissible inference, does not relate to criminal intent, and there is a rational basis between the failure to keep records and the application of trust funds for a non-trust purpose. It does not relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

    2. No, because the People failed to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the affidavits submitted to the lending institution constituted a falsity.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the presumption in Lien Law § 79-a(3) does not violate constitutional principles because it is merely a permissible inference, not a mandatory presumption that shifts the burden of proof to the defendant. The court emphasized that the prosecution still had the duty to prove the defendants’ guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court relied on People v. Farina, 290 N.Y. 272 and Ulster County Ct. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 in its analysis.

    The court stated, “It is readily apparent that both courts below, and quite correctly, treated this statutory presumption as only a permissible inference that defendants, by failing to keep statutorily prescribed records, used trust funds for other than authorized trust purposes.” The court also noted that “the presumption does not relate to criminal intent.” The court found a “rational basis between the fact proved (failure to keep records) and the fact presumed (applying trust funds for a nontrust purpose).”

    Regarding the charge of making false statements, the court expressed no opinion on whether intent to utter or publish the statement as true is necessary for a conviction under Penal Law § 210.35 but concluded that the People failed to prove the affidavits were false beyond a reasonable doubt. The court referenced People v Chesler, 50 NY2d 203. The court affirmed the Appellate Division’s ruling primarily for the reasons stated in the Appellate Division opinion by Justice Lazer.

  • New v. New, 417 N.E.2d 1257 (N.Y. 1980): Establishing Intent Behind Asset Transfers Before Applying for Public Assistance

    New v. New, 417 N.E.2d 1257 (N.Y. 1980)

    When determining eligibility for public assistance, transfers of assets made close to the time of application are presumed to be for the purpose of qualifying for assistance, but this presumption can be rebutted by evidence showing the transfer was for another legitimate purpose.

    Summary

    This case concerns the denial of public assistance to Mary New based on asset transfers to her son, Gunther, shortly before applying for assistance. Gunther claimed the money was always his, held in his mother’s name for protection. The court held that while the commissioner could have found the money was Gunther’s and not transferred to qualify for assistance, the timing of the transfer triggered a statutory presumption that it was for that purpose. The court found substantial evidence supported the commissioner’s decision to deny assistance, given the account forms, commingled funds, and lack of proof regarding Mrs. New’s living expenses.

    Facts

    Mary New applied for public assistance. Prior to her application, she transferred funds to her son, Gunther. Some of the funds deposited were hers, some accounts were in her name in trust for Gunther, and some were in their joint names. Gunther claimed all the money was his and he controlled the bank books. He stated his mother’s name was on the accounts to protect her if he died or became incapacitated. All accounts were transferred to Gunther’s name alone within two months of the application for assistance. Mary New had received reparations and Social Security payments in her own right over the years, and her funds and those of her son were commingled.

    Procedural History

    The Commissioner denied Mary New’s application for public assistance. The lower court reversed the Commissioner’s decision. The Appellate Division reversed the lower court, confirming the Commissioner’s determination. The New York Court of Appeals granted further review.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Commissioner’s determination to deny public assistance was supported by substantial evidence, considering the statutory presumption regarding asset transfers made shortly before applying for assistance.

    Holding

    Yes, because the transfer of accounts to Gunther’s name alone was made within two months of the application, triggering the statutory presumption that the transfer was to qualify for assistance. Furthermore, the form of the accounts, the commingling of funds, and the absence of proof regarding Mrs. New’s living expenses provided substantial evidence supporting the Commissioner’s determination.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied the statutory presumption that transfers made within two months of applying for assistance are presumed to be for the purpose of qualifying for such assistance. While the commissioner could have found that the money, or most of it, was in fact Gunther’s and that it was not transferred for the purpose of qualifying for assistance, the timing of the transfer triggered the statutory presumption. The court reasoned that the form of the accounts (some in trust, some joint), the fact that Mrs. New received her own reparations and Social Security payments, the commingling of funds, and the lack of documentation regarding Mrs. New’s living expenses all supported the Commissioner’s decision. The court emphasized that the Commissioner was not required to accept the petitioner’s account and was not denied any procedural right. The court held that the Appellate Division did not err in confirming the Commissioner’s determination because it was supported by substantial evidence.

  • People v. Lemmons, 40 N.Y.2d 505 (1976): Exception to Firearm Possession Presumption in Automobiles

    People v. Lemmons, 40 N.Y.2d 505 (1976)

    When a firearm is found in a woman’s handbag within her immediate reach inside a vehicle, and she admits ownership of the bag, the statutory presumption that all occupants of the vehicle possess the firearm does not apply to the other occupants.

    Summary

    Lemmons and others were convicted of possessing weapons found in a handbag in a car they occupied. The Court of Appeals addressed whether the statutory presumption of possession for firearms found in a vehicle applies when the firearm is located in a handbag belonging to one of the occupants. The court held that the presumption does not apply in this specific circumstance because the handbag’s contents are considered to be “upon the person” of the woman. While the court upheld Lemmons’ conviction based on plain view, it reversed and remanded the convictions of Hardrick and Allen to determine if there was other evidence to prove possession.

    Facts

    Police stopped a vehicle occupied by Jane Doe, Lemmons, Hardrick, Allen, and the driver. Upon searching the vehicle, police discovered two handguns in a woman’s handbag located on the floor between Doe’s legs. Doe admitted the handbag was hers. Lemmons was also found to be in possession of two handguns in plain view. All occupants except the driver were charged with possession of the weapons. At trial, the prosecution relied on the statutory presumption that the presence of a firearm in a vehicle is presumptive evidence of its possession by all occupants.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Lemmons, Hardrick, and Allen. These defendants appealed, arguing the statutory presumption was improperly applied. The appellate division affirmed the convictions. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the statutory presumption of possession arising from presence in an automobile in which a firearm is found applies when the firearm is located in a handbag belonging to one of the occupants?

    Holding

    No, because the handguns in this instance were found “upon the person” of Jane Doe within the contemplation of the statute; thus, the statutory presumption does not apply to the other occupants.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the presumption of possession is a rule of necessity, only to be invoked when there is an absence of satisfactory evidence of actual possession. The statutory exception for weapons found “upon the person of one of the occupants” exists because it’s irrational to infer that all occupants possess a weapon in the exclusive possession of another. A woman’s handbag is considered an extension of her person, similar to pockets, containing highly personalized items exclusively controlled by the owner. The court noted that the handbag was within Doe’s easy reach and not easily accessible to the other passengers. Judge Wachtler, concurring in part and dissenting in part, stated, “Common experience teaches that a woman’s pocketbook is but an extension of her pockets; intended to hold items which she cannot or prefers not to keep in her clothing.” The court concluded that the presumption cannot stand where the presumed fact (possession) does not rationally flow from the evidence. However, the court remanded for a new trial for Hardrick and Allen, as the presence of weapons in the vehicle coupled with other evidence might still provide a basis for a jury to infer logical constructive possession. The conviction of Lemmons was upheld because he was found in possession of additional firearms.

  • People v. Kirkpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 17 (1973): Knowledge of Obscenity Inferred from Handling and Displaying Material

    People v. Kirkpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 17 (1973)

    A bookseller’s knowledge of the obscene content of material can be inferred from the circumstances of its sale, including the conspicuous nature of the material, the seller’s handling of the material, and the seller’s role in ordering and displaying the material.

    Summary

    Defendants, bookstore employees, were convicted of selling obscene material. The trial court found that the magazine “Zap No. 4” was obscene and that the defendants had knowledge of its contents, both through a statutory presumption and an inference drawn from the evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the circumstances surrounding the sale of the magazine, including its conspicuous display and the defendants’ handling of it, supported an inference of knowledge. The Court also upheld the validity of the statutory presumption that a seller of obscene material knows its contents, finding that it was supported by the probabilities of knowledge in such a situation.

    Facts

    Defendant Dargis managed a bookstore and ordered/reordered “Zap No. 4”, unpacking and shelving copies, and personally sold 20-25 copies. He admitted glancing at the ending pages and noticing the “Adults Only” label. Defendant Kirkpatrick co-managed a bookstore. He ordered 150 copies of “Zap No. 4” and personally sold 25-30 copies. The magazine had distinct, similar drawings throughout.

    Procedural History

    Defendants were convicted in the trial court for violating Penal Law § 235.05 for selling obscene material. The Appellate Term affirmed the convictions. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that the booksellers knew of the obscene contents of the magazine.
    2. Whether the statutory presumption that a seller of obscene materials knows the contents of what they sell is valid (Penal Law, § 235.10, subd. 1).

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the trial court properly inferred knowledge from the defendants’ handling, ordering, and selling of the magazine, as well as its conspicuous display.
    2. Yes, because the statutory presumption is based on the probabilities of knowledge and is not unconstitutional.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that an inference of knowledge can be drawn from possession of contraband, especially when the possessor is actively involved in its sale and distribution. The court cited People v. Reisman, stating, “Generally, possession suffices to permit the inference that the possessor knows what he possesses… This, of course, is an elemental inference based on common experience and all but universal probabilities.” The court emphasized that the defendants’ actions in ordering, unpacking, displaying, and selling the magazine, combined with its “conspicuous display,” supported the inference of knowledge. The court also upheld the statutory presumption of knowledge, finding that it was based on a rational connection between the act of selling obscene material and the likelihood that the seller is aware of its contents. The court noted that this presumption does not eliminate the need for the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court addressed concerns about censorship, referencing Smith v. California, but distinguished that case by noting that the New York statute allows for a defense based on lack of knowledge. The court stated, “Eyewitness testimony of a bookseller’s perusal of a book hardly need be a necessary element in proving his awareness of its contents. The circumstances may warrant the inference that he was aware of what a book contained, despite his denial”. The court also mentioned the practicality of enforcing obscenity laws, stating that it “behooves the courts to sustain rational efforts at control and not, indirectly on attenuated constitutional speculations, to overthrow serially every restrained effort at control.”

  • People v. Gibbs, 26 N.Y.2d 390 (1970): Interpreting “Unauthorized Use” and Statutory Presumptions

    People v. Gibbs, 26 N.Y.2d 390 (1970)

    The “unauthorized use of a vehicle” statute encompasses not only operating a vehicle without consent but also exercising control over or otherwise using it, and the statutory presumption that a person using a vehicle without the owner’s consent knows they lack such consent is constitutional.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the unauthorized use of a vehicle statute applies to merely occupying a vehicle without consent and whether the presumption of knowledge of non-consent is valid. Defendants Gibbs and McCaleb were found in separate parked, stolen cars. The Court held that the statute extends beyond “joyriding” to include exercising control or other uses of the vehicle, even if stationary. It also upheld the statutory presumption that unauthorized use implies knowledge of non-consent, finding a rational connection between the act and the knowledge, thus satisfying due process. The court reversed the Appellate Term’s decision and ordered new trials.

    Facts

    Defendant Gibbs was found asleep in the passenger seat of a stolen car with the engine running. Defendant McCaleb was seated in the back of a different stolen car, with the engine off but the key in the ignition. Both vehicles had been reported stolen within nine hours of the defendants’ arrests. Neither defendant had the owner’s consent to be in the vehicles.

    Procedural History

    Both Gibbs and McCaleb were convicted in the Criminal Court of the City of New York. The Appellate Term reversed both convictions “on the law and facts” and dismissed the complaints. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Penal Law § 165.05(1) criminalizes the mere occupation of another’s motor vehicle without consent, even without locomotive use.
    2. Whether the statutory presumption in Penal Law § 165.05(1) of knowledge of the owner’s non-consent is constitutionally valid.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the statute’s language extends beyond “joyriding” to include “exercises control over” and “otherwise uses” a vehicle, encompassing situations beyond mere operation.
    2. Yes, because there is a rational connection between using a vehicle without permission and the presumption that the user knows they lack such permission.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the current statute’s language is broader than its predecessor, which focused primarily on “joyriding.” The addition of phrases like “exercises control over” and “otherwise uses” indicates a legislative intent to prohibit a wider range of conduct than simply operating a vehicle. The court stated, “In that phrase the term ‘otherwise’ serves only the purpose of broadening rather than narrowing the connotation of the word following it, namely, ‘uses’.” The Court distinguished this case from prior interpretations of the old law, which narrowly construed “use” to relate only to moving vehicles. The Court noted that lowering the crime’s classification from a felony to a misdemeanor suggests a legislative intent to include less serious conduct.

    Regarding the statutory presumption, the Court applied the rational connection test, stating that “ ‘the fact upon which the presumption is to rest must have some fair relation to, or natural connection with the main fact’ ”. The court found that there is a natural and rational connection between using a car without permission and knowing that one does not have permission. The Court distinguished this case from Leary v. United States, where the Supreme Court struck down a presumption related to marijuana possession, because in Leary, the presumption was based on another presumption (illegal importation). Here, it was undisputed the cars were stolen. The court found that the presumption satisfies due process because the likelihood of innocent use is minimal, and an innocent explanation would present only a light burden on the defendant. The court stated that “But the unexplained use or presence in a stolen vehicle has a ‘sinister significance’ sufficient to justify the presumption that the unauthorized use is with knowledge.”

    Because the Appellate Term reversed on the facts, the Court of Appeals could not reinstate the convictions but ordered new trials.