New York Law Review

Tag: statutory deadlines

  • Brill v. City of New York, 2 N.Y.3d 648 (2004): Enforcing Statutory Deadlines for Summary Judgment Motions

    2 N.Y.3d 648 (2004)

    CPLR 3212(a)’s “good cause” exception for late summary judgment motions requires a showing of good cause for the delay in making the motion, not simply that the motion is meritorious and non-prejudicial.

    Summary

    Ona and Maurice Brill sued the City of New York for injuries Ona suffered from a sidewalk trip and fall. The City moved for summary judgment nearly a year after plaintiffs filed their note of issue, beyond the 120-day limit in CPLR 3212(a), arguing lack of prior written notice of the defect. Supreme Court, citing judicial economy and no prejudice to Mrs. Brill, granted the motion. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that “good cause” for late motions requires a satisfactory explanation for the delay itself, reinforcing statutory deadlines and preventing eleventh-hour motions.

    Facts

    • On February 15, 1998, Ona Brill allegedly tripped and fell on a public sidewalk in Brooklyn, sustaining injuries.
    • On June 4, 1998, the Brills sued the City of New York and others.
    • After discovery, on June 28, 2001, plaintiffs filed their note of issue and certificate of readiness.
    • On June 18, 2002, almost a year after the note of issue filing, the City moved for summary judgment, claiming lack of prior written notice of the defect. The City did not explain its delay in filing the motion.

    Procedural History

    • Supreme Court granted the City’s summary judgment motion, finding no proof of prior written notice and citing judicial economy.
    • The Appellate Division affirmed.
    • The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether “good cause,” as used in CPLR 3212(a) to excuse the late filing of a summary judgment motion, is shown merely by demonstrating that the motion has merit and causes no prejudice, or whether it requires a specific explanation for the delay in filing the motion.

    Holding

    No, because “good cause” in CPLR 3212 (a) requires a showing of good cause for the delay in making the motion—a satisfactory explanation for the untimeliness—rather than simply permitting meritorious, nonprejudicial filings, however tardy.

    Court’s Reasoning

    • The Court emphasized that summary judgment is a valuable tool for resolving cases involving only questions of law, avoiding needless cost and delay.
    • CPLR 3212(a) was amended to address the problem of eleventh-hour summary judgment motions, setting a 120-day limit after the note of issue filing, unless the court grants leave on a showing of “good cause.”
    • The Court rejected the argument that “good cause” is satisfied by showing the motion’s merit and lack of prejudice to the opposing party. Instead, the Court stated that “good cause” requires a satisfactory explanation for the delay itself. As the Court noted, “That reading is supported by the language of the statute—only the movant can show good cause—as well as by the purpose of the amendment, to end the practice of eleventh-hour summary judgment motions. No excuse at all, or a perfunctory excuse, cannot be ‘good cause.’”
    • The Court referenced Kihl v. Pfeffer, emphasizing the importance of maintaining the integrity of the judicial system by adhering to deadlines.
    • The Court acknowledged the potential anomaly of denying a meritorious motion, but reasoned that consistent enforcement of the statute will encourage compliance. As the Court stated, “If this practice is tolerated and condoned, the ameliorative statute is, for all intents and purposes, obliterated.”
    • In dissent, Judge G.B. Smith argued that the merits of the case constituted “good cause” and that the trial court should have the discretion to entertain the motion to avoid wasting judicial resources on a meritless case, stating the trial court did not abuse its discretion because “[t]he good cause shown was the merits of the action.”

  • People v. Thill, 75 N.Y.2d 895 (1990): Enforcing Deadlines for Pretrial Motions

    People v. Thill, 75 N.Y.2d 895 (1990)

    A motion to dismiss based on a defect in the accusatory instrument is waived if not made within the statutory time limit for pretrial motions, unless an extension is granted.

    Summary

    Defendant Thill was convicted in Town Court of speeding and driving while intoxicated. He appealed to the County Court, which reversed both convictions. The Court of Appeals considered whether the County Court properly dismissed the speeding conviction based on an insufficient supporting deposition, given that Thill’s motion to dismiss was untimely under CPL 255.20(1). The Court of Appeals held that because the motion was filed beyond the statutory deadline without a request for an extension, the Town Court’s denial of the motion was proper. The Court of Appeals reinstated the speeding conviction.

    Facts

    The defendant was arrested and charged with speeding and driving while intoxicated. The defendant was arraigned. More than three months after his arraignment, the defendant moved to dismiss the speeding charge, arguing the supporting deposition was insufficient because it failed to specify the speed limit he allegedly violated. The defendant did not request an extension of time to file the motion.

    Procedural History

    The Town Court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss as untimely. The defendant was convicted of both speeding and driving while intoxicated in the Town Court. The Chautauqua County Court reversed both convictions. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the County Court erred in dismissing the speeding conviction when the defendant’s motion to dismiss was filed outside the statutory time limit for pre-trial motions without an extension, based on an alleged defect in the supporting deposition.

    Holding

    Yes, because CPL 255.20(1) requires pre-trial motions to be filed within forty-five days of arraignment, or within such additional time as the court may fix upon application of the defendant, and the defendant did not comply with this requirement.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the procedural requirements of CPL 255.20(1), which sets a deadline for pre-trial motions. The court emphasized that the defendant’s motion to dismiss the speeding charge was made over three months after his arraignment. The court noted that the defendant failed to request an extension of time to file the motion, and therefore, the Town Court properly denied the motion as untimely. The Court relied on People v. Key, 45 NY2d 111, 116, which reinforces the importance of adhering to statutory deadlines for pre-trial motions. The Court stated, “CPL 255.20 (1) provides that ‘all pre-trial motions shall be served or filed within forty-five days after arraignment * * * or within such additional time as the court may fix upon application of the defendant’. Defendant’s motion to dismiss was made over three months after his arraignment and he did not request an extension of time. Hence, the Town Court properly denied defendant’s motion as untimely”. By reinstating the speeding conviction, the Court reinforced the principle that procedural rules must be followed, and failure to comply with statutory deadlines can result in waiver of legal arguments.