New York Law Review

Tag: statute of limitations

  • Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC v. King, 14 N.Y.3d 410 (2010): Application of Borrowing Statute to Assigned Debt

    Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC v. King, 14 N.Y.3d 410 (2010)

    When a nonresident assignee of a cause of action accruing outside of New York brings suit in New York, the borrowing statute, CPLR 202, requires the action to be timely under the statute of limitations of both New York and the jurisdiction where the cause of action accrued; the court must also borrow the tolling provisions of the jurisdiction where the cause of action accrued.

    Summary

    Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, as assignee of Discover Bank, sued Jared King in New York to recover on a credit card debt. The credit card agreement contained a Delaware choice-of-law clause. King argued that Delaware’s three-year statute of limitations barred the action under New York’s borrowing statute (CPLR 202). The New York Court of Appeals held that CPLR 202 applied, requiring consideration of Delaware’s statute of limitations and its tolling provisions. Because the cause of action accrued in Delaware and Delaware’s tolling statute did not apply to King, a nonresident, the action was time-barred.

    Facts

    Jared King, while a resident of Connecticut, opened a credit card account with Greenwood Trust Company (later Discover Bank) in 1989. The agreement had a Delaware choice-of-law provision. King canceled the card in 1999 and made no payments after December 1998. In August 2000, Discover assigned King’s debt to Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC. Portfolio sued King in New York in 2005, asserting breach of contract and account stated.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to Portfolio. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Portfolio’s claim was time-barred under the borrowing statute.

    Issue(s)

    Whether New York’s borrowing statute, CPLR 202, requires application of Delaware’s statute of limitations and tolling provisions to a debt collection action brought in New York by an assignee of a Delaware corporation against a New York resident, where the cause of action accrued in Delaware.

    Holding

    Yes, because CPLR 202 mandates that when a nonresident sues on a cause of action accruing outside New York, the action must be timely under the limitations periods of both New York and the jurisdiction where the cause of action accrued. Moreover, in determining whether the action would be barred in the other state, the court must also borrow that state’s tolling provisions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that choice-of-law provisions generally apply to substantive issues, while statutes of limitations are procedural. Therefore, the Delaware choice-of-law clause did not automatically incorporate Delaware’s statute of limitations. However, CPLR 202 dictates that the statute of limitations of both New York and the state where the cause of action accrued must be considered. Since Discover Bank sustained the economic injury in Delaware, the cause of action accrued there. As such, Delaware’s three-year statute of limitations applied. The court then addressed Delaware’s tolling statute, which tolls the statute of limitations when a defendant is out of state. However, the court interpreted Delaware law as intending its tolling provision to apply only where the defendant had a prior connection to Delaware, meaning the defendant would at some point return to the state or be subject to service there. Since King had no prior connection to Delaware, the tolling provision did not apply. The court noted that its holding was consistent with the purpose of CPLR 202, “namely, to prevent forum shopping by nonresidents attempting to take advantage of a more favorable statute of limitations in this state.” Because the action was time-barred in Delaware, it was also time-barred in New York. The court reversed the grant of summary judgment to Portfolio, but noted that it could not grant summary judgment to King because King did not cross-move for that relief.

  • Bazakos v. Lewis, 12 N.Y.3d 631 (2009): Statute of Limitations for Negligence During an Independent Medical Exam

    Bazakos v. Lewis, 12 N.Y.3d 631 (2009)

    A claim against a doctor for negligence during an Independent Medical Examination (IME) is a claim for medical malpractice, subject to CPLR 214-a’s two-year-and-six-month statute of limitations, even in the absence of a traditional doctor-patient relationship.

    Summary

    Lewis Bazakos sued Dr. Philip Lewis, alleging injury during an IME required for a previous lawsuit. Bazakos claimed Lewis negligently injured him by forcefully rotating his head. The suit was filed approximately 2 years and 11 months after the IME. The court addressed whether such a claim constitutes medical malpractice subject to a shorter statute of limitations, or ordinary negligence. The Court of Appeals held that the claim was for medical malpractice because the doctor’s actions involved medical skill, and the legislative intent behind the shorter statute of limitations for malpractice applied equally to IMEs. Therefore, the claim was time-barred.

    Facts

    Lewis Bazakos was involved in a prior lawsuit stemming from an automobile accident. As part of that lawsuit, Bazakos was required to undergo an Independent Medical Examination (IME) by a physician selected by the opposing party.

    The opposing party designated Dr. Philip Lewis to conduct the IME. Dr. Lewis examined Bazakos on November 27, 2001.

    Bazakos alleged that during the IME, Dr. Lewis injured him by “tak[ing] plaintiff’s head in his hands and forcefully rotated it while simultaneously pulling.”

    Procedural History

    Bazakos commenced an action against Lewis on October 15, 2004, approximately 2 years and 11 months after the IME.

    Lewis moved to dismiss, arguing the claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Supreme Court granted the motion, relying on Evangelista v. Zolan.

    The Appellate Division reversed, overruling Evangelista, holding the action was timely because no physician-patient relationship existed, thus the claim was not for medical malpractice. Two justices dissented.

    The Appellate Division granted Lewis leave to appeal, certifying the question of whether its order was properly made.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a claim against a doctor for alleged negligence during an Independent Medical Examination (IME) constitutes a claim for “medical malpractice” under CPLR 214-a, thus subject to the statute’s two-year-and-six-month statute of limitations.

    Holding

    No, because such actions involve medical treatment by a licensed physician, regardless of the absence of a traditional physician-patient relationship.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the essence of Bazakos’s claim, like any medical malpractice claim, is that a doctor failed to competently perform a procedure requiring specialized medical skill.

    The Court emphasized that the act underlying the lawsuit – Lewis’s manipulation of Bazakos’s body – constitutes “medical treatment by a licensed physician,” thus negligent performance constitutes medical malpractice, citing Weiner v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 88 N.Y.2d 784, 788 (1996).

    The Court noted the legislative intent behind CPLR 214-a, enacted to address a crisis in medical malpractice insurance, aimed to enable “health care providers to get malpractice insurance at reasonable rates” (quoting Bleiler, 65 NY2d at 68). The Court found it unlikely the Legislature intended to exclude doctors performing IMEs from this protection.

    The Court agreed with the dissenting Justices at the Appellate Division that a “limited physician-patient relationship” exists during an IME, referencing an AMA opinion on the ethical responsibilities of doctors performing IMEs.

    Quoting Dyer v. Trachtman, 470 Mich. 45, 49-50, 679 N.W.2d 311, 314-315 (2004), the Court stated that this limited relationship “imposes a duty on the IME physician to perform the examination in a manner not to cause physical harm to the examinee.”

    The dissenting opinion argued that medical malpractice requires medical treatment, which was absent in the IME context. The dissent emphasized that the purpose of CPLR 214-a was to protect health care providers offering treatment, not those providing litigation support services. The dissent asserted that context matters, and that what constitutes malpractice in a treatment setting may not in an IME setting, highlighting the limited scope of responsibility in an IME.

  • Bloomingdales, Inc. v. New York City Transit Authority, 13 N.Y.3d 65 (2009): Statute of Limitations for Continuing Trespass and Nuisance Claims

    Bloomingdales, Inc. v. New York City Transit Authority, 13 N.Y.3d 65 (2009)

    When a trespass or nuisance is continuous, resulting in successive causes of action, the statute of limitations does not begin to run from the initial act but accrues as long as the trespass or nuisance persists, until it ripens into a prescriptive right.

    Summary

    Bloomingdales sued the New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) for trespass and nuisance after a contractor, Janus Industries, cut Bloomingdales’ drainpipe during excavation and installed a conduit in its place, causing flooding. The NYCTA argued the suit was time-barred under Public Authorities Law § 1212 and General Municipal Law § 50-i, as it was filed more than one year and 90 days after the drainpipe was severed. The Court of Appeals held that the placement of the conduit constituted a continuing trespass and nuisance, meaning the statute of limitations had not yet run, as the damages stemmed from the ongoing encroachment, not solely from the initial severance of the pipe.

    Facts

    In September 1999, Janus Industries, working on a NYCTA project, cut Bloomingdales’ drainpipe, mistakenly believing it to be a “dead” water main. Janus installed a concrete-encased conduit in its place. Bloomingdales experienced flooding and, in February 2002, discovered the cut drainpipe and the conduit. Bloomingdales then installed a new drainpipe above the conduit at a cost exceeding $165,000.

    Procedural History

    Bloomingdales sued the NYCTA in January 2003, alleging negligence, trespass, and nuisance. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the NYCTA and third-party defendants, dismissing the complaint based on the statute of limitations. The Appellate Division reversed, reinstating the trespass and nuisance claims, holding it was a continuing tort. The NYCTA appealed, and the Appellate Division certified the question of whether its order was properly made to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the placement of a concrete conduit in place of a severed drainpipe constitutes a continuing trespass and nuisance, such that the statute of limitations for those claims begins to run from the cessation of the encroachment, rather than the initial act of severing the pipe?

    Holding

    Yes, because the placement of the concrete conduit interfering with Bloomingdales’ access to its drainpipe constitutes a continuous trespass and nuisance, giving rise to successive causes of action for which the statute of limitations had not yet run.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while Public Authorities Law § 1212 (2) and General Municipal Law § 50-i require actions for property damage to be commenced within one year and 90 days after the event, this period does not apply to continuous trespasses or nuisances. Citing 509 Sixth Ave. Corp. v New York City Tr. Auth., the Court emphasized that a trespass that unlawfully encroaches on a plaintiff’s property is considered a continuous trespass, giving rise to successive causes of action. The statute of limitations only bars suits after the time required to create an easement by prescription or change of title. Here, the conduit’s presence interfered with Bloomingdales’ access to its drainpipe and the city sewer, forcing the installation of a new pipe. The Court stated that “[t]hus, for purposes of the statute of limitations, suits will only be time-barred by the expiration of such time as would create an easement by prescription or change of title by operation of law.” The Court found the actual damages arose from the need to install a new drainpipe in a different location due to the conduit. The Court considered the nuisance claim another way of characterizing the trespass, subject to the same statute of limitations analysis. Thus, the Appellate Division’s order was affirmed.

  • IDT Corp. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 12 N.Y.3d 132 (2009): Statute of Limitations for Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims

    IDT Corp. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 12 N.Y.3d 132 (2009)

    The applicable statute of limitations for a breach of fiduciary duty claim in New York depends on the substantive remedy sought; a three-year statute of limitations applies when the remedy is purely monetary, while a six-year statute applies when equitable relief is sought or when the claim is based on fraud.

    Summary

    IDT sued Morgan Stanley, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference with contract, misappropriation of confidential information, and unjust enrichment. IDT claimed Morgan Stanley, acting as Telefonica’s investment banker, used confidential information obtained from IDT to induce Telefonica to breach a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with IDT. The New York Court of Appeals held that IDT’s claims for breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference, and misappropriation were time-barred under the three-year statute of limitations. The court also found that the unjust enrichment claim failed to state a cause of action because it was based on a valid contract and because Morgan Stanley was not unjustly enriched at IDT’s expense.

    Facts

    IDT and Telefonica entered an MOU for IDT to buy a 10% equity share in NewCo, a corporation that would operate an underwater fiber-optic cable network. Morgan Stanley, acting as Telefonica’s investment banker, allegedly advised Telefonica to breach the MOU. IDT claimed Morgan Stanley used confidential information obtained from prior engagements with IDT. In 2000, Telefonica informed IDT it intended to modify the MOU, replacing NewCo with a larger entity, Emergía, offering IDT a five percent share. IDT rejected this proposal and initiated arbitration proceedings against Telefonica in 2001.

    Procedural History

    IDT commenced an arbitration against Telefonica in 2001, alleging breach of the MOU. In 2004, IDT sued Morgan Stanley. The Supreme Court dismissed one claim but otherwise denied Morgan Stanley’s motion to dismiss. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding the claims were not barred by collateral estoppel. The Court of Appeals reversed, answering the certified question in the negative, holding that IDT’s claims were either time-barred or failed to state a cause of action.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether IDT’s breach of fiduciary duty claim is governed by a three-year or six-year statute of limitations.

    2. Whether IDT’s claims for breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference with contract, and misappropriation of confidential information were time-barred.

    3. Whether IDT’s unjust enrichment claim stated a valid cause of action.

    Holding

    1. The three-year statute of limitations applies, because IDT primarily sought monetary damages, and the equitable relief sought was incidental.

    2. Yes, because the claims accrued when IDT first suffered damages resulting from Telefonica’s refusal to comply with the MOU, which occurred more than three years before IDT commenced the action against Morgan Stanley.

    3. No, because the unjust enrichment claim was based on services governed by a valid contract (regarding the $10 million fee) and because Morgan Stanley was not unjustly enriched at IDT’s expense regarding the fees obtained from Telefonica.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined the applicable statute of limitations for the breach of fiduciary duty claim based on the remedy sought. Since IDT primarily sought monetary damages, the court applied the three-year statute of limitations for injury to property under CPLR 214(4). The court rejected IDT’s argument that the claim was essentially a fraud action requiring a six-year statute of limitations because IDT did not justifiably rely on Morgan Stanley’s alleged misrepresentations. The court found that the claims accrued when Telefonica refused to comply with the MOU, which was before May 25, 2001, rendering the action time-barred. Regarding the unjust enrichment claim, the court stated: “Where the parties executed a valid and enforceable written contract governing a particular subject matter, recovery on a theory of unjust enrichment for events arising out of that subject matter is ordinarily precluded” (Clark-Fitzpatrick, Inc. v Long Is. R.R. Co., 70 NY2d 382, 388 [1987]). The court also held that Morgan Stanley’s profits from Telefonica did not unjustly enrich Morgan Stanley at IDT’s expense because IDT did not pay those fees. The court rejected equitable estoppel arguments as IDT was aware of Morgan Stanley’s disparaging comments yet failed to inquire further.

  • Tydings v. Greenfield, Stein & Senior, LLP, 11 N.Y.3d 196 (2008): Collateral Estoppel and Statute of Limitations for Trustee Accounting

    Tydings v. Greenfield, Stein & Senior, LLP, 11 N.Y.3d 196 (2008)

    Collateral estoppel does not apply to an alternative holding in a prior case when an appellate court affirms the decision on other grounds, and the statute of limitations for compelling a former trustee to account begins when the trusteeship is transferred to a successor.

    Summary

    Frieda Tydings sued GSS for legal malpractice, alleging their negligence in defending a petition for a compulsory accounting caused her damage. Tydings, a former trustee, had failed to raise a statute of limitations defense in the initial accounting proceeding, which the Surrogate Court rejected on two grounds. The Appellate Division affirmed on only one ground. The Court of Appeals held that collateral estoppel did not apply to the Surrogate’s alternative holding and clarified that the statute of limitations for compelling a former trustee to account begins when the trusteeship is transferred to a successor. This ruling clarifies the application of collateral estoppel and provides a clear rule for the statute of limitations in trustee accounting cases.

    Facts

    Frieda Tydings served as trustee of a grantor trust and resigned on January 1, 1997, with a successor trustee immediately taking over. More than six years later, on August 20, 2003, a beneficiary filed a petition seeking a compulsory accounting from Tydings. Initially, Tydings’s counsel, GSS, failed to assert a statute of limitations defense. After new counsel was retained, Tydings moved to dismiss the objections based on the statute of limitations.

    Procedural History

    The Surrogate’s Court denied Tydings’s motion to dismiss, citing both the statute of limitations expiring and Tydings waiving the defense by asserting it late. The Appellate Division affirmed, but only on the waiver ground. Tydings then sued GSS for malpractice. The Supreme Court granted GSS’s motion to dismiss based on collateral estoppel, but the Appellate Division reversed, finding collateral estoppel inapplicable. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether collateral estoppel bars relitigation of a ruling that was an alternative basis for a trial-level decision, where an appellate court affirmed the decision without addressing that ruling.
    2. When does the statute of limitations begin to run for an action to compel a former trustee to account?

    Holding

    1. No, because the appellate court affirmed on other grounds, and thus the alternative ruling was not fully litigated on appeal.
    2. The statute of limitations begins to run from the date the trusteeship is turned over to a successor, because this provides a clear and easily applicable rule.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals addressed collateral estoppel, noting that it bars relitigation of an issue “which has necessarily been decided in [a] prior action and is decisive of the present action” if there has been “a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now said to be controlling” (Buechel v Bain, 97 NY2d 295, 303-304 [2001]). The court distinguished Malloy v Trombley, where collateral estoppel was applied to an alternative holding because the losing party could have appealed but did not. Here, Tydings appealed, but the appellate court did not rule on the statute of limitations issue. The court aligned with decisions from other jurisdictions, stating that “if an appeal is taken and the appellate court affirms on one ground and disregards the other, there is no collateral estoppel as to the unreviewed ground.” Regarding the statute of limitations, the court reaffirmed the rule from Spallholz v Sheldon: “after the trust relation is at an end, and the trustee has yielded the estate to a successor, the rule is different. The running of the statute then begins, and only actual or intentional fraud will be effective to suspend it” (216 NY 205, 209 [1915]). The court rejected GSS’s argument that the statute runs from the refusal to provide an accounting, deeming it impractical. The court emphasized the clarity and ease of application of the Spallholz rule, allowing six years from the transfer of the trusteeship to bring an accounting proceeding. The court noted that under SCPA 2205 (1), a court may require a fiduciary to file an account “at any time,” reinforcing that the successor trustee can act immediately.

  • Matter of Manzi v. City of Kingston, 11 N.Y.3d 725 (2008): Statute of Limitations and Necessary Party Joinder

    Matter of Manzi v. City of Kingston, 11 N.Y.3d 725 (2008)

    A statute of limitations defense does not deprive a court of jurisdiction over a party, and therefore, the discretionary factors of CPLR 1001(b) do not apply when a necessary party is subject to the court’s jurisdiction but has a valid statute of limitations defense.

    Summary

    This case clarifies the interplay between CPLR 1001(b) regarding the joinder of necessary parties and the statute of limitations. The Court of Appeals held that a statute of limitations defense does not equate to a lack of jurisdiction. Therefore, when a necessary party is subject to the court’s jurisdiction but has a valid statute of limitations defense, the court is not required to consider the discretionary factors outlined in CPLR 1001(b) before dismissing the proceeding against the original party for failure to join the necessary party. In this case, the petitioners’ failure to timely join the County and School District, who then successfully asserted a statute of limitations defense, justified the dismissal of the case against the Assessor.

    Facts

    The petitioners initiated a proceeding against the City of Kingston Assessor. The Assessor moved to dismiss the proceeding, arguing that the petitioners failed to join Ulster County and the Onteora Central School District, which were necessary parties. In response, the petitioners filed an amended petition, adding the County and the School District as respondents. The County and School District then moved to dismiss the amended petition based on the expiration of the four-month statute of limitations period applicable to Article 7 proceedings.

    Procedural History

    The respondent Assessor moved to dismiss for failure to join necessary parties. Petitioners then amended the petition to include the necessary parties. The County and School District then moved for dismissal based on statute of limitations. The lower courts dismissed the amended petition against the County and School District. The Court of Appeals reviewed the dismissal of the initial claim against the Assessor.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division erred in failing to apply the discretionary factors enumerated in Matter of Red Hook/Gowanus Chamber of Commerce v New York City Bd. of Stds. & Appeals before dismissing the proceeding for failure to join necessary parties Ulster County and the Onteora Central School District, where those parties successfully asserted a statute of limitations defense.

    Holding

    No, because a statute of limitations defense does not deprive a court of jurisdiction; thus, the discretionary factors of CPLR 1001(b) do not apply when the necessary parties are subject to the court’s jurisdiction but have a valid statute of limitations defense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from Matter of Red Hook/Gowanus Chamber of Commerce v New York City Bd. of Stds. & Appeals, clarifying that the discretionary factors in CPLR 1001(b) are only considered when jurisdiction over a necessary party can be obtained only by consent or appearance. The Court adopted the reasoning in Matter of Romeo v New York State Dept. of Educ., which stated that a statute of limitations is merely a defense and does not deprive a court of jurisdiction. The Court emphasized that the CPLR distinguishes between a necessary party ‘subject to the jurisdiction of the court’ and one over whom jurisdiction can be obtained only by consent or appearance. Here, because the County and the School District were subject to the court’s jurisdiction (despite their successful statute of limitations defense), the court was not required to consider the discretionary factors. The Court stated, “[a] statute of limitations does not deprive a court of jurisdiction nor even a litigant of a substantive right, but is merely a defense which may, if properly asserted, deprive a plaintiff of any remedy from a defendant.” The Court noted that while typically, the court would be required to join the necessary parties and remit for further proceedings, the petitioners’ failure to timely join the County and School District, resulting in the dismissal of the claims against them, justified the dismissal of the case against the Assessor due to the failure to join necessary parties as per CPLR 1003.

  • Amorosi v. South Colonie Independent Central School District, 9 N.Y.3d 367 (2007): Statute of Limitations for Discrimination Claims Against School Districts

    9 N.Y.3d 367 (2007)

    Executive Law § 296 discrimination claims against a school district are subject to the one-year statute of limitations outlined in Education Law § 3813 (2-b), notwithstanding any other law providing a longer period.

    Summary

    Jennifer Amorosi sued the South Colonie Independent Central School District, alleging discrimination based on maternity leave in violation of Executive Law § 296. The Court of Appeals addressed whether the three-year statute of limitations for discrimination claims generally applies, or the one-year limit in Education Law § 3813 (2-b) specific to actions against school districts. The Court held that the one-year statute of limitations applied. The plain language of Education Law § 3813 (2-b) dictates a one-year limit for actions against school districts, superseding the general three-year limit for discrimination claims. Therefore, Amorosi’s claim was time-barred.

    Facts

    Jennifer Amorosi was hired as a temporary part-time guidance counselor in July 1999, becoming full-time in January 2001 with a three-year probationary period for tenure consideration. She took maternity leave in January 2002, returning in September 2002. Her probationary period was extended to June 2004 by agreement. While initial reviews were favorable, her July 2003 review indicated performance concerns. She took a second maternity leave in October 2003, returning in December 2003, after which she received a negative review and was allegedly asked to resign. She resigned in January 2004, effective June 2004. Amorosi claimed she became aware of the school district’s discriminatory practices in early 2005.

    Procedural History

    Amorosi initiated proceedings on September 7, 2005, seeking leave to file a late notice of claim, alleging discrimination. Supreme Court granted leave, applying a three-year statute of limitations. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that Education Law § 3813 (2-b) provides a one-year statute of limitations and the Supreme Court lacked the discretion to grant leave to file a late notice of claim since the proceeding was commenced more than one year after the cause of action arose. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the one-year statute of limitations in Education Law § 3813 (2-b) applies to discrimination claims brought under Executive Law § 296 against a school district, or whether the general three-year statute of limitations for discrimination claims applies.

    Holding

    No, because the clear and unambiguous language of Education Law § 3813 (2-b) provides that, notwithstanding any other provision of law providing a longer period of time in which to commence an action or special proceeding, no action or special proceeding shall be commenced against any school district more than one year after the cause of action arose.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Education Law § 3813 (2-b) clearly and unambiguously dictates a one-year statute of limitations for actions against school districts. The Court emphasized that when statutory language is clear, it must be given effect, and courts should not resort to rules of construction to broaden a statute’s scope when the words are unequivocal. The Court distinguished prior cases (Koerner and Murphy) that applied a three-year statute of limitations to discrimination claims, noting those cases did not involve the application of Education Law § 3813. The Court also addressed and distinguished two appellate division cases, Lane-Weber and Stoetzel, noting that neither decision involved the specific application of Education Law § 3813 (2-b) to an Executive Law § 296 claim. The Court stated, “[D]espite any provision for a longer statute of limitations, such as the three-year statute of limitations in CPLR 214 (2), as urged by petitioner, the one-year limitation prescribed in Education Law § 3813 (2-b) should govern discrimination claims against a school district.” The court found that because the legislature is presumed to be aware of existing law, the lack of an exception for discrimination claims in Education Law § 3813 (2-b), similar to the exception for tort claims, indicated a deliberate intent to subject such claims to the one-year statute of limitations. The Court acknowledged the apparent contradiction with the policy of eliminating employment discrimination but deferred to the clear statutory language.

  • Nussenzweig v. diCorcia, 9 N.Y.3d 184 (2007): Statute of Limitations for Right of Privacy Claims

    Nussenzweig v. diCorcia, 9 N.Y.3d 184 (2007)

    The single publication rule applies to claims brought under New York Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51, meaning the statute of limitations begins to run from the date the offending material is first published, not from the date of discovery.

    Summary

    Photographer Philip-Lorca diCorcia took candid photographs of people in Times Square between 1999 and 2001 without their knowledge. One photograph included Erno Nussenzweig. DiCorcia exhibited and sold the photographs in the fall of 2001. Nussenzweig did not discover the use of his image until March 2005 and subsequently sued, alleging a violation of his statutory right to privacy under Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the one-year statute of limitations barred the claim. The New York Court of Appeals held that the single publication rule applied, and the statute of limitations ran from the initial publication date, not the date of discovery, barring Nussenzweig’s claim.

    Facts

    Between 1999 and 2001, Philip-Lorca diCorcia took candid photographs of individuals in Times Square without their consent or knowledge.

    In the fall of 2001, diCorcia exhibited these photographs at an art gallery owned by Pace/MacGill, Inc.

    Pace/MacGill published and sold a catalogue containing images on display, and created limited edition prints of each photograph for sale.

    One of the images was of Erno Nussenzweig.

    Nussenzweig did not learn of the photograph’s use until March 2005.

    Procedural History

    Nussenzweig commenced an action against diCorcia and Pace/MacGill, Inc., alleging violation of Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51.

    Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the claim was time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations.

    Supreme Court granted the defendants’ motion.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision and granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, certifying the question of whether the order of the Supreme Court, as affirmed, was properly made.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the single publication rule applies to claims brought under Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51, such that the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the initial publication, or from the date the plaintiff discovers the publication.

    Holding

    Yes, because the policy underlying the single publication rule – to prevent stale claims and protect defendants from defending actions after memories fade and evidence is lost – is equally applicable to statutory right of privacy claims under Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied the single publication rule, which states that a cause of action accrues on the date the offending material is first published, citing Gregoire v Putnam’s Sons, 298 NY 119, 125-126 (1948).

    The court reasoned that the policy behind statutes of limitations, as articulated in Gregoire, is to “ ‘spare the courts from litigation of stale claims, and the citizen from being put to his defense after memories have faded, witnesses have died or disappeared, and evidence has been lost’ ” (id. at 125, quoting Chase Securities Corp. v Donaldson, 325 US 304, 314 [1945]).

    The court acknowledged that New York appellate courts have generally applied the single publication rule to statutory right of privacy claims. It cited cases such as E.B. v Liberation Publs., 7 AD3d 566, 567 [2d Dept 2004] and Castel v Sherlock Corp., 159 AD2d 233 [1st Dept 1990], while also noting the exception in Russo v Huntington Town House, 184 AD2d 627, 628 [2d Dept 1992], which held the statute of limitations runs from the date of the most recent violation.

    The Court found that the publishing event occurred no later than the fall of 2001, more than one year before Nussenzweig commenced suit. Therefore, his claims were time-barred.

  • Reliance Ins. Co. v. PolyVision Corp., 9 N.Y.3d 55 (2007): CPLR 205(a) and Refiling by a Different Corporate Entity

    9 N.Y.3d 55 (2007)

    New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) § 205(a) does not permit a corporation to refile an action when a previous, timely-filed action was mistakenly commenced in the name of a different, related corporate entity and was subsequently dismissed for naming the wrong plaintiff.

    Summary

    Reliance Insurance Company (RIC) brought a federal action after a previous state action, involving the same faulty panels, was dismissed because it was brought by Reliance Insurance Company of New York (RNY), a related but distinct corporate entity. RIC argued that CPLR 205(a), which provides a six-month grace period for refiling actions, should apply. The Second Circuit certified the question to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held that CPLR 205(a) does not allow a different corporation, even a related one, to benefit from the statute’s savings provision, as the statute explicitly limits the benefit to “the plaintiff” in the original action.

    Facts

    In 1987, the Lindenhurst School Board contracted with Park Construction. RIC issued bonds for Park’s performance. Separately, RNY issued similar bonds for a different project with the same obligee. In 1988, Park filed for bankruptcy, and RIC assumed responsibility. RIC inherited Park’s rights, including an agreement with PolyVision to furnish curtain wall panels. In 1990, the panels showed signs of deterioration, and RIC replaced them. In 1994, RNY, instead of RIC, sued PolyVision in state court for the faulty panels. In 2004, the state court dismissed the complaint because RNY was not the real party in interest.

    Procedural History

    1. 1994: RNY commenced an action against PolyVision in state court.
    2. 2003: The Appellate Division rejected intervention, noting RNY was the wrong plaintiff.
    3. 2004: The state court dismissed the complaint because RNY was not the real party in interest.
    4. RIC then commenced an action in the Federal District Court.
    5. The District Court granted PolyVision’s motion to dismiss.
    6. The Second Circuit certified a question to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether New York CPLR § 205(a) allows a corporation to refile an action within six months when a previous, timely-filed action has mistakenly been commenced in the name of a different, related corporate entity, and has been dismissed for naming the wrong plaintiff?

    Holding

    No, because CPLR 205(a) explicitly bestows the benefit of the statute only on “the plaintiff” who prosecuted the initial action, and RIC is a different legal entity from RNY.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the explicit language of CPLR 205(a), which states that only “the plaintiff” may commence a new action. The Court emphasized that it has not read “the plaintiff” to include an individual or entity other than the original plaintiff, except in the context of an executor or administrator acting on behalf of a deceased plaintiff. The court distinguished the case from George v. Mt. Sinai Hosp., where the action was allowed to proceed because it was the same person whose rights were being vindicated, albeit in a different capacity (administratrix). Here, RIC sought to enforce its own rights, not the rights of RNY. Allowing RIC to proceed would open a new avenue in the law and potentially revive stale claims. The court noted that a diligent corporate suitor should determine which entity has been wronged before bringing suit. The court stated, “To grant the right conferred by [the statute] to a different party plaintiff, representing in part different interests, would require the placing of a construction upon the section plainly beyond its intent and purpose.” Furthermore, the court was wary of the ramifications of allowing a “different, related corporate entity” the benefit of the grace period, given the potential for varying degrees of corporate relationships. Therefore, the Court preferred to adhere to the statute’s plain language and consistent application.

  • People v. Hansen, 7 N.Y.3d 656 (2006): Waiver of Statute of Limitations Defense by Guilty Plea

    7 N.Y.3d 656 (2006)

    A defendant who pleads guilty waives the right to assert a statute of limitations defense, as it is neither a jurisdictional matter nor a right of constitutional dimension that survives a guilty plea.

    Summary

    Defendant appealed his conviction for rape and sodomy, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to move to dismiss the indictment on statute of limitations grounds. The New York Court of Appeals held that the defendant waived this defense by pleading guilty. The Court reasoned that a guilty plea marks the end of a criminal case and generally prevents review of claims relating to pre-plea rights deprivations. The statute of limitations defense is waivable and does not fall within the limited exceptions for jurisdictional or fundamental constitutional rights that survive a guilty plea. Therefore, the defendant’s claim was foreclosed by his guilty plea.

    Facts

    In 1993, a sexual assault occurred. The incident was reported, and a semen sample was collected. The case was closed as “unfounded” due to the victim’s reluctance to pursue the complaint. In 1996, the defendant, while imprisoned on unrelated charges, provided a blood sample for a DNA database. In 2003, the sample linked him to the 1993 assault. He was subsequently charged with rape and sodomy.

    Procedural History

    The defendant filed a pro se motion to dismiss the indictment based on the statute of limitations, but the court refused to entertain it because he was represented by counsel. The court warned defense counsel against frivolous motions. The defendant’s attorney did not file the motion. Subsequently, the defendant pleaded guilty to rape and sodomy, waiving his right to appeal. He later moved to vacate the judgment, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court denied the motion, holding that the guilty plea waived the statute of limitations defense. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant waived his statute of limitations defense by pleading guilty.
    2. Whether the defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the statute of limitations defense is not a jurisdictional matter or a constitutional right that survives a guilty plea.
    2. No, because under the circumstances of this case, the defendant waived the right to have the issue reviewed; further, counsel secured a favorable plea agreement.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on precedent establishing that a guilty plea generally waives claims relating to pre-plea deprivations of rights. The Court distinguished between claims that survive a guilty plea (jurisdictional matters or fundamental constitutional rights) and those that are foreclosed (preindictment misconduct, selective prosecution, etc.). The Court stated that “[a] plea of guilty…marks the end of a criminal case, not a gateway to further litigation.” The statute of limitations, governed by CPL 30.10, is not a jurisdictional or constitutional right and can be waived. The court noted the right to assert this defense can be waived (see People v Mills, 1 NY3d 269 [2003]). The court further stated that the defendant waived his right to have this issue reviewed, due to his plea and the fact that counsel secured a favorable plea agreement. The court cited People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248 [2006] stating that a valid waiver of the right to appeal includes the waiver of the right to invoke the Appellate Division’s interest of justice jurisdiction to reduce the sentence.