Matter of Marcellius F., 679 N.E.2d 227 (N.Y. 1997)

The notice provision of Family Court Act § 330.2(2), requiring notice of intent to introduce a juvenile’s statements at a fact-finding hearing, does not extend to statements made to non-public servant witnesses, such as social workers not acting as agents of law enforcement.

Summary

This case concerns whether a presentment agency in a juvenile delinquency proceeding must provide notice to the respondent of its intent to introduce statements made by the juvenile to a non-public servant witness. A juvenile was found to have committed acts that would constitute criminal possession of a weapon if committed by an adult. The New York Court of Appeals held that Family Court Act § 330.2(2) does not require notice for statements made to witnesses like the social worker in this case because the statute’s legislative history and related Criminal Procedure Law sections suggest the notice requirement is limited to statements made to public servants.

Facts

A mother found a gun in her 15-year-old son Marcellius’ closet. Distraught, she contacted her social worker for guidance. The social worker went to the apartment and asked Marcellius about the gun, and he admitted to purchasing it from a drug addict. The social worker advised the mother to contact the police. The responding officer was shown the gun and arrested Marcellius.

Procedural History

At the fact-finding hearing, Marcellius’ counsel objected to the social worker’s testimony because he had not received prior notice as required by Family Court Act § 330.2(2). The Family Court overruled the objection, finding that the statements were not made to a law enforcement official. The Appellate Division affirmed the Family Court’s order without specifically addressing the notice issue. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

Issue(s)

Whether, in a juvenile delinquency proceeding, the presentment agency must provide pre-fact-finding hearing notice under Family Court Act § 330.2(2) before introducing statements made by the juvenile to a person who is not a public servant.

Holding

No, because the notice provision of Family Court Act § 330.2(2) does not extend to testimony from witnesses who are not public servants or acting as agents of law enforcement, as supported by legislative intent and precedential analysis.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals relied on the precedent set in People v. Mirenda, 23 N.Y.2d 439, which addressed a similar statutory interpretation issue regarding the predecessor to CPL 710.30, after which Family Court Act § 330.2 was modeled. Mirenda held that the District Attorney is not required to notify defendants of admissions made to private parties who are not police agents. The Court reasoned that the purpose of the notice statute is to provide defendants adequate time to prepare their case for questioning the voluntariness of a confession or admission made to law enforcement, not to serve as a pretrial discovery device.

The Court also noted that when Family Court Act § 330.2(2) was originally drafted, it cross-referenced CPL 710.20, which included language limiting its application to statements made to public servants. Although CPL 710.20 was later amended to remove the public servant limitation, the Court found that the lack of symmetry indicates a legislative oversight and that the judiciary should not interpret the statute in a way that amends the requirement without clear legislative intent. Further support was found in Family Court Act § 331.2, which explicitly does not require disclosure of statements made to persons other than public officials and their agents.

The Court concluded that, given the significant consequences of eliminating the limitation, the original public servant limitation should remain operative until the Legislature explicitly removes it. As the Court stated, “Because the practical and theoretical consequences are so sweeping and significant with respect to the operation of the Family Court Act § 330.2 (2) notice requirements, we conclude it is not warranted or prudent for the judiciary to interpret in such a way as to amend the requirement to eliminate an evidently intended limitation.”