New York Law Review

Tag: State Prosecution

  • McNeil v. Supreme Court, 73 N.Y.2d 563 (1989): Double Jeopardy and Federal vs. State Prosecutions

    McNeil v. Supreme Court, 73 N.Y.2d 563 (1989)

    Under New York’s statutory double jeopardy protections, a prior federal conspiracy conviction for stealing funds does bar a subsequent state prosecution for larceny based on the same underlying theft, as the federal government is not considered “another state” under CPL 40.20(2)(g).

    Summary

    Thomas McNeil was indicted in New York for grand larceny. He had previously been convicted in federal court for conspiracy to transport stolen property interstate, based on the same underlying theft. McNeil sought to dismiss the state charges, arguing double jeopardy. The New York Court of Appeals held that the state prosecution was barred. The Court reasoned that the federal conviction was based on the same criminal transaction as the state charges, and that the exception in CPL 40.20(2)(g), which allows prosecution for a “result offense” after a conspiracy prosecution in “another state”, did not apply to prior federal prosecutions. Therefore, the writ of prohibition barring Thomas McNeil’s prosecution was granted.

    Facts

    Thomas McNeil and his brother were charged in New York with stealing funds from their respective companies, Triad and Everest. Prior to being apprehended on the state charges, McNeil was indicted federally for interstate transportation of stolen property and conspiracy to commit that crime, for stealing funds from Triad and Everest and transporting them to Switzerland. McNeil pleaded guilty to the federal charges. He was then arraigned on the State charges.

    Procedural History

    McNeil moved to dismiss the state charges based on statutory double jeopardy grounds (CPL 40.20). The Supreme Court denied the motion, finding an exception applied. McNeil then sought a writ of prohibition from the Appellate Division to prevent the state prosecution, but the Appellate Division denied the petition. The New York Court of Appeals granted permission to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the federal and state prosecutions were based on the same criminal transaction, triggering double jeopardy protections under CPL 40.20(2)?
    2. Whether the exception in CPL 40.20(2)(g), for conspiracy prosecutions in “another state,” applies to prior federal conspiracy convictions, thus permitting the state prosecution?
    3. Whether the exceptions in CPL 40.20(2)(a) or (b) apply, permitting the state prosecution despite the federal conviction?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the federal conspiracy charge encompassed the same underlying theft that formed the basis of the state larceny charges.
    2. No, because the term “another state” in CPL 40.20(2)(g) does not include the federal government.
    3. No, because the offenses did not have substantially different elements, and the statutes were not designed to prevent very different kinds of harm or evil.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court found that the federal conspiracy charge, which included the theft of funds as an overt act, was part of the same criminal transaction as the state larceny charges. The court emphasized that “the significant inquiry is not what overt acts were actually charged as part of the conspiracy but whether ‘the particular activity for which the State seeks to hold defendants responsible could have been alleged to support the [Federal] conspiracy charge’” (citing People v. Abbamonte). The Court rejected the argument that the federal and state prosecutions were not based on the same criminal transaction, stating that the conspiracy count charged the very conduct that constitutes the crime of larceny.

    Regarding CPL 40.20(2)(g), the Court held that the plain language of the statute limits the exception to prior prosecutions in “another state,” which does not include the federal government. The Court reasoned that when the Legislature intends to broaden the scope of an exception to the double jeopardy bar, it does so explicitly, as seen in other subdivisions of CPL 40.20(2). The court stated, “[w]hen the language of a statute is unambiguous, it is to be construed ‘according to its natural and most obvious sense, without resorting to an artificial or forced construction.’”

    The Court also rejected the People’s argument that CPL 40.20(2)(a) and (b) permitted the state prosecution. It found that the acts establishing the state and federal offenses were not clearly distinguishable. The Court stated, “it is the same theft ‘charged and proved and for which a conviction was had’” that constitutes the state larceny charges. Additionally, the Court held that the federal and state offenses were designed to prevent the same evils (theft and protecting property owners), thus making the exception in CPL 40.20(2)(b) inapplicable.

  • People v. Lo Cicero, 14 N.Y.2d 374 (1964): Double Jeopardy and Federal Acquittal

    People v. Lo Cicero, 14 N.Y.2d 374 (1964)

    A prior acquittal in federal court for a crime arising from the same act bars a subsequent state prosecution for the same crime or legally constituent elements thereof, but not for separate offenses.

    Summary

    Lo Cicero was acquitted in federal court on charges of robbery obstructing interstate commerce. He was subsequently indicted in state court on charges arising from the same incident: robbery, grand larceny, assault, and kidnapping. Lo Cicero moved to dismiss the state indictment based on double jeopardy. The New York Court of Appeals held that the federal acquittal barred the state prosecution for robbery, grand larceny, and assault because these charges were based on the same act and could have been proven in the federal case. However, the kidnapping charge was a separate offense not included in the federal prosecution and thus not barred.

    Facts

    Lo Cicero and co-defendants were indicted in federal court for hijacking a truck containing goods in interstate commerce. Before the federal trial, Lo Cicero was also indicted in state court on charges stemming from the same hijacking incident: robbery, grand larceny, assault, and kidnapping of the truck driver. Lo Cicero was acquitted in federal court.

    Procedural History

    The Kings County Court granted Lo Cicero’s motion to dismiss the state indictment based on double jeopardy following his acquittal in federal court. The Appellate Division reversed, reinstating the indictment. Lo Cicero appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a prior acquittal in federal court bars a subsequent state prosecution for the same crime arising from the same act?
    2. Whether a prior acquittal in federal court bars a subsequent state prosecution for legally constituent elements of the same crime arising from the same act?
    3. Whether a prior acquittal in federal court bars a subsequent state prosecution for a separate offense arising from the same incident?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because New York Penal Law § 33 and Code of Criminal Procedure § 139 consider the federal government as “another state or country” for double jeopardy purposes, and a man shall not be twice vexed for the same cause.
    2. Yes, because the state charges of grand larceny and assault were legally constituent elements of the robbery charge for which Lo Cicero was acquitted in federal court.
    3. No, because the kidnapping charge was a separate offense not included in the federal prosecution.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals interpreted New York Penal Law § 33 and Code of Criminal Procedure § 139, which address double jeopardy, to include the federal government within the meaning of “another state or country.” The court reasoned that a narrow interpretation excluding the federal government would undermine the fundamental principle against being twice tried for the same offense. The court noted that the statutes should be construed to avoid constitutional doubts, especially considering evolving interpretations of double jeopardy protections. The court distinguished the kidnapping charge from the other charges, stating that because the federal prosecution did not include that separate offense, the state prosecution was not barred.

    The court stated, “We can think of no reason why the considerations underlying the admitted immunity predicated on a former judgment of a sister State or a foreign country are less compelling in regard to the Federal jurisdiction; nor have any been called to our attention by the People.” They also stated, “Since the language of both section 33 of the Penal Law and section 139 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, though not entirely clear, will bear the construction which so clearly fulfills the purpose for which they exist, we hold that the United States comes within the definition of ‘another state or country’ as used in the two relevant statutes.”

    Regarding collateral estoppel, the court held that it could not be applied against the State of New York because the state was not a party to the federal prosecution and had no control over that case. Collateral estoppel requires that the party sought to be estopped be identical to, or in strict privity with, the party who previously had their day in court and lost.