New York Law Review

Tag: state law

  • Matter of Committee to Stop the Airport v. Board of Elections, 66 N.Y.2d 163 (1985): Limits on Referendums that Contradict State Law

    66 N.Y.2d 163 (1985)

    A proposed city referendum that directly conflicts with a state statute is invalid and can be removed from the ballot.

    Summary

    This case concerns a proposed New York City referendum that sought to restrict the city’s ability to use property and funds for a military installation involved with nuclear weapons. The Committee to Stop the Airport sought to have the referendum removed from the ballot. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ decisions, holding that the referendum was invalid because it conflicted with New York State Law § 50(2), which grants cities the power to dispose of land to the United States for military use, notwithstanding any city charter provisions. The court found that because the referendum sought to deprive the city of a power granted by the legislature, it was facially invalid.

    Facts

    A proposed referendum sought to amend the New York City Charter § 67. The amendment aimed to prohibit the Board of Estimate from approving the sale, lease, or other disposition of city property for a military installation involved in carrying or storing nuclear weapons. It further sought to prohibit the Board from granting franchises, permits, or licenses for such purposes, as well as from approving appropriations of funds to facilitate the development of such installations.

    Procedural History

    The Special Term found the proposed amendment unconstitutional as it interfered with the federal government’s power to provide for national defense. It also found the amendment called for an unauthorized citywide opinion poll. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed, agreeing that the amendment violated the Federal Constitution and was also invalid under State Law § 50(2). The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a proposed city referendum that seeks to restrict the city’s power to dispose of land for federal military installations, when that power is expressly granted by state law, is invalid and can be removed from the ballot.

    Holding

    Yes, because State Law § 50(2) expressly authorizes cities to sell, lease, exchange, or donate land to the United States for military use, notwithstanding any city charter provisions. Therefore, a referendum seeking to deprive the city of this power is invalid on its face.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision solely on state statutory grounds, finding it unnecessary to reach federal constitutional questions. The court emphasized that State Law § 50(2) grants cities the power to dispose of land to the United States for military use, even if it conflicts with city charter provisions. The proposed referendum directly contradicted this state law by attempting to preclude the city from approving the sale, lease, or exchange of city property for a federal military installation. Because the referendum sought to deprive the city authorities of a right and power granted by the legislature, the court held that it was invalid on its face and could have no legal effect if enacted. The court quoted the statute directly, noting that the state law authorizes cities to dispose of land for military reservations “notwithstanding the provisions of any charter or any other statute”. Because the disposition and use of city land was at the core of the controversy, the Court found it inappropriate to submit the referendum to the electorate.

  • Robin v. Incorporated Village of Hempstead, 30 N.Y.2d 347 (1972): Preemption of Abortion Regulation by State Law

    Robin v. Incorporated Village of Hempstead, 30 N.Y.2d 347 (1972)

    When the state has demonstrated a clear intent to comprehensively regulate a particular field, such as medical procedures, local municipalities are preempted from enacting ordinances in the same area unless explicitly authorized by the state.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a village ordinance restricting abortions to hospitals is valid when state law already regulates the practice of medicine and abortions. The Court of Appeals held that the ordinance was invalid because the State of New York had preempted the field of abortion regulation through comprehensive legislation and administrative rules. The court reasoned that allowing municipalities to create their own abortion regulations would undermine the state’s uniform policy and that the village lacked specific authorization to enact such an ordinance.

    Facts

    Dr. Charles Robin, a physician specializing in obstetrics and gynecology, performed abortions at his office in the Incorporated Village of Hempstead. The Village enacted an ordinance requiring all abortions to be performed in state-licensed and accredited hospitals. The Bill Baird Center, a family planning and birth control center where Dr. Robin also worked, did not meet these hospital requirements. The Village sought to enjoin Dr. Robin and the Center from performing abortions in violation of the ordinance.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court, Nassau County, consolidated two actions and declared the village ordinance valid, enjoining Dr. Robin and the Center from violating it. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the ordinance was outside the scope of the Village’s powers. The Village appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Village of Hempstead’s ordinance, restricting abortions to hospitals, is valid given the State’s existing regulation of medicine and abortions.

    Holding

    1. No, because the State of New York has preempted the field of abortion regulation, and the Village lacked specific authorization to enact its own ordinance.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the State had demonstrated a clear intent to comprehensively regulate the practice of medicine, including abortions, through the Education Law, Public Health Law, and amendments to the Penal Law. The Public Health Law explicitly gives the Department of Health “the central, comprehensive responsibility for the development and administration of the state’s policy with respect to hospital and related services”.

    The court emphasized that the State Department of Health had amended the State Hospital Code to regulate abortions in both hospitals and “independent out-of-hospital health facilities”. This indicated the State’s intention to occupy the entire field of abortion regulation, prohibiting additional regulation by local authorities.

    The Court cited precedent, including Good Humor Corp. v. City of New York, 290 N.Y. 312 (1943), to support the principle that a municipality lacks authority to legislate on a matter when the State has expressed a policy to preempt the subject, “unless it is specifically empowered so to do in terms clear and explicit”. The Court found no such clear and explicit authorization in this case.

    While villages have the general power to enact ordinances for the health of their inhabitants under Village Law § 89, subd. 59, this is not a delegation of the entire police power of the state and is limited to matters of an inherently local nature. The Court noted that there were no “special conditions” concerning the performance of abortions in the Village of Hempstead, as opposed to the rest of the State, which would warrant the local ordinance.

    The Court also pointed out that when the Legislature amended the Penal Law to define a “justifiable abortional act,” it did not specify the place where such an act must be performed. The Legislature had considered bills that would have required abortions to be performed in certified hospitals, but these bills did not become law, indicating a deliberate choice not to impose such a restriction.

    The Court acknowledged that health and safety considerations might justify requiring abortions to be performed in hospitals, but emphasized that the decision was solely about the Village of Hempstead lacking the power to enact the ordinance, not about the wisdom of such a restriction.