Tag: State Land Liability

  • Sega v. State, 60 N.Y.2d 183 (1983): State Immunity for Recreational Use of Land

    Sega v. State, 60 N.Y.2d 183 (1983)

    New York General Obligations Law § 9-103 protects the State from liability for injuries sustained by individuals using state-owned land for recreational activities, absent willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether New York General Obligations Law § 9-103, which limits landowners’ liability for recreational use of their property, applies to the State of New York. The Court of Appeals held that the statute does apply to the State, shielding it from liability for injuries sustained on state-owned land used for recreation, unless the State acted willfully or maliciously. The court rejected the argument that the statute codified common law classifications of trespasser, licensee, or invitee, instead finding it imposed a single standard of care.

    Facts

    In Sega, the claimant was injured while hiking in the Catskill Forest Preserve when a pipe railing she was sitting on gave way. The railing had been previously damaged, but state employees determined no repairs were necessary after visually inspecting it. In Cutway, the claimant was injured while riding an all-terrain vehicle on state-owned land when he struck a steel cable gate that was difficult to see. The State had posted a sign barring public vehicles but did not warn specifically of the cable.

    Procedural History

    In Sega, the Court of Claims found the State not negligent. The Appellate Division considered General Obligations Law § 9-103 and found no willful or intentional act by the State. In Cutway, the Court of Claims found the State 80% liable based on negligence, despite the application of § 9-103. The Appellate Division affirmed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether General Obligations Law § 9-103 applies to the State of New York, thereby limiting its liability for injuries sustained on state-owned land used for recreational purposes.

    Holding

    Yes, because the plain language of § 9-103 includes “any owner, lessee or occupant of premises,” without limiting it to private landowners, and refers to Environmental Conservation Law provisions concerning state-owned lands.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized the unambiguous language of § 9-103, stating that it applies to “any owner, lessee or occupant of premises.” The court found no reason to limit the statute’s scope to private landowners, especially considering its reference to ECL provisions related to state-owned fishing and hunting preserves. The court rejected the argument that the statute codified common-law principles of premises liability. Instead, it established a single standard of care, requiring a plaintiff to prove a willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition. The court noted that the policy of New York is to determine a landowner’s duty of care based on foreseeability, not on rigid classifications like trespasser, licensee, and invitee, citing Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233. The Court stated: “On its face, section 9-103 imposes a single standard. We see no reason to reintroduce confusion and conflict by interpreting’ the statute as a retention of the common-law classifications.” In Cutway, the State may have been negligent, but there was no evidence of willful or malicious conduct. In Sega, even presuming all evidence was presented, there was no proof of willful or malicious failure to warn. The court reasoned that the standard under § 9-103 “requires a graver act than mere negligence before liability may be imposed”.