New York Law Review

Tag: State Constitutional Law

  • Tunick v. Safir, 94 N.Y.2d 709 (2000): Court Declines to Answer Certified Question Due to Potential Mootness and Lack of State Constitutional Argument

    Tunick v. Safir, 94 N.Y.2d 709 (2000)

    New York’s Court of Appeals may decline to answer certified questions from a federal court when the issue may become moot during the certification process, especially if a key issue like a state constitutional question was not adequately raised by the parties.

    Summary

    The Second Circuit Court of Appeals certified three questions to the New York Court of Appeals regarding the legality of a planned nude photography shoot in public, specifically whether it constituted a form of “entertainment or performance” exempt from public lewdness laws and whether those laws violated the New York Constitution. The New York Court of Appeals declined to answer, citing concerns about potential mootness, as the photo shoot could occur while the certification process was ongoing. Further, the court noted that the parties had not adequately raised or briefed the state constitutional issue, making it inappropriate for the court to address it in the first instance.

    Facts

    Spencer Tunick planned a nude photography shoot involving 75 to 100 people on a public street in New York City. City officials threatened to arrest participants under New York’s public lewdness laws (N.Y. Penal Law §§ 245.01 and 245.02). Tunick sought an injunction to prevent the arrests, arguing the photo shoot was artistic expression protected by the First Amendment.

    Procedural History

    The District Court granted a preliminary injunction in favor of Tunick. The Second Circuit stayed the injunction pending appeal and expedited the appeal process. The Second Circuit then certified three questions to the New York Court of Appeals. A dissenting judge opposed certification, suggesting the issue could become moot. The New York Court of Appeals then declined to answer the certified questions.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the New York Court of Appeals should answer certified questions from a federal court when: (1) the underlying issue may become moot during the certification process, and (2) a significant issue (like a state constitutional question) was not adequately raised and briefed by the parties in the lower courts?

    Holding

    No, because: (1) the delay inherent in the certification process could lead to mootness if the Second Circuit lifted the stay and allowed the photo shoot to occur and (2) the court deemed it inappropriate to address the state constitutional issue when the parties had not adequately presented it.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court weighed the benefits of answering the certified questions against the potential for the case to become moot. The court recognized New York’s certification procedure provides great value when Federal appellate courts are faced with questions of New York law on which the Court of Appeals has not previously spoken. However, the court was concerned about the already lengthy delay in adjudicating the plaintiff’s civil rights claims. The court emphasized the need for expedited review in cases involving prior restraints on artistic conduct. Because answering the questions would add months to the case, the photo shoot could take place, thus terminating the plaintiff’s action.

    The court also noted the state constitutional issue was not raised, briefed, or argued by the parties themselves. The court stated, “This Court could not responsibly engage on that question where the parties to the litigation have not sought relief under this State’s Constitution and the issue would be first briefed and raised in our Court.”

    The court underscored the value of the certification procedure but found that in this particular case, the potential for mootness and the lack of adequate briefing on the state constitutional issue outweighed the benefits of answering the certified questions.

  • Schulz v. State, 91 N.Y.2d 333 (1998): Defines ‘Single Work or Purpose’ for State Bond Acts

    Schulz v. State, 91 N.Y.2d 333 (1998)

    A state bond act satisfies the “single work or purpose” requirement of the New York Constitution if its subcategories are directly related to a single, categorical purpose, such as improving the state’s environment.

    Summary

    This case concerns a challenge to the Clean Water/Clean Air Bond Act of 1996, arguing that it violated the New York State Constitution by not adhering to the “single work or purpose” requirement for bond acts and improperly incorporating existing laws by reference. The Court of Appeals held that the Bond Act satisfied the constitutional requirement because its various subcategories (safe drinking water, waste facilities, contaminated properties, air/water quality, and open spaces) were all related to the overarching goal of improving the state’s environment. The Court also found that the petitioners lacked standing to assert the incorporation by reference claim.

    Facts

    The Clean Water/Clean Air Bond Act of 1996 authorized $1.75 billion in state debt for environmental projects. The Act specified allocations for safe drinking water, water quality improvements (including open space conservation), solid waste facilities, contaminated property restoration, and air quality enhancement. Implementing legislation further detailed how the funds would be spent, including specific projects for various waterways and environmental restoration efforts.

    Procedural History

    Petitioners initiated a combined declaratory judgment action and Article 78 proceeding challenging the Bond Act’s constitutionality. The Supreme Court denied a preliminary injunction, finding the petitioners lacked standing and the Act constitutional. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding standing only for the challenge under Article VII, § 11. The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Bond Act violates Article VII, § 11 of the New York Constitution by not adhering to the “single work or purpose” requirement?
    2. Whether the Bond Act violates Article III, § 16 of the New York Constitution by incorporating existing laws by reference without explicitly including them in the Act?

    Holding

    1. No, because the Bond Act’s subcategories are directly related to the single, categorical purpose of improving the state’s environment.
    2. No, because the petitioners lack standing to assert a violation of Article III, § 16.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court first addressed standing, noting that citizen-taxpayers generally lack standing to challenge state bond acts. However, an exception exists when a bond act infringes upon explicit voter protections in Article VII, § 11, which mandates a public referendum for long-term public debt and requires that it be “for some single work or purpose, to be distinctly specified therein.” This prevents combining unrelated purposes to secure approval and ensures voters can intelligently evaluate the act’s purpose.

    The Court distinguished the present case from People ex rel. Hopkins v. Board of Supervisors, noting that Hopkins interpreted the older, more restrictive “single work or object” clause, which was replaced in 1938 with the more flexible “single work or purpose” standard. The Court stated that the current standard precludes bond issues aimed at generic purposes lacking a discernible common theme. However, it allows funding multiple projects with a common goal. The Court found that the Bond Act satisfied this standard, as its subcategories were directly related to improving the state’s environment.

    The Court emphasized that preserving parks, open spaces, and historic sites is an integral part of the state’s environmental management plan, citing the State Environmental Quality Review Act and the Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation Law. According to the court, “the preservation and restoration of parks, open spaces and sites connected with our historical and cultural heritage have long been considered part and parcel of the State’s over-all environmental management plan.”

    Regarding the “distinctly specified” requirement, the Court held that the Bond Act satisfied this by clearly stating its purpose of improving the state’s environment. Listing specific projects in separate legislation was permissible, as the Constitution only requires the act to distinctly specify the single work or purpose, not to enumerate every activity undertaken. The court reasoned that “[t]hat the particular projects for which the proceeds were to be appropriated are listed in a separate legislative enactment is of no legal consequence in this context because the Constitution requires only that the bond act “distinctly specif[y]” the “single work or purpose” of the bond issue; it does not require a listing of the myriad activities to be undertaken in the service of that work or purpose.”

    Finally, the Court addressed the Article III, § 16 challenge, holding that the petitioners lacked standing. The purpose of this provision is to protect the Legislature from unknowingly incorporating provisions into its acts, not to protect voters in a referendum. The court stated that “[t]hus, the “evil” that article III, § 16 was intended to address is “the possibility of * * * misapprehension or unawareness” among State legislators, not citizens voting in a referendum.” Allowing standing under Article III, § 16 simply because Article VII, § 11 applies would undermine the principle that citizen-taxpayers generally lack standing to challenge bond issues.

  • People v. Skinner, 52 N.Y.2d 24 (1980): Right to Counsel Attaches When Attorney is Retained, Even in Non-Custodial Interrogation

    52 N.Y.2d 24 (1980)

    Once a suspect retains counsel on a matter under investigation, the police cannot interrogate that suspect about the same matter in a non-custodial setting if the suspect’s attorney has instructed the police not to question the suspect in their absence; any waiver of the right to counsel must occur in the presence of the attorney.

    Summary

    Skinner was a suspect in a murder investigation and had retained an attorney who instructed the police not to question him outside of his presence. Despite this instruction, police served Skinner with an order to appear in a lineup, and then proceeded to question him about the homicide, obtaining incriminating statements. The New York Court of Appeals held that Skinner’s state constitutional rights were violated. Because Skinner had retained counsel specifically for the matter under investigation and his attorney instructed the police not to question him in the attorney’s absence, the police could not elicit statements from Skinner in a non-custodial setting without violating his right to counsel. This decision emphasizes the importance of the attorney-client relationship and the state’s obligation to respect it.

    Facts

    Diane Snell was murdered in June 1975. Police suspected Skinner, who had been seen with her the night before. Skinner was questioned twice and submitted to polygraph examinations, but did not confess. In the early fall of 1975, Skinner retained attorney Leo Fallon due to the repeated police questioning. Fallon informed the police department that he represented Skinner and instructed them not to question Skinner without him. In March 1977, police served Skinner with an order to show cause regarding a lineup. After serving the order, detectives, knowing Skinner was represented, questioned him about the homicide and obtained incriminating statements. Skinner was then taken to the police station, but refused to make a statement until he spoke with his attorney.

    Procedural History

    Skinner moved to suppress the statements made on March 10, 1977. The hearing court denied the motion, finding the questioning was non-custodial. Skinner was convicted of first-degree manslaughter. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding the statements were admissible because the interrogation was non-custodial and unrelated to service of the order. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police violated Skinner’s New York constitutional right to counsel when they interrogated him in a non-custodial setting about a matter for which he had retained counsel, after his attorney instructed the police not to question him in his absence.

    Holding

    Yes, because Skinner retained counsel specifically on the matter under investigation, and the police knew this, they could not question him on the same matter in a non-custodial setting after his attorney had instructed them not to question him in his absence. Any waiver of this right had to occur in the presence of his attorney.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on the New York State Constitution’s guarantees of the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to counsel, and due process. The court emphasized that the right to counsel includes the right to have an attorney present while considering whether to waive rights. The court stated that “where, as here, a defendant is known to have invoked the right to and obtained the services of counsel on the matter about which the person is questioned, the State may not use statements elicited from that person in the absence of a waiver of counsel made in the presence of the attorney.”

    The court distinguished the case from situations where the non-waiver rule was deemed inapplicable in non-custodial settings. The court cited *People v. Townes* and *People v. Roberson*, cases that suppressed statements made in the absence of counsel even though the defendants were not in custody. Here, Skinner had retained counsel specifically because of the police investigation, indicating he felt unable to deal with the authorities without legal assistance. His attorney had interceded, demanding the police not question him, a demand the police ignored on March 10. The court rejected the argument that absent formal commencement of a criminal action, the defendant could be questioned with impunity after service of an order to show cause simply because he was not in custody.

    The Court also reasoned that allowing the police to question a represented individual in a non-custodial setting renders the right to counsel illusory. The effect of a waiver of counsel is the same regardless of whether the setting is custodial or non-custodial; therefore, the waiver’s validity should be equally scrutinized. The court found the motivations of the police irrelevant, as the impact on the right to counsel remains the same.

    The Court acknowledged the People’s argument that they depend on statements of the “guilty” to further an investigation. However, the Court countered that law enforcement officials must operate within the bounds of our State constitutional guarantees of the privilege against self incrimination and the right to counsel.

  • Wein v. State of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 136 (1976): State’s Authority to Borrow and Aid Municipalities During Fiscal Crisis

    39 N.Y.2d 136 (1976)

    The State constitutionally may give or lend its money (as distinguished from its credit) to assist a municipal or other public corporation for a public purpose, and may engage in short-term borrowing in advance of anticipated taxes and revenues to fund appropriations previously made, provided the short-term borrowing is genuinely in anticipation of committed taxes or other revenues.

    Summary

    In the midst of New York City’s severe financial crisis, a taxpayer challenged the constitutionality of state legislation that appropriated funds to the city and the Municipal Assistance Corporation (MAC), funded by short-term state borrowing. The Court of Appeals held that the appropriations, funded by short-term revenue anticipation notes (RANs), did not violate the state constitution’s prohibition against lending the state’s credit to public corporations. The court reasoned that the state was giving cash in hand, obtained through permissible short-term borrowing against anticipated revenues, and that these RANs were not demonstrably part of a prohibited “rollover” of debt.

    Facts

    New York City faced imminent bankruptcy due to a severe fiscal crisis. The State Legislature convened an extraordinary session and passed the New York State Financial Emergency Act for the City of New York. Sections 22 and 23 of the Act appropriated $250 million to the city and $500 million to MAC as advances. These appropriations were to be funded by short-term revenue anticipation notes (RANs). The city and MAC were required to enter into repayment agreements with the State Budget Director and issue notes and bonds payable to the state. The state then sold RANs to fund these appropriations. The plaintiff, a taxpayer, argued that these appropriations, funded by short-term state borrowing, constituted an unconstitutional gift or loan of the state’s credit.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court summarily declared the appropriations constitutional. The taxpayer appealed directly to the Court of Appeals, challenging the statute’s constitutionality under Article VI, Section 3(b)(2) of the New York Constitution and CPLR 5601(b)(2).

    Issue(s)

    Whether appropriations to New York City and MAC, funded by short-term state borrowing in the form of revenue or tax anticipation notes, constitute a gift or loan of the credit of the state to public corporations, in violation of Article VII, Section 8(1) of the New York Constitution.

    Holding

    No, because the Constitution does not prohibit the State from giving or lending its money to assist a municipal or other public corporation for a public purpose. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the State from short-term borrowing in advance of anticipated taxes and revenues to fund appropriations previously made, provided the short-term borrowing is genuinely in anticipation of committed taxes or other revenues and not part of a scheme to evade constitutional limitations.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized that the State constitution mandates a balanced budget, implying that any appropriations made after the regular legislative session must be covered by matching revenues. The prohibition against lending the State’s credit was designed to protect the State from the uncertain consequences of incurring future contingent liabilities, especially in light of historical abuses where the State subsidized private companies and ultimately had to cover their debts. While the Constitution prohibits the State from lending its credit, it does not prohibit the State from giving or lending its money to assist a municipal or other public corporation for a public purpose. The Court stated, “[T]he use of short-term borrowing to finance an appropriation of money to a municipal or other public corporation does not violate the prohibition against giving or lending the State’s credit, provided the short-term borrowing is authentically in anticipation of actually committed taxes or other revenues.” The Court found that the RANs in this case were validly issued in authentic anticipation of revenues to be received within one year, noting that at the time of issuance, the State anticipated sufficient taxes and revenues to pay the obligations within one year. The Court cautioned that this device could become a violation if it leads to temporary refinancing in the nature of a “rollover,” emphasizing that the validity depends on the prospect that the RANs will be paid as contemplated. Judge Jasen dissented, arguing that the transactions were an ill-disguised effort to evade the limitations imposed by the Constitution and that the State was essentially laundering city and MAC notes, placing its credit behind them in violation of the Constitution. The dissent warned that the State’s actions might pre-empt the market for its own legitimate borrowing needs. The dissent stated that the legislature was adding “new and massive appropriations after the budget has been adopted and cover them with anticipation notes.”

  • Matter of Ryan v. Rockefeller, 16 N.Y.2d 39 (1965): Federal Court Orders vs. State Constitutional Law

    Matter of Ryan v. Rockefeller, 16 N.Y.2d 39 (1965)

    A state court should generally avoid issuing injunctions that directly conflict with orders issued by a federal court, particularly when the dispute involves the interpretation of the state’s own constitution, and the matter can be definitively resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court.

    Summary

    This case involves a clash between a federal district court order mandating a state legislative election under a reapportionment plan and a New York Court of Appeals decision holding that the plan violated the state constitution. The New York Court of Appeals considered whether a state court injunction could prevent the New York Secretary of State from complying with the federal court order. The court ultimately modified the lower court’s order, but the dissenting judges argued that the injunction should be upheld to avoid a direct confrontation between state and federal judicial power, pending resolution by the U.S. Supreme Court.

    Facts

    Following challenges to the apportionment of the New York State Legislature, a federal district court ordered the election of a new legislature in 1965 based on a 1964 apportionment statute. Simultaneously, the New York Court of Appeals, in Matter of Orans, had already declared the same apportionment statute invalid under the New York Constitution.

    Procedural History

    A lower state court issued an injunction to prevent the election from taking place under the federally mandated plan. The case then reached the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals modified the order, reinstating the injunction against holding an election under the specific plan (Plan A). However, dissenting judges argued for affirming the lower court’s order in its entirety, which would have provided a stronger stance against the Federal Court order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a New York State court should issue an injunction preventing the New York Secretary of State from complying with a Federal District Court order to hold a legislative election based on an apportionment statute that the New York Court of Appeals has already declared unconstitutional under the New York Constitution.

    Holding

    The court modified the order below, reinstating the injunction against holding the election on November 2, 1965, under plan A because a direct confrontation of power ought to be avoided if possible, however the dissenting judges thought the injunction should have been affirmed completely.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The majority recognized the inherent conflict between the state court’s interpretation of its own constitution and the federal court’s order. While modifying the order to reinstate part of the injunction, the court appeared hesitant to create a full-blown constitutional crisis. The dissent, however, forcefully argued that the state court should stand by its interpretation of the state constitution and prevent the election from proceeding under an invalid statute. Judge Bergan stated, “To grant a State court injunction against the enforcement of a Federal court order amounts to a confrontation of power which ought to be avoided if possible, in the interest of orderly government within the Federal Union, entirely aside from the question whether the supremacy clause has true relevance to the internal structure of a State government.”

    The dissent emphasized that the conflict should be resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court, which has the ultimate authority to interpret the Supremacy Clause and determine the validity of the federal court’s order in light of the state constitution. The dissent warned that the current decision created a situation where “a court of one sovereign authority has directed the New York Secretary of State to prepare an election in 1965 and the court of another sovereign authority has prohibited him from doing just that.” This case serves as a reminder of the delicate balance between federal and state judicial power and the importance of seeking resolution through the established appellate process when conflicts arise.