New York Law Review

Tag: state action

  • People v. McLemore, 73 N.Y.2d 340 (1989): Delayed Appeal Due to State Action and Loss of Records

    People v. McLemore, 73 N.Y.2d 340 (1989)

    When a defendant is deprived of their right to appeal due to state action and the records of the trial are lost, making reconstruction or a new trial impossible, the conviction must be vacated and the indictment dismissed, even after a significant passage of time.

    Summary

    McLemore sought to reverse a 1963 New York assault conviction, which was used as an aggravating factor in a Mississippi murder trial where he was sentenced to death. He argued that he was never advised of his right to appeal the 1963 conviction and that the State thwarted his attempts to obtain review. The New York Court of Appeals held that because McLemore was denied his right to appeal due to state action and the trial records were lost, making a new trial impossible, the conviction was vacated, and the indictment dismissed.

    Facts

    In 1963, McLemore was convicted of assault in New York.

    McLemore was not advised of his right to appeal the assault conviction.

    The 1963 New York conviction was later used as an aggravating factor in a Mississippi murder trial, where McLemore was sentenced to death.

    McLemore made several attempts to appeal the 1963 conviction pro se, but these efforts were unsuccessful due to actions by the State.

    The records of McLemore’s 1963 trial were lost.

    Procedural History

    McLemore sought post-conviction relief in Mississippi, challenging the use of the 1963 New York conviction.

    He then sought to reverse the 1963 New York assault conviction.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of resentence, determining that review of the underlying 1963 conviction was unavailable.

    The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the passage of time bars an appeal of a conviction when the defendant was not advised of their right to appeal, made diligent attempts to appeal pro se, and was prevented from obtaining review by the State.

    Whether vacatur of the conviction and dismissal of the indictment is the appropriate remedy when the trial records are lost, and neither reconstruction nor a new trial is possible.

    Holding

    Yes, because the defendant’s right to appeal was thwarted by the state, and the conviction was used as an aggravating factor in a capital case. The passage of time does not bar appeal in these circumstances.

    Yes, because the loss of trial records and the impossibility of reconstruction or a new trial leaves vacatur of the conviction and dismissal of the indictment as the only available remedy.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the passage of time did not bar the appeal due to the unusual circumstances: McLemore was never advised of his right to appeal, he made diligent pro se attempts to appeal, and the State prevented him from obtaining review. The court stated, “It is undisputed that the actions of this State prevented defendant from ever obtaining the review of the conviction to which he was entitled.”

    The Court distinguished its prior holding in People v. Corso, noting that Corso did not involve a situation where the defendant had made timely efforts to raise an appealable issue before the statute imposing time limitations was adopted.

    Because the trial records were lost, making reconstruction or a new trial impossible, the Court determined that the only available remedy was vacatur of the conviction and dismissal of the indictment. The court cited People v. Rivera in support of this remedy.

    The court emphasized the People’s concession that McLemore had raised appealable issues with possible merit and that the records were lost preventing reconstruction or a new trial. This concession significantly influenced the Court’s decision to reverse the Appellate Division’s order.

  • Matter of Wilson, 59 N.Y.2d 461 (1983): State Action and Discriminatory Charitable Trusts

    Matter of Wilson, 59 N.Y.2d 461 (1983)

    When a court applies neutral trust law that neither encourages, affirmatively promotes, nor compels private discrimination, allowing private parties to selectively devise or bequeath their property, that choice is not attributable to the State and therefore not subject to the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection strictures.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is violated when a court permits the administration of private charitable trusts that provide educational benefits exclusively to male students. The Court of Appeals held that judicial facilitation of such trusts does not constitute state action violating equal protection, provided the state law applied is neutral and does not compel or encourage discrimination. The court distinguished between state-mandated discrimination and private choices facilitated by neutral state laws. The court found that the testator’s intent was specific and not impossible to achieve, and that the trusts could be administered by replacing uncooperative trustees or deviating from administrative terms without frustrating the charitable purpose.

    Facts

    Matter of Wilson: A will established a trust to fund the first year of college for male graduates of Canastota High School who excelled in science and chemistry. The school superintendent traditionally certified eligible students, but ceased doing so due to concerns about violating Title IX. The trustee sought a determination of the trust’s validity. Matter of Johnson: A will created a trust to provide scholarships for deserving young men graduating from Croton-Harmon High School whose parents could not afford college. The board of education, acting as trustee, faced a complaint from the National Organization for Women alleging illegal gender-based discrimination.

    Procedural History

    Matter of Wilson: The Surrogate’s Court ordered the trustee to continue administering the trust according to its terms. The Appellate Division modified, exercising cy pres to remove the school superintendent’s certification role, allowing students to apply directly to the trustee. Matter of Johnson: The Surrogate’s Court declined to reform the trust, replacing the school district with a private trustee. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that judicial reformation to substitute trustees would itself violate the Fourteenth Amendment and reformed the trust by eliminating the gender restriction.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether judicial facilitation of gender-restrictive charitable trusts violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    2. Whether the trusts’ limitation of beneficiaries by gender is invalid and incapable of being accomplished as violative of public policy.

    Holding

    1. No, because applying neutral trust principles that permit private discrimination, but do not encourage, affirmatively promote, or compel it, does not constitute state action violating the Fourteenth Amendment.

    2. No, because simply running contrary to public efforts promoting equality of opportunity for women does not justify a per se rule that gender restrictions in private charitable trusts violate public policy.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that charitable trusts are favored in law and that while gender-based discrimination is against public policy, it does not automatically invalidate a gender-restrictive charitable trust. The key is whether the state is compelling or encouraging the discrimination. The court emphasized that the Fourteenth Amendment protects against state action, not private conduct, and that simply permitting private discrimination does not equate to state endorsement. The court distinguished this case from Shelley v. Kraemer, where state courts actively enforced discriminatory covenants. Here, the courts were merely applying neutral trust law, not compelling discriminatory outcomes. The court also noted that invalidating gender restrictions could negatively impact trusts benefiting women, undermining efforts to address historical discrimination. The court found the testators’ intent was specific and not inherently impossible to achieve. The appropriate remedy was to replace uncooperative trustees or deviate from administrative terms, such as the school’s certification role, without altering the trusts’ core purpose. The court stated that “[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the… involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true significance.”

  • Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, Inc., 45 N.Y.2d 152 (1978): State Action and Due Process in Garageman’s Lien Foreclosure

    Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, Inc., 45 N.Y.2d 152 (1978)

    A state’s involvement in authorizing a garageman to conduct an ex parte sale of a bailed automobile to enforce a possessory lien constitutes sufficient state action to trigger the protections of the New York State Constitution’s due process clause, requiring that the owner be afforded an opportunity to be heard before the sale.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that sections of the Lien Law permitting a garageman to sell a vehicle to satisfy a repair or storage lien without a prior hearing violate the due process clause of the New York Constitution. Plaintiff’s car was sold to satisfy a disputed lien. The court found that the state’s authorization of the ex parte sale constituted sufficient state action, and that the owner was entitled to a hearing before being deprived of their property. This decision emphasizes that the New York Constitution can provide greater protection of individual rights than the Federal Constitution.

    Facts

    Plaintiff’s husband took her car to Dell Buick-Cadillac for an engine replacement. A dispute arose over the work and storage charges. Plaintiff received a “Notice of Lien and Sale” indicating a lien amount and a planned public auction. The amount due was repeatedly modified by Dell. Ultimately, the car, worth significantly more than the claimed debt, was sold to Dell at auction for the amount of the claimed lien.

    Procedural History

    Plaintiff sued for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming the Lien Law’s sale provisions violated due process rights. Special Term denied summary judgment for the plaintiff. The Appellate Division modified, granting judgment to the plaintiff, declaring the relevant sections of the Lien Law unconstitutional, and certified a question to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the statutory authorization afforded a garageman to foreclose his possessory statutory lien for repair and storage charges, by means of a public sale of the vehicle in his possession, violates the due process clause of the New York State Constitution?

    Holding

    Yes, because the state has so entwined itself into the debtor-creditor relationship as to constitute sufficient and meaningful State participation which triggers the protections afforded by the New York Constitution.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while the U.S. Supreme Court has established a specific threshold for state action under the Fourteenth Amendment, the New York Constitution can provide greater protection. The court emphasized that New York’s due process clause lacks explicit state action language, allowing for a more flexible application. It found that the state’s involvement in the garageman’s lien foreclosure was significant because: the state authorized the enforcement of the lien by ex parte sale, encouraging creditors to bypass the courts; the state insulates the garageman from liability; and the Department of Motor Vehicles recognizes and records the transfer of title. The court stated that the power to resolve disputes has always been deemed one of the essential attributes of sovereignty. By permitting the possessory lienor to take those steps necessary to foreclose his lien in a nonjudicial setting where the power of sale is premised on possession alone, the State has permitted the garageman to arrogate to himself the exclusive power of the sovereign to resolve disputes. “Implementation of dispute settlement, irrespective of the strength of the competing interests of the parties, is the function of the judiciary, and is not dependent on custom or the will of strategically placed individuals, but on the common-law model” (Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375). Due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before deprivation of a significant property interest. The court rejected the argument that existing remedies like injunctions or replevin actions were sufficient protection, finding them uncertain and inaccessible for many debtors. The court held that the sale provisions of sections 200, 201, 202 and 204 of the Lien Law violate the due process clause of the New York Constitution. The garageman’s right to retain his possessory lien is unaffected by this decision, but he may not sell the vehicle to satisfy his claim unless and until a method is devised, consistent with due process, of affording the owner some opportunity to be heard.

  • People v. Horman, 22 N.Y.2d 378 (1968): Admissibility of Evidence Obtained by Private Citizens

    People v. Horman, 22 N.Y.2d 378 (1968)

    The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unlawful searches and seizures applies only to governmental action; evidence obtained unlawfully by private citizens is admissible in criminal prosecutions.

    Summary

    Horman was apprehended by store detectives for shoplifting. A subsequent search by the store’s security manager revealed a loaded pistol. Horman was acquitted of shoplifting but convicted of unlawful possession of a weapon, after the trial court denied his motion to suppress the pistol. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to searches conducted by private citizens, and therefore, the evidence was admissible, even if the search was unlawful. The court emphasized that earlier Supreme Court rulings had not extended the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained by private actors.

    Facts

    Two store detectives apprehended Horman outside a department store for alleged shoplifting.
    Horman was taken to the store’s security office.
    The security manager requested Horman to empty his pockets, which he did.
    The security manager then “frisked” Horman, discovering a loaded semi-automatic pistol, which was forcibly taken from him.

    Procedural History

    Horman was indicted for felonious possession of a loaded firearm.
    The trial court denied Horman’s motion to suppress the pistol.
    Horman was convicted of criminal possession of a firearm as a misdemeanor in Nassau County Court.
    The Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed the conviction.
    The New York Court of Appeals granted review.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Fourth Amendment requires the exclusion of evidence in criminal prosecutions when that evidence was wrongfully obtained by private individuals?

    Holding

    No, because the Fourth Amendment’s protections against unlawful searches and seizures are intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment and its associated exclusionary rule, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, are designed to regulate the conduct of government officials, not private individuals. The court cited Burdeau v. McDowell, which established that the Fourth Amendment was intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies.
    The court acknowledged that the defendant argued that Burdeau had been overruled by Elkins v. United States and Mapp v. Ohio. However, the court distinguished these cases, explaining that they addressed the admissibility of evidence seized by state officials, not private actors.
    The court stated that, prior to Elkins, evidence seized by state officials was treated differently in federal prosecutions than evidence procured by private individuals. Elkins addressed the admissibility in federal court of evidence illegally seized by state officials, while Mapp extended the exclusionary rule to state courts for evidence seized in violation of the Federal Constitution. Neither case overruled the principle that the Fourth Amendment does not proscribe private conduct.
    The court noted that New York precedent also supported the admissibility of evidence obtained by private individuals, even if unlawfully obtained. “It has long been settled that our State’s prohibitions against unlawful searches and seizures (N. Y. Const., art. I, § 12; Civil Rights Law, § 8) do not require exclusion of evidence because a private individual has gathered it by unlawful means.”
    The court concluded that because the evidence in this case was seized without the participation or knowledge of any governmental official, it was admissible in a criminal prosecution. The actions of the store detectives were considered private action, not subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny.