New York Law Review

Tag: standard of care

  • Reis v. Volvo Cars of North America, 25 N.Y.3d 36 (2015): Standard of Care in Product Design Defect Cases

    Reis v. Volvo Cars of North America, 25 N.Y.3d 36 (2015)

    In a product design defect case, the standard of care is whether a reasonable person would conclude that the utility of the product’s design outweighed the risk inherent in marketing it, not whether the manufacturer used the same degree of skill and care as others in the industry.

    Summary

    Americo Silva’s 1987 Volvo lurched forward when he started the engine while it was in gear, pinning plaintiff Reis against a wall and causing severe injury. Reis sued Volvo, alleging negligent design for failing to include a starter interlock. The trial court erroneously instructed the jury using a malpractice standard of care (PJI 2:15). The jury found Volvo negligent but not liable for a design defect, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the malpractice standard was inappropriate for a design defect case and the error likely influenced the inconsistent verdict.

    Facts

    Americo Silva was showing the plaintiff, Reis, his recently purchased 1987 Volvo station wagon. Silva started the car while it was in gear, causing it to lurch forward and severely injure Reis. The car lacked a starter interlock, a safety device that prevents the car from starting while in gear. Plaintiff contended that the absence of this interlock constituted a design defect. Plaintiff presented evidence that other manufacturers such as General Motors, Ford and Toyota included starter interlocks in their 1987 models. Volvo argued that the risk of such an accident was minimal and the interlock had potential disadvantages.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied Volvo’s motion for summary judgment. The case proceeded to trial while Volvo’s appeal was pending. The jury found Volvo negligent but not liable for a design defect and awarded the plaintiff damages. The Appellate Division dismissed the failure to warn claims but otherwise affirmed. Volvo appealed to the Court of Appeals as of right.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury using PJI 2:15, the standard of care instruction for malpractice cases, in a product design defect case.
    2. Whether the trial court properly instructed the jury using PJI 2:16, regarding customary business practices.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the standard of care applicable to malpractice cases is different from the standard in negligence cases, including design defect cases.
    2. Yes, because there was sufficient evidence to permit the jury to consider industry custom and practice, without mandating that they find Volvo negligent based solely on that evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that PJI 2:15, designed for malpractice cases, was improperly applied. The Court explained that in malpractice cases, the standard is the level of skill and care used by others in the same profession. In contrast, negligence cases require comparing the defendant’s conduct to that of a reasonable person under like circumstances. In negligent design/design defect cases, the specific question is “whether the product is one as to which if the design defect were known at the time of manufacture, a reasonable person would conclude that the utility of the product did not outweigh the risk inherent in marketing a product designed in that manner” (quoting Voss v Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 59 NY2d 102, 108 [1983]). The Court noted the jury’s inconsistent verdict, finding Volvo negligent but not liable for a design defect, suggested the erroneous charge confused the jury. The Court affirmed the appropriateness of PJI 2:16, which allows the jury to consider industry custom and practice as evidence of reasonable conduct, but does not mandate a finding of negligence based solely on that evidence. The Court quoted the instruction: “a general custom, use or practice by those in the same business or trade may be considered some evidence of what constitutes reasonable conduct in that trade or business.”

  • Spiegel v. Ferraro, 11 N.Y.3d 143 (2008): Establishing Legal Malpractice Based on Evidentiary Rulings

    Spiegel v. Ferraro, 11 N.Y.3d 143 (2008)

    To successfully claim legal malpractice, a plaintiff must prove the attorney’s failure to exercise reasonable skill and knowledge caused actual damages and that the plaintiff would have prevailed “but for” the attorney’s negligence.

    Summary

    This case addresses the standard for a legal malpractice claim when based on an attorney’s failure to anticipate a court’s evidentiary rulings. Objectants in a will contest counterclaimed for legal malpractice, alleging that their attorney’s negligence in failing to anticipate adverse evidentiary rulings caused them to lose a settlement opportunity. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the malpractice counterclaim, holding that an attorney’s failure to predict a court’s evidentiary rulings, even if true, does not establish negligence sufficient to support a legal malpractice claim. The Court emphasized that a prima facie case of legal malpractice requires demonstrating a failure to exercise ordinary reasonable skill and knowledge.

    Facts

    Respondent attorney represented two objectants in a will contest in Surrogate’s Court. After an unsuccessful trial, the attorney petitioned the court for legal fees. The objectants counterclaimed for legal malpractice, claiming they would have accepted a $108,000 settlement if the attorney had not been negligent. The objectants specifically argued that the attorney failed to anticipate that the Surrogate’s Court would not admit certain evidence they intended to present.

    Procedural History

    The Surrogate’s Court dismissed the objectants’ counterclaim for legal malpractice and awarded the attorney her legal fees. The Appellate Division affirmed the Surrogate’s Court’s decision in a 3-2 decision. Objectant Marshall Spiegel appealed to the New York Court of Appeals as of right.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an attorney’s failure to anticipate a court’s evidentiary rulings, which allegedly resulted in the loss of a potential settlement, constitutes legal malpractice.

    Holding

    No, because the objectant’s allegation regarding the attorney’s failure to anticipate the court’s evidentiary rulings, even if accepted as true, does not establish negligence, which is a necessary element of a legal malpractice claim.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, emphasizing the stringent requirements for establishing a legal malpractice claim. The Court cited Am-Base Corp. v Davis Polk & Wardwell, 8 NY3d 428, 434 (2007), stating that “In order to sustain a claim for legal malpractice, a plaintiff must establish both that the defendant attorney failed to exercise the ordinary reasonable skill and knowledge commonly possessed by a member of the legal profession which results in actual damages to a plaintiff, and that the plaintiff would have succeeded on the merits of the underlying action ‘but for’ the attorney’s negligence.” The Court reasoned that even if the attorney failed to anticipate the evidentiary rulings, this alone does not prove a failure to exercise the ordinary reasonable skill and knowledge expected of a legal professional. The Court implicitly recognized that predicting a court’s evidentiary rulings is often difficult and uncertain. The court deemed that the objectants failed to present a prima facie case of legal malpractice, as they did not sufficiently allege that the attorney’s performance fell below the accepted standard of care for attorneys. This decision highlights the difficulty of proving legal malpractice based on strategic decisions or predictions about court rulings, emphasizing the need to demonstrate a clear departure from accepted legal standards.

  • Hinlicky v. Dreyfuss, 6 N.Y.3d 636 (2005): Admissibility of Clinical Guidelines to Explain Physician’s Methodology

    6 N.Y.3d 636 (2005)

    Clinical practice guidelines, like algorithms, are admissible as demonstrative evidence to illustrate a physician’s decision-making process, but not as stand-alone proof of the standard of care.

    Summary

    In this medical malpractice case, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of a clinical guideline (an algorithm) used by a physician (Dr. Ilioff) in deciding not to order a preoperative cardiac evaluation for a patient (Mrs. Hinlicky) who later died following surgery. The Court held that the algorithm was properly admitted as demonstrative evidence to illustrate the physician’s decision-making process, not as substantive proof of the standard of care itself. The Court emphasized that the physician testified about his personal use of the algorithm, and the plaintiff did not request a limiting instruction.

    Facts

    Mrs. Hinlicky, 71, underwent an endarterectomy. She died 25 days later from a heart attack. The plaintiff alleged the physicians were negligent in failing to obtain a preoperative cardiac evaluation. Dr. Ilioff, the anesthesiologist, testified he used a clinical guideline (algorithm) to decide against the cardiac evaluation. He claimed the algorithm, published by the American Heart Association (AHA) and the American College of Cardiology (ACC), helped him determine which patients needed cardiac evaluations before surgery. The plaintiff objected to the admission of the algorithm into evidence as hearsay.

    Procedural History

    The trial court admitted the algorithm under the “professional reliability exception” to the hearsay rule. The jury found for the defendants. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the algorithm was admitted not for its truth, but to illustrate the physician’s decision-making. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in admitting a clinical algorithm as evidence to explain a physician’s decision-making process in a medical malpractice case.

    Holding

    No, because the algorithm was admitted as demonstrative evidence to illustrate the physician’s decision-making process, not as substantive proof of the standard of care, and the physician testified about his personal use of the algorithm.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the algorithm was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted within it (i.e., as a definitive statement of the standard of care). Rather, it was offered as a demonstrative aid to help the jury understand the steps Dr. Ilioff took in reaching his decision. The court highlighted Dr. Ilioff’s testimony that he personally used the algorithm. The Court distinguished this case from Spensieri v. Lasky, where the Physicians’ Desk Reference (PDR) was improperly offered as stand-alone proof of the standard of care. The court emphasized that here, the algorithm was used to explain “one link in the chain” of the physician’s evaluation process. While experts on both sides presented conflicting views on the algorithm’s significance as a standard of care, the key factor was the algorithm’s use as demonstrative evidence. The Court noted that the plaintiff did not request a limiting instruction to clarify the purpose for which the algorithm was admitted. The Court stated, “It is a document, as I understand it, which does not purport to resolve any crucial issue in the case. It’s to be used only to explain an evaluation procedure which a treating doctor used, as merely one link in the chain which he relied upon to reach a conclusion.”

  • Spensieri v. Lasky, 94 N.Y.2d 231 (1999): Admissibility of Physician’s Desk Reference and Jury Charges in Medical Malpractice

    Spensieri v. Lasky, 94 N.Y.2d 231 (1999)

    The Physicians’ Desk Reference (PDR) is generally inadmissible as direct evidence of the standard of care in medical malpractice cases, and jury charges must be tailored to the specific facts and issues presented at trial.

    Summary

    This case addresses the admissibility of the PDR as evidence of the standard of care in a medical malpractice case and the necessity of specific jury charges. The plaintiff, Spensieri, sued Dr. Lasky for prescribing Estinyl, alleging negligence. The Court of Appeals held that the PDR is not, on its own, admissible as evidence of the standard of care. The court also addressed the importance of tailored jury instructions, emphasizing that while a generalized malpractice charge may suffice, specific facts may require a charge focusing on the standard of care in prescribing medications. Ultimately, the court affirmed the lower court’s order due to the plaintiff’s failure to properly preserve objections to the jury charge.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, Spensieri, brought a medical malpractice action against Dr. Lasky, alleging negligence in prescribing Estinyl (estrogen medication). The plaintiff attempted to introduce the Physicians’ Desk Reference (PDR) as evidence of the standard of care. The plaintiff also requested a specific jury charge concerning the standard of care in prescribing medications.

    Procedural History

    The trial court rejected the plaintiff’s attempt to introduce the PDR as evidence. The specific jury charge requested by the plaintiff was not given in the form requested. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant, Dr. Lasky. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the exclusion of the PDR and the failure to give the requested jury charge were errors. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Physicians’ Desk Reference (PDR) is admissible as evidence to establish the standard of care in a medical malpractice action.
    2. Whether the jury charge given adequately addressed the applicable standard of care for prescribing medication, given the facts of the case.

    Holding

    1. No, because the PDR, by itself, does not establish the standard of care.
    2. Yes, in this specific case, because the plaintiff did not properly preserve their objections to the jury charge for appellate review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the PDR is not a substitute for expert testimony in establishing the standard of care. While the PDR may contain information relevant to a physician’s knowledge, it does not, on its own, dictate the standard of care. Regarding the jury charge, the court acknowledged that a tailored charge might be necessary depending on the specific facts, particularly concerning the standard of care in prescribing medications. However, because the plaintiff’s request for a specific charge was bundled with inappropriate requests and the plaintiff failed to properly redact or clarify their request, the court found no reversible error. As Judge Smith stated in his concurrence, “The trial court’s instructions ‘should state the law as applicable to the particular facts in issue in the case at bar, which the evidence in the case tends to prove; mere abstract propositions of law applicable to any case, or mere statements of law in general terms, even though correct, should not be given unless they are made applicable to the issues in the case at bar’ ” citing Green v Downs, 27 NY2d 205, 208. The court emphasized that specific requests to change the charge are necessary to preserve the issue for appeal.

  • Trimarco v. Klein, 56 N.Y.2d 98 (1982): Admissibility of Custom and Usage Evidence in Negligence Claims

    Trimarco v. Klein, 56 N.Y.2d 98 (1982)

    Evidence of custom and usage within a particular industry, while not dispositive, is admissible and relevant to establish the standard of reasonable care in a negligence action.

    Summary

    In a negligence suit, the plaintiff, Vincent Trimarco, sought damages for injuries sustained when he fell through a glass shower door in his apartment building. Trimarco argued the landlord was negligent for failing to replace the ordinary glass with shatterproof glass, a practice allegedly customary in the industry at the time of the accident. The New York Court of Appeals held that while custom and usage evidence is admissible to demonstrate the standard of care, it is not conclusive. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s dismissal of the complaint and ordered a new trial due to the improper admission of a statute that did not apply to the existing installation, while acknowledging the admissibility of custom and usage evidence.

    Facts

    Vincent Trimarco, a tenant in a multiple dwelling, was injured when he fell through the glass enclosure door of his bathtub in July 1976. The door was made of ordinary, non-shatterproof glass. Trimarco presented evidence that since the early 1950s, shatterproof glazing materials for bathroom enclosures had become a common practice. He also showed bulletins from safety organizations warning against plain glass in “hazardous locations” like bathtub enclosures. The landlord’s managing agent admitted that since 1965, it was customary to use safety glass or plastic for shower enclosures when replacing or installing new doors.

    Procedural History

    The trial court entered judgment for Trimarco. The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the complaint, finding no duty to replace the glass without prior notice of danger. Justice Sandler dissented, finding a question of fact for the jury. Justice Fein concurred in part and dissented in part, finding ample evidence of custom and usage but believing the admission of a statute regarding safety glazing was misleading. The New York Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether evidence of custom and usage is admissible to establish the standard of care in a negligence action.
    2. Whether the admission of sections of the General Business Law regarding safety glazing, which were not applicable to the existing installation, was reversible error.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because evidence of custom and usage within a particular industry can demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct fell below the required standard of reasonable care.
    2. Yes, because the statute applied only to new installations, and its admission into evidence prejudiced the defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that evidence of custom and usage is admissible to establish the standard of care in a negligence action. The court cited Garthe v. Ruppert, 264 N.Y. 290, 296, stating that “when certain dangers have been removed by a customary way of doing things safely, this custom may be proved to show that [the one charged with the dereliction] has fallen below the required standard.” The court noted that custom and usage reflects the judgment, experience, and conduct of many and bears directly on feasibility and practicality of precautions. The court emphasized, however, that custom and usage is not a conclusive test of negligence; the jury must be satisfied with its reasonableness. As stated in Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 470, “[w]hat usually is done may be evidence of what ought to be done, but what ought to be done is fixed by a standard of reasonable prudence, whether it usually is complied with or not.” The court found that the trial court erred in admitting sections of the General Business Law requiring safety glazing because the statute applied only to new installations after its effective date and did not apply to the existing glass door in Trimarco’s apartment. The court concluded that introducing the statute prejudiced the defendant. While the court acknowledged the relevance of the statute in supporting the existence of a developing custom to use safety glass, it determined that the prejudice to the defendants outweighed its probative value. Therefore, the court ordered a new trial, excluding the improperly admitted statutory evidence, but upheld the admissibility of other evidence pertaining to custom and usage.

  • R.M. Kliment & Frances Halsband, Architects v. McKinsey & Company, 473 N.E.2d 777 (N.Y. 1984): Necessity of Expert Testimony in Architectural Malpractice

    R.M. Kliment & Frances Halsband, Architects v. McKinsey & Company, 473 N.E.2d 777 (N.Y. 1984)

    In architectural malpractice cases, expert testimony is generally required to establish the applicable standard of care and whether the architect deviated from that standard, unless the alleged malpractice falls within the competence of a lay jury to evaluate.

    Summary

    R.M. Kliment & Frances Halsband, Architects sued McKinsey & Company for architectural malpractice, alleging unreasonable delays in responding to building department objections. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that expert testimony was necessary to establish architectural malpractice in this case because the alleged negligence involved delays in responding to objections rather than defective plans, which is outside the competence of a lay jury. The court found that the plaintiff’s expert testimony was insufficient to establish proximate cause between the delays and the project’s failure.

    Facts

    R.M. Kliment & Frances Halsband, Architects (plaintiff) sued McKinsey & Company (defendant) alleging architectural malpractice. The claim was based on protracted delays in responding to objections raised by the New York City Department of Buildings, rather than the submission of defective architectural plans. The plaintiff contended that these delays led to the failure of the construction project.

    Procedural History

    The trial court dismissed the case at the close of the plaintiff’s evidence. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether expert testimony is required to establish architectural malpractice when the alleged negligence involves protracted delays in responding to building department objections.
    2. Whether the expert testimony presented by the plaintiff was sufficient to establish proximate cause between the alleged delays and the failure of the construction project.
    3. Whether the defendant guaranteed the plaintiff that they would provide plans acceptable to the Department of Buildings.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because whether the delays in complying with the building department’s objections constituted architectural malpractice is not within the competence of an untutored layman to evaluate.
    2. No, because the expert’s testimony was too vague and did not establish that the delays proximately caused the project’s failure.
    3. No, because the defendants never guaranteed that they would provide plans acceptable to the Department of Buildings.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that expert testimony is required to support allegations of malpractice, except where the alleged act falls within the competence of a lay jury to evaluate. The court distinguished this case from those involving defective plans, noting that evaluating the reasonableness of delays in responding to building department objections requires specialized knowledge outside the common experience of jurors. The court stated, “Whether the allegedly inordinate delays of defendants in complying with objections of the building department constituted architectural malpractice is not within the competence of an untutored layman to evaluate. Common experience and observation offer little guidance.”

    Regarding the sufficiency of the expert testimony, the court found that the expert’s opinion was too vague to establish proximate cause. The expert stated that there had been “an unusually long delay” between some or many of the objections and the responses. The court found that this left it to conjecture whether those unduly delayed responses in particular proximately caused the failure of the construction project. The court emphasized that the expert testimony did not imply that a competent architect would have timely complied with all the building department objections. The court stated that “the fact finder may not render a factual determination devoid of support. We do not believe that the expert testimony in this case is sufficient to enable the jury to infer reasonably that defendants’ undue delays proximately caused plaintiff’s injury.”

    The court also found that the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim failed because the defendants never guaranteed that they would provide plans acceptable to the department of buildings.

  • Hnat v. Nyack Hospital, 33 N.Y.2d 985 (1974): Foreseeability and Hospital’s Duty of Care to Patients

    Hnat v. Nyack Hospital, 33 N.Y.2d 985 (1974)

    A hospital’s duty of care to a patient is limited by the principle of foreseeability; a hospital is not liable for a patient’s injuries where the patient’s actions were not reasonably foreseeable in light of their known condition and the standard practice of hospitals in similar circumstances.

    Summary

    In this case, the New York Court of Appeals held that a hospital was not liable for the death of a patient who climbed out of bed and attempted to leave the hospital because it was not reasonably foreseeable that the patient would suddenly become violent. The court emphasized that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the hospital’s treatment deviated from accepted standards of care. The dissent argued that given the patient’s deteriorating mental state, it was a question of fact whether the hospital should have taken additional precautions to ensure his safety.

    Facts

    John Hnat was a patient at Nyack Hospital. A resident physician examined Hnat and found him “disturbed” and “quite disoriented,” concluding his condition was deteriorating. After the examination, the resident left Hnat alone to call Hnat’s private physician. During this time, Hnat climbed out of bed and attempted to leave the hospital. He sustained injuries that led to his death. There was conflicting testimony regarding whether the bed’s side rails were up at the time of the incident.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff, John Hnat’s administratrix, sued Nyack Hospital for negligence. The trial court dismissed the case at the conclusion of the plaintiff’s proof. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of negligence against the hospital, specifically demonstrating that the hospital’s treatment of the patient deviated from the standard practice of hospitals and that the patient’s actions were reasonably foreseeable.

    Holding

    No, because the plaintiff failed to present evidence showing that the hospital’s actions were not in accordance with the standard practice of hospitals, and because it was not reasonably foreseeable that the patient would suddenly become violent and attempt to leave the hospital.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ decisions, holding that the plaintiff failed to prove a prima facie case of negligence. The court reasoned that there was no evidence presented to suggest that the hospital’s treatment of the patient was not in line with the standard practices of hospitals in similar situations. The court emphasized the lack of foreseeability, stating, “It was not reasonably foreseeable that the patient would suddenly become violent, climb out of bed and attempt to leave the hospital.”

    The dissenting opinion argued that the patient’s deteriorating mental condition should have prompted the hospital to take additional precautions. The dissent stated, “In my view, under the circumstances here present, with knowledge of the patient’s mental condition, there is a question of fact whether the patient should have been left alone without, at least, some restraining or protective device to assure his safety.” The dissent concluded that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case and that it was a factual question whether the unfortunate outcome was reasonably foreseeable.