New York Law Review

Tag: Spousal Support Waiver

  • Greschler v. Greschler, 51 N.Y.2d 36 (1980): Enforceability of Foreign Divorce Decrees Incorporating Support Waivers

    Greschler v. Greschler, 51 N.Y.2d 36 (1980)

    New York courts will generally recognize foreign divorce decrees, including separation agreements incorporated therein, unless procurement of the judgment involved fraud or recognition would violate a strong public policy of New York, assessed by prevailing community standards.

    Summary

    Helen Greschler sought to invalidate a Dominican Republic divorce decree and the incorporated separation agreement, arguing the agreement, which waived her right to support, violated New York public policy. The court held that because Helen failed to sufficiently plead fraud in procuring the power of attorney for the divorce, she could not attack the separation agreement’s validity. The court reasoned that New York generally recognizes foreign judgments unless they are obtained by fraud or violate a strong public policy. Furthermore, the court noted that New York’s public policy regarding spousal support had evolved, now allowing waivers of support if the spouse is not likely to become a public charge, aligning with the terms of the separation agreement.

    Facts

    Helen and David Greschler married in 1955 and entered into a separation agreement in 1975, where Helen waived alimony. The agreement stipulated that if either party obtained a divorce, the separation agreement would be incorporated into the decree but would otherwise survive. Helen signed a power of attorney authorizing her appearance in a Dominican Republic divorce action, also directing the court to approve and incorporate the separation agreement. David obtained a divorce in the Dominican Republic based on incompatibility of temperaments, with the decree incorporating the separation agreement.

    Procedural History

    Helen sued in New York to set aside the separation agreement and request alimony, arguing it violated New York public policy and was procured by fraud. The initial complaint was dismissed with leave to replead to challenge the divorce decree itself. Helen amended the complaint to include a challenge to the Dominican Republic divorce decree, alleging fraud in procuring the power of attorney. The Supreme Court denied David’s motion to dismiss. The Appellate Division reversed, granting the motion and dismissing the complaint, finding the fraud claim insufficiently detailed and holding the relevant General Obligations Law section unconstitutional. Helen appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the plaintiff’s cause of action for fraud was pleaded with sufficient particularity to withstand the defendant’s motion to dismiss.
    2. Whether, absent a successful challenge to the jurisdiction of the Dominican Republic court, the plaintiff can attack the validity of the separation agreement incorporated into the foreign decree based on an alleged violation of New York public policy.
    3. Whether enforcing the Dominican Republic divorce decree, which incorporates a separation agreement waiving spousal support, would violate New York’s public policy.

    Holding

    1. No, because the plaintiff’s allegations were conclusory and failed to meet the statutory requirement that fraud be pleaded “in detail.”

    2. No, because failing to successfully challenge the jurisdiction of the Dominican Republic court on the ground that her power of attorney was obtained by fraud, plaintiff was precluded from assailing the validity of the separation agreement.

    3. No, because New York’s current public policy, reflected in the amended General Obligations Law, allows either spouse to waive their right to support as long as they are not likely to become a public charge.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court agreed with the Appellate Division that the fraud claim was insufficiently detailed, failing to meet the requirements of CPLR 3016(b). The court emphasized that under conflict of laws principles, without a successful challenge to the Dominican Republic court’s jurisdiction (based on fraud in obtaining the power of attorney), Helen was precluded from attacking the separation agreement’s validity on public policy grounds. The court stated that New York generally extends comity to foreign judgments, equivalent to the full faith and credit given to judgments of sister states, absent fraud in procurement or violation of strong public policy. The court quoted Loucks v Standard Oil Co., 224 NY 99, 111, stating that for a court to refuse recognition to a lawful foreign judgment, it must violate “some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal.” The court further reasoned that public policy should reflect “the prevailing attitudes of the community” (Ehrlich-Bober & Co. v University of Houston, 49 NY2d 574, 580). Examining New York’s public policy, the court highlighted the amendment to General Obligations Law § 5-311, which now permits either spouse to waive support if they are not likely to become a public charge. This evolution indicated that Helen’s waiver did not violate New York’s prevailing policy. The court concluded that without overturning the divorce decree, Helen could not collaterally attack the separation agreement, and because the fraud claim was dismissed, the argument regarding General Obligations Law § 5-311 was academic.

  • Comparetto v. Bologna, 31 N.Y.2d 32 (1972): Enforceability of Third-Party Beneficiary Rights in Partially Invalid Separation Agreements

    Comparetto v. Bologna, 31 N.Y.2d 32 (1972)

    A provision in a separation agreement benefiting children as third-party beneficiaries, such as a life insurance clause, can be enforced even if other parts of the agreement, like spousal support waivers, are invalid under the law.

    Summary

    This case concerns the enforceability of a life insurance provision for children in a separation agreement, despite the agreement’s partial invalidity due to an improper spousal support waiver. The parents’ separation agreement included a clause requiring the father to maintain life insurance for the benefit of their children. However, the agreement also contained an unenforceable waiver of spousal support. The court held that the life insurance provision was severable and enforceable by the children as third-party beneficiaries, even though the support waiver was invalid. This decision underscores the principle that beneficial provisions for children in separation agreements can be upheld even if other clauses are not.

    Facts

    In 1958, a husband and wife entered into a separation agreement that included a provision requiring the husband to maintain group life insurance, initially with the wife as beneficiary, but allowing him to change the beneficiary to their children. The agreement also contained a clause where the wife waived her right to spousal support. Shortly after the agreement was signed, the husband changed the beneficiary to the children. However, years later, he changed it again to his sister and her husband (the Bolognas). Upon the father’s death in 1970, the children discovered the later beneficiary change and sued the Bolognas to recover the insurance proceeds, arguing their rights had vested under the original separation agreement.

    Procedural History

    The children sued the named beneficiaries (the Bolognas), the insurer, and the decedent’s employer, seeking a declaratory judgment that they were entitled to the insurance proceeds. Special Term granted summary judgment to the Bolognas, finding the entire separation agreement void due to the illegal support waiver. The Appellate Division reversed, granting summary judgment to the children and ordering the insurers to pay them the policy proceeds. The Bolognas appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a provision in a separation agreement requiring a parent to maintain life insurance for the benefit of their children is enforceable when other provisions of the agreement, specifically a waiver of spousal support, are invalid under the law.
    2. Whether the life insurance provision is severable from the invalid spousal support waiver.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the provision benefiting the children as third-party beneficiaries is severable and enforceable, even if the spousal support waiver is invalid.
    2. Yes, because the illegal portion of the agreement does not necessarily void the entire agreement, particularly when it includes provisions for third-party beneficiaries.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the life insurance provision was enforceable by the children. The court reasoned that once the father changed the beneficiary to the children, their rights vested. The court distinguished the invalid spousal support waiver from the life insurance provision, emphasizing the severability of the latter. It cited Forman v. Forman, 17 N.Y.2d 274, as precedent for enforcing insurance provisions for children’s benefit, even when other parts of the agreement are unenforceable. The court reasoned that the wife’s waiver of her rights to the husband’s estate and the provisions for property distribution constituted valid consideration. The court also pointed to Hoops v. Hoops, 266 App. Div. 512, and Schiff v. Schiff, 270 App. Div. 845, which held that an invalid spousal support waiver does not necessarily invalidate the entire agreement. The court quoted Hoops v. Hoops, stating, “To the extent that the agreement purported to relieve the husband from the duty to support his former wife, it was ineffectual-but it was not immoral or illegal.” The court effectively created an exception for provisions clearly intended to benefit the children, emphasizing the importance of upholding agreements when possible, especially when children’s interests are at stake.