New York Law Review

Tag: Spontaneous Statement

  • People v. Chery, No. 159 (N.Y. 2016): Impeachment Using Omissions in a Spontaneous Statement

    People v. Chery, No. 159 (N.Y. 2016)

    A defendant’s credibility can be impeached with omissions from a spontaneous statement to police when the omitted information would naturally have been included, and when the defendant has provided a different version of events at trial.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a defendant’s trial testimony could be impeached using omissions from a spontaneous statement made to police at the scene of the crime. The defendant, Chery, was arrested for robbery after a physical altercation with a store employee. At the scene, Chery made a spontaneous statement to the police. During trial, Chery provided a different version of the events, including exculpatory details not present in his initial statement. The court held that the prosecutor was permitted to impeach Chery’s testimony by questioning the omissions from his initial statement to challenge his credibility because the omitted information was significant and would have been naturally included in the initial account. This exception to the rule against using silence to impeach a defendant’s testimony underscores the importance of consistency in statements when credibility is at issue.

    Facts

    On April 20, 2012, Chery and another man attacked a grocery store employee, robbing him of $215. Two witnesses observed the altercation. When police arrived, they found Chery with a metal object and observed that the employee was injured. Chery was arrested after the officer recovered an envelope containing $215 from his pocket. Prior to trial, the court allowed the responding officer to testify that Chery stated, "why isn’t [complainant] going to jail, he kicked my bike, he should be going to jail too." At trial, Chery testified that the complainant had initiated the altercation by kicking his bike and hitting him with a wooden board. He claimed he told the police that the complainant kicked his bike and that they had gotten into a fight.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Chery’s motion to suppress the spontaneous statement and allowed the responding officer’s testimony. The jury convicted Chery of robbery. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that omissions from Chery’s spontaneous statement were proper subjects for impeachment. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether it was error to allow the prosecution to use the defendant’s omissions from a spontaneous statement to impeach his trial testimony.

    Holding

    1. No, because it was permissible to use Chery’s omissions from his spontaneous statement to impeach his trial testimony under the specific circumstances of the case, where the omitted information was significant and would naturally have been included if true, especially since Chery provided a different version of events at trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals began by differentiating the case from those concerning the constitutional right to remain silent, as Chery’s statement was spontaneous and pre-Miranda. The court then restated the general rule that pre-trial silence is inadmissible, with limited exceptions. The court referenced People v. Savage, which established an exception where omissions from a statement are admissible for impeachment. The court reasoned that, unlike in Savage, Chery’s statement was spontaneous and made before any Miranda warnings. Additionally, the nature of Chery’s statement, which described the complainant’s conduct, and its timing supported the impeachment because the context suggested that the omitted information would have naturally been included in the original statement. Because Chery provided a different version of events at trial, the credibility of his initial statement was properly questioned. The court emphasized that "when given circumstances make it most unnatural to omit certain information from a statement, the fact of the omission is itself admissible for purposes of impeachment." The Court found that because Chery chose to give an account, it was reasonable to question why he omitted key facts from the original version.

    Practical Implications

    This case has implications for how prosecutors and defense attorneys approach cases involving pre-trial statements, particularly those made spontaneously. Prosecutors can use omissions from a defendant’s prior statements to challenge their credibility, provided the circumstances make the omission significant and unnatural. Defense attorneys must advise clients of the risks associated with making any statements, even spontaneous ones, and the potential for impeachment based on those statements. The case highlights the importance of providing a consistent account of events to law enforcement and at trial. This case should inform legal practice in situations where a defendant’s story changes between an initial statement and trial testimony. Courts will likely focus on whether omitted facts are significant and whether their omission is inconsistent with the statement actually given.

  • People v. Williams, 62 N.Y.2d 765 (1984): Permissible Inference from Recent and Exclusive Possession of Stolen Property

    People v. Williams, 62 N.Y.2d 765 (1984)

    When the circumstances indicate the defendant was either guilty of stealing the property or not guilty at all, a charge on recent and exclusive possession is appropriate, and there is no need to charge the jury on the separate crime of possession of stolen property.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the trial court’s charge on recent and exclusive possession was not erroneous because the evidence presented at trial indicated the defendant was either guilty of stealing from the complainant or not guilty at all. The Court distinguished this case from cases where a reasonable view of the evidence could support a conviction for possession of stolen property without also finding the defendant guilty of the theft itself. Furthermore, the court found the identification evidence sufficient to present a jury question and determined that the defendant’s statement at the time of arrest was spontaneous and admissible.

    Facts

    The complainant was robbed, and during a chase, the officers and complainant briefly lost sight of the defendant. The complainant identified the person being chased to the police as the robber, and the officer identified the apprehended person as the person pointed out to him. The defendant was found to be in possession of the complainant’s property. At the time of the arrest, the defendant made a statement that the court later deemed spontaneous.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in its charge to the jury regarding recent and exclusive possession of stolen property.
    2. Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to establish identification of the defendant as the perpetrator.
    3. Whether the statement made by the defendant at the time of arrest was admissible.

    Holding

    1. No, because the circumstances of the case indicated that the defendant was either guilty of stealing from the complainant or guilty of nothing, making a separate charge on possession of stolen property unnecessary.
    2. Yes, because the complainant pointed out the person being chased to the police as the robber, and the officer identified the apprehended person as the person pointed out to him, and that together with the defendant’s possession of complainant’s property was sufficient to present a jury issue on identification.
    3. Yes, because the statement was spontaneous, resulting from the officer’s response to the defendant’s question, and that response was a simple statement of fact, not provocative in any sense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the charge on recent and exclusive possession was not error because the evidence suggested the defendant was either guilty of stealing or not guilty at all. The Court distinguished the case from People v. Baskerville, where there was a reasonable view of the evidence under which the defendant could be guilty of possession of stolen property without being guilty of the theft itself. Here, no such view existed. Regarding identification, the Court found the complainant’s identification of the defendant during the chase, coupled with the defendant’s possession of the stolen property, sufficient to present a jury question. Finally, the Court determined that the defendant’s statement at the time of arrest was spontaneous and admissible because it resulted from the officer’s non-provocative response to the defendant’s question. The court stated that the officer’s response was simply “a simple statement of fact, not provocative in any sense.” The Court found no merit in the defendant’s remaining contentions, affirming the Appellate Division’s order.

  • People v. Cunningham, 54 N.Y.2d 813 (1981): Invocation of Right to Counsel Requires Suppression of Subsequent Statements

    People v. Cunningham, 54 N.Y.2d 813 (1981)

    A statement made by a defendant in custody who has invoked their right to counsel must be suppressed unless it is demonstrably spontaneous and not the product of any inducement, provocation, encouragement, or acquiescence, however subtle.

    Summary

    Cunningham was indicted for criminal possession of a weapon and criminal trespass. After being given Miranda warnings, he stated he did not wish to answer questions without an attorney. Subsequently, while at the precinct, an officer suggested that Cunningham’s aunt, the car’s registered owner, might be arrested. Cunningham then made a statement about finding the gun. The Court of Appeals held that the statement should have been suppressed because it was obtained after Cunningham invoked his right to counsel and was not spontaneous.

    Facts

    Cunningham was arrested and charged with criminal possession of a weapon and criminal trespass. After receiving Miranda warnings, Cunningham stated that he did not want to answer questions without an attorney present. While at the police precinct, and in Cunningham’s presence, one officer suggested to another that since Cunningham denied knowledge of the gun and the car was registered to his aunt, perhaps she should be arrested for possession of the weapon. Cunningham then stated that he had found the weapon in an abandoned car.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Cunningham’s motion to suppress the weapon and the statement, finding the statement voluntary and the seizure of the pistol lawful. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision without issuing an opinion. The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a statement made by a defendant in custody, after invoking their right to counsel, is admissible if it is not spontaneous and is made following police conduct that could be construed as inducement, provocation, encouragement, or acquiescence.

    Holding

    No, because a statement made by a defendant in custody who has invoked their right to counsel must be suppressed unless it is in fact spontaneous and not the product of any inducement, provocation, encouragement, or acquiescence, no matter how subtle.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order. The Court reasoned that while the hearing judge found the statement voluntary in the sense that it was not the result of intimidation or coercion, the judge did not determine whether it was spontaneous. The court emphasized that “the spontaneity has to be genuine and not the result of inducement, provocation, encouragement or acquiescence, no matter how subtly employed.” Since the statement was made after Cunningham invoked his right to counsel and was prompted by the officer’s remark about potentially arresting Cunningham’s aunt, it could not be considered spontaneous. As such, the statement was inadmissible and should have been suppressed. The court cited People v. Maerling, stating that “the spontaneity has to be genuine and not the result of inducement, provocation, encouragement or acquiescence, no matter how subtly employed.” The Court also noted that even though the right to counsel issue was not raised in the lower courts, it is so fundamental that the court could consider it.