New York Law Review

Tag: speedy trial

  • People v. Blakley, 34 N.Y.2d 311 (1974): Plea Bargaining and Waiver of Speedy Trial Rights

    People v. Blakley, 34 N.Y.2d 311 (1974)

    A prosecutor cannot condition a plea bargain on the defendant’s waiver of their right to a speedy trial, as this is inherently coercive, and an unreasonable delay in bringing a defendant to trial violates their right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment and relevant state statutes.

    Summary

    George Blakley was indicted for assault and firearm possession in 1966, but his trial did not begin until 1969. During the trial, the prosecutor offered a reduced plea deal on the condition that Blakley withdraw his motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of speedy trial. Blakley accepted, but appealed, arguing his right to a speedy trial was violated. The New York Court of Appeals held that conditioning a plea bargain on waiving speedy trial rights is inherently coercive and violates public policy. Furthermore, the Court found Blakley’s right to a speedy trial was indeed violated due to the significant delay and lack of good cause shown by the prosecution.

    Facts

    George Blakley, Jr. was arrested on November 15, 1965, and indicted on January 11, 1966, for assault and possession of a loaded firearm. The charges stemmed from an incident on November 14, 1965, where Blakley allegedly shot and wounded two individuals. The case experienced significant delays and did not proceed to trial until February 4, 1969, over three years after the indictment. During the trial, after the testimony of the victims, Blakley offered to plead guilty to two counts of assault in the second degree.

    Procedural History

    Blakley was indicted in January 1966. In February 1968, Blakley moved to dismiss the indictment for failure to prosecute. The County Court denied the motion. Blakley then pleaded guilty during trial after a plea bargain conditioned on withdrawing the speedy trial motion. He appealed the judgment of conviction, arguing his speedy trial rights were violated. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the order and dismissed the indictment.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a prosecutor may condition a plea offer on the defendant withdrawing a speedy trial claim.
    2. Whether the delay between indictment and trial violated the defendant’s right to a speedy trial.

    Holding

    1. No, because conditioning a plea bargain on waiving a speedy trial claim is inherently coercive and against public policy.
    2. Yes, because the prosecution failed to show good cause for the significant delay in bringing the defendant to trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the right to a speedy trial is not solely for the defendant’s benefit, but also serves a societal interest. Conditioning a plea bargain on waiving this right allows prosecutors to submerge speedy trial challenges, potentially leading innocent defendants to plead guilty to avoid an unfair, delayed trial. The Court emphasized that “the criminal justice system should scrupulously avoid the possibility that a plea of guilty may be tainted by unfairness.” The Court also found the purported waiver of the speedy trial claim ineffectual due to the coercive nature of the plea bargain.

    Regarding the speedy trial claim, the Court applied Section 668 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which required the prosecution to show “good cause” for delays. The Court also considered the factors outlined in Barker v. Wingo: the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of the right, and the prejudice to the defendant. The Court found the 34-month delay between indictment and the defendant’s change of attorney was excessive. While calendar congestion and a missing witness were cited as reasons for the delay, the Court found them insufficient. The Court noted the witness (Young) was available for a significant period and the District Attorney’s office did not diligently attempt to secure his presence. Ultimately, the Court concluded that the length of the delay and the defendant’s assertion of his right outweighed the reasons offered by the prosecution, thus violating Blakley’s right to a speedy trial.

  • People ex rel. Franklin v. Warden, 31 N.Y.2d 498 (1973): Interpreting ‘Ready for Trial’ in Speedy Trial Statutes

    People ex rel. Franklin v. Warden, 31 N.Y.2d 498 (1973)

    The statutory requirement that “the people are not ready for trial” refers solely to the prosecutor’s readiness, not the availability of court facilities; however, a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial exists independently of statute.

    Summary

    Four pretrial detainees sought habeas corpus relief, arguing their statutory right to a speedy trial under CPL 30.30 was violated because they were detained for over six months due to calendar congestion and lack of court facilities, despite the District Attorney’s readiness for trial. The New York Court of Appeals held that CPL 30.30 focuses on the prosecutor’s readiness, not the court’s capacity, and the statute supersedes any conflicting administrative rules. However, the Court also asserted the detainees’ independent constitutional right to a speedy trial and ordered trial preferences for their cases.

    Facts

    Four individuals (Abney, Edwards, Boone, and Franklin) were arrested and subsequently indicted by the Kings County Grand Jury. Each appellant remained in custody for over six months solely due to their inability to post bail. All four sought release based on the “ready trial” rule under CPL 30.30. The District Attorney reported being ready for trial within the statutory timeframe. The Supreme Court and Appellate Division denied relief, citing calendar congestion as “exceptional circumstances.”

    Procedural History

    The defendants filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus in Kings County Supreme Court, seeking release on their own recognizance. The Supreme Court denied the petitions. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decisions. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the phrase “where the people are not ready for trial” in CPL 30.30 refers only to the prosecutor’s readiness or also to the availability of court facilities?
    2. Whether the delays experienced by the defendants constituted a violation of their constitutional right to a speedy trial, independent of CPL 30.30?

    Holding

    1. No, because the phrase refers solely to the prosecutor’s readiness, and the statute was intended to supersede any administrative rules requiring court readiness.
    2. No, not yet, because the delays have not yet reached the level of violating the constitutionally protected right. However, a trial preference is ordered to ensure a speedy trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that interpreting “the people are not ready for trial” to include the availability of court facilities would contradict the Legislature’s intent in passing CPL 30.30. The Legislature explicitly stated that the statute “shall be deemed to supersede any rule of the Administrative Board.” The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to the plain language of the statute and respecting the Legislature’s clear intent. The Court recognized that the four cases were representative of the significant pretrial felony backlogs in Kings County. Acknowledging the efforts made by various governmental bodies and organizations to address the court congestion issue, the Court asserted its constitutional duty to adjudicate the rights of individuals charged with criminal offenses while also considering the broader interests of society. Citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, the Court emphasized the need to balance the rights of the accused with the interests of society. Although the Court found that the delays had not yet violated the defendants’ constitutional rights, it ordered a trial preference for each case, ensuring that trial would commence within three months, unless an extension was granted for justifiable cause unrelated to court congestion. The court noted the ultimate solution was the provision of more resources to handle the increased court burden.

  • People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y. 305 (1955): Determining When Pre-Trial Delay Violates Speedy Trial Rights

    People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y. 305 (1955)

    Unreasonable delay in prosecuting a defendant constitutes a denial of the constitutional right to a speedy trial, and the burden rests on the prosecution to establish good cause for the delay.

    Summary

    This case addresses the constitutional right to a speedy trial and what constitutes an unreasonable delay that violates that right. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s conviction, finding that a 45-month delay between indictment and trial, without sufficient explanation or good cause shown by the prosecution, violated the defendant’s right to a speedy trial. The court emphasized that the prosecution bears the responsibility to ensure a timely trial and must provide adequate justification for any significant delay.

    Facts

    The defendants were indicted but not brought to trial for 45 months. The prosecution offered little explanation for this delay. The defendants argued that this delay violated their constitutional right to a speedy trial.

    Procedural History

    The case originated in a lower court where the defendants were convicted. The defendants appealed, arguing a violation of their speedy trial rights. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the lower court’s decision, ultimately reversing the conviction due to the unreasonable delay.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a 45-month delay between indictment and trial, absent a showing of good cause by the prosecution, constitutes a violation of the defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial.

    Holding

    Yes, because an unreasonable delay in prosecution, without good cause shown by the prosecution, constitutes a denial of the constitutional right to a speedy trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court’s reasoning centered on the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial. The court emphasized that the prosecution has a duty to ensure a timely trial. A significant delay, such as the 45-month delay in this case, raises a presumption of a violation of that right. The burden then shifts to the prosecution to demonstrate good cause for the delay. In this case, the prosecution failed to provide sufficient justification for the lengthy delay, leading the court to conclude that the defendant’s right to a speedy trial had been violated. The court acknowledged the importance of prompt prosecution but reiterated that unexplained delays are unacceptable. As Judge Scileppi noted in concurrence, “the absence of a showing of good cause for the delay, without more, cannot be equated with fault.” Jasen, J., concurring in the result, highlighted, “At a time when those concerned with the administration of criminal justice are attempting to expedite all criminal proceedings, the insufficiently explained 45-month delay in bringing the defendants to trial is intolerable.”

  • People v. Minicone, 28 N.Y.2d 370 (1971): Speedy Trial Rights and Delays Due to Incarceration

    People v. Minicone, 28 N.Y.2d 370 (1971)

    A defendant’s right to a speedy trial is violated when the prosecution fails to make a diligent effort to bring an incarcerated defendant to trial, absent a showing of good cause for the delay.

    Summary

    Minicone, incarcerated in federal prison, was indicted in New York. Despite knowing his location, the District Attorney took no action to secure his return for 11 months. Minicone moved to dismiss the indictment based on a violation of his right to a speedy trial. The New York Court of Appeals held that the delay violated Minicone’s rights because the prosecution failed to demonstrate good cause for the delay, and his incarceration did not excuse the inaction. The court emphasized the prosecution’s duty to actively pursue bringing an incarcerated defendant to trial.

    Facts

    On February 2, 1966, while Minicone was in federal prison in Atlanta, Georgia, a New York Grand Jury indicted him for robbery, grand larceny, and assault for crimes allegedly committed in 1963.
    He had also been indicted in 1964 for other, unrelated crimes. In May 1966, Minicone inquired about the status of the 1964 indictment, but the District Attorney did not mention the 1966 indictment.
    In November 1966, after Minicone moved to dismiss the 1964 indictment, the District Attorney sought to have him produced in New York for the 1964 charges.
    A warrant for the 1966 indictment was lodged in Georgia in December 1966, but Minicone had already been transferred to New York City. He was arraigned on both indictments in January 1967.

    Procedural History

    Minicone moved to dismiss the 1966 indictment, arguing a violation of his right to a speedy trial. The motion was denied. He then pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of petit larceny.
    He appealed the conviction based on the denial of his speedy trial rights to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an 11-month delay between indictment and arraignment, during which the defendant was incarcerated in federal prison and the prosecution took no action to secure his presence in New York, violates the defendant’s right to a speedy trial under New York law.

    Holding

    Yes, because the prosecution failed to show good cause for the delay, and the defendant’s incarceration did not excuse the inaction. The District Attorney knew where the defendant was incarcerated but did nothing to secure his return to New York to face the charges.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that while motions to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial are discretionary, the prosecution bears the burden of demonstrating good cause for the delay. Minicone’s incarceration in federal prison did not, in itself, constitute good cause. The court emphasized that the District Attorney was aware of Minicone’s location but neglected to take steps to bring him to trial. The court distinguished this case from situations where delays are justified by extraordinary circumstances or the defendant’s actions. The court noted that the defendant’s attorney answering “ready” to calendar calls indicated a desire for a prompt trial, not a waiver of speedy trial rights. Because the delay was solely due to the District Attorney’s inaction and the People failed to offer any valid excuse, the Court held that Minicone was denied his right to a speedy trial. As the court stated, the fact of incarceration “affords neither explanation nor excuse”. The court found the delay unreasonable under the specific circumstances of the case.

  • People v. Esposito, 20 N.Y.2d 840 (1967): Applicability of Speedy Trial Rights to Felony Informations

    People v. Esposito, 20 N.Y.2d 840 (1967)

    The statutory right to a speedy trial, as codified in Section 669-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure, applies only to indictments, informations, or complaints that the court where they are filed has the power to try.

    Summary

    The defendant, Esposito, argued that his right to a speedy trial under Section 669-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure was violated because the felony information filed against him in Police Court was not brought to trial within 180 days of his demand. The New York Court of Appeals held that because the Police Court lacked jurisdiction to try felony informations, Section 669-a did not apply. The court reasoned that the statute’s intent was to ensure prompt disposition of charges within the court’s purview, not to cover matters outside its trial jurisdiction.

    Facts

    A felony information was filed against Esposito in the Police Court.

    Esposito, relying on Section 669-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure, demanded a speedy disposition of the charge.

    More than 180 days passed without the case being brought to trial.

    Esposito then argued that his right to a speedy trial was violated.

    Procedural History

    The Police Court convicted Esposito. The specific charge and sentence are not detailed in this case brief, as the focus is on the speedy trial issue.

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Section 669-a did not apply to felony informations filed in courts lacking trial jurisdiction over felonies.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Section 669-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides a defendant with the right to demand disposition of an “untried indictment, information or complaint” within 180 days, applies to a felony information filed in a court (Police Court) that lacks the power to try felonies.

    Holding

    No, because Section 669-a is only applicable to courts that have jurisdiction to try the pending charges. The Police Court could not try the felony, therefore the speedy trial provision did not apply.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Section 669-a was intended to apply only to charges that the court where the information was filed had the power to try. Since the Police Court lacked the power to try felony informations, the statute was inapplicable.

    The court focused on the language of Section 669-a, which allows a defendant to demand disposition of an “untried indictment, information or complaint” within 180 days. The court interpreted this language to mean that the statute only applies if the court where the charge is filed has the jurisdiction to try it.

    The dissenting judge argued that the statute’s purpose was to address the negative consequences that a pending charge, regardless of the court’s jurisdiction, has on a prisoner’s rehabilitation and parole status. The dissent cited a memorandum from the Joint Legislative Committee on Interstate Co-operation, which drafted Section 669-a, emphasizing that the six-month limitation was intended to eliminate these disruptive conditions as quickly as possible.

    The dissent also pointed to Section 669-b, the uniform agreement on interstate detainers, which recognizes that “detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints * * * produce uncertainties which obstruct, programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation.”

  • People v. Wilson, 21 N.Y.2d 134 (1967): Duty to Secure Defendant’s Return for Trial

    People v. Wilson, 21 N.Y.2d 134 (1967)

    A state has a duty to make a good-faith effort to secure the return of a defendant incarcerated in another jurisdiction for trial; failure to do so violates the defendant’s right to a speedy trial and due process.

    Summary

    Wilson was arrested in 1958 on forgery and petit larceny charges, but was already incarcerated in Alabama. A detainer warrant was filed, but no action was taken to extradite him. Five years later, an indictment was issued. After Wilson was released in Alabama and returned to New York, he moved to dismiss the indictment for lack of prosecution. The Court of Appeals held that the state’s failure to attempt to secure Wilson’s return from Alabama violated his right to a speedy trial, even though he was incarcerated elsewhere. The court emphasized the state’s obligation to actively pursue prosecution once initiated, and the lack of valid justification for the lengthy delay.

    Facts

    In April 1958, Wilson allegedly committed forgery and petit larceny in Nassau County, New York, leading to an arrest warrant.

    In June 1958, Wilson was imprisoned in Alabama for violating his probation on a prior burglary conviction.

    The Nassau County District Attorney filed a detainer warrant with Alabama authorities in July 1958 but made no attempt to extradite Wilson.

    An indictment was handed down in New York in January 1963, charging Wilson with forgery and petit larceny.

    In September 1963, Alabama authorities notified Nassau County of Wilson’s impending release.

    Wilson waived extradition in October 1963 and was returned to New York.

    Procedural History

    In January 1964, Wilson moved to dismiss the indictment under Section 668 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

    The County Court granted the motion in August 1964.

    The Appellate Division reversed the County Court’s order in July 1966.

    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the four-and-a-half-year delay in prosecuting Wilson, after the initiation of criminal proceedings but before indictment, violated his due process rights and right to a speedy trial when the delay was due to his incarceration in another state and the prosecution made no effort to secure his return.

    Holding

    Yes, because the State had a duty to make a good-faith effort to secure Wilson’s return for trial and failed to do so without adequate justification, thereby violating his constitutional rights to due process and a speedy trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the delay in bringing Wilson to trial was unreasonable because the Nassau County authorities failed to take any steps to secure his release from Alabama, either before or after the indictment.

    The court rejected the Appellate Division’s conclusion that such action was unnecessary, finding no support in the record for the assertion that the administrative process would have been time-consuming or that Alabama would have been uncooperative.

    The court emphasized that a post-indictment delay is not justified solely because the defendant is imprisoned elsewhere, citing precedents involving both federal and state prisoners. The court noted that procedures exist for securing the release of prisoners in other jurisdictions for trial on pending charges.

    The court dismissed the argument that Alabama’s lack of participation in the Uniform Agreement on Detainers excused the state’s inaction, pointing out that Alabama law (Ala. Code, tit. 15, § 66) allows the Governor to transfer defendants to other states.

    “There is no proper criminological purpose served in holding several prosecutions over a defendant’s head. Neither correction nor deterrence is thus served, especially when the prosecutions withheld are for crimes of much lesser degree than those for which the defendant has been serving time.”

    The court concluded that the People failed to establish good cause for the delay, thereby violating Wilson’s right to a speedy trial and due process.

    The court noted that the delay was particularly unreasonable considering the relatively minor nature of the crimes and the staleness of the nine-year-old charges.

    The decision emphasizes the state’s affirmative obligation to advance prosecution once initiated and rejects the notion that imprisonment in another jurisdiction automatically justifies delay.