New York Law Review

Tag: speedy trial

  • People v. Staley, 41 N.Y.2d 599 (1977): Defining “Delay Resulting From” Defendant’s Absence Under Speedy Trial Rules

    People v. Staley, 41 N.Y.2d 599 (1977)

    Under New York’s speedy trial statute, CPL 30.30, a delay in prosecution is only excludable from the statutory six-month period based on the defendant’s absence if that absence directly caused the delay.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a 2.5-month period of the defendant’s absence prior to indictment should be excluded when calculating the six-month speedy trial period under CPL 30.30. The defendant was charged with felony firearm possession and escape. The court found that while the defendant was absent, her absence did not actually cause a delay in the indictment process. The court emphasized that the prosecution’s own backlog and staffing issues contributed to the delay, not the defendant’s absence. Because the total non-excludable time exceeded six months, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and granted the motion to dismiss the indictment.

    Facts

    On April 2, 1973, a felony complaint was filed against Staley for possessing a loaded firearm and escape. From August 18 to November 26, 1973, Staley was absent; a bench warrant was issued on August 18 after she allegedly committed larceny and damaged cars. Warrants were issued by other courts due to Staley’s failure to appear on other charges. On October 12, 1973, she was arrested in Orange County under an alias and failed to appear in court there on November 2. She was eventually arrested on November 26 on other felony charges. She was indicted on November 2, 1973, and the case was placed on the trial calendar on January 23, 1974.

    Procedural History

    Staley moved to dismiss the indictment on February 25, 1974, arguing that she was denied a speedy trial under CPL 210.20 and 30.30. The County Court denied the motion. Staley was convicted of escape but the jury couldn’t reach a verdict on the weapons charge, which was then withdrawn. The Appellate Division affirmed the County Court’s decision. Staley appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the 2.5-month period of the defendant’s absence prior to indictment should be excluded when calculating the six-month speedy trial period under CPL 30.30, specifically CPL 30.30(4)(c), where the defendant’s absence did not actually cause the delay in the indictment process.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s absence did not cause the delay in the indictment, as required by CPL 30.30(4)(c); the delay was due to the prosecution’s backlog and staffing issues.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the language of CPL 30.30(4)(c), which excludes delays resulting from the defendant’s absence. The court emphasized that mere absence is insufficient; the delay must *result* from that absence. The court noted that Staley’s absence did not impede the indictment process. The court pointed to an affidavit from the Assistant District Attorney, which acknowledged a backlog of cases and staffing shortages in the District Attorney’s office. The court emphasized that there was no showing of “exceptional circumstances” under CPL 30.30 (subd 4, par [g]).

    The court stated, “Explicitly under the statute, delay must result therefrom. Defendant’s absence from August 18 to November 2, 1973, when the indictment was returned, did not result in a delay, attributable to her, since the finding of the indictment was in no way impeded or prevented by the absence.” This highlights the critical distinction between mere absence and absence that directly causes delay.

    The Court found that excluding only the time attributable to the defense (nine days for an adjournment request and four days for judicial retention of papers), the time between the commencement of the criminal action and the time when the People were ready for trial still exceeded six months. Therefore, the motion to dismiss should have been granted.

  • People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y.2d 624 (1974): Determining Excludable Delay for Speedy Trial Calculations

    People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y.2d 624 (1974)

    Under CPL 30.30, periods of delay are excluded from speedy trial calculations when the defendant’s location is unknown and they are attempting to avoid prosecution, or when delays are at the request of, or with the consent of, the defendant for pretrial motions or plea negotiations.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction, holding that the trial court correctly denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss based on a violation of speedy trial rights. The court reasoned that certain periods of delay were excludable under CPL 30.30. Specifically, the period during which the defendant was inadvertently released from jail and his whereabouts were unknown, coupled with indications of an attempt to avoid prosecution, was excludable. Additionally, delays resulting from pre-plea negotiations and motions initiated by the defendant were also properly excluded. Because the prosecution was ready for trial within the statutory timeframe after excluding these periods, the defendant’s speedy trial rights were not violated.

    Facts

    The defendant was indicted on October 27, 1972, while incarcerated on a parole violation. On February 28, 1973, he was inadvertently released from jail. A bench warrant was issued on March 6, 1973, when he failed to appear in court. He remained free until his arrest on October 19, 1973. He worked at a parking lot near the county jail after his release. The case was placed on the Trial Calendar on November 30, 1973. After January 4, 1974, there were adjournments for “pre-plea” consideration and to allow the defendant to obtain new counsel. The matter was placed back on the Trial Calendar on February 24, 1974.

    Procedural History

    The Monroe County Court convicted the defendant of criminal sale of a dangerous drug in the third degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the County Court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment based on a violation of his statutory speedy trial rights under CPL 30.30.

    Holding

    No, because the prosecution was ready for trial within the statutory timeframe after excluding periods of delay attributable to the defendant’s absence and attempts to avoid prosecution, as well as delays resulting from pre-plea negotiations and motions initiated by the defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on CPL 30.30, which governs speedy trial rights in New York. The court highlighted specific exclusions allowed under the statute. First, the court noted that the period between the defendant’s release and rearrest could be excluded because the defendant’s location was unknown, and evidence suggested he was attempting to avoid prosecution. The court stated, “There was a basis for exclusion, under the ‘six months rule’ computation, of the period of almost seven and one-half months, from release to arrest, when it could be found that defendant’s location was unknown and he was attempting to avoid prosecution (CPL 30.30, subd 4, par [c]).” The fact that the defendant worked near the jail, claiming he was waiting to be rearrested, did not negate the possibility that he was also attempting to avoid prosecution. Second, the court excluded delays that were at the defendant’s request or with his consent, specifically those related to pre-plea considerations and the defendant’s need to obtain new counsel. The court reasoned, “Since it appears that the prosecution was ready for trial on November 30, 1973 (CPL 30.30, subd 1, par [a]) and that the delays occasioned thereafter, more particularly after January 4, 1974, were at the request or with the consent of defendant and for the purpose of pretrial motions, the period from November 30 to February 24, 1974 was properly excluded (CPL 30.30, subd 4, pars [a], [f]).” Because the prosecution was ready for trial on November 30, 1973, and the delays thereafter were attributable to the defendant, the court found no violation of his speedy trial rights. The court therefore affirmed the lower court’s denial of the motion to dismiss.

  • People v. Rodriguez, 35 N.Y.2d 606 (1974): Waiving the Right to a Speedy Trial

    People v. Rodriguez, 35 N.Y.2d 606 (1974)

    A defendant’s right to a speedy trial can be waived, but only if the waiver is made knowingly and voluntarily; failing to raise the issue at the trial court level constitutes a waiver.

    Summary

    Rodriguez was arrested in 1968 on burglary charges, indicted in 1970, and pleaded guilty in 1972 to attempted burglary. He argued he was denied a speedy trial, an argument first raised on appeal. The Court of Appeals held that because Rodriguez failed to raise the speedy trial issue at the trial court level after having filed a pro se motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds, he waived that right. The court emphasized that a waiver of the right to a speedy trial must be knowing and voluntary, and his prior motion indicated he was aware of his rights.

    Facts

    On April 15, 1968, Rodriguez was arrested and arraigned on charges of burglary and possession of burglar’s tools. He was indicted on these charges, along with grand larceny, on February 26, 1970. Rodriguez was incarcerated after the indictment. In January 1971, Rodriguez filed a pro se motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute, claiming a denial of a speedy trial. There’s no indication the motion was ever brought before a judge. On April 12, 1972, Rodriguez pleaded guilty to attempted burglary in the third degree, satisfying the indictment. He did not mention his pro se motion during the plea or sentencing proceedings.

    Procedural History

    Rodriguez was convicted of attempted burglary in the third degree. On appeal to the Appellate Division, he argued for the first time that he was denied a speedy trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction, with two justices dissenting, who believed the case should be remitted for a hearing on the reasonableness of the delay. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Rodriguez waived his right to a speedy trial by failing to raise the issue in the trial court, despite having filed a pro se motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds prior to pleading guilty.

    Holding

    Yes, because Rodriguez’s prior pro se motion indicated he was aware of his right to a speedy trial, and by not raising the issue in the court of first instance, he waived his right and there is no error to be reviewed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the right to a speedy trial can be waived, but the waiver must be knowing and voluntary, citing People v. White, 32 N.Y.2d 393, 399. The court noted that because Rodriguez himself filed a motion to dismiss based on the denial of a speedy trial, it could “hardly be said that defendant…was unaware of his right.” The Court further emphasized that because he failed to raise the issue in the trial court during the plea or sentencing, there was no error for the appellate court to review. The Court implied that the defendant strategically withheld the argument, possibly hoping for a more lenient outcome at trial, and then raising the issue on appeal as a fallback. This strategic maneuvering was not condoned by the court, as it undermines the efficiency and finality of the trial process. The Court effectively held that a defendant cannot assert a right on appeal if they were aware of it and chose not to assert it at the trial level. The court does not explore the reason why the pro se motion was not pursued; the mere filing of the motion and the failure to raise the issue at the time of the plea was sufficient to waive the right. The court does not mention any dissenting or concurring opinions.

  • People v. McLaurin, 38 N.Y.2d 587 (1976): Duty to Secure Defendant for Speedy Trial After Notice of Incarceration

    People v. McLaurin, 38 N.Y.2d 587 (1976)

    When the state knows of a defendant’s incarceration in another jurisdiction and fails to take diligent action to secure the defendant’s presence for trial, the defendant’s right to a speedy trial is violated.

    Summary

    McLaurin was indicted in New York in 1968 but was subsequently incarcerated in New Jersey. New York authorities were notified of his incarceration in 1969 and were asked whether they would extradite him. No action was taken until 1972 when he was returned to New York. The Court of Appeals held that McLaurin’s right to a speedy trial was violated because the New York authorities knew of his whereabouts and availability for over three years but failed to act diligently to secure his presence for trial. The Court reversed the Appellate Division order and dismissed the indictment.

    Facts

    McLaurin was indicted in New York on September 30, 1968, and pleaded not guilty. He was released on bail but was subsequently arrested and convicted in New Jersey. On June 20, 1969, New York authorities were informed that McLaurin was being held in a New Jersey State prison. New Jersey specifically requested, via three communications dated June 18, 1969, that New York advise whether it would extradite McLaurin. McLaurin remained incarcerated in New Jersey until June 25, 1972, when he was returned to New York.

    Procedural History

    McLaurin appealed to the Appellate Division, arguing that he was denied a speedy trial. The Appellate Division rejected his claim. The Court of Appeals initially withheld determination of the appeal and remitted the case to the Supreme Court, Bronx County, for evidence regarding New York authorities’ knowledge of McLaurin’s New Jersey incarceration and their efforts to secure his presence in New York. After a hearing, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and dismissed the indictment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether McLaurin’s right to a speedy trial was violated when New York authorities knew of his incarceration in New Jersey for over three years but failed to take diligent action to secure his presence for trial.

    Holding

    Yes, because New York knew of McLaurin’s whereabouts and availability for over three years, the failure to act violated his right to a speedy trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior decisions in People v. Briggs, People v. McLaurin, and People v. Winfrey, which established that the state has a duty to make diligent efforts to bring a defendant to trial, especially when the defendant is incarcerated in another jurisdiction and the state is aware of it. The Court emphasized that New York authorities were not only aware of McLaurin’s incarceration but were also specifically asked by New Jersey whether they intended to extradite him.

    “In these circumstances where New York knew of defendant’s whereabouts and availability for over three years, we are required to hold that defendant’s right to a speedy trial was violated”. The Court found the delay unreasonable and prejudicial, thus warranting dismissal of the indictment. The decision underscores the importance of prosecutorial diligence in pursuing cases, even when defendants are incarcerated elsewhere.

  • People v. Johnson, 38 N.Y.2d 271 (1975): Establishing Speedy Trial Rights Based on Length of Delay and Prejudice

    People v. Johnson, 38 N.Y.2d 271 (1975)

    A defendant’s right to a speedy trial is violated when an extended pre-trial delay, coupled with pre-trial incarceration and potential prejudice to the defense, outweighs the justification offered for the delay, even if the delay is partly attributable to institutional factors like prosecutorial caseload.

    Summary

    Johnson was incarcerated for 18 months awaiting trial for murder and weapon possession. He pleaded guilty to manslaughter, claiming the delay caused a key defense witness to become unavailable. The delay stemmed from a shortage of prosecutors. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that Johnson’s right to a speedy trial was violated. The court emphasized the length of the delay, pre-trial incarceration, potential prejudice to the defense, and the state’s failure to adequately justify the delay. The court balanced these factors and found that the delay was not excusable, requiring dismissal of the indictment.

    Facts

    Fred Womack was fatally stabbed outside Johnson’s apartment on December 7, 1971. Johnson was arrested on January 7, 1972, and indicted for murder and weapon possession on January 27. He pleaded not guilty at his arraignment on February 18, asserting self-defense. Johnson requested an investigator in March. The case was set for trial on April 11, 1972, but the trial was repeatedly adjourned due to the prosecutor’s unavailability, purportedly due to a heavy caseload. Johnson remained incarcerated due to bail he couldn’t afford. During the delay, a crucial defense witness moved away and became unlocatable. Johnson pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the second degree on July 2, 1973, citing the lost witness as a primary reason.

    Procedural History

    Johnson was indicted in January 1972. He moved for a speedy trial, which was effectively denied through numerous adjournments. He sought habeas corpus relief in federal court, which was denied for failure to exhaust state remedies. He then sought habeas corpus in state court, which was denied on the condition that the trial proceed on December 4, 1972, a condition which was not met. He eventually pleaded guilty and appealed, arguing a violation of his right to a speedy trial. The Appellate Division affirmed his conviction without opinion. Johnson then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the 18-month delay between the defendant’s arrest and guilty plea, primarily due to prosecutorial backlog, violated the defendant’s statutory and constitutional right to a speedy trial, warranting dismissal of the indictment.

    Holding

    Yes, because the length of the delay, the defendant’s pre-trial incarceration, potential prejudice to the defense due to a missing witness, and the State’s inadequate justification for the delay (prosecutorial backlog) outweighed the seriousness of the charge, thus violating the defendant’s right to a speedy trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the factors established in People v. Taranovich to assess the speedy trial claim: the extent of the delay, the reason for the delay, the nature of the charge, the extent of pre-trial incarceration, and impairment to the defense. The court found the 18-month delay significant, with only a 30-day adjournment attributable to the defendant. The court acknowledged that while the serious nature of the charge allows for more thorough preparation, the delay here was not preparation-related. The court distinguished this case from People v. Ganci, where a 16-month delay due to inadequate facilities was deemed excusable. However, here, the delay was coupled with the defendant’s incarceration and the loss of a key witness, prejudicing his defense. The court stated, “[t]he speedy trial guaranteed by statute and the Federal Constitution serves three primary purposes: ‘It protects the accused, if held in jail to await trial, against prolonged imprisonment; it relieves him of the anxiety and public suspicion attendant upon an untried accusation of crime; and finally, like statutes of limitation, it prevents him from being exposed to the hazard of a trial, after so great a lapse of time that the means of proving his innocence may not be within his reach.’” The court also noted that while delays due to institutional factors like prosecutorial backlog weigh less heavily against the state than intentional delays, they do not automatically excuse a violation of speedy trial rights, especially when combined with other factors such as lengthy incarceration and prejudice to the defense. The court emphasized the State’s duty to allocate resources to ensure prompt trials. Ultimately, the court found that the combination of factors demonstrated a violation of Johnson’s speedy trial right, requiring reversal and dismissal of the indictment.

  • People v. McLaurin, 38 N.Y.2d 123 (1975): Prosecutorial Duty to Secure Defendant’s Presence from Another State for Speedy Trial

    38 N.Y.2d 123 (1975)

    When a defendant is incarcerated in another state, the prosecution must make diligent efforts to secure the defendant’s presence for trial in New York; failure to do so may violate the defendant’s right to a speedy trial.

    Summary

    McLaurin pleaded guilty to attempted robbery. He appealed, arguing a violation of his speedy trial rights due to a delay caused by his incarceration in New Jersey. The New York Court of Appeals found the record insufficient to determine if the delay was justified, specifically whether the prosecution knew of McLaurin’s out-of-state incarceration and made diligent efforts to secure his return for trial. The court emphasized the prosecution’s duty to demonstrate “good cause” for the delay and remanded for a hearing to establish these facts. The case highlights the importance of prosecutorial diligence when a defendant is incarcerated in another jurisdiction.

    Facts

    McLaurin was indicted in Bronx County, New York, on September 30, 1968, for robbery, grand larceny, and weapon possession. He was released on bail but arrested in New Jersey on December 13, 1968, on charges of kidnapping, rape, and narcotics offenses. He was convicted in New Jersey and sentenced to five to seven years. New York authorities filed a detainer. McLaurin remained in New Jersey custody until June 25, 1972, when he was returned to New York.

    Procedural History

    On October 17, 1972, McLaurin moved to dismiss the New York indictment, alleging denial of a speedy trial. The Supreme Court, Bronx County, conditionally granted the motion, ordering dismissal if trial did not commence by January 15, 1973. McLaurin then pleaded guilty to attempted robbery. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. McLaurin appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the delay in bringing McLaurin to trial in New York, due to his incarceration in New Jersey, violated his right to a speedy trial.

    Holding

    No, the Court could not determine if McLaurin’s speedy trial rights were violated because the record was incomplete as to whether the prosecution knew of McLaurin’s incarceration in New Jersey and whether they made diligent efforts to obtain his presence for trial; therefore, the case was remitted to the lower court for further proceedings.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated the established principle that delay due to incarceration in another jurisdiction is not automatically justified if the prosecution knows of the detention but fails to diligently seek the defendant’s presence for trial. The prosecution must demonstrate “good cause” for the delay. The Court emphasized that knowledge of the defendant’s whereabouts by law enforcement is crucial and is imputed to the District Attorney’s office. The Court found the record insufficient because there was no hearing on the original motion to dismiss, McLaurin pleaded guilty, and the prosecutor was prevented from introducing evidence about when they learned of McLaurin’s New Jersey incarceration. The court noted, “A defendant ought not be penalized because of any inadequacy of internal communication within the law enforcement establishment.” The case was remanded to determine whether the prosecutor was unaware of McLaurin’s incarceration and could not, with due diligence, have discovered his whereabouts. The Court noted that documentary evidence relating to the issue of the prosecutor’s knowledge of defendant’s imprisonment in New Jersey should be presented. The court cited CPL 30.30 (subd 4, pars [c], [e]), regarding the tolling of time periods due to the absence or unavailability of the defendant or detention in another jurisdiction, although it acknowledged this statute was not directly controlling as the indictment predated the law’s enactment.

  • People v. Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d 442 (1975): Factors in Determining Speedy Trial Violations

    People v. Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d 442 (1975)

    A determination of whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial has been violated requires a balancing of several factors, with no single factor being determinative.

    Summary

    Taranovich was arrested for attempted murder after allegedly running over a police officer with his car. Due to clerical error, his indictment was delayed for 12 months after his arraignment. He moved to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds. The Court of Appeals held that while the delay was attributable to the District Attorney’s office, considering the extent of the delay, the serious nature of the charge, the short period of pre-trial incarceration, and the lack of demonstrated impairment to the defense, Taranovich was not deprived of his right to a speedy trial. The court emphasized that speedy trial claims require an ad hoc balancing of factors and are not subject to rigid, temporal rules.

    Facts

    On January 13, 1972, a police officer stopped Taranovich for erratic driving. Taranovich refused to cooperate and then ran over the officer with his car, fleeing the scene before being apprehended. The officer sustained injuries requiring hospitalization. Taranovich was arraigned on multiple charges, including attempted murder.

    Procedural History

    Taranovich was arraigned in District Court on January 13, 1972. He was released on bail eight days later. The Grand Jury voted a true bill on February 10, 1972, charging him with assault and leaving the scene of an accident, but due to clerical error, he was not indicted until January 19, 1973. The County Court granted Taranovich’s motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of a speedy trial. The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the indictment. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a 12-month delay between arraignment and indictment, caused by clerical error, violated Taranovich’s constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy trial.

    Holding

    No, because considering the extent of the delay, the reason for the delay, the nature of the underlying charge, the lack of extended pretrial incarceration, and the lack of apparent impairment to the defense, Taranovich was not deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court stated that there is no specific temporal duration after which a defendant automatically becomes entitled to release for denial of a speedy trial. The court outlined five factors to be examined in determining if a defendant’s right to a speedy trial has been violated: (1) the extent of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the nature of the underlying charge; (4) whether or not there has been an extended period of pretrial incarceration; and (5) whether or not there is any indication that the defense has been impaired by reason of the delay.

    While the 12-month delay was significant and attributable to the District Attorney’s clerical error, the court noted it was not a deliberate attempt to hamper the defense. The serious nature of the charges (attempted murder and assault) justified a more cautious approach by the prosecution. Taranovich was incarcerated for only eight days, mitigating concerns about prolonged imprisonment. Critically, there was no indication that the delay impaired the defense. The court reasoned, “a questionable period of delay may or may not be unreasonable depending upon whether or not the likelihood of the defendant’s acquittal has been effected thereby.” Given the case primarily involved the testimony of the defendant and the police officer, the court deemed it improbable that the officer’s recollection would be significantly affected.

    The court emphasized that the factors must be evaluated on an ad hoc basis, as “no rigid precepts may be formulated which apply to each and every instance in which it is averred that there has been a deprivation of the speedy trial right.” The court concluded that “[a] one-year delay between the alleged occurrence of a crime and an indictment for a class C felony, even when it results from prosecutorial inattention, in and of itself does not entitle a defendant to a dismissal of the indictment where there is no lengthy pretrial incarceration and no apparent impairment of his defense caused by the delay.”

  • Scranton v. Supreme Court, 36 N.Y.2d 704 (1975): Availability of Article 78 Proceeding for Speedy Trial and Double Jeopardy Claims

    36 N.Y.2d 704 (1975)

    A claim of denial of a speedy trial is not cognizable in a CPLR Article 78 proceeding seeking to prohibit a District Attorney and Supreme Court Justices from proceeding on an indictment; however, a double jeopardy claim may be raised in such a proceeding.

    Summary

    Agnes Scranton sought to prohibit the District Attorney and Justices of the Supreme Court from proceeding with her indictment, arguing she was denied a speedy trial and that further prosecution would constitute double jeopardy. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s judgment denying her petition. It held that a speedy trial claim is not reviewable via an Article 78 proceeding, but a double jeopardy claim is. However, it found that Scranton was not placed in jeopardy because a mistrial was declared after only three jurors were sworn in, and thus, CPL 40.30(1)(b) was not violated.

    Facts

    Agnes Scranton was indicted, and a trial commenced. After three jurors were sworn in, a mistrial was declared. Scranton then brought an Article 78 proceeding, seeking to prevent the District Attorney and Justices of the Supreme Court from proceeding with the indictment against her. She argued that her right to a speedy trial had been violated and that a subsequent trial would constitute double jeopardy.

    Procedural History

    Scranton initiated an Article 78 proceeding against the Supreme Court and the District Attorney. The Appellate Division rendered a judgment, which was appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s judgment.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a claim of denial of a speedy trial is cognizable in an Article 78 proceeding seeking to prohibit the District Attorney and Justices of the Supreme Court from proceeding on an indictment.
    2. Whether a claim of double jeopardy may be raised in a prohibition proceeding under CPLR Article 78.
    3. Whether the petitioner was placed in jeopardy when a mistrial was declared after three jurors had been sworn.

    Holding

    1. No, because prior decisions have established that Article 78 proceedings are not the proper vehicle for raising speedy trial claims.
    2. Yes, because previous cases have recognized the availability of prohibition proceedings for double jeopardy claims.
    3. No, because under CPL 40.30(1)(b), a person is not deemed to have been prosecuted unless the trial proceeds to the point of swearing in all jurors.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on precedent, citing Matter of Watts v. Supreme Ct. of State of N. Y., 28 Y 2d 714, Matter of Lee v. County Ct. of Erie County, 27 Y 2d 432, 437, and Matter of Blake v. Hogan, 25 Y 2d 747, to support its holding that a speedy trial claim is not cognizable in an Article 78 proceeding. Regarding the double jeopardy claim, the court acknowledged that such claims could be raised in a prohibition proceeding, citing Matter of State of New York v. King, 36 Y 2d 59, at p. 64; Matter of Kraemer v. County Ct. of Suffolk County, 6 Y 2d 363. However, the court found that Scranton had not been placed in jeopardy because CPL 40.30(1)(b) specifies that a person is not considered to have been prosecuted for double jeopardy purposes unless the trial proceeds to the point of swearing in all the jurors. Since only three jurors had been sworn in when the mistrial was declared, Scranton was not placed in jeopardy. The court stated: “The petitioner was not placed in jeopardy despite the fact that three jurors had been sworn before a mistrial was declared. (CPL 40.30, subd. 1, par. [b].)” The decision emphasizes the statutory requirement for double jeopardy to attach. This case provides practical guidance on the appropriate procedural vehicle for raising speedy trial and double jeopardy claims in New York and clarifies the point at which jeopardy attaches under CPL 40.30(1)(b).

  • People v. Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d 442 (1975): Balancing Test for Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Claims

    People v. Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d 442 (1975)

    A determination of whether a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial has been violated requires a balancing of the conduct of the prosecution and the defendant, with particular attention to events toward the end of the relevant time period.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s orders, holding that despite 22- and 29-month delays between arrest and trial, the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was not violated. The court emphasized that much of the delay was attributable to the defendant’s own actions, including his dissatisfaction with assigned counsel and defense-instigated delays on the eve of trial. Furthermore, the defendant did not object to earlier delays caused by the prosecution and court. The court applied a balancing test, weighing the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant to determine if the delay prejudiced the defendant’s rights.

    Facts

    The defendant was subject to two indictments that experienced significant delays between arrest and trial: 22 months for one, and 29 months for the other. During the period leading up to the trial, the defendant expressed dissatisfaction with several assigned counsel, requiring their replacement. On the eve of trial, defense counsel indicated that the defendant was largely responsible for the delays.

    Procedural History

    The case originated with two indictments against the defendant. After delays in bringing the case to trial, the case reached the Appellate Division, whose orders were affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the delays of 22 and 29 months between the defendant’s arrest and trial constituted a violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, thereby warranting dismissal of the indictments.

    Holding

    No, because the delays were significantly attributable to the defendant’s actions, and the defendant failed to object to earlier delays caused by the prosecution and the court. The totality of the circumstances did not demonstrate a violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that delay alone does not automatically constitute a violation of a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial. Rather, a balancing test must be applied, weighing the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant. Citing People v. Blakley, 34 N.Y.2d 311, the court emphasized that courts should especially review events occurring toward the end of the relevant time period. The Court also pointed to People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y. 353, 359, 360 to emphasize the importance of contemporaneous objections. In this case, the court found that significant delays were instigated by the defense, and earlier delays were either justified or not objected to by the defendant. As a result, the defendant had no grounds for complaint. The court stated, “Delay alone does not automatically breach the defendant’s constitutional and statutory rights. Each such case must be determined on balance, i.e., the conduct of the prosecution and that of the defendant are weighed.”

  • People v. Miller, 35 N.Y.2d 337 (1974): Enforcing Speedy Trial Rights Under the Agreement on Detainers

    People v. Miller, 35 N.Y.2d 337 (1974)

    When a defendant invokes the Agreement on Detainers and is returned to their original place of imprisonment before trial without a showing of impossibility in bringing the defendant to trial, the indictment must be dismissed with prejudice if the trial does not occur within the statutory timeframe.

    Summary

    Leonard Miller, serving a federal sentence in Virginia, was indicted in New York. He invoked his right to a speedy trial under the Agreement on Detainers. He was brought to New York but returned to Virginia without trial because his case was not reached due to court scheduling policies. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the indictment. The court reasoned that the 10-month delay exceeded the 180-day limit under the Agreement, and the prosecution failed to demonstrate it was impossible to bring Miller to trial while he was in Buffalo, thus warranting dismissal with prejudice.

    Facts

    1. Leonard Miller was indicted on January 29, 1969, while serving a federal sentence in Virginia.
    2. In April 1969, Miller and his counsel asserted his right to a speedy trial, invoking the Agreement on Detainers.
    3. Miller was brought to Buffalo on June 5, 1969, for trial.
    4. He was held in Buffalo for 24 days and then returned to Virginia without a trial.
    5. The reason for the return was that Miller’s case was not reached in June and would not be reached in July due to Erie County Court policy of only hearing cases of defendants incarcerated for Erie County crimes during July.
    6. On December 10, 1969, Miller successfully moved to dismiss the indictment under the Agreement on Detainers.

    Procedural History

    1. The Erie County Court granted Miller’s motion to dismiss the indictment.
    2. The appellate division affirmed the lower court’s decision.
    3. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the appellate decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the return of a defendant to their original place of imprisonment before trial, after invoking the Agreement on Detainers, requires dismissal of the indictment when the trial does not occur within 180 days, as prescribed by the agreement?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the Agreement on Detainers mandates that a defendant be brought to trial within 180 days of their request, and if returned to their original place of imprisonment before trial, the indictment must be dismissed with prejudice, especially when the prosecution fails to demonstrate the impossibility of bringing the defendant to trial within the prescribed timeframe.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court based its reasoning on the Agreement on Detainers (Code Crim. Pro., § 669-b; CPL 580.20), which stipulates that a defendant must be brought to trial within 180 days of requesting it. The court emphasized that if a defendant is returned to their original place of imprisonment before trial, the court must dismiss the indictment with prejudice. Despite the United States not being a party to the agreement at the time, the court found that all parties acted in accordance with its provisions.

    The court acknowledged that a 10-month delay does not automatically warrant dismissal in every case, and that the length of delay is one of several factors to consider. However, the delay significantly exceeded the 180 days allowed under the Agreement on Detainers. The court noted the reduced opportunity for a concurrent sentence as a significant consequence of the delay. The court further stated that while court congestion and rules of precedence are cognizable factors, they are limited by the nature of the speedy trial guarantee. The court found critical that the District Attorney made no attempt to show that it was impossible to bring Miller to trial while he was incarcerated in Buffalo.

    The court referenced People v. Blakley, 34 N.Y.2d 311, and Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, emphasizing that the defendant and his counsel did assert the speedy trial right.

    The court explicitly stated, regarding the Agreement on Detainers, that if, as here, the defendant is returned to his original place of imprisonment before a trial is obtained, “ the court shall enter an order dismissing [the indictment] with prejudice.” (Code Crim. Pro., § 669-b; CPL 580.20, art. Ill, subds. [a], [d].)