New York Law Review

Tag: speedy trial

  • People v. Lomax, 50 N.Y.2d 351 (1980): Calculating Speedy Trial Time Under CPL 30.30

    People v. Lomax, 50 N.Y.2d 351 (1980)

    For speedy trial calculations under CPL 30.30, a criminal action commences with the filing of the first accusatory instrument, and delays caused by the defendant’s pretrial motions are generally excluded from the time the prosecution has to be ready for trial.

    Summary

    James Lomax was arrested and indicted for robbery. After the initial indictment was dismissed, a new indictment was filed. Lomax moved to dismiss the second indictment based on a violation of his speedy trial rights under CPL 30.30. The trial court summarily denied the motion. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the criminal action commenced with the first accusatory instrument. Although more than six months had passed, Lomax’s motion papers were insufficient because they did not adequately detail excludable periods resulting from his own pretrial motions, thus failing to demonstrate a clear entitlement to dismissal.

    Facts

    James Lomax was arrested on March 23, 1977, and charged with robbery. He was arraigned and subsequently indicted on March 28, 1977. The initial indictment was dismissed on June 14, 1977, following a defense motion. The District Attorney was granted leave to resubmit, and a new indictment was issued on June 23, 1977, encompassing the same charges. Lomax was re-arraigned. Lomax filed a second motion, including a request to inspect the grand jury minutes. A hearing was held in September 1977, but the decision denying the request was not announced until November 2, 1977. Lomax appeared for trial on December 8, 1977, but the trial was adjourned for three weeks to accommodate the District Attorney.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Lomax’s motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of a speedy trial without an evidentiary hearing. The trial ended in a mistrial. Lomax then pleaded guilty to a reduced charge. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction. Lomax appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing the denial of his speedy trial motion was improper.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the statutory speedy trial period under CPL 30.30 commences with the filing of the initial accusatory instrument or a subsequent indictment for the same charges?
    2. Whether the trial court erred in summarily denying Lomax’s speedy trial motion without a hearing, given his allegations of delay?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because under CPL 1.20(17), a criminal action commences with the filing of the first accusatory instrument, regardless of subsequent indictments for the same charges.
    2. No, because Lomax’s motion papers were insufficient to establish a clear entitlement to dismissal under CPL 30.30, as they failed to adequately account for excludable periods attributable to his own pretrial motions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that under CPL 1.20(17), a criminal action commences when the first accusatory instrument is filed. The court emphasized that “[a] criminal action is commenced by the filing of an accusatory instrument against a defendant in a criminal court, and, if more than one accusatory instrument is filed in the course of the action, it commences when the first of such instruments is filed”. Therefore, the speedy trial clock started on March 24, 1977, with the filing of the original felony complaint. However, the court noted that CPL 30.30(4)(a) excludes certain periods of delay, specifically those resulting from pretrial motions made by the defendant. The Court stated, “[U]nder the clear language of CPL 30.30 (subd 4, par [a]), such periods would generally be excluded from the total time within which the People are required by statute to become ready to proceed to trial.” Lomax’s motion papers acknowledged delays due to his motions but failed to provide specific dates, preventing the trial court from calculating the excludable time. The court reasoned that because Lomax had demonstrated some delay was excusable, he had the burden of showing that the remaining “unexcused” delay exceeded the statutory limit. Because Lomax’s papers were deficient, the trial court acted within its discretion to deny the motion summarily under CPL 210.45(5). The court also rejected Lomax’s general speedy trial claim, finding that the nine-and-a-half-month delay was not excessive, especially considering the seriousness of the charges and the delays caused by Lomax’s motions. The court balanced the factors outlined in People v. Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d 442 (1975), and found no violation.

  • People v. Whisby, 48 N.Y.2d 834 (1979): Admissibility of In-Court Identification and Speedy Trial Rights

    People v. Whisby, 48 N.Y.2d 834 (1979)

    An in-court identification is admissible if it is based on an independent source of recollection or if no police identification procedure took place, and a claim of denial of a speedy trial must be raised at trial to be preserved for appellate review.

    Summary

    Defendants Whisby and Price appealed their convictions, arguing that they were denied a speedy trial and that the in-court identification by the victim should have been suppressed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the speedy trial issue was not preserved for review because it was not raised at trial. The Court also found that the in-court identification of Price was based on an independent source and that no police identification procedure occurred with respect to Whisby, making the identification admissible. The Court found no merit in the defendants’ remaining contentions.

    Facts

    The victim identified Price in court. Prior to trial, the victim identified Whisby on a public street in White Plains without any police involvement. The defendants were convicted, and on appeal, they argued that their right to a speedy trial had been violated and that the in-court identification by the victim should have been suppressed.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted the defendants. The defendants appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the convictions. The defendants then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendants’ contention that they were denied their right to a speedy trial may be considered on appeal when the issue was not raised at trial.

    2. Whether the in-court identification of defendant Price by the victim ought to have been suppressed.

    3. Whether the in-court identification of defendant Whisby by the victim ought to have been suppressed.

    Holding

    1. No, because defendants failed to raise the issue at trial.

    2. No, because the in-court identification was based upon an independent source of recollection.

    3. No, because the complaining witness identified Whisby on a public street, and no police identification procedures took place.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that a claim of denial of a speedy trial must be raised at trial to be preserved for appellate review, citing People v. Primmer and People v. Adams. The Court stated that it could not consider the defendants’ speedy trial claim because they failed to raise it at trial.

    Regarding Price’s in-court identification, the Court found that there was evidence in the record to support the trial court’s factual finding, affirmed by the Appellate Division, that the identification was based upon an independent source of recollection. The Court emphasized that it cannot disturb such findings of fact, citing People v. Burrows and People v. Peterson.

    As for Whisby’s in-court identification, the Court relied on the affirmed finding of fact that he was identified by the complaining witness on a public street and that “there were no police identification procedures necessary and none, in fact, took place.” The court cited People v. Logan, noting that under such circumstances, the identification was proper. The Court suggested that the lack of police involvement distinguished this case from situations involving potentially suggestive police identification procedures.

    The Court summarily dismissed the defendants’ remaining contentions, finding them to be without merit.

  • Westchester Rockland Newspapers, Inc. v. Leggett, 48 N.Y.2d 985 (1979): Redaction Responsibility in Public Access to Trials

    Westchester Rockland Newspapers, Inc. v. Leggett, 48 N.Y.2d 985 (1979)

    When providing public access to pre-trial proceedings, while a court may offer redacted transcripts, the responsibility for the redaction itself is a nondelegable duty of the court.

    Summary

    This case concerns the balance between the public’s right to know and a defendant’s right to a fair trial, specifically regarding access to pre-trial suppression hearings. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision to allow access to transcripts, but clarified that while the court can offer redacted transcripts to the press, the actual act of redacting inadmissible evidence is the court’s responsibility, not that of the District Attorney or defense counsel. The court also cautioned against staying trial proceedings for collateral appeals regarding public access, emphasizing the defendant’s right to a speedy trial.

    Facts

    The case arose from pre-trial motions in a criminal case. The trial court determined to allow the press access to transcripts of the pre-trial proceedings. The court offered to supply complete transcripts of the proceedings during the pretrial motions, except for the redacted portions of yet inadmissible admissions of the defendant. The court stated that the redacting “has to be done by the District Attorney and defense counsel because the court doesn’t have the time”. The trial court then stayed its proceedings pending the determination of this appeal.

    Procedural History

    The trial court decided to allow press access to redacted transcripts of pre-trial proceedings and stayed the trial pending appeal of that decision. The Appellate Division’s decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a trial court can delegate the responsibility of redacting inadmissible portions of pre-trial transcripts to the District Attorney and defense counsel when providing those transcripts to the press.
    2. Whether a trial court should stay its proceedings pending the determination of an appeal regarding press access to redacted transcripts, potentially impacting the defendant’s right to a speedy trial.

    Holding

    1. No, because the redaction of transcripts is a nondelegable responsibility of the hearing court itself.
    2. No, because the right of a defendant to a speedy trial is important and should not be sacrificed in the name of collateral appeals, except in rare situations not present here.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the allowance of public access to the transcripts, referencing Matter of Gannett Co. v De Pasquale, which emphasized balancing public knowledge with fair trial rights via redacted transcripts. However, the Court explicitly stated that while a court may offer redacted transcripts, performing the redaction is the “nondelegable responsibility of the hearing court itself”. The court reasoned that delegating this responsibility was inappropriate. Further, the Court cautioned against staying proceedings for collateral appeals, stressing the importance of a defendant’s speedy trial rights. The court recognized the broad discretion of trial courts to stay their own proceedings, but cautioned that the right of a defendant to a speedy trial is important and should not be sacrificed in the name of these collateral appeals. The Court found the stay in this case was not justified, highlighting that the defendant had been incarcerated since September 1978, awaiting trial, which had been delayed due to the collateral matter. The court stated, “Only in rare situations, not present here, should a court stay trial proceedings to permit a challenge to rulings permitting the press and public to have redacted transcripts of pretrial suppression proceedings.”

  • People v. Hamilton, 46 N.Y.2d 932 (1979): Establishing the Requirement for On-Record Communication of Readiness for Trial

    People v. Hamilton, 46 N.Y.2d 932 (1979)

    To comply with speedy trial requirements, the prosecution must communicate their readiness for trial on the record to the court; merely claiming readiness in response to a motion to dismiss is insufficient.

    Summary

    This case addresses the prosecution’s responsibility to demonstrate readiness for trial under New York’s speedy trial statute. Hamilton was charged with a felony, and more than six months elapsed between the filing of the felony complaint and the prosecution’s readiness for trial. The Court of Appeals held that the prosecution failed to adequately demonstrate its readiness for trial because it only asserted such readiness in an affidavit responding to the defendant’s motion to dismiss, and not on the record to the court. Therefore, the delay was not excludable, and the indictment was dismissed.

    Facts

    On November 13, 1975, a felony complaint was filed against Hamilton.

    The People claim to have been ready for trial in May 1976.

    On November 26, 1976, the People were actually ready for trial, one year and 13 days after the felony complaint was filed.

    Hamilton moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing a denial of his right to a speedy trial.

    The People opposed the motion, claiming they were ready in May 1976 and offered excuses for the delay.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment based on a denial of a speedy trial.

    The Appellate Division order was appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and dismissed the indictment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People’s delay of one year and 13 days between the filing of the felony complaint and their readiness for trial violated CPL 30.30(1)(a), requiring dismissal of the indictment.

    Whether the People’s assertion of readiness for trial, made for the first time in an affidavit responding to a motion to dismiss, is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of communicating readiness to the court on the record.

    Holding

    Yes, because the period exceeded six months, and the delay was not sufficiently excludable under CPL 30.30(4).

    No, because to sustain an assertion of readiness, the People must communicate readiness for trial to the court on the record when ready to proceed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that under CPL 30.30(1)(a), the People must be ready for trial within six months of the commencement of a criminal action when a felony is charged. Since the delay exceeded six months, the burden shifted to the People to demonstrate that enough time was excludable under CPL 30.30(4) to bring the delay within the statutory limit.

    The only period the court found excludable was from May 10, 1976, to August 10, 1976, due to pretrial motions made by the defendant. The court rejected the People’s argument that the need for further investigation excused the delay, citing People v. Washington, 43 N.Y.2d 772 (1977).

    The court emphasized that the People’s claim of readiness in May 1976 was insufficient because they failed to communicate this readiness to the court on the record. The court explicitly stated: “To sustain such an assertion, the People must communicate readiness for trial to the court on the record when ready to proceed. It is insufficient, as a matter of law, to inform the court of such a claim for the first time in an affidavit submitted in response to a motion to dismiss the indictment.” The court cited United States v. Pierro, 478 F.2d 386, to support this proposition.

    The court also underscored that the right to a speedy trial under CPL 30.30 is not contingent on the defendant’s readiness for trial or a showing of prejudice resulting from the delay. This reinforces the prosecution’s independent duty to be ready for trial within the statutory timeframe and to properly communicate that readiness to the court.

  • People v. Dean, 45 N.Y.2d 651 (1978): Clarifying Speedy Trial Rights Under CPL 30.30

    People v. Dean, 45 N.Y.2d 651 (1978)

    Under CPL 30.30, the statutory right to a speedy trial is not violated when the delay beyond six months is primarily due to other proceedings involving the defendant, including pretrial motions, trials on other charges, and appeals, especially when a related appeal could directly impact the validity of the indictment.

    Summary

    The defendant was indicted on multiple counts of grand larceny and issuing bad checks. He moved to dismiss indictment No. 534, arguing that the delay between indictment and trial violated his right to a speedy trial. The Court of Appeals held that the delay was justified because a significant portion of it was attributable to other proceedings involving the defendant, specifically the appeal of a related conviction for issuing a bad check. The court reasoned that the prosecutor was entitled to await the outcome of that appeal, as a favorable ruling for the defendant could have impacted the validity of the other indictments. Therefore, the motion to dismiss was properly denied, and the conviction was affirmed.

    Facts

    The defendant was indicted on multiple charges in September 1973 and released on bond. He was tried and acquitted on some charges, but convicted of issuing a bad check in a separate trial (indictment No. 535). The defendant appealed the bad check conviction, arguing he couldn’t be held criminally liable because he didn’t personally sign the check. While the appeal was pending, the defendant moved to dismiss the remaining indictments (including No. 534) based on a denial of his right to a speedy trial. The motion was denied, and he was subsequently convicted on indictment No. 534.

    Procedural History

    The Monroe County Grand Jury indicted the defendant. The defendant was convicted in Monroe County Court on indictment No. 534. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was granted.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the delay between the defendant’s indictment and trial violated his statutory right to a speedy trial under CPL 30.30, considering the time spent on other proceedings involving the defendant.
    2. Whether the defendant’s general speedy trial right under CPL 30.20 and Section 12 of the Civil Rights Law was violated.
    3. Whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred the prosecution based on a prior acquittal on a grand larceny charge in a related case.

    Holding

    1. No, because the majority of the delay was attributable to other proceedings involving the defendant, including pre-trial motions, trial of other charges, and the period during which such matters were under consideration by the court, as well as certain appeals, as outlined in CPL 30.30(4).
    2. No, because the defendant suffered no pretrial incarceration, there was no showing of prejudice, and there was a valid reason for the People to delay the prosecution.
    3. No, because it could not be determined with certainty that the prior acquittal necessarily represented a finding by the jury that the defendant lacked larcenous intent with respect to the transactions related to indictment No. 534.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals analyzed the delay under CPL 30.30, which requires the People to be ready for trial within six months of a felony indictment. However, CPL 30.30(4) excludes certain periods from this calculation, including delays resulting from other proceedings involving the defendant, such as pretrial motions, trials on other charges, and appeals. The court found that most of the delay was due to the defendant’s pretrial motions and the appeal of his conviction for issuing a bad check (indictment No. 535). The court emphasized that the appeal in the other case raised an issue that, if decided in the defendant’s favor, could have warranted the dismissal of the remaining indictments. The court stated, “The prosecutor was entitled to await the outcome of the appeal before subjecting both the defendant and his office to the expense and travail of a trial which might well have proved to be futile.” The court also found that the defendant’s general speedy trial right under CPL 30.20 was not violated, considering the factors outlined in People v. Taranovich (37 N.Y.2d 442 (1975)), including the lack of pretrial incarceration and prejudice. Finally, the court rejected the collateral estoppel argument, finding that the prior acquittal did not necessarily determine the issue of larcenous intent in the present case. The court quoted the Appellate Division, “it is certainly plausible that the jury based its acquittal upon the belief that no property had been obtained or withheld by means of the bad check issued to’ Insana…”

  • People v. Staley, 41 N.Y.2d 733 (1977): Defining “Exceptional Circumstances” for Speedy Trial Rights

    People v. Staley, 41 N.Y.2d 733 (1977)

    A narcotics investigation can only excuse a delay in prosecution under the “exceptional circumstances” exception to speedy trial rights if the prosecution demonstrates credible and vigorous activity in pursuing the investigation and the delay is justified by the investigation’s purpose.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, dismissing the indictment against Staley due to a seven-month delay between his felony indictment and arrest, a violation of his statutory right to a speedy trial. The prosecution argued that an ongoing narcotics investigation constituted “exceptional circumstances” justifying the delay. However, the Court of Appeals found the proof of such an investigation deficient, noting a lack of significant activity and unsatisfactory excuses for the investigation’s stagnation. The Court clarified that the “exceptional circumstances” exception requires credible, vigorous investigative activity to justify delays.

    Facts

    Defendant Staley was indicted on felony narcotics charges. A seven-month delay occurred between Staley’s indictment and his subsequent arrest. The prosecution claimed this delay was due to an ongoing narcotics investigation, which they argued constituted “exceptional circumstances” under CPL 30.30, subd 4, par (g), thereby excusing the delay in bringing Staley to trial. The defense argued that the delay violated Staley’s right to a speedy trial under CPL 30.30, subd 1, par (a).

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Staley. Staley appealed, arguing the seven-month delay violated his speedy trial rights. The intermediate appellate court affirmed the conviction, accepting the prosecution’s argument that the narcotics investigation justified the delay. Staley then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a generalized claim of an ongoing narcotics investigation, without demonstrating credible and vigorous investigative activity, constitutes “exceptional circumstances” sufficient to excuse a seven-month delay between indictment and arrest, thereby satisfying the requirements of CPL 30.30 concerning a defendant’s right to a speedy trial.

    Holding

    No, because the prosecution failed to demonstrate credible, vigorous activity in pursuing the narcotics investigation; therefore, the delay was not justified by “exceptional circumstances” as required to avoid violating the defendant’s statutory right to a speedy trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that the prosecution’s evidence of an ongoing narcotics investigation was deficient. The court emphasized that “no activity of any significance was shown, but only a variety of unsatisfactory excuses why the investigation did not proceed.” The Court interpreted CPL 30.30, subd 4, par (g), stating that statutory examples of exceptional circumstances would entail at least probable availability of new evidence within a reasonable period of time, and a justified need for additional time to prepare the People’s case. The court reasoned that the exception must be limited to instances in which the prosecution’s inability to proceed is justified by the purposes of the investigation and credible, vigorous activity in pursuing it. Because the prosecution failed to demonstrate such activity, the delay was deemed a violation of Staley’s statutory right to a speedy trial, requiring dismissal of the indictment. The Court emphasized that the legislative purpose behind the speedy trial statute would be undermined if generalized, unsubstantiated claims of ongoing investigations could excuse lengthy delays. The court also noted it was unnecessary to address a potential error regarding the characterization of a defense witness due to the primary holding on the speedy trial issue.

  • People v. Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d 442 (1975): Speedy Trial Rights and Lengthy Pre-Trial Detention

    People v. Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d 442 (1975)

    The length of pre-trial detention is a significant factor in determining whether a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated, but it is not the only factor, and other circumstances must also be considered.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the order upholding the defendant’s conviction, despite a 19-month pre-trial detention. While acknowledging the length of the delay, the court distinguished the case from a prior decision, People v. Johnson, due to differing factual circumstances and a lack of demonstrable prejudice to the defendant. The court emphasized that the length of delay is but one factor in determining if a speedy trial right has been violated, noting that the defendant did not claim that the delay prejudiced his case. A concurring judge agreed with the outcome based on the majority’s interpretation that the previous ruling wasn’t dispositive and referencing his dissent in the previous ruling.

    Facts

    The defendant was arrested and charged with attempted murder. He was held in jail for 19 months awaiting trial. After the trial, the defendant was found guilty of assault in the first degree and possession of a weapon.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted after a trial. The Appellate Division order affirming the conviction was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the 19-month pre-trial detention of the defendant violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial, warranting a reversal of his conviction.

    Holding

    No, because while the length of pre-trial detention is a significant factor, it is not dispositive. The Court found no dispositive distinction requiring reversal based on prior precedent, particularly where the defendant did not demonstrate prejudice resulting from the delay.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court acknowledged the precedent set in People v. Johnson, where an 18-month pre-trial detention was deemed a violation of speedy trial rights. However, the court distinguished Taranovich from Johnson. The court noted that although the defendant was held for 19 months, one month longer than the defendant in Johnson, the charge against this defendant was less serious. Further, the court found it significant that the defendant in Taranovich did not claim that the delay cost him witnesses, even though the defendant Johnson’s claim was unsubstantiated. The concurring judge wrote, “That this defendant does not claim that the delay cost him witnesses is of little moment since defendant Johnson’s claim was totally barren.” Ultimately, the court held that no speedy trial violation had occurred.

  • People v. Frazier, 46 N.Y.2d 271 (1978): Concession of Facts in Speedy Trial Motions

    People v. Frazier, 46 N.Y.2d 271 (1978)

    A court may summarily grant a motion to dismiss if the prosecution’s papers do not present a factual dispute that must be resolved at a hearing; a failure to controvert the facts alleged in the motion is deemed a concession.

    Summary

    This case addresses the procedure for deciding motions to dismiss on speedy trial grounds under CPL 30.30. The Court of Appeals held that a trial court may grant such a motion without a hearing if the prosecution fails to raise a factual dispute in response to the defendant’s allegations. The Court emphasized that the prosecution cannot demand a hearing simply by refusing to expressly concede the facts, especially when the relevant information is available to both sides. The Court remitted the cases to allow the prosecution to submit additional papers, given the prevailing practice in the relevant county.

    Facts

    The defendants in these consolidated cases moved to dismiss their indictments, arguing that the People were not ready for trial within six months of the commencement of the criminal actions, violating CPL 30.30(1)(a). The People did not dispute the facts alleged in the defendants’ motion papers but instead requested a hearing.

    Procedural History

    The trial court dismissed the indictments without a hearing, reasoning that the People’s failure to raise a factual issue in their answering papers was equivalent to conceding the truth of the allegations in the moving papers. The People appealed, claiming that the court erred by not holding a hearing because they had not expressly conceded the facts. The Appellate Division orders were appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a court must conduct a hearing on a motion to dismiss an indictment on speedy trial grounds when the prosecution does not expressly concede the facts alleged by the defendant but also fails to controvert those facts in their responding papers.

    Holding

    No, because the court may summarily grant a motion to dismiss unless the prosecutor’s papers show a factual dispute that must be resolved at a hearing. A failure to controvert facts is generally deemed a concession.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals rejected the prosecution’s argument that CPL 210.45(4) requires an express concession of facts before a motion to dismiss can be granted without a hearing. The Court stated that this interpretation would have a “catastrophic effect on motion practice in all criminal cases” by virtually abolishing the court’s power to grant motions on the papers. The Court reasoned that, normally, what is not disputed is deemed conceded, and a party cannot arbitrarily demand a hearing for a “fishing expedition.”

    The Court cited People v. Ganci, highlighting the court’s previous emphasis on reducing delays caused by unnecessary hearings. The Court noted that the Legislature’s enactment of CPL 30.30 was intended to ameliorate the harsh results of earlier rules regarding speedy trials and that the prosecution’s current position would be a procedural luxury.

    The Court clarified that opposition papers need not be as detailed as those required to defeat a motion for summary judgment. However, in cases where the facts are available to both sides, the failure to raise an issue by contradiction or avoidance eliminates the need for a hearing.

    In this specific case, the court acknowledged that a different practice may have prevailed in Westchester County. Therefore, the Court remitted the cases to allow the People to submit additional papers. The Court noted that in the Frazier case, the claim that the defendant had absconded might warrant a hearing, but in the Gruden case, the alleged facts might not be sufficient to defeat the motion even if proven at a hearing.

  • People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y.2d 634 (1974): Balancing Factors in Speedy Trial Determinations

    People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y.2d 634 (1974)

    The determination of whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial has been violated requires a balancing of factors, including the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the extent of pretrial confinement, and any prejudice to the defendant.

    Summary

    Prosser was convicted of second-degree manslaughter after confessing to a killing. He appealed, arguing that the 27-month delay between his indictment and trial violated his right to a speedy trial. The delay was largely attributed to the key prosecution witness’s physical incapacity and the prosecutor’s focus on other pressing cases. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that while the delay was significant, considering all factors, including Prosser’s limited pretrial confinement, the justifications for the delay, and the lack of demonstrated prejudice to his defense, his speedy trial right was not violated. The court emphasized the need to balance competing interests and priorities in the criminal justice system.

    Facts

    Prosser fatally shot Allison in August 1968. Initially, a grand jury did not indict him after he claimed self-defense. In 1970, Prosser confessed to the killing to a fellow police officer, Cofield, who, under pretense, recorded Prosser repeating the confession and admitting to other crimes. Prosser was then indicted for murder in December 1970. He was free on bail for most of the time between indictment and trial.

    Procedural History

    Prosser was convicted of second-degree manslaughter after a jury trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Prosser then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing a violation of his right to a speedy trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the 27-month delay between indictment and trial violated Prosser’s constitutional right to a speedy trial, considering the reasons for the delay and the circumstances of the case.

    Holding

    No, because considering the length of the delay, the justifications for the delay (witness incapacity and prosecutorial priorities), the limited pretrial confinement, and the lack of demonstrated prejudice to Prosser’s defense, his right to a speedy trial was not violated.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied a balancing test, considering several factors to determine if Prosser’s right to a speedy trial was violated. These factors included the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the extent of pretrial confinement, and the existence of prejudice to the defendant’s ability to defend himself. Approximately 11 months of the delay were attributed to the defense, and 10 months were due to the key witness’s (Officer Cofield) physical incapacity. Another five months were due to the prosecutor’s involvement in other high-profile cases. The court noted that while a 27-month delay was significant, Prosser was on bail for most of that time, reducing the burden on him. The court distinguished this case from People v. Johnson, where the defendant was continuously jailed and asserted a plausible self-defense. Here, the court found no prejudice to Prosser’s defense. The critical issue was the authenticity of his confessions, which was not affected by the delay. The court acknowledged the importance of prioritizing jail cases and cases involving serious crimes of public significance. The court found the cross-examination of Prosser regarding other crimes was justified, given his admissions to Cofield. The court stated, “Whether one is deprived of a speedy trial depends on a number of related factors: The length of the delay, the excuses or justifications for the delay, the burden and extent of pretrial confinement, and, of course, even if not an essential factor, the existence of prejudice to defendant’s opportunity to defend. Influencing the application of the delay factor is, within tolerable limits, the temporary or permanent burdens on the prosecution in moving cases to trial.” The court concluded that the circumstances justified the delay and affirmed the conviction.

  • People v. Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d 442 (1975): Balancing Factors for Speedy Trial Violations

    People v. Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d 442 (1975)

    A determination of whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial has been violated requires a sensitive weighing of several factors, with no single factor being determinative.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the defendant was denied his right to a speedy trial, considering a 21-month delay between indictment and trial. The court reiterated that assessing a speedy trial claim requires balancing multiple factors: the extent of the delay, the reason for the delay, the nature of the charge, any extended pretrial incarceration, and any impairment to the defense due to the delay. The court found that while the delay was significant, the prosecution’s prioritization of cases with incarcerated defendants, the seriousness of the charges, the defendant’s liberty during the delay (except for three days), and lack of demonstrated prejudice to the defense weighed against a speedy trial violation. Therefore, the court affirmed the conviction.

    Facts

    The defendant was arrested on August 24, 1968, and indicted on September 16, 1968, for attempted rape, attempted sexual abuse, attempted sexual misconduct, robbery, and grand larceny. The charges stemmed from an incident in which the defendant lured an airline stewardess to his hotel room under false pretenses and attempted to rape her. The defendant was released on bail three days after his arrest. His jury trial began on January 3, 1972, approximately 40 months after the commencement of the criminal proceeding.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of attempted rape in the first degree. Prior to trial, the defendant moved for dismissal based on failure to prosecute. The District Attorney was directed to try the case by the end of the January 1972 Term, or the motion would be granted. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction, and the defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals based on the speedy trial issue.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the 21-month delay between indictment and trial, coupled with the prosecution’s prioritization of cases involving incarcerated defendants, constituted a denial of the defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial.

    Holding

    No, because considering the extent and reasons for the delay, the seriousness of the charges, the defendant’s release on bail, and the absence of demonstrated prejudice to the defense, the defendant was not deprived of his right to a speedy trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reiterated the balancing test for speedy trial claims, emphasizing that no single factor is determinative. The court acknowledged the 21-month delay was substantial, but it considered the prosecution’s justification for the delay—prioritizing cases involving incarcerated defendants. The court distinguished this case from People v. Johnson, 38 N.Y.2d 271 (1975), where the priority system was based solely on the date of indictment and incarceration. Here, the court found the priority system reasonable, especially since the defendant was not incarcerated (except for three days) and did not object to the adjournments. The court noted that the seriousness of the charges justified thoroughness in the prosecution. Finally, the court emphasized that the defendant failed to demonstrate any impairment to his defense as a result of the delay. The court reasoned that any potential loss of memory could have been more damaging to the prosecution, which had the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court stated, “the greater the delay the more probable it is that the accused will be harmed thereby.” However, the court found no actual harm to the defendant here. The court balanced these factors and concluded that the defendant was not deprived of his right to a speedy trial. Therefore, the court affirmed the order of the Appellate Division.