New York Law Review

Tag: speedy trial

  • People v. Liotta, 79 N.Y.2d 841 (1992): Consenting to Adjournment and Speedy Trial Rights

    People v. Liotta, 79 N.Y.2d 841 (1992)

    A defendant’s consent to an adjournment of a trial must be clearly expressed by the defendant or defense counsel to relieve the People of responsibility for that portion of the delay when considering speedy trial rights under CPL 30.30; and post-readiness, the People bear the burden of clarifying the basis for adjournments on the record.

    Summary

    Defendant Liotta was indicted for hindering prosecution. The People declared readiness, but Liotta moved to dismiss, claiming a speedy trial violation under CPL 30.30. The Court of Appeals held that a defendant’s consent to adjournment must be explicitly stated to be valid. Additionally, after the People declare readiness, they must clarify the reasons for adjournments on the record, or the delay will be charged to the People. Since the People failed to obtain express consent for one period and clarify the reasons for adjournment for another, those periods were charged to them, violating Liotta’s speedy trial rights.

    Facts

    Defendant Liotta was indicted on November 2, 1988, for hindering prosecution in the first degree. The People filed a notice of readiness on March 23, 1989. Liotta moved to dismiss the indictment in October 1989, claiming the People violated his right to a speedy trial under CPL 30.30. Two periods of delay were at issue: February 27, 1989, to March 23, 1989 (pre-readiness), and May 17, 1989, to June 14, 1989 (post-readiness).

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment at the trial level, arguing that the People had violated his speedy trial rights. The intermediate appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision, agreeing with the defendant. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the appellate court’s decision, finding that the delays were chargeable to the People and that the defendant’s speedy trial rights had been violated.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a defendant’s failure to object to an adjournment or defense counsel’s failure to appear constitutes consent to the adjournment, relieving the People of responsibility for the delay under CPL 30.30.

    2. Whether, after the People have announced readiness for trial, the burden rests on the People to clarify the basis for adjournments on the record, such that failure to do so results in the adjournment being charged to the People under CPL 30.30.

    Holding

    1. No, because consent to an adjournment must be clearly expressed by the defendant or defense counsel to relieve the People of the responsibility for that portion of the delay.

    2. Yes, because the People must clarify the basis for adjournments on the record after announcing readiness so the court can determine who should be charged with the delay.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the right to a speedy trial is not contingent on the defendant expressing readiness for trial, citing People v. Hamilton, 46 NY2d 932, 933-934. Consequently, mere failure to object to an adjournment or absence of defense counsel does not equate to consent. The court emphasized that consent must be “clearly expressed.”

    Regarding post-readiness delay, the Court placed the onus on the People to ensure the record clearly indicates the reason for adjournments. By failing to do so, the People forfeit the ability to argue later that the delay should not be attributed to them. The court stated that “where, as here, the court grants adjournments after the People have announced the indictment ready for trial, the burden rests on the People to clarify, on the record, the basis for the adjournment so that on a subsequent CPL 30.30 motion the court can determine to whom the adjournment should be charged. Inasmuch as the People failed to do so in this case, the adjournment must be charged to them.” This rule prevents ambiguity and ensures accurate calculation of chargeable time.

    There were no dissenting or concurring opinions.

  • People v. Lomax, 72 N.Y.2d 820 (1988): Interpreting Speedy Trial Rules When Felony Complaint is Replaced by Misdemeanor Indictment

    People v. Lomax, 72 N.Y.2d 820 (1988)

    When a criminal action commences with a felony complaint that is later replaced by a misdemeanor indictment, the applicable speedy trial period is determined by the accusatory instrument that initiated the action, not the final charge.

    Summary

    Defendant Lomax was convicted of reckless endangerment in the second degree. The case began with a felony complaint, but the Grand Jury indicted her on a misdemeanor. Lomax argued the People had to be ready for trial within 90 days of the misdemeanor indictment under CPL 30.30. The People contended they had six months, arguing that the initial felony complaint controlled. The Court of Appeals agreed with the People, holding that CPL 30.30(5)(c) doesn’t include misdemeanor indictments when listing accusatory instruments that trigger the shorter 90-day speedy trial period. Therefore, the six-month period applied, and Lomax’s speedy trial rights weren’t violated.

    Facts

    Lomax, a hospital volunteer, disconnected the life support of an AIDS patient, believing prayer had healed him.

    She was initially arraigned on a felony complaint for reckless endangerment in the first degree.

    The Grand Jury subsequently filed a misdemeanor indictment charging her with reckless endangerment in the second degree.

    Procedural History

    The Trial Court held that the six-month speedy trial period applied.

    The Appellate Division affirmed.

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, under CPL 30.30, when a criminal action commences with a felony complaint that is later replaced by a misdemeanor indictment, the applicable speedy trial period is 90 days from the filing of the misdemeanor indictment or six months from the initial felony complaint.

    Holding

    No, because CPL 30.30(5)(c) does not include misdemeanor indictments in the list of accusatory instruments that trigger the 90-day speedy trial period; thus, the six-month period applies from the initial felony complaint.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court focused on the plain language of CPL 30.30(5)(c), which specifies the accusatory instruments that trigger the 90-day speedy trial period when a felony complaint is replaced or converted. Misdemeanor indictments are notably absent from this list.

    The Court rejected Lomax’s argument that the legislature intended a distinction between felonies and lesser offenses for speedy trial purposes, stating that courts must give effect to the statute as written, not as they think it should have been written: “‘must be read and given effect as it is written by the Legislature, not as the court may think it should or would have been written if the Legislature had envisaged all the problems and complications which might arise’.” (quoting Parochial Bus Sys. v Board of Educ., 60 NY2d 539, 548-549).

    The court applied the principle that the exclusion of a matter from a statute indicates intentional exclusion: “The failure of the Legislature to include a matter within a particular statute is an indication that its exclusion was intended” (citing Pajak v Pajak, 56 NY2d 394, 397).

    Because the legislature didn’t include misdemeanor indictments, the court concluded the six-month period applied from the date of the initial felony complaint. This decision emphasizes the importance of strictly interpreting statutes and not adding provisions the legislature omitted. The practical impact is that prosecutors have more time to prepare when a felony complaint is later reduced to a misdemeanor indictment.

  • People v. Correa, 77 N.Y.2d 930 (1991): Arraignment Delay Not Excluded from Speedy Trial Calculation

    People v. Correa, 77 N.Y.2d 930 (1991)

    Delays between indictment and arraignment are generally not excludable from the time within which the People must be ready for trial under CPL 30.30, as such delays typically do not prevent the People from being ready.

    Summary

    The Court of Appeals held that delays between indictment and arraignment are not excludable from the statutory speedy trial time under CPL 30.30. The People argued that these delays should be excluded because they couldn’t announce readiness for trial before arraignment, as the defendant might not have counsel or might plead guilty at arraignment. The Court rejected these arguments, stating that the lack of counsel is expressly exempted under CPL 30.30(4)(f), and the possibility of a guilty plea does not excuse the prosecution from preparing for trial within the statutory timeframe. Therefore, the delay was properly charged to the People.

    Facts

    The specific facts of the underlying criminal case are not detailed in this memorandum opinion. The central issue revolves around the delay between the indictment and the defendant’s arraignment. The People sought to exclude this period from the time charged against them under CPL 30.30, New York’s speedy trial statute.

    Procedural History

    The lower courts found that the delay between indictment and arraignment was chargeable to the People. The People appealed this determination. The Court of Appeals reviewed the submissions and affirmed the order of the Appellate Division, effectively upholding the lower court’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the delay between indictment and arraignment is excludable from the time within which the People must be ready for trial under CPL 30.30.

    Holding

    No, because delays between indictment and arraignment, such as court congestion, do not prevent the People from being ready for trial and therefore are not excludable under CPL 30.30.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that delays related to arraignment scheduling, like other forms of court congestion, do not inherently prevent the People from being ready for trial. They cited People v. Brothers, 50 N.Y.2d 413, 417, to support this point. The Court dismissed the People’s argument that they were legally blocked from announcing readiness before arraignment due to potential lack of counsel, pointing to CPL 30.30 (4) (f), which expressly exempts periods when the defendant lacks counsel. The Court also rejected the argument that preparing for trial before arraignment was impractical due to the possibility of a guilty plea. The Court stated: “That defendant might plead guilty then or at any other time before trial should not excuse the prosecutor from taking the necessary steps to be ready for trial within the prescribed period.” The Court emphasized the prosecutor’s duty to be prepared for trial within the statutory timeframe, irrespective of potential guilty pleas. The decision underscores that administrative or logistical hurdles do not automatically excuse the People from meeting their speedy trial obligations. The opinion is a memorandum decision, providing a concise statement of the court’s reasoning without dissenting or concurring opinions.

  • People v. McKenna, 76 N.Y.2d 59 (1990): Prosecutorial Readiness and Delays in Producing Grand Jury Minutes

    76 N.Y.2d 59 (1990)

    A delay in producing Grand Jury minutes necessary for a court to decide a defendant’s pretrial motion constitutes a direct impediment to the commencement of trial and impacts the People’s readiness under CPL 30.30.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of assault. The People declared readiness but then delayed producing Grand Jury minutes needed for the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment based on evidentiary insufficiency. The Court of Appeals held that the People’s five-month delay in producing the minutes, after declaring readiness, was chargeable to the People under CPL 30.30. Because the delay directly impeded the trial’s commencement, it negated the People’s claim of readiness. The Court rejected arguments that the defendant should have withdrawn his motion or sought other remedies. The conviction was reversed, and the indictment dismissed.

    Facts

    Defendant was charged with felony assault. The accusatory instrument was filed on March 17, 1985. The People declared their readiness for trial on June 26, 1985. On August 1, 1985, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment for evidentiary insufficiency (CPL 210.30). The People filed a written response but did not provide the Grand Jury minutes needed for the court to decide the motion. The Grand Jury minutes were transcribed and delivered to the District Attorney’s file room on June 25, 1985, but were not retrieved until December 2, 1985, and not delivered to the court until January 3, 1986.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss based on CPL 30.30, finding the People’s ability to proceed to trial was unaffected by the delay. The defendant was convicted of the charged counts. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, dismissing the indictment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People’s failure to produce Grand Jury minutes necessary for a court to decide a defendant’s pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment, within the statutory speedy trial period, constitutes a delay chargeable to the People under CPL 30.30.

    Holding

    Yes, because the delay in producing the Grand Jury minutes directly impeded the trial’s commencement and therefore impacted the People’s readiness under CPL 30.30.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 30.30 requires the People to be ready for trial within six months of the commencement of a criminal action involving a felony. The court distinguished this case from People v. Anderson, where delays in producing Rosario material did not impact the People’s readiness. Here, the People’s failure to provide Grand Jury minutes was a “direct, and virtually insurmountable, impediment to the trial’s very commencement.” The court stated that “the People can hardly claim to be ‘ready’ when they have not done all that is required of them to bring the case to the point where it may be tried.” The Court rejected the People’s argument that the defendant could have withdrawn his motion or sought other remedies, stating that a defendant’s right to a speedy trial cannot be conditioned on waiving the right to test the sufficiency of the evidence before the Grand Jury. Furthermore, the Court stated that the readiness should be evaluated from the perspective of the preparedness to present their own case. The court found that the defendant’s presence is a constitutionally and statutorily mandated condition precedent to the commencement of trial. The court concluded that the five-month delay, when added to other chargeable delays, exceeded the statutory limit, requiring dismissal of the indictment. The court stated, “First, there must be a communication of readiness by the People which appears on the trial court’s record. * * * [Second,] the prosecutor must make his statement of readiness when the People are in fact ready to proceed.”

  • People v. Lomax, 72 N.Y.2d 820 (1988): Calculating Speedy Trial Time Under CPL 30.30

    People v. Lomax, 72 N.Y.2d 820 (1988)

    When calculating the time within which the People must be ready for trial under CPL 30.30, the day the criminal action commenced is excluded from the computation.

    Summary

    This case addresses how to calculate the statutory speedy trial time under New York Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 30.30. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Term’s order, holding that when computing the time within which the People must be ready for trial, the day the criminal action commenced should be excluded. The Court relied on General Construction Law § 20, which provides a general rule for excluding the first day when computing a period of time from a specified event. The decision emphasizes that CPL 30.30 specifies the event that begins the running of the statutory period, triggering the application of General Construction Law § 20.

    Facts

    The specific facts of the underlying criminal case are not detailed in this memorandum opinion. The relevant fact is that the issue arose concerning the proper calculation of the time period under CPL 30.30, specifically whether the first day of the statutory period should be included or excluded.

    Procedural History

    The case originated in a lower court, where the defendant likely moved for dismissal based on a violation of CPL 30.30. The Appellate Term reversed, presumably finding no speedy trial violation. The Court of Appeals then affirmed the Appellate Term’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, in computing the time within which the People must be ready for trial under CPL 30.30, the day on which the criminal action commenced should be included or excluded from the computation.

    Holding

    Yes, the day on which the criminal action commenced should be excluded from the computation because the statute specifies an event that begins the running of the statutory period, thus requiring application of General Construction Law § 20.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its reasoning on two main points. First, it cited General Construction Law § 20, which states that “[i]n computing any specified period of time from a specified event, the day upon which the event happens is deemed the day from which the reckoning is made. The day from which any specified period of time is reckoned shall be excluded in making the reckoning.” The Court found this provision directly applicable to CPL 30.30 because CPL 30.30 specifies the event that starts the clock: “commencement of a criminal action.”

    Second, the Court noted that excluding the first day has been the “accepted practice” in previous cases involving CPL 30.30, citing People v. Anderson, 66 N.Y.2d 529 and People v. Sturgis, 38 N.Y.2d 625 as examples, even though the specific issue of first-day exclusion wasn’t explicitly litigated in those cases.

    The Court distinguished its holding from the companion case, People ex rel. Neufeld v. McMickens, 70 N.Y.2d 763, explaining that the statute at issue in Neufeld (CPL 170.70) referred to “the period of actual custody” rather than measurement from a specified day or event, making the General Construction Law § 20 inapplicable. The court quoted Justice Gibbons’ dissent in Neufeld: “[the statute] does not refer to measurement from a specified day or event; it refers to the period of actual custody” (117 AD2d 243, 250).

    This case underscores the importance of carefully examining the language of the statute in question to determine if it refers to a specific event triggering the application of General Construction Law § 20.

  • People v. Santos, 68 N.Y.2d 859 (1986): Burden of Proof for Speedy Trial Violations

    People v. Santos, 68 N.Y.2d 859 (1986)

    When a defendant alleges a violation of their statutory right to a speedy trial under CPL 30.30, the People bear the burden of proving that any delays are excludable from the time calculation.

    Summary

    Santos was arrested in December 1978 and indicted on drug charges. He moved to dismiss the indictments nearly two years later, arguing he was denied a speedy trial. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in summarily denying Santos’s motion. Once the defendant alleges unexcused delay exceeding the statutory maximum, the burden shifts to the People to demonstrate that specific periods should be excluded. The People’s failure to provide specific dates and factual bases for exclusions warranted a hearing to resolve the factual disputes.

    Facts

    Defendant was arrested on December 6, 1978.

    Two weeks later, he was arraigned on drug charges.

    On October 31, 1980, defendant moved to dismiss the indictments based on a denial of his right to a speedy trial under CPL 30.20 and 30.30, alleging a two-year delay mostly attributable to the prosecution.

    The prosecution responded that delays were due to plea negotiations and the defendant’s detention in New Jersey, but failed to specify dates or relevant exclusions.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss without a hearing.

    The defendant was subsequently convicted on drug charges.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction without opinion.

    The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division order, remitting the case for a hearing on the CPL 30.30 motion.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in summarily denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictments based on CPL 30.30 without holding a hearing, given the defendant’s allegations of unexcused delay.

    Holding

    Yes, because when a defendant alleges unexcused delay exceeding the statutory maximum under CPL 30.30, the burden shifts to the People to controvert the factual basis for the motion and demonstrate that specific periods should be excluded from the time calculation. If the People’s papers present a factual dispute, a hearing is required.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on CPL 210.45(4), which states that if a defendant moves to dismiss an indictment and alleges unexcused delay exceeding the statutory maximum, the motion must be granted unless the People controvert the factual basis for the motion. The court cited People v. Lomax, People v. Berkowitz, and People v. Gruden in support of this principle.

    The court emphasized that, as stated in People v. Kendzia, once the defendant demonstrates unexcused delay, “the burden of showing that time should be excluded falls upon the People.”

    Here, the defendant alleged a delay of nearly two years. While the initial affidavit lacked a precise starting date for the delay, the prosecutor’s response cured this defect.

    The Court found that the People failed to meet their burden because they did not provide specific dates or a factual and statutory basis for each exclusion. The court noted that the People’s obligations under CPL 30.30 are independent of obligations under the Agreement on Detainers and the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, although time spent in other jurisdictions may be excludable under CPL 30.30.

    The court concluded that because the prosecutor’s affidavit raised a factual dispute but did not establish compliance with speedy trial obligations as a matter of law, a hearing was required to determine the excludability of the alleged delays.

  • People v. Smith, 68 N.Y.2d 722 (1986): People’s Delay and ‘Exceptional Circumstances’ Under Speedy Trial Law

    People v. Smith, 68 N.Y.2d 722 (1986)

    Delays attributable to the prosecutor’s vacation are chargeable to the People and do not constitute exceptional circumstances excusing speedy trial violations, even if the defendant caused other delays in the case.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and dismissed the indictment against the defendant. The court held that the lengthy post-readiness delays caused by the trial assistant’s planned European vacation were not an “exceptional fact or circumstance” under CPL 30.30 (3) (b) sufficient to excuse the delay. The court emphasized that only the People’s delay is considered, unless the delay directly results from the defendant’s actions. Even though the defendant caused substantial delays, the People were also responsible for delays exceeding the statutory limit, requiring dismissal.

    Facts

    The defendant was indicted and the People declared their readiness for trial. However, the trial was significantly delayed. The defendant was responsible for a substantial portion of post-readiness delay, totaling approximately 17 months. The trial assistant was scheduled for a European vacation, which resulted in a 28-day adjournment. The People argued that the defendant’s delays constituted exceptional circumstances that excused the delay caused by the trial assistant’s vacation.

    Procedural History

    The case reached the Appellate Division, which presumably affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s order. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered the indictment dismissed, finding a violation of the defendant’s speedy trial rights.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether lengthy post-readiness delays attributable to the trial assistant’s planned vacation constitute an “exceptional fact or circumstance” under CPL 30.30 (3)(b) sufficient to excuse adjournments chargeable to the People?
    2. Whether the defendant’s post-readiness delays, even if substantial, constitute an exceptional circumstance within the meaning of CPL 30.30 (3)(b) in the absence of a causal relationship to the People’s delay?

    Holding

    1. No, because a prosecutor’s planned vacation does not constitute an exceptional circumstance, especially when another trial assistant could have been substituted.
    2. No, because under CPL 30.30(3)(b), it is the People’s delay alone that is considered, unless the delay directly results from action taken by the defendant, and there was no causal relationship between the defendant’s delays and the prosecutor’s vacation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the 28-day adjournment due to the trial assistant’s vacation was chargeable to the People, citing precedent that shortages of personnel and illness of the prosecutor are chargeable to the People. The court found that the vacation did not qualify as an “exceptional fact or circumstance” that would excuse the delay, especially since a substitute trial assistant could have been assigned. The court further clarified the interpretation of CPL 30.30 (3) (b), stating that “[I]t is the People’s delay alone that is to be considered, except where that delay directly ‘results from’ action taken by the defendant.” Because the defendant’s post-readiness delays were not causally related to the trial assistant’s vacation, and the People were chargeable with more than six months of delay (164 days of prereadiness delay plus the 28-day vacation delay), the court concluded that the defendant’s speedy trial rights were violated, requiring dismissal of the indictment.

  • People v. Worley, 66 N.Y.2d 523 (1986): Defendant’s Adjournments Excluded from Speedy Trial Calculations

    66 N.Y.2d 523 (1986)

    Adjournments requested by the defendant are excluded when calculating the People’s readiness for trial under CPL 30.30, even if the People knew or should have known earlier of facts that led to a more serious charge.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, reinstating the indictment against the defendant. The defendant was initially arraigned on misdemeanor charges but later indicted on a felony charge after the prosecution discovered a prior conviction. The trial court dismissed the indictment, concluding the prosecution wasn’t ready for trial within the time provided by CPL 30.30 because they should have known earlier of the prior conviction. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals held that the defendant’s requested adjournments between the initial arraignment and the felony indictment must be excluded from the speedy trial calculation, making the prosecution’s actions timely. The court emphasized that the substance of the charges remained essentially unchanged.

    Facts

    Defendant was arraigned on June 2, 1983, on misdemeanor charges: driving under the influence, speeding, and failing to keep to the right.
    Between June 2 and October 4, 1983, the defendant secured several adjournments to obtain counsel, make motions, and prepare for trial.
    On October 4, 1983, the People discovered that the defendant had a prior DWI conviction within the past 10 years, which elevated the charge to a felony under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(5).
    The People secured an adjournment to file a felony complaint.
    Defendant was arraigned on the felony complaint on November 1, 1983, and indicted on February 8, 1984, for driving while intoxicated, speeding and failing to keep to the right side of the highway.
    The People announced their readiness for trial on February 17, 1984.

    Procedural History

    The trial court dismissed the indictment, finding the People should have known of the prior conviction sooner and were not ready for trial within the statutory timeframe.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal, stating the People failed to show the pre-indictment delay caused by the defendant impeded them from presenting the case to the Grand Jury. (115 AD2d 266).
    The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and reinstated the indictment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the adjournments requested by the defendant between the initial misdemeanor arraignment and the subsequent felony indictment should be excluded when calculating the People’s readiness for trial under CPL 30.30.

    Holding

    Yes, because defendant’s requested adjournments in the period between June 2 and October 4 must be excluded in determining the People’s compliance with CPL 30.30 (CPL 30.30 [4] [b], [f]), thus bringing the period in issue here within statutory requirements.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 30.30(4)(b) and (f) explicitly exclude periods of delay resulting from adjournments requested by the defendant when calculating the People’s readiness for trial. The court emphasized that the People don’t need to prove that the defendant’s actions directly caused their lack of readiness when the delay is due to the defendant’s requests. The court stated, “Where adjournments are allowed at defendant’s request, those periods of delay are expressly waived in calculating the People’s trial readiness, without the need for the People to trace their lack of readiness to defendant’s actions.” The court found that the charges against the defendant remained essentially unchanged, despite the upgrade to a felony. The fact that the People knew or should have known of the prior conviction earlier did not alter the application of the speedy trial rules. This case underscores that defendants cannot benefit from delays they themselves requested in speedy trial calculations. This decision reinforces the principle that a defendant’s actions contributing to pre-trial delay will be attributed to them, even if the prosecution could have acted faster. The Court distinguished this case from situations where the prosecution’s delay is unrelated to the defendant’s actions, emphasizing that the defendant actively sought the adjournments in question. There were no dissenting or concurring opinions.

  • People v. Meierdiercks, 68 N.Y.2d 613 (1986): Adjournment ‘Sua Sponte’ and Speedy Trial Rights

    People v. Meierdiercks, 68 N.Y.2d 613 (1986)

    When a court adjourns a preliminary hearing *sua sponte* (on its own motion) without the defendant’s request or consent, the resulting delay is charged against the prosecution for speedy trial purposes.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether delays resulting from adjournments of preliminary hearings should be charged against the prosecution under New York’s speedy trial statute (CPL 30.30). The Court of Appeals held that when a local criminal court adjourns a hearing *sua sponte*, without the defendant’s request or consent, that delay is attributable to the People. However, delays resulting from adjournments requested or consented to by the defendant are excluded when calculating speedy trial time. The critical factor is whether the defendant waived the delay by requesting or consenting to the adjournment, not whether the delay prevented the People from seeking an indictment.

    Facts

    In *People v. Meierdiercks*, the local criminal court adjourned the preliminary hearing *sua sponte* after defense counsel pointed out that the complaint inaccurately described the purportedly stolen check. The defendant did not request or consent to this adjournment. In contrast, in *People v. Boyd* and *People v. Harris*, the defendants either requested or consented to adjournments of their preliminary hearings.

    Procedural History

    In *Meierdiercks*, the defendant sought dismissal of the indictment, arguing that the pre-indictment delay violated her speedy trial rights under CPL 30.30. The lower court granted the motion and dismissed the indictment. The Appellate Division affirmed. In *Boyd* and *Harris*, the defendants’ motions to dismiss the indictments based on similar speedy trial grounds were denied. The Appellate Division affirmed these denials as well. All three cases were appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an adjournment of a preliminary hearing ordered *sua sponte* by the local criminal court, without the defendant’s request or consent, is chargeable to the People for purposes of CPL 30.30 speedy trial calculations.

    Holding

    Yes, because the controlling consideration is whether the defendants waived the delay in the proceedings by requesting or consenting to the adjournments; if there is no waiver, the delay is charged against the People.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the critical issue is whether the defendant waived their right to a speedy trial by requesting or consenting to the adjournment. CPL 30.30(4)(b) excludes periods of delay resulting from adjournments requested or consented to by the defendant. The court distinguished this case from situations where the defendant actively prevents the People from obtaining an indictment. The court stated, “the controlling consideration is not whether defendants’ actions prevented the People from obtaining accusatory instruments sufficient for trial, but whether defendants waived the delay in the proceedings by requesting or consenting to the adjournments.” In *Meierdiercks*, because the adjournment was *sua sponte* and not at the defendant’s request or with her consent, the delay was properly charged against the People. In *Boyd* and *Harris*, the defendants had expressly waived their objection to the delay, so the delay periods were correctly excluded. This case clarifies that a defendant’s passive conduct is not equivalent to a waiver; an express request or consent is necessary to exclude the delay period from the speedy trial calculation.

  • People v. Sinistaj, 67 N.Y.2d 236 (1986): How Excludable Time Applies to Successive Indictments Under Speedy Trial Rules

    People v. Sinistaj, 67 N.Y.2d 236 (1986)

    When a subsequent indictment replaces an earlier one in the same criminal action, it relates back to the original accusatory instrument for determining both the commencement of the speedy trial period and the computation of excludable time.

    Summary

    The case addresses whether excludable time under New York’s speedy trial statute (CPL 30.30(4)) applies to a second indictment that replaces an earlier one for the same criminal action. The Court of Appeals held that it does. The initial felony complaint was filed on November 20, 1981, followed by an indictment on December 3, 1981. A second indictment, correcting a legal deficiency in the first, was filed on July 13, 1982. The court reasoned that treating the subsequent indictment differently under subdivisions (1)(a) and (4) of CPL 30.30 would be inconsistent with the statute’s purpose and create an arbitrary cutoff for replacement indictments. The court emphasized that CPL 30.30 is a prosecutorial readiness rule designed to ensure prompt trials.

    Facts

    Defendant was initially charged with criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. The first indictment was flawed because it charged possession in a “place of business,” which was excluded under the relevant Penal Law section. The second indictment corrected this by charging possession under a different subsection of the same Penal Law section, requiring proof of a prior felony conviction. Both indictments related to the same weapon and criminal transaction.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court dismissed both indictments, finding delays exceeding six months chargeable to the People. The Appellate Division reinstated the first indictment but affirmed the dismissal of the second, reasoning that the excludable time periods were inapplicable since the second indictment was filed more than six months after the original complaint. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals from the Appellate Division’s decision regarding the second indictment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, for purposes of CPL 30.30, a subsequent indictment replacing an earlier one in the same criminal action should be related back to the original accusatory instrument not only for determining the commencement of the six-month readiness period under CPL 30.30(1)(a), but also for computing excludable time under CPL 30.30(4)?

    Holding

    Yes, because treating a subsequent indictment differently under CPL 30.30(1)(a) and CPL 30.30(4) would contradict the statute’s intent and create an arbitrary six-month limit on replacement indictments.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on prior decisions in People v. Lomax and People v. Osgood, which held that a new indictment after dismissal of the original relates back to the initial accusatory instrument for the six-month readiness period. The court reasoned that applying this principle only to CPL 30.30(1)(a) but not to CPL 30.30(4) would be inconsistent and violate statutory construction rules. The court stated, “[A] rule that succeeding indictments are not to be related back to the commencement of the criminal action for computing excludable time would have consequences which do not further the aim of CPL 30.30 and could not have been contemplated by the Legislature.” It emphasized that CPL 30.30 is a prosecutorial readiness rule and that the District Attorney is entitled to only one six-month readiness period, which commences upon filing the initial accusatory instrument. The court also noted that CPL 200.80 permits the People to seek another indictment anytime before a guilty plea or trial commencement. The Court stated that CPL 30.30 must be interpreted “so as to harmonize its various provisions.” The court emphasized that its decision only applies when the new indictment is “directly derived” from the first accusatory instrument.