New York Law Review

Tag: speedy trial

  • Smith-Hunter v. Harvey, 95 N.Y.2d 191 (2000): Malicious Prosecution and Favorable Termination After Speedy Trial Dismissal

    95 N.Y.2d 191 (2000)

    A dismissal of criminal charges based on a violation of speedy trial rights (CPL 30.30) can constitute a “favorable termination” for the purposes of a malicious prosecution claim, unless the circumstances surrounding the dismissal are inconsistent with the accused’s innocence.

    Summary

    Smith-Hunter sued Harvey for malicious prosecution after trespass charges against her were dismissed due to the prosecutor’s failure to comply with discovery and speedy trial rules. The New York Court of Appeals considered whether a dismissal under CPL 30.30 constitutes a “favorable termination,” a required element of a malicious prosecution claim. The Court held that such a dismissal can be a favorable termination unless circumstances suggest the termination was inconsistent with the plaintiff’s innocence. The Court reversed the lower courts’ grant of summary judgment to the defendant, finding that the prosecutor’s inaction did not suggest Smith-Hunter’s guilt, and therefore the dismissal could be considered a favorable termination.

    Facts

    Smith-Hunter parked in Jonathan Harvey’s reserved parking spot. An argument ensued, and Jack Harvey escorted Smith-Hunter from the premises, during which she fell down stairs and was injured.

    Jonathan Harvey filed a trespass charge against Smith-Hunter. Smith-Hunter filed assault charges against Jack Harvey.

    Smith-Hunter served discovery demands and motions to dismiss, but the special prosecutor, Banagan, failed to respond or appear in court. The trial court dismissed the trespass charges against Smith-Hunter for violation of CPL 30.30 after Banagan failed to adequately respond to her motions.

    Jonathan Harvey later wrote a letter to Smith-Hunter apologizing for the incident and the trespass charge.

    Procedural History

    Smith-Hunter sued Jonathan Harvey for malicious prosecution. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to Harvey, concluding that the CPL 30.30 dismissal did not imply Smith-Hunter’s innocence. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a CPL 30.30 dismissal can constitute a favorable termination.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a dismissal of criminal charges pursuant to CPL 30.30 (speedy trial violation) constitutes a “termination of the proceeding in favor of the accused” for the purpose of a malicious prosecution action.

    Holding

    Yes, because a dismissal under CPL 30.30 is a final judgment that bars further prosecution of the offense, and is not inconsistent with the innocence of the accused, unless the defendant can demonstrate circumstances surrounding the dismissal that indicate otherwise.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court began by outlining the four elements of a malicious prosecution claim: (1) commencement or continuation of a criminal proceeding, (2) termination of the proceeding in favor of the accused, (3) absence of probable cause, and (4) actual malice. This appeal centered solely on the second element: whether the dismissal under CPL 30.30 was a favorable termination.

    The Court stated the general rule: “[A]ny final termination of a criminal proceeding in favor of the accused, such that the proceeding cannot be brought again, qualifies as a favorable termination for purposes of a malicious prosecution action.” The Court cited Robbins v. Robbins, stating a criminal proceeding is terminated favorably when “there can be no further proceeding upon the complaint or indictment, and no further prosecution of the alleged offense.”

    The Court acknowledged exceptions to the general rule where the termination is inconsistent with the innocence of the accused. Examples include dismissal due to misconduct by the accused, a compromise with the accused, or mercy requested/accepted by the accused. The Court distinguished MacFawn v. Kresler, noting that the dismissal in that case was without prejudice, meaning the charges could be refiled.

    The Court rejected the argument that a dismissal must affirmatively indicate innocence to be considered a favorable termination. The Court reasoned that requiring a showing of innocence would bar recovery for innocent individuals whose prosecutions were abandoned for lack of merit and would force defendants to waive speedy trial rights to preserve a civil remedy.

    The Court emphasized that Banagan’s explanation for the dismissal (being busy with another trial) was insufficient to overcome the general rule that a speedy trial dismissal is a favorable termination.

    The Court concluded that dispositions inconsistent with innocence cannot be viewed as favorable to the accused. The court reiterated the language from MacFawn that “involves the merits and indicates the accused’s innocence” but stated that such language was not necessary to the resolution of the case. The court clarified that such language stands only for dispositions inconsistent with innocence.

  • People v. Williams, 90 N.Y.2d 894 (1997): Defining ‘Readiness for Trial’ under Speedy Trial Rules

    90 N.Y.2d 894 (1997)

    A prosecutor’s declaration of readiness for trial applies to all charges for which they are prepared to proceed, even if a related felony charge is pending procedural reduction to a misdemeanor.

    Summary

    Defendant Williams was convicted of criminal mischief and petit larceny. The case originated with a felony charge that the People sought to reduce to a misdemeanor. While the reduction was pending, the People declared their readiness for trial. The defendant argued that the delay in formally reducing the felony charge meant the People’s declaration of readiness was untimely under CPL 30.30. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the People’s readiness extended to the misdemeanor charges, and delays were also attributable to the defendant’s pretrial motions and changes of counsel. The procedural delay in reducing the felony charge did not negate the readiness for the misdemeanor charges.

    Facts

    On March 13, 1996, the People initiated an action against Williams for criminal mischief in the third degree (a felony) and petit larceny (a misdemeanor). Williams was arraigned on March 29, 1996.

    Procedural History

    On May 14, 1996, the People stated they were ready for trial and moved to reduce the felony charge to a misdemeanor. The defendant and the court consented, but the reduction wasn’t properly executed under CPL 180.50. The charge was formally reduced on October 15, 1996, with the People reiterating their readiness. The County Court affirmed the convictions. The Court of Appeals affirmed the County Court decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People’s declaration of readiness for trial on May 14, 1996, was ineffective due to the pending procedural reduction of the felony charge, thus violating CPL 30.30’s speedy trial requirements?

    Holding

    No, because the People’s readiness for trial included the misdemeanor charge of petit larceny, which was unaffected by the procedural mechanics of CPL 180.50, and delays were attributable to the defendant’s actions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the People’s statement of readiness on May 14, 1996, encompassed the misdemeanor charge of petit larceny. The court emphasized that the procedural delay in reducing the felony charge did not invalidate the People’s readiness regarding the already existing misdemeanor charge. The court also noted that the defendant’s numerous pre-trial motions and five changes of attorney contributed to the delay, making it unreasonable to charge six months to the People under CPL 30.30 (4)(a), (f). The court implicitly applied the principle that a declaration of readiness should be evaluated in light of the actual preparedness to proceed on at least some of the charges. The court concluded: “when the People answered ready on May 14, 1996, their readiness included the misdemeanor charge of petit larceny. That unreduced charge was unaffected by the procedural mechanics of CPL 180.50.”

  • Matter of Benjamin L., 692 N.E.2d 663 (N.Y. 1998): Juvenile’s Right to Speedy Adjudication

    Matter of Benjamin L., 692 N.E.2d 663 (N.Y. 1998)

    Juveniles in delinquency proceedings have a right to speedy adjudication under the Due Process Clause of the New York Constitution, assessed using a balancing test similar to that used for adults, but adapted to the unique nature of juvenile proceedings.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether juveniles in New York are entitled to a speedy trial under the Due Process Clause of the State Constitution. Benjamin L., a 15-year-old, was arrested in 1994, but a petition alleging delinquency was not filed until over a year later. The Court of Appeals held that juveniles do have a right to speedy adjudication, applying a modified version of the Taranovich test, balancing factors like the extent and reason for delay, the nature of the charge, and potential impairment to the defense. The court reversed the lower court’s order and remitted the matter for a hearing to determine the reasons for the delay.

    Facts

    Benjamin L., a 15-year-old, was arrested on July 7, 1994, for allegedly menacing a delivery person and attempting to steal food. The following day, a pre-petition detention application was submitted to the Family Court, which was denied, and Benjamin was released to his mother’s care with a curfew. Over a year later, on August 2, 1995, a petition was filed alleging acts that would constitute attempted robbery and menacing if committed by an adult.

    Procedural History

    The Westchester County Attorney’s office filed a petition. Benjamin appeared with counsel on August 8, 1995, and denied the allegations. The case was adjourned for a fact-finding hearing. On August 30, 1995, Benjamin moved to dismiss the petition, alleging a violation of his statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy hearing/trial. The Family Court denied the motion. Following fact-finding and disposition hearings, Benjamin was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent and placed on probation. The Appellate Division affirmed, and the New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the constitutional right to a speedy trial extends to juveniles in delinquency proceedings in New York State, and if so, what standard should be applied to determine if that right has been violated.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Due Process Clause of the New York Constitution affords juveniles the right to a speedy adjudication, and the Taranovich test, adapted for the juvenile context, should be applied to determine if that right has been violated.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while juvenile proceedings are distinct from adult criminal proceedings, fundamental fairness dictates that juveniles are entitled to due process protections, including the right to a speedy adjudication. The court acknowledged the specific time limitations in the Family Court Act but found no statutory remedy for delays between a pre-petition detention application and the filing of a petition when the juvenile is not detained. However, the court extended the due process right to a speedy trial, typically afforded to adult criminal defendants, to juveniles, noting that many of the same policy concerns apply in both contexts. The court adopted a modified version of the People v. Taranovich test, which balances factors such as the extent of the delay, the reason for the delay, the nature of the charge, any extended pretrial incarceration, and any impairment to the defense. The court emphasized that these factors must be evaluated with an understanding of the unique aspects of juvenile proceedings, recognizing that prejudice and length of delay may have different connotations in the juvenile context. The court stated, “In light of the need for swift and certain adjudication at all phases of a delinquency proceeding, we conclude that the speedy trial protections afforded under the Due Process Clause are not for criminal proceedings alone and are not at odds with the goals of juvenile proceedings.” The case was remitted to the Family Court for a hearing to determine the reason for the delay and to apply the Taranovich factors, as adapted for the juvenile context, to the specific facts of Benjamin’s case.

  • People v. Carter, 91 N.Y.2d 792 (1998): Validity of Pre-Arraignment Readiness Statements

    91 N.Y.2d 792 (1998)

    A statement of readiness for trial, made before the defendant’s arraignment, is valid if the People have completed all required actions to bring the case to trial and the arraignment and trial can occur within the statutory speedy trial period.

    Summary

    The case addresses whether the People’s pre-arraignment statement of readiness for trial was valid under CPL 30.30. The Court of Appeals held that the statement of readiness, made when the People had done everything required to bring the case to trial, tolled the speedy trial clock, even though the defendants had not yet been arraigned. The Court emphasized that the responsibility for securing the defendant’s appearance rests with the court, not the prosecution. The Court reversed the lower court’s dismissal of the indictment.

    Facts

    A felony complaint was filed against the defendants on May 31, 1995. The People sent letters to the defendants on November 16, 1995, notifying them of their right to testify before the grand jury; however, these letters were returned undelivered. On November 22, 1995, the People filed an indictment and announced their readiness for trial in open court and again sent letters to the defendants, informing them of the indictment and their scheduled arraignment. The defendants failed to appear for arraignment, and bench warrants were issued. The defendants were eventually arraigned in December 1995 and January 1996.

    Procedural History

    The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the People’s readiness statement was premature because they were not present and had not been arraigned. The Judicial Hearing Officer recommended granting the motion, and the Supreme Court confirmed the recommendation. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People’s pre-arraignment statement of readiness on November 22, 1995, was effective to toll the speedy trial clock under CPL 30.30, given that the defendants had not yet been arraigned.

    Holding

    Yes, because the People had done everything required of them to bring the case to trial, and the arraignment and trial could occur within the six-month speedy trial period. The delay in arraignment is attributable to the court, not the People.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that, under CPL 30.30 (1)(a), the People must be ready for trial within six months of the commencement of a criminal action. A statement of readiness must be communicated on the record when the People are truly ready to proceed. The Court cited People v. Goss, noting that a pre-arraignment statement of readiness can be valid where it is possible for the defendant to be arraigned and the trial to go forward within the six-month period. The Court emphasized that there is no requirement that a defendant be present to establish readiness for trial.

    The Court found that the People made an effective statement of readiness by filing the indictment, announcing their readiness on the record, and attempting to notify the defendants. Absent proof that the readiness statement was inaccurate or made in bad faith, the People discharged their duty under CPL 30.30. The Court distinguished pre-readiness delay from post-readiness delay, stating that the responsibility for scheduling the arraignment and securing the defendant’s appearance lies with the court, not the People. The Court noted, “Responsibility for scheduling an arraignment date and securing a defendant’s appearance lies with the court, not the People.”

    The Court distinguished People v. Bolden, which the defendants cited for the proposition that the People were required to exercise due diligence in locating them, noting that Bolden relates to pre-readiness computation of time, while this case involved a valid declaration of readiness. The Court emphasized the importance of the People’s demonstrating readiness within the statutory time frame when they have diligently taken steps to ensure the defendant’s presence, but the ultimate responsibility for arraignment rests with the court. This distinction clarifies the prosecutor’s obligations and the court’s role in managing the arraignment process after the People declare readiness.

  • People v. Chavis, 91 N.Y.2d 500 (1998): Statement of Readiness for Trial Requires Actual Trial Preparation

    91 N.Y.2d 500 (1998)

    A statement of readiness for a pre-trial hearing, such as a Huntley hearing, does not equate to a statement of readiness for trial under CPL 30.30, and therefore, delays due to court congestion before a declaration of trial readiness are chargeable to the prosecution.

    Summary

    Defendants were arrested and charged with attempted murder. The People announced readiness for a Huntley hearing but never declared readiness for trial. After multiple adjournments, mostly due to court congestion, the defendants moved to dismiss the indictment based on a violation of speedy trial rules (CPL 30.30). The People argued that their readiness for the Huntley hearing should count as trial readiness. The Court of Appeals held that readiness for a pre-trial hearing does not satisfy the requirement of readiness for trial, and pre-readiness delays caused by court congestion are chargeable to the prosecution. Thus, the indictment was properly dismissed.

    Facts

    Defendants were arrested on March 14, 1994, and arraigned the following day. On April 7 and 8, 1994, the defendants were arraigned on an indictment charging them with attempted murder and related offenses. A Huntley hearing was set for October 17, 1994. The People stated they were ready for the hearing on that date, but it was adjourned to January 17, 1995, at the request of the defense. On January 17, the People were not ready due to an unavailable witness. The hearing was adjourned four times over 203 days. The People never stated they were ready for trial or filed a certificate of trial readiness.

    Procedural History

    In September 1995, defendants moved to dismiss the indictment under CPL 30.30 (1)(a), arguing that the People exceeded the 184-day speedy trial limit. The trial court granted the motion, rejecting the argument that readiness for a hearing equaled readiness for trial. The Appellate Division reversed, finding that the People were ready for trial before January 17. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and reinstated the trial court’s dismissal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the People’s statement of readiness for a Huntley hearing is equivalent to a statement of readiness for trial under CPL 30.30?

    2. Whether delays caused by court congestion prior to a declaration of trial readiness are chargeable to the People for speedy trial purposes?

    Holding

    1. No, because a pretrial suppression hearing is not the equivalent of a trial, and readiness for one does not demonstrate readiness for the other.

    2. Yes, because in the absence of a statement of readiness to proceed to trial, any delay due to court congestion is chargeable to the People.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that CPL 30.30 (1)(a) requires the People to be ready for trial within six months. “‘Ready for trial’ comprises two elements: (i) ‘either a statement of readiness by the prosecutor in open court…or a written notice of readiness sent by the prosecutor to both defense counsel and the appropriate court clerk’ and (ii) the People must in fact be ready to proceed at the time they declare readiness” (quoting People v Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331, 337). The court stated that a Huntley hearing determines narrow issues of admissibility, not the same as a trial. A statement of readiness for a hearing is only “an expectation of future readiness,” not a present readiness. Because the People never declared readiness for trial, the 92-day delay from court congestion was chargeable to them, exceeding the 184-day limit. The Court reiterated that the People could have avoided the delay by filing a certificate of readiness, assuming actual readiness. The Court stated the People waived their right to argue certain periods should have been excluded because they conceded those points before the motion court. The Court concluded that the People failed to meet their speedy trial obligation.

  • People v. Anderson, 86 N.Y.2d 437 (1995): Commencement of Criminal Action for Speedy Trial Purposes After DAT Issuance

    People v. Anderson, 86 N.Y.2d 437 (1995)

    For speedy trial purposes under CPL 30.30, a criminal action commences when a defendant appears in court in response to a desk appearance ticket (DAT), regardless of whether an accusatory instrument has been filed; however, a subsequent statement of readiness can toll the speedy trial clock during an adjournment period, even if the initial adjournment was due to the People’s lack of readiness.

    Summary

    Anderson was arrested and issued a DAT. He appeared in court as directed, but no accusatory instrument had been filed. It was eventually filed months later. After delays, Anderson moved to dismiss the indictment based on a violation of speedy trial rules. The New York Court of Appeals held that the speedy trial clock begins to run when the defendant first appears in court in response to the DAT. However, the Court also clarified that a subsequent statement of readiness by the prosecution can halt the running of the speedy trial clock during an adjournment, even if the adjournment was initially caused by the prosecution’s unreadiness.

    Facts

    Anderson was arrested on December 23, 1992, for fraudulently endorsing a check and was issued a DAT directing him to appear in court on January 22, 1993.
    He appeared on January 22, 1993, but no accusatory instrument had been filed. He was instructed to return on March 4. Anderson returned on that date, and again on April 16, when the police detective signed the felony complaint. It was not filed until May 4, 1993, when Anderson was arraigned.

    Procedural History

    The People announced readiness on July 19, but post-readiness delays occurred. Anderson moved to dismiss the indictment 15 months later, on October 31, 1994.
    Supreme Court granted the motion, finding 214 days chargeable to the People.
    The Appellate Division affirmed, finding 219 days chargeable to the People.
    The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether, under CPL 30.30 (5)(b), a criminal action commences for speedy trial purposes when a defendant appears in court in response to a DAT, even if an accusatory instrument has not been filed.
    2. Whether a subsequent statement of readiness by the People can stop the speedy trial clock from running during an adjournment period, even if the initial adjournment was due to the People’s lack of readiness.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because CPL 30.30(5)(b) specifically states that a criminal action is “deemed” to have commenced when the defendant appears in court in response to a DAT, regardless of the filing of an accusatory instrument.
    2. Yes, because a notice of readiness constitutes a commitment to proceed, satisfying the People’s duty and tolling the speedy trial clock, even if the adjournment was initially due to the People’s lack of readiness.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the commencement of the action, the Court reasoned that CPL 30.30(5)(b) creates an exception to the general rule that a criminal action commences upon the filing of the accusatory instrument. The legislative history of CPL 30.30(5)(b) demonstrates that the Legislature intended the speedy trial clock to begin running upon the defendant’s physical appearance in court in response to the DAT.

    The Court stated, “[T]he logical sanction for delay in filing a criminal complaint is simply to deem the criminal action commenced once the defendant has appeared in the local criminal court in compliance with the instructions contained in the DAT, solely for the purpose of calculating the time from which the prosecutor must become ready for trial.”

    Regarding the 48-day period of adjournment, the Court acknowledged that the People bear the burden of explaining adjournments. However, the Court found that the People’s notice of readiness, served during the adjournment, served to toll the speedy trial clock from running. The court distinguished between court congestion and delays caused by the People’s own laxity. Since the defendant did not contest the People’s actual readiness as reflected in the notice, only the time before the notice of readiness was chargeable to the People.

    The court emphasized that “a notice of readiness is the kind of record commitment to proceed which satisfies the People’s duty to be ready for trial, and serves to toll the ‘speedy trial clock’ from running for the remainder of that adjournment period.”

  • People v. Torres, 88 N.Y.2d 928 (1996): Exclusion of Delay for Defendant Avoiding Apprehension

    People v. Torres, 88 N.Y.2d 928 (1996)

    The prosecution is not required to demonstrate due diligence in locating a defendant to exclude periods of delay from speedy trial calculations when the defendant is actively attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution.

    Summary

    Defendant was arrested for drug possession, failed to appear for arraignment, and a bench warrant was issued. After his re-arrest, he moved to dismiss the charges on speedy trial grounds. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division erred in requiring the People to demonstrate due diligence in locating the defendant during the period he was a fugitive because the trial court had found he was actively avoiding apprehension. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division to review that finding and other relevant factual issues.

    Facts

    Defendant was arrested on March 27, 1989, and indicted for criminal possession of a controlled substance. He was released on his own recognizance but failed to appear for arraignment on the indictment on June 13, 1989, resulting in a bench warrant for his arrest. A detective was assigned to the warrant on July 5, 1989. The detective periodically checked the computer for information and received a photograph of the defendant on July 24, 1989. The detective investigated two addresses provided by the defendant and discovered that neither was valid. On June 27, 1990, defendant was arrested while assisting a co-conspirator attempting to smuggle cocaine. He later pleaded guilty to a federal indictment.

    Procedural History

    While incarcerated on federal charges, defendant moved to dismiss the state charges on speedy trial grounds; the Supreme Court denied the motion. A jury convicted defendant of criminal possession. The Appellate Division held the appeal in abeyance and remitted the matter to the Supreme Court for a de nova hearing on the speedy trial motion. On remand, the Supreme Court determined defendant’s speedy trial rights had not been violated, because he had been avoiding apprehension and the People had exercised due diligence in attempting to locate him. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the People had failed to exercise due diligence, and granted defendant’s motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the 73-day period from July 24, 1989, to October 6, 1989, should be charged to the People in calculating the speedy trial period, given that the People allegedly failed to exercise due diligence in locating the defendant.

    Holding

    No, because pursuant to CPL 30.30(4)(c), the People need not exercise due diligence in attempting to locate a defendant who is attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on CPL 30.30 (4)(c), which addresses excluding periods of delay from the time chargeable to the People when a defendant’s location is unknown and the defendant is attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution. The Court stated, “The People need not exercise due diligence in attempting to locate a defendant who is attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution” (People v. Luperon, 85 N.Y.2d 71, 80, n. 3). The Court found that the Appellate Division erred in imposing a due diligence requirement on the prosecution. The Court remitted the case to the Appellate Division, instructing it to review the Supreme Court’s finding that the defendant had attempted to avoid apprehension or prosecution, along with any other relevant factual issues.

  • People v. Goss, 87 N.Y.2d 792 (1996): Validity of Pre-Arraignment Readiness Declarations

    People v. Goss, 87 N.Y.2d 792 (1996)

    A pre-arraignment statement of readiness for trial is valid under CPL 30.30 if it was possible for the defendant to be arraigned and the trial to proceed within the statutory speedy trial period, and the delay is not solely attributable to the People’s conduct.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the validity of a pre-arraignment declaration of readiness for trial under CPL 30.30. The Court held that such a declaration is valid if the defendant could have been arraigned and the trial commenced within the six-month statutory period, distinguishing People v. England where the People’s actions made timely arraignment impossible. The Court clarified that the responsibility for scheduling arraignments rests with the court, not the prosecution, and post-readiness delays caused by the court are not charged against the People. The indictments were improperly dismissed because the People had declared readiness within the statutory period.

    Facts

    In People v. Goss, a felony complaint was filed against Goss on July 19, 1993. An indictment was filed on January 14, 1994, and the People declared readiness, notifying Goss of a January 24, 1994 arraignment. Goss failed to appear, and was arraigned on February 7, 1994. In People v. Avery, Gaymon, and Cole, a felony complaint was filed on October 19, 1993, and an indictment was filed on April 14, 1994, with the People declaring readiness and setting arraignments for April 22, 1994. Gaymon was arraigned on April 25, 1994.

    Procedural History

    In Goss, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment based on CPL 30.30, and the Appellate Division affirmed. In Avery, Gaymon, and Cole, the trial court also granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss, which was affirmed by the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a pre-arraignment declaration of readiness for trial is valid under CPL 30.30 when it was possible for the defendant to be arraigned within the six-month statutory period.

    Holding

    Yes, because the critical factor is whether arraignment and trial could have occurred within the statutory period, and delays caused by the court in scheduling arraignments are not attributable to the People.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished its holding in People v. England, where the People’s delay in securing an indictment until the last day of the statutory period made a timely arraignment impossible. The Court emphasized that England created a narrow exception applicable only when the People’s actions make timely arraignment impossible. The Court reaffirmed the principle that delays between indictment and arraignment, by themselves, do not prevent the People from being ready for trial, quoting People v. Correa, 77 NY2d 930, 931, noting that “[d]elays between indictment and the arraignment * * * do not prevent the People from being ready for trial”.

    The Court emphasized that arraigning a defendant is exclusively a court function, citing CPL 210.10. The court has a “nondelegable duty on the trial court to arraign the defendant.” Therefore, any delay in arraignment is attributable to the court, not the prosecution. The Court stated, “Where, as in these cases, a felony complaint was previously filed in local criminal court, the Criminal Procedure Law imposes a nondelegable duty on the trial court to arraign the defendant. Neither local practice violative of CPL 210.10 (2) nor consent of the parties can divest the court of this responsibility.” Because the People declared readiness before the expiration of the six-month period and the delay in arraignment was attributable to the court, the dismissals were in error.

  • People v. Matthews, 88 N.Y.2d 1047 (1996): Preservation of Speedy Trial Claims

    People v. Matthews, 88 N.Y.2d 1047 (1996)

    A defendant must specifically identify legal or factual impediments to the People’s reliance on statutory exclusions under CPL 30.30 to preserve a challenge to a speedy trial claim for appellate review.

    Summary

    Matthews was indicted on August 20, 1991, but not arraigned until April 2, 1992, when the People declared readiness. He moved to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds, arguing the delay was chargeable to the People. The People argued a 35-day medical quarantine of Matthews was excludable under CPL 30.30 (4)(c) and (g). The Supreme Court denied the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Matthews failed to preserve his argument that the People needed to establish a causal relationship between his quarantine and their delay in declaring readiness. The Court emphasized the importance of providing the lower court with an opportunity to address and remedy any potential errors.

    Facts

    Matthews was indicted on August 20, 1991, for unauthorized use of a vehicle and criminal possession of stolen property.
    He was arraigned on April 2, 1992, at which time the People declared their readiness for trial.
    During the period between February 27, 1992, and April 2, 1992, Matthews was under medical quarantine.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment based on a violation of speedy trial rules.
    The Supreme Court denied the motion.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision, citing CPL 30.30 (4)(c) and (g).
    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant preserves a challenge to the People’s reliance on CPL 30.30 (4)(c) and (g) exclusions by merely arguing general causation principles, without specifically arguing that the exclusions are unavailable absent a causal link between the defendant’s condition and the People’s delayed readiness.

    Holding

    No, because once the People identify statutory exclusions, the defendant must specifically identify legal or factual impediments to the use of those exclusions to preserve the issue for appellate review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that to preserve a speedy trial claim for appellate review, a defendant must do more than simply allege a failure to declare readiness within the statutory period. According to the court, once the People identify the statutory exclusions they intend to rely on, the defendant must specifically identify any legal or factual impediments to the use of those exclusions. The Court stated that “[t]he purpose of adhering to strict rules of preservation in this context is to provide the court with an ‘opportunity to remedy the problem and thereby avert reversible error.’” The Court found that Matthews’ argument focused on general causation principles and did not specifically argue that the medical quarantine exclusions required a causal link between the quarantine and the People’s delay. Because he did not raise this specific argument before the motion court, he failed to preserve the issue for appellate review. The Court referenced People v. Luperon, stating that the defendant must alert the court to the claim that lack of causation was an impediment to the People’s reliance on CPL 30.30(4)(c) and (g).

  • People v. Cortes, 88 N.Y.2d 1049 (1996): Post-Readiness Delay and People’s Burden to Clarify Adjournments

    People v. Cortes, 88 N.Y.2d 1049 (1996)

    When the People declare readiness for trial but a post-readiness delay occurs, the People bear the burden of clarifying the reason for the adjournment on the record; failure to do so results in the delay being charged to the People for speedy trial purposes.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of an indictment against Cortes because the People failed to be ready for trial within the statutorily prescribed six-month period. The court included a 49-day post-readiness adjournment against the prosecution. The People did not clarify on the record the basis for this lengthy adjournment. Because the People failed to clarify, on the record, the basis for this adjournment, the period was properly charged to them. The Court held that the People’s failure to clarify the reason for the post-readiness adjournment on the record meant the delay was attributable to them, thus violating the defendant’s speedy trial rights.

    Facts

    The defendant, Cortes, was indicted. The People declared readiness for trial at some point. However, a 49-day adjournment occurred from August 7 to September 25, 1992. On August 7, 1992, the Supreme Court dismissed three counts of the indictment and suggested that the People might choose to re-present those counts, and adjourned the case to September 25, 1992. At the September 25 appearance, the prosecutor did not assert the People’s readiness for trial or ask the court for an explanation for the lengthy adjournment.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court dismissed the indictment against the defendant, Cortes, pursuant to CPL 30.30 because the People were not ready for trial within the statutory six-month period. The Appellate Division affirmed this dismissal. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a post-readiness adjournment should be charged to the People when they fail to clarify on the record the basis for the adjournment.

    Holding

    Yes, because the People bear the burden of clarifying the reason for a post-readiness adjournment on the record; failure to do so results in the delay being charged to them for speedy trial purposes.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior holdings in People v. Liotta, 79 N.Y.2d 841 (1992) and People v. Collins, 82 N.Y.2d 177 (1993), which established the principle that the People must clarify the basis for an adjournment on the record. Because the prosecutor did not assert readiness or seek clarification for the adjournment on September 25, the court found the delay was properly charged to the People. The People’s argument that a statement of readiness filed four days after the August 7 adjournment cut off their responsibility for the remaining adjournment period was deemed unpreserved because it was not raised below. The Court emphasized the importance of a clear record in determining speedy trial claims, stating that the People have a duty to clarify the reasons for delays, especially after declaring readiness. The Court noted that, “Because the People failed to clarify, on the record, the basis for this adjournment, the period was properly charged to them.” The court effectively reinforced the prosecution’s obligation to maintain a clear record regarding readiness and the reasons for any subsequent delays, lest those delays be attributed to them, potentially leading to dismissal of the case.