New York Law Review

Tag: speedy trial

  • People v. Blue, 2024 NY Slip Op 05175: Validity of Pro Se Waiver and Speedy Trial Issues

    2024 NY Slip Op 05175

    A criminal defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel is valid if the court’s inquiry ensures the defendant is aware of the dangers of self-representation, but it is not constitutionally mandated that the court inform the defendant of his/her maximum sentencing exposure. The time excluded for speedy trial purposes includes a reasonable period of delay when the defendant is joined for trial with a co-defendant.

    Summary

    Anthony Blue was convicted of burglary after representing himself at trial. He appealed, arguing his waiver of counsel was invalid because the trial court did not explicitly inform him of the maximum potential sentence. He also claimed his right to a speedy trial was violated. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary based on the record, even without a specific recitation of the potential sentence. It further held that the period of delay caused by his co-defendant’s motions was properly excluded from the speedy trial calculation, even though Blue had not yet been arraigned during this period.

    Facts

    Blue and co-defendant Puello were indicted on burglary charges. After failing to appear for arraignment, Blue was eventually apprehended and arraigned. Blue initially had counsel, but later requested to proceed pro se. The trial court conducted a colloquy to ensure Blue understood the risks. Blue filed multiple motions to dismiss the indictment based on speedy trial grounds, claiming the time between indictment and arraignment was chargeable to the prosecution. The trial court denied the motions, concluding that the delay caused by Puello’s motion practice was excludable under CPL 30.30(4)(d). Blue was found guilty and sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment. The Appellate Division affirmed, and Blue appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Procedural History

    Blue was indicted and later arraigned. He requested to proceed pro se and, after a colloquy, the request was granted. Blue filed multiple motions to dismiss based on speedy trial grounds, all of which were denied. Blue was convicted after a jury trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a criminal defendant can make a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel only if the trial judge specifically informs the defendant of the maximum sentencing exposure.
    2. Whether the delay between Blue’s indictment and arraignment was excludable from the speedy trial calculation under CPL 30.30 (4) (d).

    Holding

    1. No, because the court ensured Blue understood the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, even without a recitation of the maximum potential sentence, the waiver was valid.
    2. Yes, because Blue was joined for trial with his co-defendant at the time of indictment, the period of delay was excludable under CPL 30.30 (4) (d).

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the waiver of counsel, the court cited Faretta v. California and established precedent, explaining that a defendant may choose self-representation but must do so knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. While a “searching inquiry” is required, the court has declined to impose a rigid formula. The critical inquiry is whether the defendant was aware of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel. The court reviewed the whole record and found that Blue understood the charges, the possible penalties, and the disadvantages of self-representation. Therefore, Blue made a valid waiver. Regarding the speedy trial issue, the court addressed the interpretation of CPL 30.30 (4) (d). The Court found that the defendant and his co-defendant were joined for trial at the time of indictment. This interpretation is consistent with the purpose of joinder and does not undermine the policy in favor of joint proceedings.

    Practical Implications

    The case reinforces the flexible nature of the inquiry required for a valid waiver of counsel. Trial courts should engage in a thorough colloquy, examining the defendant’s understanding of the charges, possible defenses, and the disadvantages of self-representation. However, the court need not explicitly state the maximum potential sentence, so long as the record as a whole demonstrates the defendant’s awareness of the risks. This case clarifies that the exclusion under CPL 30.30 (4) (d) applies from the time of indictment when co-defendants are joined, even before arraignment, thus affecting how courts calculate speedy trial time in multi-defendant cases. The ruling limits the ability of a defendant to take advantage of delays caused by a co-defendant’s actions. This case is important for criminal defense attorneys because they must ensure that any waiver of counsel is fully informed, even if a specific sentence range is not recited by the court.

  • People v. Blue, 2024 NY Slip Op 05175: The Requirements for Valid Waiver of Right to Counsel and Statutory Speedy Trial Claims

    People v. Blue, 2024 NY Slip Op 05175 (2024)

    A valid waiver of the right to counsel requires a searching inquiry into the defendant’s understanding of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, but not a specific recitation of the maximum potential sentence; for speedy trial purposes, a defendant is “joined for trial” with a co-defendant upon indictment.

    Summary

    The defendant, Anthony Blue, challenged his conviction on multiple counts of second-degree burglary on two main grounds. First, he argued that his waiver of the right to counsel was invalid because the trial court failed to inform him of his maximum potential sentence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that while a searching inquiry is required, there is no rigid formula, and the record demonstrated Blue’s understanding of the risks. Second, Blue claimed that his indictment should have been dismissed on statutory speedy-trial grounds. The court found that the period between the indictment and his arraignment, when he was joined with a co-defendant, should be excluded from the speedy-trial calculation. Therefore, his speedy trial claim failed.

    Facts

    Blue and a co-defendant were indicted for multiple counts of second-degree burglary. Blue was released after the initial arrest but failed to appear for his arraignment, and was later apprehended in Florida. He initially had court-appointed counsel but requested to proceed pro se. The trial court conducted a colloquy, warning Blue of the dangers of self-representation. Blue filed motions to dismiss the indictment based on speedy trial grounds, arguing that the time between his indictment and arraignment should be counted against the prosecution. The trial court denied the motions, and after a trial, Blue was convicted.

    Procedural History

    Blue filed pre-trial motions, which were denied. Following the jury verdict, Blue was convicted. The trial court sentenced Blue to consecutive prison terms totaling 25 years with post-release supervision. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment, finding that the waiver of counsel was valid and the speedy trial claims were without merit. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Blue’s waiver of his right to counsel was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, despite the trial court not informing him of his maximum sentencing exposure in years.
    2. Whether the period between the indictment and arraignment should be excluded from the speedy-trial calculation where Blue was joined for trial with a co-defendant.

    Holding

    1. No, because a specific recitation of the maximum potential years of imprisonment is not constitutionally required to render a waiver valid.
    2. Yes, because under CPL 30.30(4)(d), Blue was “joined for trial” with his co-defendant at the time of indictment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reiterated that a valid waiver of the right to counsel requires a “searching inquiry” to ensure the defendant is aware of the dangers of proceeding pro se, but the inquiry is flexible and non-formulaic. The court considered the totality of the circumstances, including the prior proceedings in which Blue was informed that he faced substantial jail time. Thus, it was clear that Blue understood the implications. Regarding the speedy trial claim, the court found that under CPL 30.30(4)(d), a defendant is “joined for trial” with a co-defendant upon indictment, not arraignment. This interpretation furthers the policy of expediting the judicial process. The language of CPL 200.40 and the purposes of the exclusion support the Appellate Division’s conclusion.

    Practical Implications

    This case reinforces that trial courts should conduct a thorough inquiry, and, while not mandatory, it is advisable to ensure that defendants understand their potential sentencing exposure. The case clarifies that a defendant can be considered “joined for trial” with a co-defendant from the time of the indictment for speedy trial purposes. This means that when a co-defendant requests a motion schedule, the time is excluded for all defendants in the indictment, even those who have not yet been arraigned. This ruling streamlines multi-defendant cases by establishing that the clock starts from the date of indictment, not arraignment, and will affect how attorneys calculate speedy trial deadlines in such cases.

  • People v. Canady, People v. Brown, People v. Young, 31 N.Y.3d 403 (2018): Speedy Trial and the ‘Exceptional Circumstances’ Exception

    31 N.Y.3d 403 (2018)

    When the prosecution declares readiness for trial and later becomes unready, the time between declarations is chargeable against the prosecution under CPL 30.30 unless the unreadiness is due to an ‘exceptional fact or circumstance’ with due diligence by the prosecution.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the application of Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 30.30, the speedy trial statute. The court considered how to calculate the time chargeable to the prosecution when it initially declares readiness for trial but later indicates it is not ready. The court held that time is chargeable unless the prosecution’s unreadiness stems from an exceptional fact or circumstance, as defined in the statute, and the prosecution exercised due diligence. The case clarifies the burden of proof and the standard for determining when delays are attributable to the prosecution, and also reinforces the significance of prosecutorial readiness.

    Facts

    The cases involved defendants who moved to dismiss indictments based on violations of CPL 30.30. The prosecutions had initially declared readiness for trial but subsequently indicated they were not ready. The specific facts regarding the reasons for the prosecution’s change in readiness varied across the cases.

    Procedural History

    The cases originated in trial courts, with defendants filing motions to dismiss due to speedy trial violations. The trial courts reached different conclusions on whether to grant the motions. Some cases proceeded to the appellate level, with the Appellate Term reversing or affirming lower court decisions. The New York Court of Appeals consolidated the cases to resolve the legal questions regarding CPL 30.30 and the speedy trial calculations.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the time between the prosecution’s declaration of readiness for trial and a subsequent declaration of unreadiness is chargeable to the prosecution under CPL 30.30.

    2. If the time is chargeable, what standard should courts apply to determine whether the prosecution’s unreadiness is excused due to exceptional circumstances?

    Holding

    1. Yes, the time between the declaration of readiness and the subsequent declaration of unreadiness is chargeable to the prosecution.

    2. The prosecution’s unreadiness is excused if it is due to ‘some exceptional fact or circumstance,’ provided the prosecution exercised due diligence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court examined CPL 30.30 and its purpose: to ensure a speedy trial. The court emphasized that the prosecution must be ready for trial. The court referenced earlier cases establishing that a declaration of readiness must reflect present readiness and not merely future expectation. The court referenced CPL 30.30(3)(b), which provides an exception if the present unreadiness is due to an ‘exceptional fact or circumstance’.

    The majority held that, after a declaration of readiness, the burden shifts to the prosecution to demonstrate that the time should be excluded, because their present unreadiness is due to “some exceptional fact or circumstance” and that the prosecution exercised due diligence. The court acknowledged the legislative intent behind CPL 30.30 to reduce delays and ensure the prompt resolution of criminal cases. The court also emphasized the importance of maintaining the burden on the defendant to establish the initial speedy trial violation.

    Dissenting Judge Rivera argued that the majority’s interpretation would undermine the intent of CPL 30.30. The dissenting judge stated that the court should adopt the view that the People must demonstrate that “some exceptional fact or circumstance arose after their declaration of readiness so as to render them presently not ready for trial.”

    Practical Implications

    This ruling requires prosecutors to maintain a good faith readiness for trial. Prosecutors must be prepared to explain why they are not ready if they change their position. This case reinforces that prosecutors must act with diligence to secure evidence or prepare for trial. When evaluating a speedy trial claim, the court must determine the extent of any delay. The decision clarifies that the period between a statement of readiness and a subsequent statement of unreadiness must be charged against the prosecution unless there is a valid justification, such as the exceptional circumstances that were beyond the control of the prosecution.

    This case highlights that the prosecutors must be able to demonstrate that they exercised due diligence and that their unreadiness resulted from an exceptional fact or circumstance. This decision should influence how courts analyze similar cases. It clarifies the burden-shifting framework and emphasizes the importance of prosecutorial accountability in ensuring speedy trials.

  • People v. Gritzner, 35 N.Y.3d 64 (2020): Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Speedy Trial in DNA Testing Cases

    35 N.Y.3d 64 (2020)

    Ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on failure to challenge speedy trial violations will be unsuccessful where the record does not demonstrate the underlying speedy trial claims would have been meritorious.

    Summary

    In People v. Gritzner, the New York Court of Appeals addressed an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The defendant argued his attorney was ineffective for failing to challenge delays in the DNA testing process as a violation of his right to a speedy trial under CPL 30.30. The court held that counsel was not ineffective because the record did not support the defendant’s claim that the prosecution lacked due diligence in securing the DNA testing. The court emphasized that, without evidence of prosecutorial misconduct or procedural errors, the delays were likely excludable as exceptional circumstances.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with multiple counts of sexual assault. After an initial DNA profile from the sexual assault evidence kit excluded the defendant, additional testing was performed on fingernail screens. The People announced on June 24, 2009, and again on August 13, 2009, that the DNA testing was still pending. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment based on a violation of his right to a speedy trial under CPL 30.30, which was denied by the trial court, which excluded the DNA testing delays as an exceptional circumstance. The defendant then claimed on appeal that his counsel was ineffective for not arguing that certain periods of delay were chargeable to the prosecution, as the prosecution allegedly did not act with due diligence in securing the DNA testing.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment based on CPL 30.30 grounds, excluding the DNA testing periods as exceptional circumstances. The Appellate Division affirmed. The defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel due to his attorney’s failure to challenge the DNA testing delays. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to argue that certain delays in DNA testing should be charged to the prosecution under CPL 30.30.

    Holding

    1. No, because the record does not support a finding that the prosecution lacked due diligence in the DNA testing process, defense counsel’s failure to make this argument did not constitute ineffective assistance.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reiterated that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires a showing that the counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome would have been different. Here, the court found that there was no evidence in the record to support the defendant’s claim that the prosecution lacked due diligence or that the DNA testing procedures deviated from standard laboratory protocols. The court noted the defendant’s argument depended on assumptions outside the record. The court also pointed out that at the time of the defendant’s CPL 30.30 motion, precedent existed to exclude DNA testing delays from the speedy trial calculation as an exceptional circumstance. The court cited People v. Brunner and People v. Turner to establish the high bar for showing ineffective assistance. The court explained that the defendant’s claim was based on matters outside the record and thus, more appropriately the subject of a CPL 440.10 motion. The court emphasized that a single lapse by counsel does not automatically render assistance ineffective. The Court found that “there is nothing in the record to demonstrate that the People were not diligent in requesting DNA testing on the evidence or that the manner in which the DNA testing was conducted by OCME was inconsistent with standard laboratory protocols.”

    Practical Implications

    This case underscores the importance of a complete factual record when challenging delays in DNA testing under speedy trial grounds. Attorneys must be prepared to show a lack of prosecutorial diligence or deviation from standard protocols. Without such a showing, courts are likely to view the delays as excludable exceptional circumstances. Moreover, this case highlights that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel must be supported by evidence. The case also suggests that claims of ineffective assistance based on tactical decisions are unlikely to succeed. It reinforces that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel should be brought under CPL 440.10 if the record is insufficient to make the determination. Defense attorneys should carefully review all DNA testing procedures and timelines to ascertain if a valid speedy trial claim exists. This case indicates the courts will give deference to prosecutorial decisions absent strong evidence of malfeasance.

  • People v. Osgood, 27 N.Y.3d 108 (2016): Due Diligence Requirement for Speedy Trial Exceptions Related to DNA Testing

    27 N.Y.3d 108 (2016)

    To exclude delays related to obtaining evidence, like DNA results, from speedy trial calculations under CPL 30.30(4)(g), the prosecution must demonstrate that they acted with due diligence to acquire the evidence.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that the prosecution failed to exercise due diligence in obtaining a DNA sample from the defendant for comparison with DNA evidence found on a gun. The court found that the 161-day delay in obtaining and analyzing the DNA sample was not an excludable “exceptional circumstance” under CPL 30.30(4)(g), and the defendant’s speedy trial rights were violated. The court emphasized that the prosecution bears the burden of proving due diligence, and their inaction in pursuing readily available evidence, such as the DNA sample, was unjustified. This decision reinforces the requirement for prosecutors to proactively seek evidence to avoid speedy trial violations.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with weapons offenses on November 29, 2007. DNA was found on a gun related to the charges, per a February 11, 2008, OCME report. The report stated that further analysis could be done upon submission of a sample from the defendant. Almost nine months after indictment, in May 2009, the prosecution moved for an order to obtain a DNA sample from the defendant for comparison. The defendant consented to an oral swab on June 5, 2009. The DNA report was produced November 13, 2009. The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment under CPL 30.30, arguing speedy trial violation.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendant’s CPL 30.30 motion. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the 161-day delay between defendant’s consent to a DNA swab and production of the report was chargeable to the prosecution, as they had not exercised due diligence. The Appellate Division granted the CPL 30.30 motion and dismissed the indictment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the prosecution’s delay in obtaining and analyzing the defendant’s DNA sample was an excludable “exceptional circumstance” under CPL 30.30(4)(g).

    Holding

    1. No, because the prosecution did not exercise due diligence in obtaining the defendant’s DNA sample.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied CPL 30.30, which requires the prosecution to be ready for trial within six months for felony offenses. The court focused on CPL 30.30(4)(g), which allows for the exclusion of delay caused by “exceptional circumstances” in obtaining material evidence, but only if the prosecution exercised due diligence. The court stated, “To invoke the exclusion provided in CPL 30.30 (4) (g), however, the People must exercise due diligence in obtaining the evidence.” The court found that the prosecution’s delay in obtaining the DNA sample, particularly given the existing OCME report from February 2008, demonstrated a lack of diligence. The court emphasized that “the prosecution’s inability to proceed [must be] justified by the purposes of the investigation and credible, vigorous activity in pursuing it.” The court rejected the prosecution’s arguments that they were not aware of OCME’s findings and that they did not have an affirmative obligation to seek out the information, holding that CPL 30.30 is a People-ready rule and placing the burden on the prosecution to demonstrate diligence. The court noted that CPL 30.30 “was specifically intended ‘to address delays occasioned by prosecutorial inaction.’”

    Practical Implications

    This case underscores the importance of prosecutorial diligence in criminal cases, especially in cases involving scientific evidence. Prosecutors must proactively seek out and obtain all potentially relevant evidence in a timely manner. This decision has significant implications for how speedy trial calculations are made. Delay in seeking evidence that could have been readily obtained is likely to be counted against the prosecution under CPL 30.30. It may lead to more aggressive pre-trial discovery, earlier requests for DNA samples or other scientific analyses, and more diligent tracking of evidence and reports from laboratories. This case serves as a warning that failure to act promptly may result in dismissal of charges. Subsequent cases will likely apply this standard when evaluating the excludability of delays in obtaining various types of evidence.

  • People v. New York, 27 N.Y.3d 552 (2016): Speedy Trial Rights and Charging Delay During Pre-Readiness Adjournments

    27 N.Y.3d 552 (2016)

    When calculating time excludable from the speedy trial clock under CPL 30.30, a defendant’s ambiguous comment accommodating the court’s schedule is not a “clear expression” of consent to an adjournment, and the delay is chargeable to the prosecution if the adjournment was initially requested by the prosecution and is due to court congestion.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed how delays should be attributed for speedy trial purposes under CPL 30.30 when multiple adjournments occur. The case involved a defendant indicted on multiple charges, with several adjournments requested by the prosecution. The Court held that a defendant’s acquiescence to a date set by the court, due to court congestion, is not considered consent for purposes of excluding that time from speedy trial calculations. Consequently, the court found that the prosecution was responsible for the delay caused by court scheduling issues and granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment due to a violation of his speedy trial rights. The case clarifies that the People must bear the burden of delays attributable to court congestion when they have not declared readiness.

    Facts

    The defendant was indicted on identity theft and theft of services charges. The prosecution requested several adjournments, during which time defense counsel requested longer adjournments due to her other commitments. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment based on a violation of his speedy trial rights, but the Court of Appeals reversed. The court examined how to allocate the time when the prosecution requested adjournments, the defense sought additional time, and court congestion caused further delays. After the court set a date after defense counsel’s requested date, the defense responded, “That should be fine.”

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendant’s speedy trial motion. The Appellate Division modified the judgment, dismissing one count but otherwise affirming the conviction. The Court of Appeals granted the defendant leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s ambiguous response to the court’s scheduling constituted consent to the adjournment for purposes of CPL 30.30.

    2. Whether the prosecution should be charged with the delay resulting from court congestion when the prosecution had not filed a statement of readiness.

    Holding

    1. No, because an ambiguous response is not a clear expression of consent, and the delay is chargeable to the prosecution when the delay results from court congestion.

    2. Yes, because the prosecution did not file a statement of readiness and the delay was due to court congestion.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on the language of CPL 30.30 and prior case law (e.g., People v. Smith, 82 N.Y.2d 676 (1993)) to determine when delay is excludable. It found that the defendant’s statement “That should be fine” did not represent a “clear expression” of consent to the delay, especially when the court’s calendar was the reason for the additional delay, and the prosecution failed to file a statement of readiness. The court emphasized that the prosecution bears the burden of showing that time should be excluded. Court congestion does not prevent the People from announcing readiness in a written off-calendar statement and is therefore charged to the prosecution. The court found that the prosecution’s failure to file a statement of readiness, and that the additional delay was caused by court congestion, was chargeable to the prosecution. The prosecution exceeded the six-month limit.

    Practical Implications

    This case provides clear guidance on how courts should analyze speedy trial claims when adjournments occur, and the defense consents only to the initial adjournment. Prosecutors must be proactive in declaring readiness or securing clear consent from the defense to avoid having delays charged against them, especially when the court’s schedule is a factor. Defense attorneys should carefully consider their responses to proposed adjournment dates, as ambiguous comments may not be considered consent. The ruling underscores the importance of the prosecution’s ability to control the speedy trial clock by filing a statement of readiness, even when adjournments are needed. Courts must precisely track the reasons for delays and allocate responsibility accordingly. Failure to do so can result in the dismissal of the indictment.

  • People v. Green, 22 N.Y.3d 972 (2013): Speedy Trial Rights After Appellate Reversal

    People v. Green, 22 N.Y.3d 972 (2013)

    When a conviction is reversed on appeal and remanded for a new trial, the statutory speedy trial clock starts running from the date the order occasioning the retrial becomes final, and the mere passage of time during an adjournment is not automatically excludable from the speedy trial calculation.

    Summary

    Green was convicted of assault, but the conviction was reversed on appeal due to an improper jury charge. After the People’s application for leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was denied, the case was adjourned. Due to a clerical error, the case was not calendared, and the prosecution was not present. Over 90 days after the denial of leave to appeal, Green moved to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. The Criminal Court granted the motion, but the Appellate Term reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Term, holding that the time was not automatically excludable and the People failed to justify the delay.

    Facts

    Defendant Green was convicted of assault in the third degree in October 2006. The Appellate Term reversed the conviction in March 2010 and remanded the case for a new trial due to an improper jury charge. The People sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals. On May 10, 2010, the case was adjourned to June 21, 2010, while the People’s leave application was pending. The Court of Appeals denied leave on May 14, 2010. Due to a clerical error, Green’s case was not calendared for June 21, 2010, and no prosecutor was present. The District Attorney’s office discovered the error in July and scheduled a new date of August 23, 2010. The People had not declared themselves ready for trial before this point.

    Procedural History

    Green was convicted of assault in Criminal Court. The Appellate Term reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial. The People’s application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals was denied. Criminal Court granted Green’s motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. The Appellate Term reversed. The Court of Appeals granted Green leave to appeal and then reversed the Appellate Term, reinstating the Criminal Court’s dismissal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the period between May 10, 2010, and August 23, 2010, was automatically excludable from the speedy trial calculation under CPL 30.30(4)(a) as a reasonable period of delay resulting from an appeal, when the People did not provide any justification for the delay after their leave to appeal was denied.

    Holding

    No, because the mere lapse of time following the denial of leave to appeal does not automatically constitute a reasonable period of delay resulting from an appeal under CPL 30.30(4)(a), and the People provided no justification for any delay to be added to the 90-day speedy trial period.

    Court’s Reasoning

    CPL 30.30(1)(b) requires the People to be ready for trial within 90 days of the commencement of a criminal action involving a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment of more than three months. CPL 30.30(5)(a) states that when a conviction is reversed and remanded, the action commences on the date the order occasioning the retrial becomes final. The Court noted that CPL 30.30(4)(a) excludes a “reasonable period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, including but not limited to…appeals…and the period during which such matters are under consideration by the court.” The Court distinguished its holding from the Appellate Division case, People v. Vukel, which held that an adjournment pending leave to appeal was excludable. The Court reasoned that allowing the People to delay retrial for the duration of an adjournment, even after leave to appeal is denied, would be inconsistent with the intent of CPL 30.30, which is to discourage prosecutorial inaction. To the extent that Vukel holds otherwise, the Court stated that “it should not be followed.” The Court agreed with the Criminal Court that the People had not justified any reasonable period of delay under CPL 30.30(4)(a) to be added to the 90-day period under CPL 30.30(1)(b).

  • People v. Sibblies, 22 N.Y.3d 1174 (2014): Limits on Excluding Time After Off-Calendar Readiness Declaration

    People v. Sibblies, 22 N.Y.3d 1174 (2014)

    When the prosecution declares readiness for trial off-calendar but then declares unreadiness at the next court appearance, the intervening time is not excluded from the speedy trial period unless the unreadiness stems from exceptional circumstances arising after the initial declaration.

    Summary

    Defendant was arrested and charged with felony and misdemeanor offenses. After the felony charge was dismissed and replaced with a misdemeanor information, the People filed an off-calendar certificate of readiness. At the next court appearance, the People stated they were not ready due to awaiting medical records. The Court of Appeals held that the time between the off-calendar declaration of readiness and the subsequent declaration of unreadiness is chargeable to the People unless their unreadiness is caused by exceptional circumstances that arose after the initial declaration of readiness. The court reversed the Appellate Division order and dismissed the misdemeanor information.

    Facts

    Marsha Sibblies was arrested on November 27, 2006, and charged with felony and misdemeanor offenses stemming from an altercation during a traffic stop.

    On February 8, 2007, the People dismissed the felony charge and replaced it with a misdemeanor information, which started the 90-day speedy trial period.

    On February 22, 2007, the People filed an off-calendar certificate of readiness and a supporting deposition.

    On March 2, 2007, the People requested the injured officer’s medical records.

    On March 28, 2007, the People stated they were not ready because they were awaiting the officer’s medical records.

    The People filed a second certificate of readiness on May 23, 2007, 104 days after the speedy trial period began.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the misdemeanor information, excluding the time between the People’s declaration of readiness and the March 28 appearance from the 104-day period.

    The defendant was convicted of obstructing governmental administration and resisting arrest, but acquitted of assault.

    The Appellate Division affirmed, holding the People were ready on February 22, 2007, because they could have made a prima facie case without the medical records.

    The Court of Appeals granted the defendant leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the period between the People’s off-calendar declaration of readiness and their subsequent statement of unreadiness at the next court appearance should be excluded from the speedy trial period under CPL 30.30 when the unreadiness is not due to exceptional circumstances arising after the initial declaration.

    Holding

    No, because such a period of prosecutorial readiness may not be excluded from the speedy trial period unless the People’s unreadiness is occasioned by an exceptional fact or circumstance that arose after the declaration of readiness.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that CPL 30.30 obligates the People to prepare promptly for trial. To be ready, the People must declare readiness and be in fact ready to proceed. An off-calendar certificate of readiness allows the People to declare readiness even if the statutory period expires before the next court date. However, readiness requires more than simply “mouthing” the words. The inquiry is whether the People have done all that is required of them to bring the case to a point where it may be tried.

    The Court emphasized that if the People are not ready at the court appearance, the defendant cannot ask the court to set the matter for trial, rendering the readiness ineffective and potentially harmful to the defendant by delaying the running of the statutory period. CPL 30.30 demands prosecutorial readiness to reduce delays in criminal prosecutions.

    The Court held that if challenged, the People must demonstrate that some exceptional fact or circumstance arose after their declaration of readiness so as to render them presently not ready for trial. The requirement of an exceptional fact or circumstance should be the same as that contained in CPL 30.30 (3) (b), which preserves the readiness period when “some exceptional fact or circumstance,’ [including, but not limited to, the sudden unavailability of evidence material to the People’s case,] occurring after the initial readiness response, makes it impossible for the People to proceed” (People v. Anderson, 66 NY2d at 534, quoting CPL 30.30 [3] [b]). If the People cannot demonstrate an exceptional fact or circumstance, then the time between the filing and the following appearance cannot be excluded.

    In this case, the People’s unreadiness was not due to the type of “exceptional fact or circumstance” contemplated by CPL 30.30 (3) (b). It was not occasioned by, for example, the sudden unavailability of a material witness or material evidence, merely the People’s desire to strengthen their case. The 34-day period from the People’s off-calendar declaration of readiness to their in-court statement of unreadiness is chargeable to the People, thus exceeding the 90-day statutory period.

    The Court noted that allowing declarations of readiness off-calendar and subsequent declarations of unreadiness at the next appearance without scrutiny creates the possibility that this scenario could be reenacted ad seriatim, which would undermine the purpose of CPL 30.30 to expedite trials. As Chief Judge Lippman stated, “CPL 30.30 is not a mechanism for filibustering trials.”

  • People v. Alexander, 17 N.Y.3d 204 (2011): Enforceability of Plea Agreements Conditioned on Withdrawing Motions

    People v. Alexander, 17 N.Y.3d 204 (2011)

    A guilty plea is not rendered involuntary merely because a trial judge states that acceptance of the plea is conditional on the defendant withdrawing pending motions, absent prosecutorial overreach or manipulation to preclude judicial review of a constitutional speedy trial claim.

    Summary

    Defendant Alexander appealed his conviction, arguing that his guilty plea was unlawfully conditioned on withdrawing a constitutional speedy trial claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial judge’s statement that the plea was accepted on the condition that defendant withdraw all pending motions did not render the plea involuntary. The Court distinguished this case from prior holdings (People v. White, People v. Blakley, People v. Sutton) that addressed prosecutorial misconduct during plea bargaining, emphasizing that here there was no evidence of prosecutorial manipulation to avoid judicial review of the speedy trial claim. The court found the plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

    Facts

    Defendant was indicted for drug offenses in December 2006. While awaiting trial, he filed numerous pro se motions, including a constitutional speedy trial motion filed on December 29, 2007. On January 11, 2008, the scheduled trial date, the trial judge learned that the Appellate Division had granted defendant’s habeas corpus petition regarding the agency defense, transferring the matter for her decision. The prosecutor offered a plea deal. The trial judge stated that she would accept the plea on the condition that the defendant withdraw all outstanding motions, including the speedy trial motion, and waive his right to appeal. Defendant initially rejected the plea but later accepted it, pleading guilty to criminal sale of a controlled substance in the fifth degree. Defendant then sought to withdraw his plea, arguing it was coerced by the condition that he withdraw his speedy trial claim.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the motion to withdraw the guilty plea after a hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment, finding that the guilty plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and that this case did not fall within the ambit of People v. Blakley and People v. Sutton. The Appellate Division distinguished the case from Blakley and Sutton because here the speedy trial motion was still pending, whereas in those cases the motion had already been denied. Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a guilty plea is rendered involuntary when the trial judge states that acceptance of the plea is conditional on the defendant withdrawing all pending motions, including a constitutional speedy trial motion.

    Holding

    No, because the trial judge’s statement, considered in context, does not constitute prosecutorial overreach or manipulation aimed at precluding judicial review of a constitutional speedy trial claim as was the concern in prior holdings like People v. White, People v. Blakley, and People v. Sutton.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court distinguished this case from People v. White, People v. Blakley, and People v. Sutton, emphasizing that those cases dealt with prosecutorial attempts to manipulate plea bargaining to preclude judicial consideration of constitutional speedy trial claims. In those cases, the prosecutor recommended a plea contingent on the defendant giving up the right to have a speedy trial motion decided (White) or to have an adverse determination reviewed on appeal (Blakley and Sutton). Here, there were no such conditions attached to the plea offer by the prosecutor. The Court noted the trial judge’s intent was merely to explain that the guilty plea would render the pending motions moot, not to coerce the defendant into relinquishing a valid claim. The Court emphasized its long-standing avoidance of a “uniform mandatory catechism of pleading defendants” in favor of “broad discretions controlled by flexible standards” (quoting People v. Nixon, 21 N.Y.2d 338, 353-354 [1967]). Because there was no prosecutorial misconduct, and the defendant understood the terms of the plea agreement, the Court held that the plea was valid. As the court concluded, “There can be little doubt that the [plea] bargain was reasonable, that defendant knew and understood the terms of it and that he willingly accepted them” (quoting Seaberg, 74 NY2d at 12).

  • People v. Feliciano, 17 N.Y.3d 16 (2011): Duty to Promptly Execute a Violation of Probation Warrant

    People v. Feliciano, 17 N.Y.3d 16 (2011)

    A court’s failure to promptly execute a violation of probation (VOP) warrant for a defendant incarcerated out-of-state does not automatically divest the court of jurisdiction, especially when extradition is complex and the delay is partially attributable to the defendant’s actions.

    Summary

    Luis Feliciano pleaded guilty to a felony drug charge and received a split sentence of jail time and probation. He violated his probation by fleeing to Puerto Rico, prompting the court to issue a VOP warrant. Years later, while incarcerated in Pennsylvania for a separate crime, Feliciano requested resolution of the VOP. The New York court delayed the VOP hearing until Feliciano’s release from Pennsylvania due to extradition difficulties. After his release, Feliciano was resentenced to a prison term. The New York Court of Appeals held that the delay did not divest the court of jurisdiction because of the complexities of interstate extradition and the defendant’s initial flight, distinguishing the case from situations where a defendant is readily available within the state.

    Facts

    In 1992, Feliciano was sentenced to jail and probation for a drug felony.

    He violated probation by fleeing to Puerto Rico without permission.

    A VOP complaint was filed, and a warrant was issued for his arrest.

    In 2000, he was arrested in Pennsylvania for homicide-related crimes.

    In 2002, he requested resolution of the outstanding VOP from New York.

    The District Attorney noted the difficulties of extraditing him from Pennsylvania.

    The court postponed the VOP hearing until his release from Pennsylvania.

    In 2007, after his release from Pennsylvania, the VOP warrant was executed, and he was resentenced.

    Procedural History

    The County Court initially imposed a split sentence for the drug charge.

    After Feliciano violated his probation, the County Court declared him delinquent and issued an arrest warrant.

    After serving time in Pennsylvania, Feliciano was returned to Greene County, and the County Court revoked his probation and resentenced him.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the resentencing.

    Feliciano filed two CPL 440.20 motions, claiming jurisdictional defect and ineffective assistance of counsel, both of which were denied.

    His application for a writ of error coram nobis was denied by the Appellate Division, but leave to appeal was granted by the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the five-year delay in adjudicating the VOP complaint, due to the defendant’s incarceration in another state and the difficulties of extradition, violated his statutory or constitutional rights and divested the County Court of jurisdiction to revoke his probation.

    Holding

    No, because the delay was not unreasonable given the complexities of interstate extradition, the defendant’s initial flight from New York, and the lack of a clear legal obligation for New York to prioritize his return for the VOP hearing while he was serving a sentence in Pennsylvania.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from People v. Horvath, where the probationer was incarcerated within New York and readily available. The court emphasized that CPL 410.30 requires the court to “promptly take reasonable and appropriate action,” but what constitutes “reasonable and appropriate action” depends on the circumstances.

    The court cited Carchman v. Nash and Moody v. Daggett, highlighting that the Supreme Court has drawn distinctions between detainers based on criminal charges and those based on probation violations, noting the reduced urgency and constitutional dimension of the latter.

    The court also distinguished this case from People v. Winfrey, where the People made no effort whatsoever to secure the defendant’s return from out-of-state. Here, the District Attorney investigated the possibility of extradition and determined it was impractical.

    The court stated, “The arguments that defendant asserts trial counsel should have advanced at the VOP hearing are not so strong that ‘no reasonable defense lawyer could have found [them] … to be not worth raising.’ They are, in fact, novel and call for an extension of or change in — not an application of — existing law.”

    Because the arguments were not clearly dispositive, appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise them.