New York Law Review

Tag: speeding

  • People v. Asaro, 21 N.Y.3d 677 (2013): Establishing Recklessness Through Speeding and Prior Warnings

    People v. Asaro, 21 N.Y.3d 677 (2013)

    To prove recklessness in vehicular manslaughter or assault cases involving speeding, the prosecution must demonstrate an “additional affirmative act” beyond simply exceeding the speed limit, coupled with proof that the defendant was aware of and consciously disregarded a substantial risk.

    Summary

    Patrick Asaro was convicted of manslaughter and assault after a high-speed car crash that killed one person and injured several others. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that there was sufficient evidence to prove Asaro acted recklessly. The evidence showed that Asaro, after drinking and possibly smoking marijuana, stopped his car, revved the engine, accelerated to speeds over 90 mph in a 55 mph zone, crossed a double yellow line, and crashed head-on into another vehicle. Crucially, he had also been warned about speeding on that road earlier that evening and immediately before the crash.

    Facts

    Several hours before the accident, Asaro attended a party where he consumed vodka and beer. He showed off modifications to his car designed to increase its speed and noise. He drove to pick up two individuals from a train station, and on the way back to the party, he stopped in the middle of the road for no apparent reason. Asaro revved the engine and rapidly accelerated to a high speed. A passenger warned him to slow down as they approached a sharp turn. Asaro crossed the double yellow line and collided head-on with another vehicle, killing the driver and injuring the passenger. Witnesses testified to Asaro’s high speed and that he appeared intoxicated. A blood test revealed the presence of marijuana, although a later test was negative. At the scene, Asaro said, “I’m sorry, I only had a few.”

    Procedural History

    Asaro was indicted on multiple charges, including manslaughter, assault, reckless endangerment, and reckless driving. At trial, he moved to dismiss the manslaughter and assault charges, arguing insufficient evidence of recklessness. The trial court denied the motion, and the jury convicted him on most charges. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to establish that Asaro acted with the mental state of recklessness to support convictions for second-degree manslaughter and second-degree assault.
    2. Whether the trial court erred by giving an adverse inference charge regarding lost Rosario material (the accident reconstruction expert’s handwritten notes) instead of striking the expert’s testimony about the car’s speed.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because there was sufficient evidence that Asaro was aware of and consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk by driving at an extremely high speed after being warned about the danger of the road.
    2. No, because the defendant requested to strike all of the expert’s testimony, not specifically the testimony relating to speed, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying that broad request.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that a finding of recklessness requires more than just speeding; there must be an “additional affirmative act.” Here, the court pointed to Asaro’s stopping the car, revving the engine, and rapidly accelerating as such acts. Furthermore, the court highlighted the testimony that Asaro had been warned twice about speeding on that particular road, first earlier in the evening and again immediately before the crash. This established that Asaro was aware of the risk and consciously disregarded it. The court distinguished recklessness from criminal negligence, noting that recklessness requires awareness of the risk, while criminal negligence involves a negligent failure to perceive the risk. The court quoted People v. Cabrera, 10 NY3d 370, 377 (2008), stating the evidence demonstrated conduct exhibiting “the kind of seriously blameworthy carelessness whose seriousness would he apparent to anyone who shares the community’s general sense of right and wrong.” The court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to issue an adverse inference charge rather than striking the accident reconstruction expert’s testimony, as the defendant’s request to strike was overly broad. The court emphasized that the defendant didn’t specifically target the speed-related testimony.

  • People v. Knight, 72 N.Y.2d 481 (1988): Admissibility of Moving Radar Evidence Without Expert Testimony

    People v. Knight, 72 N.Y.2d 481 (1988)

    Evidence obtained from moving radar devices is admissible in court without requiring expert testimony to explain the underlying scientific principles, provided the accuracy of the device is reasonably proven.

    Summary

    Knight was convicted of speeding based on evidence from a moving radar device. He challenged the admissibility of this evidence, arguing that expert testimony was necessary to establish the reliability of moving radar. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that moving radar evidence is admissible without expert testimony, similar to stationary radar. However, the prosecution bears a greater burden to demonstrate the accuracy of the moving radar by showing proper calibration, qualified operation, independent verification of the patrol vehicle’s speed, and minimal risk of interference or misidentification. The court found sufficient evidence to support the conviction, including the officer’s visual estimation of Knight’s speed.

    Facts

    Chief Hall, operating a moving radar device in his patrol car, visually estimated Knight’s speed at 70 mph in a 55 mph zone. Hall then activated the radar, which recorded Knight’s speed at 71 mph. The radar unit had been laboratory tested and Chief Hall tested the unit before and after his shift using internal and external calibration methods.

    Procedural History

    The Randolph Town Court convicted Knight of speeding. The County Court affirmed the conviction. Leave to appeal was granted by a Judge of the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether moving radar evidence is admissible at trial without expert testimony explaining its underlying principles.

    2. Whether the evidence presented was legally sufficient to sustain Knight’s speeding conviction.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the underlying scientific principles of moving and stationary radar are the same, making expert testimony unnecessary, provided that reasonable proof of its accuracy is presented.

    2. Yes, because the evidence presented, including the radar reading, the officer’s verification of the patrol car’s speed, and the officer’s independent visual estimation, sufficiently established Knight’s guilt.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior decision in People v. Magri, which established that expert testimony is not required to explain the scientific principles of stationary radar. The court reasoned that both moving and stationary radar operate on the same Doppler Principle. While acknowledging a greater potential for error with moving radar, the court stated that this only increases the prosecution’s burden to demonstrate accuracy.

    The court emphasized the following factors to establish the reliability of moving radar evidence: proper calibration of the radar unit, qualified operation by a trained officer, independent verification of the patrol vehicle’s speed (e.g., by comparing radar speed to speedometer speed), and use of the radar in an area with minimal risk of misidentification or distortion.

    The court found that the evidence in this case was sufficient. The court noted that “evidence of speeding obtained by means of moving radar generally will be admissible and ‘may be sufficient in [itself] if there be reasonable proof of [its] accuracy’”. The Court noted, also, that Chief Hall independently verified his speed and road conditions were unlikely to cause distortion. Even without the radar evidence, Chief Hall’s visual estimation of Knight’s speed independently supported the conviction. The court stated, “even if the radar evidence standing alone were deemed insufficient to support the conviction, there is additional evidence here that sufficiently corroborates the accuracy of the radar reading so as to establish defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”

  • People v. Shapiro, 3 N.Y.2d 203 (1968): Defining ‘Reasonable and Prudent’ Speed Under the Vehicle and Traffic Law

    People v. Shapiro, 3 N.Y.2d 203 (1968)

    A conviction under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180(a) for driving at an imprudent speed requires evidence that the defendant’s speed, not merely poor judgment, made it difficult to control the vehicle and avoid hazards.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of violating Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180(a) after his car skidded on a snowy night and collided with a police car stopped at a red light, causing no damage or injuries. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s speed was unsafe or imprudent. The court emphasized that § 1180(a) targets excessive speed, not simply any act of careless driving or poor judgment, such as misjudging when to apply the brakes.

    Facts

    On a snowy night, the defendant’s car collided with the rear of a police car that was stopped at a red traffic light. The defendant was driving approximately 20 to 25 miles per hour before the incident. When the defendant applied his brakes to stop for the light, his car skidded on the snow-covered road. Despite pumping the brakes, the skidding continued until the defendant’s vehicle made contact with the police car. Neither vehicle sustained any damage, and no one was injured.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of violating Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180(a) in the initial trial court. The defendant appealed the conviction, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he was driving at an unsafe speed. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and reversed the judgment of conviction, ordering the information dismissed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180(a) by driving at a speed greater than was reasonable and prudent under the existing conditions.

    Holding

    No, because the evidence did not sufficiently demonstrate that the defendant’s speed, as opposed to poor judgment, made it difficult for him to control the car and avoid the collision. The lack of damage or injury suggested poor judgment in applying the brakes rather than excessive speed itself.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180(a) specifically targets excessive speed, not all instances of careless driving. The court found that the evidence presented did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was driving at an unsafe speed, which made it impossible or difficult for him to control his car. The fact that the impact was slight and caused no damage or injuries suggested that the accident resulted from poor judgment as to when the defendant should have applied the brakes, rather than from excessive speed. The court essentially distinguished between speed as a cause of loss of control versus other factors (like road conditions and braking technique) contributing to the incident. The court emphasized that the statute isn’t intended to penalize every instance of careless driving, but only those where excessive speed is the primary factor. There were no dissenting or concurring opinions.